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West Europe Report

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POLITICAL DENMARK

ELLEMANN-JENSEN ON ROLE IN UN, EEC, NATO, WORLD

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE SONDAG in Danish 12 Oct 86 pp 18-19

[Article by Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen: "A Little Land--And Yet"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE SONDAG introduction]

[Text] Danish foreign policy took up only a page and a half of Prime Minister Poul Schluter's 20-page opening address to Folketing on Tuesday. Against this background BERLINGSKE SONDAG asked Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen to write a "foreign policy opening address" as an introduction to the debate on Danish security policy and other matters in the new Folketing session.

"The king is to act on behalf of the nation in international affairs." (Paragraph 19 of the Danish Constitution)

In its pursuit of foreign policy the government must present Denmark as it is and should be: a democratic and humane western welfare state.

Naturally we will try at all times to safeguard national Danish interests to the best of our ability. But this must always occur on the basis of the realization that no country can be self-sufficient. Therefore at the same time as we are looking after Danish interests we must make a constructive effort for the benefit of the international community. And we must show solidarity with the partners we have chosen--and with whom we have natural ties.

Few countries are so dependent on the rest of the world as Denmark. This gives Danish foreign policy a very special significance. It is to a large extent our relations with the rest of the world that are decisive when it comes to our ability to fulfill the mutual desires and goals we set for ourselves.

In view of the enormous importance of "international affairs" for the daily lives of individual Danes, it is surprising that the foreign policy section is traditionally so brief in the report on the general state of the nation with which the prime minister introduces sessions of Folketing.

This is probably for the simple reason that there has traditionally been broad political agreement on the main features of foreign policy. And that is also best in view of the importance foreign policy really has for domestic policy opportunities.

But this broad agreement has been seriously shaken in the 4 years that have gone by since the four-party government took office. Not because this government has tried to change the foreign policy line. It has not. We have loyally carried on with the policy that had broad support up to September 1982. It is because the Social Democratic Party has chosen in its opposition role to question essential features in the policy that the party was prepared to take responsibility for itself when it was in power!

This has given rise to a new situation in which there is uncertainty about Denmark's foreign policy. An uncertainty that we did not have before. And one which--if it goes too far--can cost Denmark dearly.

It is the duty of every government to work for broad cooperation on foreign policy. But not at any price! The price of broad political agreement on Denmark's foreign policy must definitely not be Denmark's credibility and esteem in the area of international affairs.

Actually we have an opportunity to influence international conditions to a much greater extent than our economic importance and population size would suggest. That is true as long as we inspire trust and respect--especially as far as our cooperative partners are concerned. But if we squander this trust and respect we will at the same time reduce our opportunity to exert some influence.

Therefore one goal of the government's efforts to implement foreign policy is to preserve the trust and respect that have insured Denmark a receptive hearing in the area of international affairs in the past. And that is by no means an impossible goal--if we can make people understand this connection.

Denmark's membership in the United Nations and our policy in the international organization are central--and positive--elements in this context. There is often a wide gap between the hopes we have in the United Nations and the organization's actual ability. But although one can be critical of the United Nations it is a fact that if the international organization did not exist we would have to set it up immediately.

The United Nations is in the midst of a difficult readjustment process and Denmark actively and constructively supports these reform efforts. We do so through our effort in all the UN bodies--the Security Council, the General Assembly and the many special organizations.

At the end of the year Denmark will be leaving the Security Council after serving on it for 2 years. Fortunately there has been broad support in Folketing for the government's view of how Denmark should conduct itself in this important body. We have therefore been able to work on the basis of important to concern ourselves with individual conditions. Therefore at next month's follow-up meeting in Vienna I will propose on behalf of Denmark that a conference be set up on the human dimensions of the CSCE process. This will cover both the observance of human rights and the establishment of personal contacts between East and West. And Denmark will be glad to host such a conference.

In a similar vein we have announced a UN proposal for steps that could ease the existence of the many millions of refugees around the world. Here the international community must act on the principles of solidarity and sharing the burden. With this in mind we are proposing the establishment of regional asylum centers under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that can assemble refugees, distribute them according to national refugee quotas based on a UN solution--and in general work for a global solution to a problem that everyone has an obligation to help out with. Only in this way can we give the truly persecuted refugees the assistance they deserve.

The importance I have assigned to Denmark's reputation--and the concern I have expressed--are closely connected. We must not forget the many possibilities we have for strengthening the positive aspects of Denmark's image. It is the positive aspects H. C. Andersen expressed in these words in the patriotic song:

"A little land--and yet..."

The words "and yet" imply that we do not need to bow our heads like serfs appearing before the master of the estate. We have great assets in our ability, in our history, in our culture that give us an opportunity to be heard, to increase our influence.

This is what makes it possible for us to present proposals and to attempt to influence international developments in a positive direction. But it means that we must pursue a logical and coherent policy that is supported by our ideals and acknowledged principles of law.

The government will work to this end in its pursuit of foreign policy. It will do so in accordance with the injunctions of the constitution and with full respect for the parliamentary system we all acclaim.

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CSO: 3613/11

POLL ON PARTY VOTING PREFERENCE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 Oct 86 p 7

[Text] Political Index

Question: Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow?

Survey conducted in the period 20 September-2 October 1986.

Party Preference	10 Jan 1984	Apr 1986	May 1986	Jun 1986	Aug 1986	Sep 1986
Social Democrats	31.6%	31.1%	31.0%	31.1%	30.7%	29.5%
Radical Liberals	5.5	5.5	3.8	5.1	4.1	5.0
Conservatives	23.4	24.3	24.6	23.4	25.8	24.7
Single-Tax Party	1.5	--	--	--	--	--
Socialist People's Party	11.5	15.0	15.4	14.7	14.5	16.3
Green Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
Humanist Party	--	--	--	--	--	--
International Socialist Workers	0.1	--	--	--	--	--
Communists	0.7	--	--	--	--	--
Marxist-Leninist Party	0.0	--	--	--	--	--
Center-Democrats	4.6	3.5	3.1	4.0	3.6	3.1
Christian People's Party	2.7	--	2.6	2.9	2.2	2.4
Liberals	12.1	11.2	11.6	12.4	11.7	12.5
Left-Socialist Party	2.7	--	2.1	--	--	--
Progressives	3.6	3.7	3.0	2.7	2.8	3.6
Other parties*	--	5.7	2.8	3.7	4.6	2.9
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Parties with less than 2 percent of the votes

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the basic viewpoint that the Security Council is a negotiating body and not a debate forum.

We have seen it as Denmark's task to bring about as much agreement as possible among members of the Security Council. That is more important than "distinguishing" ourselves with initiatives that are incapable of implementation from the outset. This position and Denmark's contributions have also won general recognition and respect in very broad international circles.

In the regional conflicts around the world--and unfortunately there are many of them--Denmark, alone or in cooperation with the other Nordic or EC countries, has called for and supported initiatives that could promote dialogue and a peaceful settlement of disputes.

This is also true of the situation in southern Africa. The apartheid regime in South Africa occupies a special position, however. Apartheid and racial discrimination are in themselves such a shocking suppression of human rights that the situation should lead to a reaction by the international community. And in our opinion the United Nations should have approved binding sanctions against South Africa a long time ago in order to hasten a peaceful transition to majority rule. This has not yet happened. And while we are waiting, Denmark and a number of other countries have enacted sweeping voluntary sanctions against South Africa.

Denmark's efforts in the United Nations have clearly increased respect for Denmark around the world. The same thing is true of the extent and quality of Danish aid to developing countries. And it is obvious that the results of the Danish government's economic policy have inspired respect, especially among our cooperative partners and allies.

Thus there are a number of "pluses" when it comes to the respect that is a prerequisite for influence. But there are also a few blemishes that detract from this.

I am thinking here of the questions our partners in EC and NATO sometimes raise--and not without reason--concerning Denmark's real involvement in the two cooperative organizations.

In connection with the discussion of the "EC package" last winter we had a healthy--although quite heated--political debate about what EC membership requires of Denmark. When a Folketing majority was not prepared to immediately approve Denmark's full participation in the future expansion of European cooperation, the government had no choice but to ask the people what they thought.

Fortunately a clear majority of the voters confirmed that they shared the government's point of view. Therefore Denmark was able to be the first EC country to ratify the EC package. And the entire course of events served as a useful--and impressive--demonstration for our EC partners that Danes take their EC membership seriously.

It has also been a positive element in the domestic policy debate to see how the clear result of the referendum has helped the Social Democrats to clarify their stand on EC after 3 years of exhausting and paralyzing internal dissension.

Our partners now expect us to make a positive contribution toward achieving the mutual goal of developing the community in the years ahead--primarily by implementing a large Common Market that will insure European production and employment a stronger position in competition with other countries, especially the United States and Japan.

The popular referendum on the "EC package" was called because a majority of Folketing members overstepped a line drawn by the government: we could not--and will not--allow doubts to be created concerning Denmark's future relationship to EC.

There is a similar limit when it comes to our relationship to NATO. The government cannot--and will not--tolerate the creation of doubts concerning Denmark's future NATO membership! A Folketing majority has come close to overstepping this line. But I do not think it will do so.

It is now known that the government is serious about setting limits on what is permissible when it comes to our relationship to our cooperative partners and allies. The line is drawn precisely where Denmark's credibility could be jeopardized. Where questions are raised about our solidarity. Where the impression is given that Denmark is a country that is interested only in receiving, not in giving. In this respect it must reassure our alliance partners to know that a very large majority of the Danish people support NATO membership. And that imposes a special obligation on the government to insure that this membership is not threatened by our own actions.

Our NATO partners are democracies. They know the parliamentary ground rules. And they understand that there are differences of opinion among democracies. It is actually a hallmark of democracy that there is room for more than one opinion. But disagreements in an alliance must be expressed in confidential and objective talks--not through public disavowals and backbiting.

Backbiting and the disloyal behavior we have clearly displayed in NATO on certain issues have cost us dearly in terms of lost opportunities for exerting influence. And they have seriously tested our credibility as loyal partners.

In the coming year the government will initiate two new foreign policy moves that are based on Denmark's humanistic tradition.

Considerable progress has been made in the European Security and Cooperation process (CSCE) based on the Helsinki accords. The Stockholm conference concentrated on the so-called measures to create confidence and security in the military area. We in Denmark feel that the various elements in this process should be given equal prominence. Of course it is important to get results in the military area--and the work here should continue. But it is just as

Despite all efforts to get on the track towards a balance in the industrial sphere, there is still not a glimmer of hope to be seen. In talks with the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and with Hungarian economic circles, the president of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Wolff von Amerongen, attempted to open new possibilities for an intensification and a balancing of German-Hungarian trade. Expansion of cooperation between mid-sized German companies and Hungarian businesses may be favored by the economic reforms currently under way.

The German economy is already leading, with 330 cooperative treaties and 19 mixed German-Hungarian companies. The engagement of German firms in the economy is of great significance for Hungary because it has a Western debt of $12 billion, and a prompt reduction of this interest burden depends considerably on the expansion of Western contacts. The soundness and credit standing of Hungary is not in doubt, despite the high per capita debt. In any case, Western bank consortiums always make Hungary the necessary loans, or they approve payment extensions.

Last year almost 900,000 German vacationers contributed to improving the Hungarian balance of payments with their Deutsche mark expenditures. Foreign Minister Genscher visited some favorite holiday spots of the German vacationers on Lake Balaton, and so could pass judgement on what Hungary has to offer for tourist travel. On this route, Genscher traveled at least a small portion of the path that FRG President von Weizsaecker will take during his official Hungarian visit, which is planned for October. Genscher is also arranging final political details for the first official visit of a West German head of state in Hungary. The overdue approval of Budapest for the opening of a Goethe Institute in Hungary would be a praiseworthy contribution to development of German-Hungarian relations.

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GENSCHER VISITS HUNGARY, REVIEWS POLITICAL, TRADE RELATIONS

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 17 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Gustav Chalupa: "Bonn and the Economic Problems of Hungary--The Talks with Genscher--Upcoming Visit by von Weizsaecker"]

[Text] Officials in Budapest describe German-Hungarian relations as cordial and friendly, with the best prospects for further development. West German Foreign Minister Genscher's visit is confirmation of that here. Genscher attended a benefit gala concert for the SOS children's home in Budapest and made a private side trip as a guest of the Hungarian foreign minister to Lake Balaton. He used the opportunity to engage in informal discussions.

The official round of talks took place on Monday (15 September, 1986) and included a reception by the Hungarian party boss Janos Kader. The talks were characterized by "mutual understanding in a friendly tone."

Three main points were identified during the official talks of the two foreign ministers. One was the preparations for the coming round of conference talks on European Security and Cooperation in Vienna, at which Hungary will present the results of the Budapest CSCE Culture Forum which was held for this conference. Hungary's relationship to the EC was another point, and in connection with this the state of German-Hungarian economic relations. The last two are almost inseparable, since the FRG is Hungary's most important trade partner in the EC with 53 percent of total EC trade. Hungary is striving for a trade treaty with the EC, and made certain during the talks with Genscher that it has Bonn's support with EC offices in Brussels.

Whether Brussels can accommodate the wish of Budapest up front to eliminate restrictions on trade with the EC, that is, the limitations on certain critical products, appears to be doubtful, even when Budapest can point to its GATT membership and special regulations. The fact that even the Hungarian-German economic exchange is not without problems is indicated by the most recent figures. These show that the German exports in 1985 were DM3.06 billion, and imports from Hungary were DM 2.24 billion. The Hungarian deficit of DM822 million is the highest in years and could increase this year because of EC import restrictions following the Chernobyl atomic disaster, which did not allow any Hungarian agricultural products out to the FRG.

PCI'S OCCHETTO DISCUSSES LEFTIST REFORM STRATEGY

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 18 Oct 86 pp 3-5

[Article by Achille Occhetto: "Goals, and Means, of a Reform Strategy"; first paragraph is RINASCITA summary]

[Text] In offering our proposal, we hope to deal with the question of mediation as a way to seek out the new compatibilities that exist within the reform bloc, in a context free from an attitude either of defensive corporatism or of subordination to the moderate interests. A new fluidity characterizes the alignments that cut across the whole of society and the body politic. A new welfare program should be instituted that will take account of the harsh responses of the neo-free market partisans. Why is it that today more than ever, the radical proposal of a few objectives without any organic frame of reference is insufficient?

At the congress in Florence we introduced the idea of a platform convention. Our proposal was well received, and today we are getting requests from many sides to hasten the holding of such a convention.

In initiating this programmatic constituent assembly--which will of course culminate in a session during which we shall present the platform--we do so based on our conviction that the choices which the progressive forces must make today are choices on which the country's future depends. These are choices that will determine Italy's growth or its decline--that will decide the very fate of Italian democracy vis-a-vis society and vis-a-vis the state, and determine whether an effort will be made to implement a reform process that has had a long incubation period and that becomes increasingly indispensable, so to speak, in proportion as both its necessity and feasibility are being increasingly--and stubbornly--denied.

What is the apparent cause of the so-called failure of the five-party coalition? It is unquestionably the power struggle in which the Christian Democratic Party and Italian Socialist Party have long been locked, based on a desire to alter the balance of power within the majority coalition, with the prime ministership as the prize--a desire that has engendered an atmosphere of conflict harmful to the continued existence of the democratic institutions themselves.

But this is--so to speak--the internal history of the majority coalition. To limit ourselves to this history would be shortsighted; there is also an external history which we must take into account. We made this point very succinctly at the congress in Florence when we said that the five-party coalition represented an attempt to provide a solution for the social and political crisis that manifested itself in Italy in the 1970's--a solution formulated in terms of a moderate- and conservative-oriented stabilization, whose objective was the definitive exclusion of the most advanced forces of reform. It is the selfsame process--shaped in the colossal contest over the redistribution of power and resources, a contest that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state--that has consolidated the neoconservative blocs and brought about, in almost the entire West, a shift in the political spectrum to the disadvantage of the Left.

Coincidentally with the restructuration of the advanced industrial societies through the instrumentality of large agglomerations of interests in accordance with a neocorporative plan, a proposal for the "modernization" of existing political systems has taken shape in recent years: a proposal designed to simplify the models of representation; to weaken the forms of democratic sovereignty; to restore elitist circuits of decision and control; and finally, to impoverish the content of citizenship.

This is the vise that is tightening over the conquests of the social state. It is, moreover, a vise that places special concerns and jurisdictions above sensitive problems that in a very direct way involve opposing interests and aspirations. For this reason the debate--the dialogue between jurisdictions and politicians--must be approached with openness and cannot do other than make a thorough examination of the purposes, objectives, and values that inspire the programmatic research itself.

This is also useful and necessary in order to initiate that process of policy development of the forces of the Left during which new relationships between decisions and knowledge, between intellectuals and politics, are also being tested. The urgent need for these relationships in the area of organizational models, among others, also manifested itself forcefully at the conference on neoconservative policies that was organized by CESPE [Center for Studies in Economic Policy] and CRS, with the cooperation of the members of parliament of the PCI and Independent Left. Indeed, the problem of the platform is precisely the problem of the relationship among goals, values, objectives, and the bloc of social and political alliances. Moreover, the very diversities that can emerge in the course of such deliberations do not derive from abstract programmatic choices but very probably have their origin in a different perception of the alliances on which the reform project must be based. It is a complex question, a question that still divides the Left into a broad spectrum of positions and nuances. At one end of this spectrum are the defensive positions, and at the other, the positions that reduce the number of reform objectives to the minimum possible, so as to facilitate an indiscriminate expansion of the alliances.

At the same time, we have the position that was forcefully assumed recently by Claudio Martelli: a position advocating certain radical objectives but without any organic frame of reference. A position of this kind most closely resembles a "double track" policy: one track within the institution, and the other expressed in the movements--two tracks that do not coincide on the same policy plane. This position has a drawback, namely the fact that instead of promoting genuine high-level mediation among the different classes and sectors that would presumably constitute the new reform bloc, it ultimately opens up many--and also contradictory--"little doors" onto the political marketplace. I wish to state emphatically, however, that the platform problem is also the mediation problem, as far as the search for new compatibilities within the reform bloc is concerned. Everything depends on locating the point of social and political equilibrium that should be the object of this mediation.

An indisputable internal truth lies behind the mistrust of the incursions made by the movements. However, the correct response to a mere tactical superimposition of objectives--a tactic carried out in an undiscriminating quest for a consensus--cannot be either a posture of defensive corporatism or an attitude of acquiescence and subordination vis-a-vis the compatibilities of the moderate bloc.

The mere existence of the movements, and the disparate radicalism of the objectives, contradict the fundamental effort made by the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] in behalf of a more comprehensive mediation, and have basically embarked on a collision course with the need for the creation of a new system of alliances. I should like, however, to add with equal clarity that even though we are not frightened by the urgent need--postulated as a genuine problem, at the aforesaid congress, by Michele Salvati--to respond to the scarcely credible banking, business, and technical circles on the subject of control of the dynamics of monetary income (a policy of all income) and of political compromise, it is still a good idea to understand that an arena for dialogue of this kind does not necessarily involve a minimalist reduction of the objectives of change. This is especially true in the light of the new structural gaps opened by the "great restructuration" that has characterized these years of the dynamic offensive of the neo-free market forces. Let us therefore beware of two types of unbridled subjectivism: the kind that makes a reversal of power relationships the fundamental objective, quite apart from one's goals, and the kind that makes the nonreversal of power relationships--and governmental relationships--an inviolable taboo.

Problem of the New Needs

Accordingly, if the problem of the platform is also the problem of mediation and compatibilities, then one must define the interrelationship among the compatibilities; the plan for change; and the goals. At this point the discourse may appear to be methodological in character, but it is not. It is not, because it deals with the essential political problem that exercises the controlling influence over the very possibility of formulating a platform that is both credible and capable of eliciting the support of the entire progressive front. One need only consider certain issues which--though elementary--are very complicated and difficult to resolve. The very fact that the majority of the population tends to be organized not within the production process but outside it is altering in spectacular fashion the entire traditional picture that formerly was unrolled before both the reformist components and revolutionary components of the labor movement. The proven fact that one cannot automatically--and without enlarging the panoply of activities--produce additional jobs inasmuch as increments in production are henceforth unrelated to increments in employment poses problems that are disruptive from the standpoint of the substance of the existing social structures.

I do not understand how it is possible to banish from any realistic vision of the world the established fact that the new technological and industrial revolution carries with it social implications of such significance as to call into question all the structures of organized society, ranging from the relationship between work time and living time to the heart of the traditional family relationships, and from one's personal life style even to one's concept of the meaning of life. What we have here, in short, is some new wants. One need only consider the possible future ramifications of the division that exists between those who possess adequate information and those who do not, in order to realize that the new hierarchical structuration of society--and the ways to overcome it--will prove to be entirely different than in the past. The very process of overcoming the separation of the moment of production from the moment of reproduction--a separation that manifests itself in the division between the masculine and feminine roles--involves changes of incalculable proportions in the power relationships, in that it necessitates a profound reorganization of society--of its schedules, its rhythms, its models of production, and the very quality of its work.

Is all this perhaps extraneous to the platform--to the new relationship that one must be able to establish between weak sectors of society and a part of the strong sectors of society? No credible "democratic" platform can in fact exist if it does not take account of this problem. The choice lies only between authoritarian equalization or corporative anarchy, or a mix of both. It is precisely the problem of the fluidity of the alliances and alignments, that is to say, of the transverse alliances that cut across the entire electorate and all of society, transcending the traditional and rigid social classifications. Moreover, the synthesis that manifests itself through genuine mediation is precisely the problem of the platform. This is the area of the new--and genuine--effort (not yet entirely successful) of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

Obviously, a concept such as this heightens the centrality of the platform, but as a focal point for coalition on the basis of which the new aggregations are welded together. The Left must accordingly promote a coalition that will unite to the "weak" the greatest number possible of the "strong," even if their immediate interests are different. This cannot be accomplished without a correct definition of the priorities, nor can it be accomplished by an a priori reduction in the objectives of change--by a kind of programmatic self-censorship. The transverse character of the alliances necessitates tedious processes of coalition designed to cope--in modern terms--with the thrust toward individualization, within the framework of a new relationship between state and marketplace, between public sector and private sector. This will be the terrain for a revival of the social state--one that will take account of the harsh responses of the neo-free market forces.

This undoubtedly will require a policy of compatibilities, but a policy of compatibilities that is functional to the objectives of reform--a policy not even a trace of which is visible in the government's commitment. I wonder what "reformer"--or even "reformist"--means, in the absence of a solution to this problem?

Public Intervention and State Ownership

What is lacking is the capability, the will, the intention to delineate--in contrast to a mere corporative sum of the individual interests, which is so characteristic of a certain "political marketplace"--the hypothesis of the bloc, of a new reform alliance that will stand in contrast, to be sure, to the strategy of the barricades and even the social-populist logic of which De Michelis speaks, but also to the political marketplace: to the "double track," or--in other words--the degradation of the weak, who are offered up and sacrificed to the mechanism of accumulation. That is a context in which an employment policy--such as the one proposed by the government--designed to replicate the war among the poor is completely functional.

What emerges instead is the urgent need for the construction of a positive, conscious alliance based on a precise plan for the progress of society. It is in relation to this objective that the gradualisms can, and should, be accepted and the mediations defined. The historical and programmatic problem that we face is the orientation of the gradualism, not the choice between gradualism and maximalism. This should be the terrain on which the Left competes. There is no gradualism in the governmental Left, because there is no "definitive orientation."

If we really want the platform, however, we must begin a serious discussion of a hypothesis of positive change--of a qualitative gradualism--that looks beyond a mere defensive posture, that infuses the very radicalism and bias of the objectives of the movements into a renewed commitment to planning and into the task of identifying special compatibilities that can be relied on.

This is rendered all the more dramatic because the confines of the weakest part of society are being displaced, in the sense that the potential circle of the disadvantaged is being enlarged, and dominion over society--achieved through the modernization of processes and the mastery of technology--is being concentrated in the hands of a minority.

More generally speaking, however, the key to overcoming the crisis of the social state is to be found today in the new contradictions posed by neo-free marketism; it is on this basis that a new discourse on the subject of growth is being initiated. This is also intensifying the urgent need for a new content and quality of growth, giving rise to the hypothesis of a transition to a new model. A new concept of the correct response to the reaction of the neo-free market forces is emerging strongly; it is embodied precisely in the hypothesis of a socialization of accumulations, in other words, planning and progressive socialization within the framework of a reform of the marketplace. This renders all the more urgently necessary a concept of socialization that does not equate government intervention with state ownership.

Indeed, this very probably means reversing the present situation--a situation characterized by a lack of planning with respect to the central choices, and by total state interference at the end points of the process (the suffocation of entrepreneurship and professionalism)--and replacing it with a strong indication of the central options available and with a more comprehensive liberalization of the capacity for initiative at the end points. This would probably require a shift in themes--with respect to institutional reforms--toward serious questions, starting with those that are inherent in the democratic management of the economy and in the democratization and socialization of the processes of accumulation. The hypothesis should be one of liberating the marketplace from burdensome bureaucratic encumbrances and guiding it--through the action of public individuals, among others--toward higher social objectives. In this sense one may speak at one and the same time--and not only in ideological and political terms--of freedom and socialization.

But in that case--I ask myself--must not the objective of the economy--and of any economy that aims at full employment--necessarily also be to bridge the gap between labor and the destination of labor? And therefore also to solve precisely the question of who will decide--and how to decide--the destination of labor? And, moreover, the question of why produce, and what to produce? Should, or should not, a platform also respond to these questions, to these needs? This is the only possible starting point for defining the concrete objectives--and also the real alternatives. It is, moreover, the point of contact with the most vital and advanced thinking of the European Left.

Not an Academic Process

In the last years of this century an attempt is being made, on the one hand, to cope with the unsettling effects of the dynamics of the world economy, which have punished the weakest regions by aggravating the conditions of dependency of the South of the world, while on the other hand there is a need to master the effects of a technological revolution that is opening up to human labor extraordinary opportunities for enterprise but that at the same time is being compressed into the mechanism of a growth that is distorted, unsettling, and unstable. Lastly, an attempt is being made to respond to what is perhaps the central demand of our times--a demand that sums up in itself the totality of the emergent expectations, needs, and rights (and no longer just consumer goods): the totality of the new forms of life associated in the areas of production, culture, political organizations, and movements that cut across all of society. It is, in short, a demand for a new quality of growth.

This demand is today a challenge to the European Left as a whole. It is concretely linked to the elaboration of the platform that we have made central to our thinking and to our policy from the congress of Florence to the present day. The significance that the proposed platform is acquiring is therefore clear.

What we have here is not an accessory element of our policy, and not even just the obligatory statement of objectives and subject matter on which to concentrate from time to time the available political resources. This is what we did when we introduced a draft platform for the final part of the legislative session, as the only political force that deemed it necessary to do so--and was successful in doing so--in the course of the most recent crisis. These are segments--parts--of a broad process of policy definition. This process--which cannot be resolved academically--aspires to merge jurisdictions and strategic choices in the very heart of a movement that will commit all the political resources of the party, and in the very midst of an open debate concerning the major lines of change in society and the state--concerning the country's future. This is what we say to all those who reproach us for the abstractness and instrumentalization of the platforms and call on us to return to the prejudicial link with the alignments as the sole, indestructible principle of reality. The platform is therefore also the course that leads to this goal and is, at the same time, one of the fundamental elements for defining the identity of a political force--of a reform party. It is also the pivot of a political system such as the Italian system: the turning point that must be reached in order to bring the democratic alternative nearer.

Precisely for this reason, we believe that an important stage in this course is the platform convention that we announced at the congress. We attach great importance to it, precisely because on the one hand it allows us to infuse great inspiration--in the dialogue with the jurisdictions, with the specializations, and with the most active forces of Italian society--into the elaboration of the platform, and because on the other hand it allows us to select issues and forces with a view to the construction of a progressive alignment.

It will be a question of giving shape to a legislative platform, and getting it under way. We leave to others their addiction to establishing birthrights within the European Left. The serene knowledge that we have outlined a bright prospect--and solid ground--for the renewal of this society and this state is enough for us.

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CSO: 3528/21

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

SHADOW CABINET COMPOSITION HOLDS NO SURPRISES

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 4 Oct 86 p 3

[Text] The presentation of the shadow cabinet of the PS was an event awaited with great interest.

First of all, because the intention to appoint this cabinet was announced some time ago.

Secondly, because there were careful preparations for the event and it was surrounded by special solemnity.

Thirdly, it was the first undertaking of its sort by a large party.

And fourthly, because it really was the first political action by the successor to Mario Soares, on the basis of which it will be possible to begin to discern his capacity to control the PS and to modify its conduct.

For all of these reasons, innovations were expected.

It was expected that a solid and original series of choices would be announced, combining unchallengable individuals with others who, because they were unexpected, would arouse curiosity and interest.

In a word, a surprise was expected.

One cannot but admit, however, that everything in this presentation of the shadow cabinet was more than predictable.

There were no surprises. None of the new "ministers" provoked special curiosity, and it even happens that many of them have already served in the government, and, in the majority of cases, as secretaries of state at that.

None among the names announced points to any possible future "revelation."

There will also be those who will say that the present cabinet does not represent a brilliant choice.

The argument is not well founded.

Vitor Constancio is not Cavaco Silva.

For reasons of temperament and style, Cavaco Silva is in a position to give a cabinet its image single-handed, making the identity of the ministers holding the various posts secondary.

Vitor Constancio, on the contrary, whose image is more subtle and whose style is less bold, will always be viewed as the coordinator of a team, and it will appear to the country to be strong or weak depending on the individuals it includes.

ny cabinet of Cavaco Silva's will always be like any of his others, however much the ministers may have changed.

One of Constancio's cabinets, on the contrary, might be very different from another chosen by him, if, for example, the ministers of finance, defense or education were to change.

But there is another reason why the introduction of the PS shadow cabinet was a disappointment.

An analysis of the choices made reveals that they were the result of internal compromises and arrangements, with the distribution of the posts having been effected more to establish certain political balances and as a reward for services rendered than as a result of a desire to create a homogeneous, efficient and technically competent team. And here again, it is impossible to avoid comparing the process of appointing the shadow cabinet with that of the appointment of the actual cabinet.

The present prime minister, following the Sa Carneiro line, cut through the party's rights and appointed a cabinet which, setting compromises aside and visibly overlooking "historic" figures, gave the impression of being the clear result of his desires.

Vitor Constancio presented the country with a different image of himself, suggesting that he does not yet feel that he is the real head of the Socialist Party, by appointing a heterogeneous team which seeks to reconcile instead of to clarify positions. It appears that he was sensitive to the pressures exerted upon him.

5157
CSO:3542/14

PCP ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTING PLAN OPPOSED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Ricardo Sa Gomes]

[Text] The establishment of administrative regions seems likely to be the focus of a heated party battle during the next legislative session. Following the presentation by the PCP of a draft outline law which would establish administrative regions, the parties represented in the Assembly of the Republic have already adopted their positions. They will all vote against it!

The PRD already will present its completed proposale to the AR within a few days. A socialist proposal is being completed, and the PSD and the CDS are also studying the problem.

The communists urge establishment of all the administrative regions, or at least those on which there is a consensus, in fact next year. They want to begin with district division, to serve as a reference point for the people.

The PCP proposal further provides that "The municipal assemblies can vote in favor of regional areas corresponding to the present districts or they can propose a merger with other regional areas." The draft has been sent to the municipal assemblies for their opinion.

PCP on the Offensive

According to some observers, the submission of the draft law by the PCP was designed to achieve a clear strengthening of its position in certain regions where it has been tending to weaken in recent years. Beginning with the district division and through the mechanisms proposed, it would be easy for the communists to mobilize and distribute (to the regions) the various municipalities where they still dominate, in order to weaken the influence of the other parties in these regions. This would be the case in Alentejo where, since the PCP has been losing ground in various sectors, the proposal submitted now would allow it to move ahead of the opposition.

"Controlling isolated municipalities is very different from controlling a large region with financial and administrative autonomy"--this is the concept which prevails in the communist ranks.

PRD Terms Situation Regrettable

In the opinion of Carlos Lilaia, the spokesman for the PRD, the communist proposal that 18 regions be created justifies serious reservations. The PRD also disagrees with the way in which the discussion being pursued in the municipal assemblies is developing.

According to the renewal leaders, "It is regrettable that the municipal assemblies are losing time discussing just one proposal, rather than awaiting the submission of others like ours, which they know are nearly completed."

The PRD draft law, which will be made public shortly, takes into account the socioeconomic development of the regions, according to Lilaia. These regions should be based on areas corresponding to certain district complexes.

The PRD further proposes that the industrial contribution and the tax on agricultural industry be used, among other sources, to obtain regional income. Carlos Lilaia believes that the necessary conditions exist so that all of the regions could function in 1988.

Too Soon, Says CDS

In the view of the CDS, it makes no sense to analyze any draft law on regionalization until the approaching constitutional revision is complete. In connection with the draft law proposed by the Communist Party, the CDS warns that it is only designed to consolidate the "artificial strengthening" of the PCP.

According to Fernando Seara, secretary general of the CDS, the proposal presented, to judge from its political premises and the form in which the establishment of the regions is sought, is merely intended to achieve the strategic goal of strengthening communist power in certain areas.

Finally, the centrists urge that the national consideration of the model of regionalization to be adopted be made compulsory.

PS Wants Referendum

The PS has also criticized the communist proposal harshly, and it is preparing to submit its alternative proposal.

In the view of the socialists, the regional division should be effected on the basis of district complexes, but in a way different from that proposed by the PRD. Because of the complexity of the process of regionalization, they urge that "It should include a prior institutional consultation, and possibly a national referendum."

Accusing the PCP of urging "false regionalization," the socialists say that the proposal submitted reveals "the traditional strong centralizing desire of the PCP, and it endorses the districts and the status quo."

PSD Suggests Pilot Region

While the PSD is studying the factors involved in establishing administrative regions with a view to "submitting concrete proposals," we have received reports that the Social Democrats might initially opt for the establishment of "pilot regions." In such a case, the Algarve would certainly be one of the first.

The Cavaco Silva's government is devoting attention to this issue and has already appointed a commission to reorganize the administrative divisions. It is headed by Antonio Montalvo. The work of the commission, which will be made public shortly, will serve as a basis for a possible draft law to be proposed by the government on the establishment of administrative regions.

This subject is likely to be a burning issue in the near future. Each party will fight for the solution which best suits its aspirations with regard to the local authorities.

5157
CSO:3542/14

DAILY PAPER INTERVIEWS PARTY CHAIRMEN AT RIKSDAG OPENING

Ingvar Carlsson (SDP)

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Oct 86 p 13

[Article by Sven Svensson and Ake Ekdahl: "Ingvar Carlsson Does Not Believe in Organized Cooperation--The Issues Must Decide"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] "I believe in broad political agreement across bloc lines, especially concerning defense, termination of nuclear power and sanctions against South Africa," said Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson in an interview before the opening of the Riksdag. All the parties have been burned by tactical maneuvers around the nuclear power issue, and those who are proposing increased defense expenditures must show how they will be financed, said the prime minister.

When Ingvar Carlsson came into office as prime minister after the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme seven months ago he promised to leave the door open for discussion of all questions.

"Things have gone rather well so far," summarized Ingvar Carlsson. "We have made progress in housing with the Liberal Party [FP], and in the planning and construction law with the Center Party [CP].

"Ahead of us are the issues of defense, nuclear power termination and South Africa. I expect the same openness and unity on these questions."

Bloc Lines

Ingvar Carlsson does not believe that the new set of leaders on the nonsocialist side has altered the conditions for cooperation across party lines.

His theory is, "Cooperation does not depend on individuals, but on situations."

After 44 years of Social Democratic [SDP] governments, the three nonsocialist parties were forced into governing together. That allowed very little room for compromises, and it became difficult to cooperate across bloc lines, he said.

"On the other hand, the Social Democratic one-party government can make its proposals openly, and compromise in parliamentary committees. We do not need first to compromise with two coalition parties," said Ingvar Carlsson.

He sees no reason why the major controversial issue of the fall session, the so-called one-time tax on private pensions, should prevent possibilities for cooperation.

Ingvar Carlsson pointed out that the SDP never rejected the possibility of using property taxation. He recalled the 1928 discussion about inheritance taxes and the conflict over estate taxes after the war.

That did not prevent the SDP, after these difficult conflicts, from forming a coalition with the then existing Farmers' Union.

Issues

Ingvar Carlsson does not think that it is possible today to have organized political cooperation with any party. It is the issues which will be decisive, he said. Naturally cooperation with the Center Party comes first, and also to a certain extent the Liberal Party.

For ideological reasons, cooperation with the Conservative Party (M) is more difficult, said the prime minister, mostly because the newly elected Carl Bildt has moved the party still farther to the right.

"The Conservative election platform of 1985 was, for me, conservatism at its worst. It's equal has not been seen since the night-watchman state of the 1930's.

"Immediately following the election the Conservatives realized that they had gone too far, but today the neoliberals are in good spirits again," said Carlsson.

After the election Liberal Party [FP] leader Bengt Westerberg wanted to make it appear that it was his social-liberal stance which led to the FP election success.

"It will be interesting to see Westerberg's reaction to Bildt's turn to the right," continued Ingvar Carlsson.

The prime minister has carefully noted that Westerberg mainly subscribes to the general social policy, but he wants more solid proof of Westerberg's social-liberal position.

"I have no preconceived opinions, I just wait and see."

Engineers

Conservative leader Carl Bildt's criticism of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] for its "social engineering" in his inaugural speech is seen by the prime minister as merely an expression of the Conservative leader's desire to enter the debate.

"I began the debate about the information society three years ago. Now Bildt wants to present it as proof that the Conservatives will govern in the future. I have a hard time taking that seriously."

Ingvar Carlsson wants open discussions by the party leaders about defense and the development of nuclear power.

"In general it is advantageous to have broad unity on security policy. After the murder of Olof Palme I believe that we all recognized a need to stop quarrelling, especially over foreign policy.

"I do not know whether unity exists in eternity," continued Ingvar Carlsson. "The willingness to compromise will be tested when the Defense Committee soon recommends not only increased defense appropriations, but also how they will be financed."

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson was always both formal and careful in his responses.

His first major task as prime minister was to travel to Moscow, where he received guarantees that Party Secretary Gorbachev had unconditional respect for Sweden's policy of neutrality.

Now, six months after the trip to Moscow, Ingvar Carlsson has still not drawn any conclusions from the discussions.

"First I want to see what is happening in different areas. Negotiations on the centerline in the Baltic are going on, and several related cases remain to be solved."

Even when talking about submarine violations, Ingvar Carlsson takes his time before making any statement.

"We have not been able to determine the nationality of the activities which are said to take place in Swedish waters. We do not hypothetically discuss which countries are involved."

Carlsson emphasized that it is urgent that the violations be stopped. We will use our utmost resources, and those who are engaged in these activities must take the consequences.

The government will also strive to achieve cooperation across bloc lines about the liquidation of nuclear power, said Ingvar Carlsson.

"I believe that we have all learned the risks of short-sighted tactical speculation about nuclear power," said Ingvar Carlsson, answering a question whether political motives can determine the rate of termination.

I am coming to the party leader discussions without preconditions, and I will not in advance say anything about termination. It is a great advantage to conduct our energy policy with firmness and logic, so that the decisions are not torn up succeeding Riksdag majorities. That would be exceedingly costly and would produce unfortunate results.

Nuclear Power

Sweden is the only country which has decided to terminate its nuclear power. It was not possible to live with the anxiety which nuclear power caused. The accident at Chernobyl has further reinforced the anxiety, said Ingvar Carlsson.

The question of South Africa will be the third test of the climate of cooperation. After the notable summer debate, unity was reached in the Foreign Relations Committee on Sweden's line.

"I hope that the Conservatives will also agree to the boycott policy. Following the UN recommendation, this is totally in accordance with our foreign policy line," he said. "And the more countries we can cooperate with, the better."

During the fall the Social Democrats must solve a number of problems, the foremost being the labor conflict in the public sector.

The government's strategy has been to conduct an economic policy which will keep inflation down and create good employment figures. Minister of Finance Kjell-Olof Feldt has disagreed, and the government is behind him. There are limits to how much the wage earners can take out. This has been expressed clearly, said Carlsson.

Carlsson refuses to disclose what will be the next step.

"Just now nothing can be done. It is a sensitive situation, and I do not want to say anything."

Rules of the Game

Carlsson hinted that in the future he will be prepared to open a discussion about the rules of the game on the labor market. He referred to a statement last spring about wildcat strikes.

About the conflict within the labor movement between the public sector employees and those in the private sector, Carlsson said that it is primarily a matter for LO [Confederation of Trade Unions] to arrange a common wage strategy.

There have been tensions for many years. but usually the discussions have been behind closed doors. An open debate, such as occurred at the last LO congress, would have been impossible 15 years ago, but today attitudes are different, and the mass media more skillful, said the prime minister.

Ingvar Carlsson is a believer in collective action. His task as party chairman, trained by Tage Erlander and in the SSU [Social Democratic Youth] is to listen to the party Executive Committee, and let the decisions be made at next year's party congress. He does not know how the nonsocialists' demand in the Riksdag for a prohibition law will be handled in the fall.

The LO congress showed that collective action has broad support in the country, despite what is said, he believes.

"Those who work hard all day and cannot manage to go to meetings in the evening find that through collective action they have influence in the development of the community. That is one side of the debate which has not come out before, and it is worthwhile that it came out during the LO congress."

Karin Soder (C)

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "Soder Prepared to Review Nuclear Power--Broad Solutions Best"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] "Before the election of 1988 we must have in place a broad agreement about more rapid termination of nuclear power, preferably in line with the Center Party plan, with termination before the year 2000. I do not now dare have any preconceived notions about whom we will agree with, but I believe that Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson's and Energy Minister Birgitta Dahl's statements about Barseback should obligate them to a prior commitment. The Liberal Party's position also gives hope."

These were the words of the Center Party's [C] Karin Soder to DAGENS NYHETER, at the same time as she expressed a strong willingness to compromise on the matter of termination. The Center Party leader spoke quietly and definitely, entirely free of the brisk freshness which she is encouraged to display before the TV cameras, when she spoke with DAGENS NYHETER for a couple of hours before the opening of the Riksdag.

For Karen Soder, leadership of the party is an unsought duty which she was required to undertake before Christmas of last year when Thorbjorn Falldin defected.

Save the Children

Previously this confident politician from Varmland and Taby decided at age 58 to reduce her political activity and devote more time to the Nordic activity "Save the Children" and her grandchildren. Instead she was forced in one evening to return and save her party, which was on the way to the bottom.

And she also believes that the party was saved, "even though more work is still necessary before we make real progress."

In the conversation which took place in her workroom in the Riksdag, and also in the corridors on the way to the granite bust of the father of the party, Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorps for photographs, she admitted without hesitation that the decision to change paths was difficult.

On major questions such as nuclear power and defense she expresses a positive view of the possibility of broad agreements, but explains that Ingvar Carlsson can not count on her as an ally on the planned pension tax. Although she believes that the Conservatives and Liberals who speak of "confiscation" are exaggerating.

But as she is an experienced politician, she avoids expressing herself categorically. She glides elegantly around questions concerning the condition of the nonsocialist front. To questions about the possibility of cooperation with SDP she replies, "We Swedish party leaders have all known each other for a long time, and we talk to each other." To the question of whether she can visualize an agreement on the nuclear power question with Ingvar Carlsson, she replies that she "does not exclude an agreement with the Liberal Party." She states in another context that the goal is "a nonsocialist alternative to socialism."

No Lock In

Her political style is clearly different from that of her predecessor Thorbjorn Falldin, and even on the central question for her party of nuclear power she refuses to be locked in.

She cites all the known negative factors about nuclear power--the unsolved waste problem, the built-in uncertainties--but she also emphasizes the need to listen to the readjustment problems of industry and its need for so-called lead time.

The Center Party plan for the termination of all nuclear power before the end of the century is a recommendation which the party brought forth for negotiation in the broad Energy Council.

"It will be discussed," said Karin Soder. She added that she is ready to study seriously all other proposals.

"We have our own proposal, but we are also anxious to have nuclear power terminated responsibly and with retention of a good environment and economy as early as possible. There will surely be adjustments between the plans, but we cannot agree with just any compromises."

She also firmly denied that Olof Johansson, energy minister in the Falldin government, and since last summer the first vice chairman of the party, gave the Conservatives and Liberals an ultimatum on the nuclear power question. His statement at Sala last week raised the hackles of Conservative Party leader Carl Bildt.

"What Olof Johansson demanded was almost exactly what I demanded, namely that the other parties bring forth their alternatives so that we will have a starting point for discussion," said Karin Soder, and immediately took back the word "demanded."

"I do not like the word 'demand'," she added. She said that "think" is a better word.

Alternative

She emphasized that it is high time that the parties bring forth their alternatives, since nobody wants a repetition of the chaos of 1978, which led to the Center Party leaving the three-party government, and the referendum.

She also emphasized that Olof Johansson really pointed out that the party is not locked into the nuclear power question, even though all agree that a changed attitude toward nuclear power exists after Chernobyl.

Karin Soder said that she is convinced that there is a readiness for revision on the nuclear power question in the other parties as well. She considers it a hopeful sign that the Liberal Party's Bengt Westerberg in the Riksdag last spring made reference to some nuclear power skeptics as sources. They were people whom the Center party had long been consulting in opposition to nuclear power.

Neither did she exclude the possibility of getting some Conservative supporters of nuclear power to join in a broad agreement for the termination of nuclear power.

"That depends entirely on what decision is supported by a broad majority," she said. Like Ingvar Carlsson, the Center Party leader fully agrees that a decision must be reached that has such broad support that it will not be torn up again. As to the possibility of agreement with the Conservatives on energy questions, however, she added that she does not share Carl Bildt's opinion that it is a choice between nuclear power and coal.

"There are of course many more alternatives, for example take the latest reports on solar experiments. It is really just a question of politicians deciding what to do. We have of course both research and high technical knowledge in our country which we must utilize. We have come a long way in the development of fossil fuels."

Karin Soder welcomes the decision by the American Senate to boycott South Africa, that "plague on the world community." If the work of the Security Council to reach a decision on sanctions does not succeed, the Nordic governments must quickly decide on a common boycott.

About the newcomer to the party leader circle Carl Bildt, she says that she wants to hear a bit more about him before she classifies him, as Ingvar Carlsson has done, as more rightwing than Ulf Adelsohn. Karin Soder says that she has cordial contacts with both the other nonsocialist party leaders.

"We do have contacts with each other, even though we have no formal discussions before the opening of the Riksdag," she said.

She is as eager to tone down her own role at the worktable as she is to tone down the drama around contacts between party leaders. The only advantage to holding the unique position of the only female party leader that this earthy woman can think of is that she is "probably better than a man at getting involved in the striking nurses' demand for better wages." She was a teacher until she was swallowed up by their policies.

Scoffed At

On the other hand she has no sympathy for the female writers who scoffed at her contributions to the general political debates in the Riksdag last spring.

"I am who I am, and I have difficulty dissembling. And even if I have not mastered every detail of a question--no party leader has--I really know what I am doing. We politicians do not need to be oracles. It is better to be like ordinary people," said Karin Soder very firmly.

She also said that the figures in the opinion polls are not always as bad as they can appear. The party has risen in the polls since last winter, even though it is still below the election results. She pointed out that it is really the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties which have been hit by declines during the second quarter.

"It is interesting that since the election we have taken in a large number of new voters. We have grown in the big cities and we are slowly but surely gaining. But we fully appreciate that there are no cheap victories," said Karin Soder.

Carl Bildt (M)

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Ake Ekdahl and Sven Svensson: "Bildt Wants Stronger Foreign Relations: The Security Policy Has Failed"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] "The continued submarine violations are casting a certain shadow across Swedish-Russian relations. We have failed with a very centralized security policy mission during the past three years." These words were spoken by Conservative Party (M) leader Carl Bildt during DAGENS NYHETER's third interview with party leaders before the opening of the Riksdag.

Since long before he became party leader, Bildt has been one of the most vocal opposition politicians on the issue of security policy. The alarm has grown quiet following the murder of Palme.

"The watershed within security policy really became the defense policy thoughts which were set forth in May of last year, and which are still valid even today," said Bildt.

"Furthermore it was important that former Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom departed and left a place for Sten Andersson, who has shown greater ability to listen to others," he said.

Security

"It is serious that the security problem is still with us today. Everything indicates that submarine violations are continuing at the same level despite the new prime minister, Ingvar Carlsson, visiting Moscow last spring," said Bildt.

"We have all failed with a very central security policy mission during the past three years.

"The violations can only be stopped if we have a strong foreign policy in combination with a stronger defense policy. The violations can only be stopped if we gradually and firmly increase the risks for the offending nation."

Bildt emphasized that the continuing submarine violations are casting a certain shadow over Swedish-Russian relations. We cannot prove that they are Soviet violations, he said. The only nation that we can tie to the violations is the Soviet Union. The obvious violations that we have had cause a certain caution in Swedish political behavior. We must behave with caution toward any nation which can be suspected of being responsible for the violations.

"At the end of last year we got the impression that the Soviet Union was pondering its relations with Sweden. After Ingvar Carlsson's visit to Moscow the attention declined."

Waiting

Bildt sees Swedish relations with the Soviet Union as waiting for daylight. He believes that surprisingly little has happened in connection with the reunion cases and the unsolved issue of the middle line in the Baltic.

Can Sweden Be Defended?

"There are troublesome holes in the defense. The size and staying power of the air defense is beginning to be a great concern. Antisubmarine capability is another major problem. The quality is high, but the quantity is too little in the light of what is happening in the outside world," said Bildt.

The Conservative Party wants to raise defense expenditures, and considers that it could finance strengthened defense within its own budget alternative.

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson's ideas in DAGENS NYHETER about the Defense Committee approving increased financing for defense appropriations was considered by Bildt as being farfetched.

He expects that the SDP leaders in the committee will put forth proposals for financing, and he believes that a four-party agreement is attainable.

"If we agree on reforming the defense at a reasonable level, we will also agree on the financing. But we are not ready to sit down for detailed discussions on how the SDP government should run its national budget."

Sanctions

Another difficult question for the Conservatives in the fall session will be the sanctions against South Africa.

"Binding sanctions would be the best alternative. But the Security Council was satisfied with a general recommendation, so we must look at the formulation. Then it will be up to our own judgment how we should act. We must try to reach a solution in line with other countries which will be effective in South Africa without damaging ourselves.

Bildt considers it stupid to surrender Swedish firms to South African principles. He does not see how that can help the blacks, or Swedish business.

The Conservative Party Leader wants to activate Sweden's European policies. He said that otherwise Sweden runs the risk of becoming a "backyard" to Europe. The French visa decision is a warning sign of what can happen. We have also had difficulties in keeping up with cooperation in high technology.

"We must be a part of the inner market which the 12 EC countries will establish in 1992. Therefore we should have serious conversations with the other Nordic countries in order to give the Nordic area increased influence in European cooperation," said Bildt.

Europe

He has not established any final goal for Sweden's European policy, but he wants a gradual closing of the distance. Neutrality prevents Sweden from participating in an obligating foreign policy cooperation, said Bildt.

The Conservative Party has no fear that the three nonsocialist parties will not be able to bring forth a viable government alternative before the next election. Bildt issues no ultimatums about either taxes or nuclear power, which previously destroyed two nonsocialist governments.

"It is important to convince the voters of our willingness and ability to act together. The voters believe in our willingness, but some still suspect our ability. Therefore the three nonsocialist parties must in their daily conduct create a basis for such confidence."

Bildt believes that it is important that the parties have different positions on different questions. The voters expect that. We are, he said, three different parties, and the question is how we will handle our differences and retain our mutual respect. Bildt believes that conditions for this are better now than they were 10 years ago.

"Karin Soder's reasoning about nuclear power in DAGENS NYHETER shows that," he said.

Ambitions

The Conservative Party leader does not believe that any party on the nonsocialist side can make ultimative demands. Both nuclear power and tax questions deal with the level of ambition, he said.

The Conservatives want an objective test of nuclear power in which safety will be decisive.

"I do not see how Chernobyl can influence judgments on the safety of Swedish nuclear power. If we determine that Swedish nuclear power plants are not more unsafe today than before, then we should make no changes in the nuclear power program. On the other hand, if they are more unsafe, then we will demand prompt termination. I have difficulty understanding intermediate positions, but I am willing to listen to arguments," said Bildt.

About the total tax burden, Bildt said that Sweden should lower the level to that of the other European countries. The rate depends on the growth of the economy. If there is zero growth in public expenditures and a simultaneous growth in the national economy, Bildt believes that the total tax burden can be reduced rather quickly.

"I do not believe that anyone today wants to make it a kind of a dogma that we should always have the tax burden that we have today."

Before the Public

Bildt believes that such a dogma would mean that we are forced to increase the public expenditures more than planned. The new Conservative leader believes that the SDP has become petrified in its thinking.

"If one should compare an ideological speech by Palme to one by Carlsson, the latter is much more dogmatic. Palme's flexibility was both his strength and his weakness. Palme moved across the field so fast that his content became unclear. Carlsson is clearer," said Bildt, who carefully read the prime minister's speech to the LO.

Therein Carlsson compared the rights of citizenship against the rights of ownership. Bildt believes that by rights of citizenship Carlsson means voting rights. Everything can clearly be determined through voting rights. Bildt considers that the recipe for a totally polarized society in which the rights of private ownership are successively undermined.

"The right of ownership gives the right of influence. I must have the right of influence over my pension, my house or my car. That is the right of citizenship. Also through voting rights I have influence over economic policy, security policy, the legal system, etc."

Distribution

Today's conflict in the labor market is, according to Bildt, proof that the SDP is not solving the distribution question. It arose because they promised gold and green forests to the public sector. We are therefore experiencing a crisis of quality in public service and the exercise of authority.

"The state tries to do more than it can, and we have impoverished the public sector which created problems both for those who work and those who depend on public service."

Bildt believes that the SDP has been clumsy in solving the problems. He believes that the head of LO, Stig Malm, made several bold statements before his congress, but seldom has anyone been so run over as he.

"Civil Affairs Minister Bo Holmberg now looks like--I don't know what. He was offered nothing."

Is the Ghost of the Right Alive?

"Certainly, the ghost of the right crops up in every election. The SDP prints large colorful brochures about the ghost of the right, but the ghost of the right requires more and more advertising money to keep him alive. But the SDP is rich enough to manage that."

Bengt Westerberg (FP)

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Dick Ljungberg: "Bengt Westerberg Plans For a Power Shift: Nonsocialists Agree on Tactics"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] "Karin Soder, Carl Bildt and I agree on how we will conduct the job of the opposition until--we hope--it becomes government cooperation after 1988." Those were the words of Liberal Party [FP] leader Bengt Westerberg. At the same time he believes that possibilities are good for broad agreements in the fall on defense, nuclear power and South Africa.

Bengt Westerberg swiftly became the doyen as party leader on the nonsocialist side. He believes that the three parties can write up a political platform together before 1988 on the questions on which they agree. But he avows that he is not a "cooperation engineer."

"Karin Soder, Carl Bildt and I meet now and then. But I do not believe that any of us feel the need to be cooperative engineers. We visit each other quite naturally, and exchange thoughts and opinions."

The difficulties of the government coalition were of interest recently because of a treatise by the former chief editor of DAGENS NYHETER Sven-Erik Larsson. What conclusions does Westerberg himself draw from the power shift of 1976?

Close Contacts

"One lesson is that the lack of contact between the three parties before the election of 1976 led to difficulties when they later formed a government," replied Westerberg. "Now we have closer contacts in order to be better prepared.

"The contacts are not just to build a bridge over conflicts or to try to find common solutions, but also so that we can learn to know each other and to understand the viewpoints of the other side. Contacts can also mean that we can explain ourselves when journalists dramatize some statement. It is important in creating confidence."

At the irregular meetings they also discuss what will happen until the election, said Westerberg. It is important to base possible future government cooperation on cooperation in the Riksdag, for example through common dissents.

"We agree on how we will conduct this job until 1988."

Self-Confidence

The nonsocialists have now shaken off a bit of the attitude which they had toward SDP in 1976, said Westerberg. Self-confidence in their own policies is now greater.

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, in Sunday's DAGENS NYHETER interview, sought broad agreement concerning defense appropriations, energy policy after Chernobyl and measures against the apartheid regime in South Africa. Bengt Westerberg believes that the chances are good to reach agreement on all three questions.

Foreign Policy

"Unity on defense is valuable in itself. That is a good tradition to follow."

Submarine violations are expected to continue. Westerberg believes it is correct of Ingvar Carlsson not to criticize any special nation when no determination of nationality has been feasible.

"But I believe that on his visit to Moscow Ingvar Carlsson made it very clear how we in Sweden see the violations, and that they are damaging our relations. When we have been able to determine the nationality of the penetrating submarines they have of course been Russian."

The FP leader believes that the reason why foreign policy was so stormy during the time of Olof Palme and Lennart Bodstrom was a sense of mental discomfort after a series of "affairs." The debate at that time did not reflect any real opposition on foreign policy.

Even on the issue of South Africa Westerberg believes that he has received signals during the fall that they will be able to agree.

"We have of course recommended that Sweden together with other Nordic countries should carry out a trade boycott. On the other hand the government believes that we have gone as far as we can without breaking international agreements and rights. We believe, however, that the UN resolution of 1985 and GATT stability allow us to go farther."

Nuclear Power

On nuclear power Westerberg believes that it is possible to reach "rather significant unity" despite the breach which exists between the Center Party and the Conservatives.

The Center Party's termination plan and statements by vice chairman Olof Johansson have caused wondering.

"I believe that the Center Party is anxious to push its position hard, and one must understand that," said Westerberg. "But from Karin Soder and party secretary Goran Johansson I have received the impression that the Center Party does not intend to make ultimative demands. They are aware that one party cannot dictate terms.

"Everyone recognizes that nuclear power will be terminated. Later we will discuss how much time is necessary to develop other energy sources and increase the efficiency of energy consumption.

"I have trouble seeing any basic difference between the parties on this question--whether we should terminate in 10 or 15 or 20 years," said Westerberg.

Strain Over Taxes

Westerberg does not believe that the hottest political question of the fall session--the pension tax--will worsen cooperation in the above-discussed areas. Possibly it will be difficult to discuss other tax policy questions. The Liberal Party has had bad experiences with SDP in this area.

On tax questions there are strains even among nonsocialists. The Conservatives want a prompt reduction of the total tax burden, and the Center Party prefers better municipal tax equalization rather than lower marginal taxes.

Financing Promises

"In, for example, a five-year perspective one should be careful about making promises about total tax reduction," said Westerberg. " And I have noticed a shift among the Conservatives. Formerly they spoke of a tax reduction of 50 million in five years, and now however they speak of reducing taxes in accordance with the economy. There we are more in agreement."

When one makes promises of tax reduction he must also speak of how they will be paid for, said the FP leader firmly. In Malmo the nonsocialists reduced taxes after the 1985 election, while municipal activity continued largely unchanged. Now they have a large deficit, which is a little frightening.

FP believes in and is discussing a better tax equalization system. But it is advantageous to allow the right of municipalities to tax, and so one must accept that there will be certain differences between municipalities; an equalization scheme which would please everybody does not exist, said Westerberg.

He is personally very attracted to the tax recommendation which SACO-SR [The General Association of Salaried Employees-The National Federation of Government Officers] presented recently. He suggested that Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt circulate it through the government for comments, and Feldt dismissed the whole idea when they met in a debate in Uppsala on Monday.

"The point of circulating it for comments is that then our program, together with the SACO recommendations, could form a basis for a rather radical tax reform. And almost everyone, including the finance minister himself, agrees that we must do something about the marginal taxes."

Another Debate

About Ingvar Carlsson, the FP leader said that in two ideological speeches to the Food Workers Union and the LO congress he had expressed, on certain points, a very socialist tone.

Before the Food Workers Union last spring the prime minister said that the degree of equality in a society indicated its sense of justice. In an extension of this reasoning, total equality is the ultimate justice. Westerberg believes that this is an extremely socialist position.

"If that is an expression of Ingvar Carlsson's innermost thoughts, then there is a very great difference between us," said Westerberg.

The War of the Roses within SDP is a reality, he believes, and he points to the strains between private and public employees and between the public employees and Feldt.

The conflicts of recent years have shown that it is a myth that an SDP government would be better at wage negotiations than a nonsocialist government. It is difficult for all governments, regardless of party, to know how people will act.

"By their conduct during the election campaign the government created large expectations. They allowed LO to claim that there was room for large wage increases in the public sector. When the government after the election said there is no room, they have contributed to creating a bad climate and made negotiations more difficult," said Westerberg.

Lars Werner (VPK)

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 11 Oct 86 p 13

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "Lars Werner, VPK, Veteran Among Party Leaders: One-Time Tax Is Too Feeble"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Lars Werner, chairman of the Communist Left Party [VPK] is convinced that he will live to see the day when communists will take office as governors in Sweden. He would prefer to be the governor of Stockholm County.

Otherwise the VPK leader believes that society is treating its history carelessly--there is not a single painting or statue of any communist in the entire Riksdag Building.

Both governorships and images in the Riksdag have representatives of all the other Riksdag parties. But the Communist Left Party is not yet among them. Nor is it represented in the Foreign Relations Committee or the Armed Services Committee.

"But we will be in both places, most people agree on that," said Lars Werner confidently. "If we get a few additional seats we will be on all the committees (which prepare and decide most of the Riksdag's business)."

Monuments and governorships? Lars Werner believes that former VPK leader C. H. Hermansson could well have been offered the governorship of Stockholm. He was suitable for the job, but whether he would have accepted is another question, said his successor. And monuments?--yes, Lars Werner believes he could donate a painting of Sven Linderot, an early communist chairman after the party split in 1929. The painting hangs in the VPK office at Kungsholmen now.

If VPK is now counted among the democratic parties, where is the revolution?

No Romantics

"As I see it, a revolutionary change in Sweden is a revolution of power, so that the wage earners, the workers, get it at the expense of the owners of capital," said Lars Werner, and he has formulated it carefully.

"We are not revolutionary romantics. One could never carry out such a change in Sweden without having a popular majority in favor of it. A socialist Sweden cannot be created with blows in the Riksdag, it is a step by step process, fighting for justice in working life and in society.

Does Lars Werner believe, in the depth of his red heart, that the day will come when Sweden resembles his vision? Yes, he said, otherwise I would not bother with politics.

"But on condition that the labor movement does not continue to be as it is today, that VPK does not continue as a five percent party, and that SDP does not manage a good capitalist economy, but moves much more to the left."

Criticism of SDP

Lars Werner has a number of critical opinions of SDP. When he first came into the Riksdag in 1965, the SDP attitude was, "we lay out our proposals and the rest of you vote however you want to." Things still usually turned out the way SDP wanted them. But Lars Werner believes that a unicameral legislature with its weaker majorities has influenced SDP so that they are more realistic, even though there are still some who act as though SDP has its own majority.

The VPK leader believes that on certain questions SDP has gone to the right. He believes that the economic policies being followed now contain features which are pleasing to the nonsocialists.

"The main objective for SDP is to have a strong capitalist economy in which to make reforms. At the same time as a discussion is going on among the social democratic unionists about the distribution policies, companies are making record profits and the number of jobs is declining. That means we are turning to the right."

But in foreign policy the Social Democrats have gone to the left, said Lars Werner. They learned from the Vietnam war, which caused them to do an about-face toward the Vietnam movement.

"But of course there are rough spots in foreign policy--weapons export, for example"

Domestic policies are also turning to the right, according to the VPK leader. Collective support, which VPK and the nonsocialists want to abolish, is fostered mainly by the union representatives. Lars Werner, who is on leave from Byggetan for 3-year periods since 1965, has never had collective support, since the unions decide on their own how they want it.

"When I fought collective support it was the union Social Democrats I fought against.

But what about freedom of association?

"Today the discussion about freedom of association is equivocation. There must be limits to the freedom for an association to decide, and collective support conflicts with all principles of political freedom and freedom of association. If one uses the right of association to join individual members to a party he is overriding other and more important principles."

SDP, which VPK is now dealing with on the party secretary level,
will in an unambiguous way say that they will abolish collective support, said Lars Werner, because we are putting our own proposal for abolition before

the Constitutional Committee. We have a draft already prepared, it would be a falsehood to deny it.

Lars Werner is more pessimistic now than he was a couple of months ago about the possibility of reaching an agreement with SDP to abolish collective support. Pertinent to that situation are the statements of a couple of union representatives at the LO congress recently.

"A couple of statements like that, which indicate that the Social Democrats believe that they can settle things themselves, make it more difficult to reach an agreement. I have experienced that reaction in my own party, and also among Social Democrats who hope they will be able to solve the problem."

Social Democrat Valter Aman has said that the one-time tax, which will be a government proposition, is undemocratic. What do you think?

"Valter Aman is wrong," said Lars Werner.

"He has gradually approached the nonsocialist and conservative positions, and has actually always been somewhat of a 'petit bourgeois'."

The one-time tax is therefore not undemocratic. It is not in the least undemocratic to allow people who utilize an increase in value which they did not expect to get a little less from the enormous profits from interest.

"Now perhaps the private insurance firms will get the increased rate of return they really expected rather than one much higher."

"But the one-time tax is actually too feeble," said Lars Werner. The original idea of a real interest tax should be restated. Such a tax would have been better, according to VPK. The Social Democrats gave in too early, and did not get any help from LO.

New Program

VPK now has a proposal for a new party program under review which will be released across the country. A description of Sweden as a "small but hungry imperialist state" was deleted. But that does not really please Lars Werner, he would not have objected to seeing the passage remain.

"It is much easier today to explain the meaning of that expression than when it was written in 1972. Now there is South Africa, Sweden has participated in the exploitation of South Africa. And Sweden has not become a 'satiated imperialist state,'but even hungrier, and now invests still more abroad. We do not do this out of friendliness, but because we earn more money in the Third World."

How long will Lars Werner be the party leader? His predecessor C. H. Hermansson was in office for 11 years, and that period has passed for Lars Werner, who became party leader in 1975, and is the party leader in the Riksdag who has held office the longest, by a large margin.

Lars Werner said that of course the members decide how long the chairman will hold office.

"One should not seek to be the party leader, to have that ambition. And as long as I think that politics are exciting I will not quit. Just now it is exciting."

And if he should leave the post, Lars Werner can still be a bricklayer. He is a trained bricklayer, and could go out and work at his trade.

That is if he does not become the Governor of Stockholm, of course.

9287
CSO:3650/8

COMMENTARY EXPLORERS BRAIN DRAIN CAUSES

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 3 Aug 86 p 10

[Article by Attila Ilhan]

[Text] Thanks to the UN we are now able to 'borrow' the 'brains' that belonged to us in the first place. But before we say anything let's take a quick glance at a news item. This is how it reads:

UN has been trying to reverse the flow of the Turkish brain drain, albeit with a short-term perspective. Turkey, the focus of recent attention due to the number of its emigrating scientists, has provided rationale for a 'brain drain reversal' project for developing countries. In accordance with the TOKTEN project (Transfer of Know-How Through Expatriate Nationals) which started back in 76 and currently covers 17 countries, scientists are expected to work in 'their own' countries for short periods ranging from one week to three months.

UN has decreed that we, too, might benefit from the project by 'borrowing' 319 of 'our brains'! Even that is considered a big deal! One UN official has been heard saying :

It is quite difficult to make the expatriates return. They have acquired citizenship, some of them work with big resources and their status is quite good. Going home is simply not in the cards in the short-term.

That's it then! You raise a child, turn him into a man, place your educational system at his disposal, only to see him leave. Isn't there something wrong, drastically wrong in all this? The student who won first place in the university entrance examinations is reported to have said, "Our educational system is rotten", or something to that effect. How right he is. We know Turkey prides itself in possessing a wealth of trained manpower compared to most developing nations. But that is only half correct: Turkey lets half its 'brains' be captured by the 'infidel' and then, through the agency of UN, 'borrows' them back. What a predicament!

Whose Fault Is It?

Yes but why is it so? Lets recall the following observation made in this column on 5 Jul 83:

Our educational system has been producing a type which can be described as 'citified' intelligentsia. As if that isn't bad enough we have been compounding it, from the Tanzimat onwards, by equating the notion of 'contemporary' with unqualified acceptance of Western values, having also declared 'a la franca' as an absolute prerequisite. Thus the bureaucratic Turkish intellectual is completely cut-off from the rural culture while considering the possession of ersatz cultural values as a condition of joining the 'elite'.

Out of these observations, I seem to be drawing the following conclusions on 19 Jul 83:

Doesn't this mean that Turkish children, succumbed to a mêlange of American, French, English, and/or German influences all in the name of 'contemporary culture', have been 'co-opted'? ... And aren't we all aiding and abetting this 'co-optation' when we insist on giving priority to 'their' history, 'their' civilization and arts, always declaring the results of such comparisons in our disfavor? No wonder the so-called 'educated' intellectual begins seeing his national surroundings as inferior and becomes alienated. That is because the manners and refinement he seeks, the arts and literature he loves, the life he longs for do not exist in his 'national environment'! Where are they to be found, then? In the rarefied milieu of 'high' culture, of course. Maybe we can start tracing the brain 'drain' disaster down to its roots this way.

It is also difficult to endorse the view of the UN expert that there has been a decrease in the Turkish 'brain drain'. On the contrary, while previous losses were almost exclusively from the 'upper class' now due to the workers abroad and their children a significant drain has occurred among middle and lower stratas. Their formative environment happens to be totally 'foreign'!

Are we back to the question of 'Turkish identity' once again?

12466
CSO: 3554/172

NEW SYSTEM FOR VOCATIONAL EDUCATION

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 6 Aug 86 p 7

[Text] From 15 Sep onwards vocational education will be based upon a new system borrowed from Germany. The system aims at reorienting 65 percent of today's youth into vocational education, leaving 35 percent in mainstream education. The present situation is the exact opposite of that. Over 60 percent of students are in mainstream education and only 40 percent in vocational education.

Minister of Education, Youth and Sport Metin Emiroglu explained to MILLIYET the principles of the new system which is among the latest legislation to come out of the Assembly and is due to take effect on 15 Sep. According to the minister, from 15 Sep onwards following policies will be implemented:

Two Days School, Three Days Work

Students coming out of secondary schools and entering the industrial, commercial and tourism vocational lycees will attend courses in the first year of their three-year education, spending half of the following two years working in a factory. In the second and third years students will go to school two days a week and during the next three days will be working in jobs related to their chosen occupations while receiving pay from the employers. However, while the pay will be determined by the employer it will be no less than one-third of the minimum wage, adjusted to the length of service and in consideration of its education function.

Employers To Offer Jobs Mandatory

For workplaces employing more than 50 workers it will become mandatory to employ students on a three-days-a-week basis. The number of students finishing secondary level at vocational lycees is expected to reach 40,000 this year. Employers will make 5 percent of the jobs in their total workforce available for the student/workers. There is a way out of this though: An employer may choose to deposit to the Apprenticeship and Vocational Technical Education Development Fund a monthly sum equivalent to two-thirds of the minimum wage for each student/worker not employed, as a sort of penalty.

Money Accumulated in Fund

The main source of the Fund will be the shares issued to those filing Income and Corporation Tax forms at the rate of 1 percent of the said tax, as well as budget appropriations and monies from other sources, as it is done with other similar funds. The penalty-like fees, to be paid by employers not wanting to employ student/workers, will provide additional resources for the Fund.

The Fund will be used towards the opening and equipment of new vocational lycees and for the development of apprenticeship and vocational education. The Ministry reckons that starting next year the revenue accumulated in the Fund will bring about a great leap in vocational education.

Students graduating from industrial, commercial and tourism vocational lycees, having received one year of theoretical training and two years of combined course work and practical training, would have the option of entering the trade straight away and working for a year thereby becoming eligible for master status upon successfully passing the mastership test. But they also have the option of entering the university entrance examination and rejoining mainstream education. These two options will operate in a fashion similar to the Germans' double system.

Apprenticeship

For those who do not want to go to secondary school but prefer to train in an occupation straight away, there is another system envisioned by the Ministry. Provided they are over 13 and under 19, such individuals will be designated as apprentices under following conditions: The candidate apprentices will receive general and vocational education not less than eight hours while working part-time. They will be given additional theoretical training in accordance with principles set out by the Ministry. After completing this stage the candidates will attain apprentice status and their education will continue under the apprenticeship agreement to be contracted with the employer. 3-4 years under this status and the apprentices will face the foremanship test thus becoming eligible for foreman status and the foremanship certificate. Another 3 years, under foreman status, and they will become eligible for the mastership test. It would still be possible for those choosing the apprenticeship option after primary school to rejoin mainstream education at lycee level provided they pass the examination.

Vocational Schools

Among measures for developing vocational education are those pertaining to higher education. There are studies conducted within the Higher Education Council (HEC) framework which are directed to students who choose to attend higher vocational schools upon the completion of lycee. These students will be able to pursue their education partly at school and partly on the job under the new system. A limited implementation will start at certain higher vocational schools this year in accordance with an agreement signed between the Turkish Educational Foundation and HEC.

What Emiroglu Said

Explaining the main aspects of the new legislation Emiroglu said the following:

Those who partake in mainstream education, though they may have the diploma in their hand, do not find it so easy to get ahead in the business world. That is one of the reasons behind these structural changes . Rather than taking the factory to the school, we will be taking the school to the factory. In Turkey there is a distinct shortage of middle-level technical staff. There is more of a need for technicians and mechanics than for engineers. And we are not denying the option of rejoining mainstream education to those who have opted for vocational education. Those finishing vocational lycees will reserve the right to attend university but my feeling is that their chosen occupations will prove more attractive. I would say that 90 percent of them will not be going to the university.

Emiroglu described the Apprenticeship and Vocational Technical Education Development Fund as one of the most beneficial established so far. He quoted the German minister in charge of education affairs, saying: "We are not so rich as to educate our children at schools. We train them not in classrooms but on the factory floor." Pointing out that in many of the advanced countries of the world vocational education has become more widespread than mainstream education, Emiroglu declared that Turkey will be adopting the same course in the near future.

CAREER PATH


PRIMARY SCHOOL
3 years at work (APPRENTICESHIP)
CAREER (FOREMAN)
Mastership test
SECONDARY SCHOOL
CAREER (MASTER)
3-year vocational school with training (industrial, tourism, commercial)
LYCEE
Mastership test
One year training at work
University entrance exams
Mastership test
CAR EER (Technical Specialist)
3-years at work, vocational school
UNIVERSITY
CAREER (with degree)
Post-graduate education
CAREER (masters degree)

"Career path" will no longer be unilinear. Our mainstream educational model ---primary, secondary, lycee and university --- will be supplemented by multi-layered "horizontal passages" from 15 September onwards thus preparing young people for life in a more career-oriented manner.

12466
CSO: 3554/172

OZAL, MINISTRY SAID IN CONFLICT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 3 Aug 86 p 9

[Text] A recent booklet published by the Department of Religious Affairs titled Special Information and Prayers for Prospective Pilgrims has rekindled the apparent contradiction between the Ministry of Finance and Customs' announcement regarding the foreign exchange situation and the prime minister's denial that a foreign exchange shortage exists. The booklet also specifies "the amount of alcohol that can be brought into the country."

In page 150 of the guidebook, under a section titled The Ministry of Finance and Customs Announcements to Prospective Pilgrims, the point is made that our country is in economic difficulties. This is followed by a list of precautionary advice.

While Prime Minister Turgut Ozal declares at every opportunity, that the "Turkish economy is on the right track, there is no foreign exchange shortage and those who say otherwise are lying", the Ministry's announcement, printed in the guidebook, contains the following lines: "It is not possible to supply as much foreign exchange as may be demanded by prospective pilgrims and other citizens wanting to travel abroad. Prospective pilgrims may not bring into the country anything other than personal effects and gifts."

Amount of Alcohol Allowed

In the 'customs' section, page 152 of the Guidebook for Pilgrims published by the Department of Religious Affairs, another gaffe has been made. In this section, branded by some as an "example of frivolity and irresponsibility", it is noted that prospective pilgrims may be "allowed only five 1 litre bottles and seven 700ml bottles of alcoholic drinks" on their return home. It seems that the 'customs guide' was reviewed not even once before printing, was transferred from general regulations without any revision, and that nobody bothered to check the proofs. The 500,000 printed copies of the booklet, already distributed to the prospective pilgrims, was prepared by Irfan Yucel. Printed in 86, its selling price is TL 500.

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SOCIAL TURKEY

ASSEMBLY MEMBERS MAKE PILGRIMAGE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 August 1986 pp 1, 21

[Text] Ankara -- Nine deputies, ages ranging between 35 and 79, flew to pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia yesterday. Having arrived in suits and ties they changed into flowing robes and sandalettes in a small room within in the VIP section of the Esenboga airport. The group, comprising of 7 deputies from MP and one deputy each from CWP and FDP, was given a send off at the airport by Minister of State Mesut Yilmaz, Minister of Education, Youth and Sport Metin Emiroglu, Minister of Culture and Tourism Mukerrem Tascioglu, deputies, friends and relatives. The one SPP member among the farewell party was Kenan Nehrozoglu, there to send off his fellow townsmen Mardin deputy Abdulkerim Yilmaz Erdem (FDP). The Mecca-bound deputies said their farewells commenting, "One might go and never come back."

First-Timers Anxious

Making the pilgrimage for the third time, 35-year old Engin Cansizoglu (MP) was giving tips to the first-timers. When oldest of the group 79-year old Ankara deputy Kamil Tugrul Coskunoglu made the joking remark that he "might need some help when stoning the devil" Erdem (FDP) promised to help him.

Five of the nine deputies are said to be beneficiaries of a program started in 84, their pilgrimage being sponsored jointly by the Department of Religious Affairs and Turkish Religious Foundation. In accordance with a 84 decision issued by the Council of Pilgrimage Affairs every year 5 deputies are to be sponsored this way "to give them a chance to make personal observation about the pilgrimage - all expenses paid jointly by the Department and the Foundation. Deputies thus sponsored: Kamil Tugrul Coskunoglu (MP Ankara, chairman of the Assembly constitutional commission), Hikmet Bicenturk (MP Icel), Alaettin Firat (MP Mus), Mahmut Altunakar (CWP Diyarbakir), Abdulkerim Yilmaz Erdem (FDP Mardin). Those paying for the trip themselves: Engin Cansizoglu (MP Zonguldak), Ziya Ercan (MP Konya), Akif Kocaman (MP Gumushane) and Fecri Alpaslan (MP Agri). The wives of MP deputies Coskunoglu, Ercan and Firat are with the travelling party. Also travelling to the sacred soil are Tayyar Altikulac, director of the Department of Religious Affairs, Assistant Director Lutfi Senturk, and Irfan Yucel, chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs. The deputies will be returning home on 22 Aug.

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SOCIAL TURKEY

ACTIVITIES OF PILGRIMS REPORTED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Aug 86 pp 2, 14

[Text] Turkish pilgrims, having completed the Mecca part of the pilgrimage by stoning the devil in Mina for the third and last time have started heading for Medina. The obligatory circling of the Qaba, which comes after the sacred ritual at Arafat, Muzdelife and Mina, has already taken place. Upon returning to Mecca from Mina, our pilgrims have circled around the Qaba seven times with their guides ("mutavvif") leading, and then went to and from between Safa and Merva seven times thus completing the ritual.

From Qaba our pilgrims dispersed to their residences in various parts of Mecca, and devoted their time to prayer until the hour of departure for Medina. Meanwhile, the mobile hospitals and health centers, operating under the auspices of the Religious Affairs Department in the Arafat and Mina regions, also returned to Mecca.

The transportation of approximately 43,000 Turkish pilgrims to Medina has started the previous day. Officials from Religious Affairs have announced that the pilgrims would be travelling by bus to Medina, which is 460 kilometers away from Mecca, and be housed in residences once they get there. Following a visit to the gravesite of Prophet Mohammad, known as "Ravza-i Mutahhara", the return journey to Turkey will commence. Officials added that, "Those who are flying will return to Jedda while those travelling by bus will start off from Medina."

Photo Caption

1. Deputies with their wives -- Three of the nine deputies, in Saudi Arabia for the pilgrimage, had brought their wives along. From left to right: Ziya Ercan (MP - Konya), Kamil Tugrul Coskunoglu (MP - Ankara, chairman of the Assembly Constitutional Commission), Iffet Coskunoglu, Sidika Ercan, Aynur Firat, Alaattin Firat (MP -Mus).

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FUNDAMENTALISTS ABROAD DISAGREE ON IDEOLOGY

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 20 Aug 86 p 3

[Text] Ankara -- Reactionary elements operating outside the country with the aim of establishing a regime in Turkey based upon Islamic fundamental law (shari'a) have turned upon each other due to ideological differences. The organisation called "National Outlook", established among Turkish workers in Germany, Austria, Belgium and Holland, has been fractured into two halves due to disagreement among its officials.

It is reported by authoritative sources that a certain group of reactionaries were outraged by the spate of appointments, at leadership level, in the National Outlook -- i.e. an Iraqi doctor of Turkish origin Yusuf Zeynel Abidin became leader of the organisation, while Dr. Uveydi was appointed as his assistant, and Hasan Damar was brought in as secretary general. The last straw was the news that Secretary General Hasan Damar had gone to Russia together with the chairman of the defunct Turkish Labor Party, Behice Boran, presently residing outside the country.

Most Important Man Arrested

The arrest is reported of Osman Coskun who, having occupied very high positions in the Labor and Employment Organisation, had gone abroad and worked as a preacher in mosques founded by the National Outlook, also joining the Union of Islamic Associations and Religious Societies. Coskun was arrested while secretly trying to enter the country.

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FUNDAMENTALIST PROPAGANDA IN GREETING CARDS, VIDEOS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 16 Aug 86 p 3

[Text] Having seen "reactionary" propaganda conducted through video and cassettes, now we are seeing "calls to rebellion" trumpeted by greeting cards. Cards are sold in town squares, without any controls, bearing inflammatory inscriptions like,"Surely there must be a way of dying like a Moslem in a place where it is not possible to live like one."

Inadequate Controls

Reactionary forces have been able to make good use of the greeting card business in line with their political aims quite freely during the Sacrifice Festival season, owing to an absence of adequate controls. On the racks, alongside the scenery postcards are found cards inciting the people to rebellion, against the "regime and the Republic". On some of the cards there are pictures of Afghan mujahids with the words "We may not need mujahids but you might need a jihad (holy war)."

People are truly amazed when they first see the cards which can be considered little manifestos or a "call to rebellion". Looking at the cards with astonishment they say, "Even greeting cards are used with ulterior motives. Some individuals are openly trying to divide and sow dissension amongst our people."

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WESTERN CONCERN OVER ISLAMIC RESURGENCE

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 21-27 Jul 86 pp 30-31

[Text] Why is the West concerned about Turkey? Why does it half-heartedly point out that our interests lie with the Western camp while implying at every opportunity that we are Easterners and that the further away we stand from them better it would be? Why do they impose visa requirements and hardships on Turks at their border crossing points while deluding us with remarks such as "you act as my forward sentry against the threat from the north and do not worry about the rest"?

The Westerners do not believe that Turkey has made a full transition to democracy in the classical sense. They point out at every opportunity that democracy in Turkey still lacking in many ways.

They claim that historically Turkey has not been governed by stable governments, that the country has gone into decline because of sterile political activities and politicians who have never truly endorsed democracy and that consequently democracy is frequently interrupted. Beyond these, there is another prospect that unsettles them and makes them apprehensive: the growing strength of the radical Islamic groups in Turkey and activities aimed at establishing an Islamic regime in Turkey similar to those in Saudi Arabia and Iran. This has been deeply dismaying the Westerners. This vision, which has been unsettling both the West and us, surfaced openly at the Summer Assembly of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Council in Istanbul in recent weeks. European politicians used every opportunity to establish contact with Turks they met and queried them to gather information about our country. The most frequent questions concerned the influence of radical religious groups in Turkey. We are certain that they did not receive satisfactory answers or answers which agree with their views. They took their suspicions with them.

Surprising Pictures

It is not only the left-wing politicians who criticize the regime in Turkey and who are intimidated by radical religious movements. Right-leaning parliamentarians, particularly Christian Democrats, have also expressed concern. A German Christian Democratic parliamentarian showered a female hotel employee with questions, told her that he finds her attire and behavior very modern and that he did not think they could find such things in Turkey.

The same parliamentarian could not help saying that there are 10 times as many men on Turkey's streets than women. He even said that he saw the picture of a bearded man in Turkish newspapers that day and asked whether he was the new leader of Turkey's fundamentalists. By coincidence, that day one newspaper had published a large picture of Adnan Hoca on its front page. The German parliamentarian went so far as to think that he is [former National Salvation Party leader Necmettin] Erbakan's representative.

Swedish journalist Hjerten, who was in our country at the invitation of the Council of Europe, gathered information about Turkey rather than covering the conference. Apparently, the news agency he was affiliated with had instructed him to do so. He told the Turkish colleagues he could could get hold of: "I heard that there is a dervish lodge in Eyup and that religious rites are held there nightly. Would you please take me there?" The pitch of his pleadings reached a point when one Turkish journalist agreed to take him there. But the Turkish journalist did not know about this lodge in Eyup. After investigating the matter for some time he agreed to take the Swedish reporter there. Everyone he talked to in Eyup told him that such a place did not exist and that they had only heard about a Koranic course. In any case, the activities of the said Koranic course beyond its stated purpose had been halted by the Religious Affairs Chairmanship.

U.S. Apprehension

The allegation that radical religious groups are active in Turkey has caused deep apprehension in the United States. Both the White House and the CIA are scrutinizing this issue carefully and have expressed concern over the growth of the Islamic movement. Of course, the United States sees the issue from a different standpoint. Turkey is a Middle Eastern country. It has a secular government. This characteristic sets it apart from Arab countries. Consequently, its relations with Israel may improve in the near future. Although Turkey and Israel do not have ambassadorial level diplomatic relations at the moment, these relations may be improved in the future and Israel may rescued from its isolation in the region. The CIA and the Pentagon have submitted numerous reports on this issue to the White House.

Even the European conservative parties, which have praised the economic policies of the Ozal government lavishly, have criticized Ozal for not opposing the extremist religious groups sufficiently and for harboring in his party parliamentary deputies and politicians who have made concessions to such groups.

Evren: 'Women Should Not Veil Their Faces'

Last week, the President brought a certain measure of clarity to this controversy. President Kenan Evren spoke about the attire of women in Erzurum and its environs where he has gone to work during part of the summer. He said that the practice of covering the women's faces with veils has nothing to do with Islam and that women open their faces during Haj. At one point he even indirectly cautioned Prime Minister Ozal.

About the same time, Ozal said: "There is democracy in Turkey. We cannot interfere in people's attires." In a speech the next day, Evren said:

"Should we allow everyone freedom on the issue of dress, so that the fez may return and everyone wears turbans?" Various circles interpreted these remarks as a veiled response to Ozal.

The refusal of the Westerners to hear these modern views of the person occupying the highest office in the Turkish Republic and their insistence to see a few local religious activities as evidence for their suspicions has naturally unsettled the Turkish public.

On some issues, the Westerners view even Ozal with suspicion. For example, they point out that his brother was a parliamentary deputy and cabinet minister of the defunct National Salvation Party [NSP], that he still has trade relations with Arab countries and that even Ozal himself was a NSP parliamentary candidate from Izmir. They state at every occasion that Mehmet Kececiler, a deputy leader of the Motherland Party [MP], is a former NSP mayor of Konya and that his supporters are highly influential in the MP. The reendorsement by the National Assembly of a law unilaterally permitting the sale of property to Arabs is seen as proof of their suspicions.

Article 2 of the Constitution states: "The Turkish Republic is a democratic and secular government of social law which is based on the basic principles stated at the beginning, which remains loyal to Ataturk's nationalism and which respects human rights within the framework of social peace, national solidarity and justice." Article 10 of the Constitution says: "Everyone is equal before the law regardless of language, race, color, sex, political beliefs, philosophical beliefs, religion, sect and other characteristics." However, these articles are not found satisfactory by the West. The West is concerned that Khomeynis may breed in Turkey and seize the government.

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SOCIAL TURKEY

SECULARISM SAID TO BE EMBATTLED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Iskender Ozturanli, lawyer with the Izmir Bar Association]

[Text] The Turkish person, the Turkish intellectual, the Turkish thinker has been asking the following question of himself for years: Where are we going? He then turns and asks the same question of the politicians: Where are you going and what do you intend to do?

During the 1950's the late Yasar Nabi Nayir dealt with this issue quite extensively. The question then was, "Where are we going and at which point of the dark night do we find ourselves?" Nayir examined the probable costs of deviating from Ataturk and Ataturkism in a detailed fashion. Nobody seems to have listened. The government of the day managed to do away, in a few months, with what had been introduced by Ataturk. Turkish society had to go through some bitter times. First the Arabic call to prayer started emanating out of the minarets. The longings of former times -- which found poetic expression in the stanza, "A country where the call to prayer is in Turkish/ Where the villager understands the meaning of the prayer" -- faded away. Then the fortresses of the Ataturk revolution -- People's Houses, People's Hearths, Village Institutes -- were demolished. They have not been replaced. The Turkish youth, the Turkish peasant were left in a vacuum.

And "Nature abhors a vacuum." The vacuum created by reactionaries would be filled by progressives, and the vacuum created by progressives would be filled by reactionaries. Unfortunately, with the probable exception of one or two years during the 27 May revolution, the vacuum has always been filled by the reactionaries in our country since 50. Somehow it has not been possible to establish the hegemony of the progressives. The longings of Ataturk has gone unfulfilled.

Ataturk had started out by founding the secular state, and he was quite successful in that. Those in charge of the state administration used to apply the same laws to themselves as it applied to others in matters relating to exploitation of religion and the introduction of religious sentiments into the political arena.

The question of the secular state and secular law is an issue of who is in charge. So long as the administrative echelons are composed of steadfast people, that would suffice to resolve the problem. As to the question of secularism in society, that is a social issue. For its realization it would be necessary for all stratas of society to espouse the secular mentality.

Had we been able to march in the footsteps, the path of Ataturk no doubt we would have brought about the secular society. And we could have reached "the level of contemporary civilization". But we did not walk along that path, or we were not able to. With votes in mind we have given concessions from secularism, and went backwards instead of forwards. Getting further away from the concept the modern state we become a state where religion weighs heavy. And we have occasionally endangered the secular state in the process. This danger has acquired larger dimensions today as compared to previous periods.

The 1982 Constitution, despite its negative aspects regarding basic freedoms, has brought a positive bent to the issue of attaining the secular state and society. The 1961 Constitution merely specifies that "the constitutional clause stipulating the form of state as a republic cannot be changed, or even proposed that it be changed" (clause 9), whereas the 1982 Constitution has brought the stipulation that not only the republic but also the principle of secularism cannot be changed, or even proposed that it be changed (clause 4). But, despite these safeguards, in the real world the principle of secularism has been trampled upon in an unprecedented manner during the last few years. And by successive governments themselves. Compulsory religion courses in primary and secondary schools, efforts to introduce Arabic to the lycee curriculum, forcing our young women to wear long skirts and trousers during the 19 May Youth and Sports Festival -- all these happen to be the product of such a mentality.

Those who start out with that mentality would no doubt convert certain rooms in municipality buildings, ministries and other official organizations into prayer halls. They would attempt to establish mosques in the garden of the General Assembly or at international trade fairs. Mandatory fasting would be introduced, and the speaker of the Assembly would hold pre-fast and break-fast dinners inside the Assembly building together with other deputies. International conferences would be opened with religious incantations -- "Bismillah" -- and the national anthem would be followed by verses from the Koran.

Illegal religious education has spread all around. Educational establishments, where wearing the 'takke' (oriental headgear) and the 'shalvar' (loose pantaloons) is the norm, are being financed by municipalities. Koran courses, some secret and some operating behind a facade, can be found all over the country. The number of students wearing chador and headscarf is increasing every single day. Those who want the Shari'a reintroduced, followers of the Nur sect, Naqshibendis, followers of the Suleyman sect are all free to roam around the country. While newly-introduced legislation, 'Encouragement of Social Aid and Solidarity', is directed towards the welfare of the poor, the same framework allows the establishment of religious foundations with all authority vested in men of religion. From now on, poor people in a district will be specified by religious officials. This is the first instance of such a responsibility being given to men of religion since the founding of the republic. Religious officials who until now have been charged exclusively with providing religious services will be used in running the affairs of the state. This is a heavy blow to the secular republic of Ataturk.

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PSYCHIATRIST DENOUNCES FALSE RELIGIOUS TEACHING

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 3 Aug 86 pp 11, 19

[Interview with Professor Mualla Ozturk, Ankara University Faculty of Medicine, by correspondent Emin Colasan; date and place not specified]

[Question] Professor, you are a specialist in child psychology. You have scientifically established that mental illnesses are produced in little children, even very small children, due to a misconceived religious education. How does this happen?

[Answer] Mr. Colasan, in our clinical observations at the child psychiatry department we have noticed a notable increase in the number of children attending religious education establishments, licensed or unlicensed. Due to a misconceived fear of God that is instilled in them, and misconceptions disseminated in the Koran courses and in our schools even very small children have started coming to us. This, of course, is a sorry state of affairs. We don't recall children this small being brought to us before. Nowadays even 4-5 year old children are being brought by their parents.

[Question] To what do you attribute this?

[Answer] In recent years clandestine religious education has been on the increase. In certain Koran courses, children are being taught mistaken notions about religion and are getting frightened as a result.

[Question] What kind of symptoms do you observe?

[Answer] Heavy mental symptoms. Overanxiety, lack of inner peace, depression, certain fixations, compulsive behavior like perpetual handwashing, spitting, touching here and there, constant speaking, shouting and screaming, hitting and breaking things. In short all kinds of deviant behavior. When we look more closely we see that at the bottom of all these is "an excessive fear of God" instilled in the children. Of course, families are also largely responsible for this.

[Question] How is the fear of God instilled in the children?

[Answer] It is done to enforce discipline among children. For instance a child who doesn't eat or sleep, or engages in mischief is told, "God sees you. He will shortly punish you. God will turn you into stone. God will burn you in hell." These are quite frightening things for children. Adults are thus exploiting the child's propensity towards being easily frightened. And it is not only the fear of God. A child who has done some mischief is told things like, "Bring my jacknife so that I will circumcise him, put him into the snake-filled room, throw him into the bottomless pit." In fact, all forms of fear have harmful mental effects. But children can find ways and means to escape from or overcome known and visible forms of fear. For instance they can avoid the fear of punishment by behaving nicely. They can mollify their fear of animals by staying away from them. However, the most effective forms of fear, both for children and for adults, are those which are unknown, invisible, insidious, and seemingly inevitable -- e.g. microbes, illnesses, death, disasters and so on. But above all else are misconceived notions and fear of God.

[Question] How is the fear of God being instilled?

[Answer] As I mentioned before, from the time the child starts walking he is confronted with the concept of 'God'. Many adults say things like, "God turns into stone those who don't listen to their mother...burns in hellfire those who don't eat their food...cuts the tongue of liars." All this has the effect of instilling a misconstrued notion and fear of God. The natural curiosity of the child propels him to investigate who this God is that he has heard so much about, and where it is to be found, and what it looks like. But he cannot yet understand these abstract notions. What the child hears about God only serves to frighten him.

[Question] Have you been asking these children, brought to you for therapy, what their conception of God is?

[Answer] Of course we do. The most common answer is this: "God is everywhere. He sees us and hears us. He knows our wrongdoings. He will most certainly hand out our punishment when we die, or maybe before that." We had a 3-year old patient who used to say: "God is on the ceiling. God does not want me to do any mischief." He then grabbed a toy gun and started firing towards the ceiling. When we asked him what he was doing he said, "The enemy does not love God, they are firing at him." He was pretending to be the enemy firing at God because he would not dare do it himself. If he did God would be angry with him. We have another patient, a 4-year old. He often interrupts his meals or play, gets up and salutes with his head. Making him talk with our playacting method we arrived at the following conclusion: The child wants to hit back at God who is constantly watching him. But fearing that God will punish him because the all-knowing God knows all about these inner feelings and thoughts, he feels the need to placate God after every urge to do him harm. So he salutes God with his head. We talked about this condition with the child's parents. We learned that his grandfather tries to prevent any undesirable action on the part of the child by invoking the fear of God, and that he often narrates religious stories to him. All this means that a misconceived fear of God is being instilled in children from an early age. In their eyes God becomes something to be feared, someone who is capable of all kinds of harm. This goes on throughout their growing years. They see God as a dangerous being from whose wrath it is impossible to flee. This is dead wrong.

[Question] Professor, are we saying that in Turkey children are being fed with a misconceived image of God?

[Answer] Most certainly, yes. Instead of being presented as a being to be loved, respected, or as someone who can do good things, who can protect and reward, God is introduced as an evil concept. Children are fed the idea of a God which punishes even the most innocent acts, and they subsequently become mentally sick. "If you don't love mother, God would punish you", is one form. It is natural for a child not to love his mother from time to time. Another example, "If you don't eat your meal, God will turn you into stone." A child, almost by definition, cannot be expected to eat his meals every time.

[Question] What actually takes place inside the child under such circumstances?

[Answer] What would happen when you continually frighten the child with a concept? He would not love the source of that fear. Thus the child begins to have negative feelings towards God. Anger is accompanied by illnesses. A need to curse God and other fixations take hold in his mind. Then panic sets in because he knows he is thinking about God whom he fears so much. The expected punishment from God causes him to panic. One cannot overstate how profound this fear and panic is. The child no longer wants to play, learn, eat or drink. He begins holding on to the skirt of his mother (or the kilt of his father!). Let me give you an example. An 11-year old boy, a boarding student at a Koran course, comes home for the holidays. On the very first night he goes into a panic seizure due to anxiety, great discomfort and invisible fears. The parents brought the child to us. Our examination revealed the following: The child was supposed to go shopping with his father. But when the father went out without taking him he felt deep anger inside. But since feeling angry towards the father is a sin and thus punishable by God, he started asking, "When will God punish me?" After a while this turned into panic. They brought us the child a week later. He had lived in this condition throughout the week. I'll give you another example. They brought us a 14-year old girl who was a day-student in a Koran course. She was complaining about the bad thoughts stuck in her mind, and her attendant fears. She used to wash her hands compulsively, could not go outside the house, couldn't watch TV, was constantly apathetic, had trouble sleeping. During examination she told us about her fears of "visual fornication". They had explained in the Koran course what visual fornication meant. I first heard of the expression from that girl. Afraid of visual fornication, she avoided eye contact with people on her way from school to her home, and to ensure that she walked with downcast eyes. In the Koran course she was fed with the idea that viewing men on the TV screen also constitutes visual fornication. So she began listening to the musical programs on TV from the adjoining room without looking at the screen. During examination it transpired that this child wanted to become a singer. But due to an excessive amount of self-repression she was seized by panic and consequently was brought to us.

[Question] Very interesting. Well, professor, what kind of education should parents be giving to their small children so as to maintain their mental health?

[Answer] Here I would like to send a message to the parents. The earlier they start giving religious education the more risk they create for their children. This is especially true below the age seven.

[Question] Well, what is the ideal religious education for children then?

[Answer] First of all it is necessary to present God as a being which rewards rather than punishes, and which loves, protects and forgives. And religious education should never stand in the way of mental development. For this there is a need for competent teachers of religious education.

[Question] Can you tell us anything about the present educators? Generally speaking, that is.

[Answer] Shall I give you an example?

[Question] Of course, please go ahead.

[Answer] Some of our patients, though not attending Koran courses, have taken religion courses at the primary and secondary schools. We are told of an instance where an instructor of religion had said, in the classroom: "Even the earth rejects the corpse of a sinner. Such corpses stay out in the open." He also told the following story in class. A sinner dies, so they bury him. But at that instant the earth starts shaking and ejects him out. However hard they try to bury him the earth still ejects him out. This is an instance of what has been happening in religion courses. A child from that class came to us as a patient. We had to administer therapy to him. Yet another example: A religion instructor tells a story that God has three angels one of which is responsible for announcing the doomsday. The angel is supposed to blow a whistle just before doomsday arrives. After hearing the story the child was becoming sick whenever he heard the sound of a whistle. He would not go out lest he hears a whistle, won't allow the door opened, would not even watch TV or listen to the radio. I happen to believe that there are many good things that could be taught these children in religion courses. Instead of instilling fear and disgust they should be presenting the beautiful and loving aspects of religion. The last two instances I mentioned, unfortunately, are examples of religion instructors at our state schools. Their misconceived teachings are responsible not only for making the children sick but also constitute disrespect to our religion and to God. Isn't that so? Aren't these things unfair to God? We are simply planting the seeds of fear, reinforce the impulse to curse and swear, foster timidity and hate. Humans don't love the things they fear. They avoid things they fear and try to eliminate them. This is a law of nature. Anything otherwise contrevenes the laws of nature. I mean to say that let our children receive religious instruction but it is absolutely necessary to do away with this kind of fanatic teaching that inspires nothing but fear and disgust.

[Question] Professor, what kind of numbers are we talking about regarding cases brought to your attention concerning fear of God?

[Answer] I have brought some statistics with me. We have studied 2,000 primary school children -- not our patients, regular school children. 54 percent of them have a pernicious fear of God.

[Question] The kind that we have been talking about?

[Answer] Yes. That is quite a high proportion, unfortunately. Another study was made among our patients which indicated that 70 percent of them are subject to the same fear. Though certainly not responsible for every kind of illness, fear of God instilled in children is a leading cause of mental illness. I am trying to demonstrate this to you using scientific data.

[Question] Well, professor, what about those small children who find themselves in Koran courses taught by individuals with very questionable credentials, and are left to the mercy of local preachers? Could it be that these children, in the clutches of that ignorant and fanatic mob, may have been suffering more damage than the rest?

[Answer] Yes, there are more of them that come to us. Pre-school children are coming...One of them was brought to us with complaints of excessive crying, sleeplessness, lack of appetite, clinging to the mother, trying to keep the mother from moving about. She would not allow anyone to talk to the mother, crying, "Talk only to me. I'm not swearing at God, am I? I'm not a bad girl, am I?" During examination it transpired that there was a tower near her house where an intermittent light flickered, changing from red to green. At home the child was together with her grandparents quite often. Apparently the grandfather had told her, "When the light is red that means God doesn't love you because you committed some wrong. When the light is green it means God loves you." Poor child had become a wreck watching the lights turn red and green.

[Question] Are there many Preacher School students that come to you?

[Answer] Yes many. Teachers telling strange and frightful stories are found there too. They manage to put the children off education and off the concept of God. That is obvious loud and clear.

[Question] Professor, so far we have talked about religious education. You have explained that certain errors, deliberate or unknowing, can have very negative effects on children. Are there things that have negative effects on the mental well-being of children other than religious education?

[Answer] There is also the problem of harmful publications. Harmful to children, that is. Of course, the responsibility lies with the press and TV. We have many children coming to us who have been upset by what they read in newspapers, or watch on TV. We observe some very negative developments in this area.

[Question] Like what, professor?

[Answer] For instance, we see headlines and news items like 'Famous Mafia Godfathers'. Essentially worthless individuals are being presented with large headlines and pictures as if they were somebody. What is the purpose of all this? I am not able to say. Children receive very negative influences from such publications. The Mafia godfather image exerts a pull over children -- maybe not all but many of them. Murders, sexual publications. The Mafia godfather image exerts a pull over children -- maybe not all but many of them. Murders, sexual perversions, rapes and crime stories are being printed with large headlines and color pictures. Is our press fully conscious of the potential damage in all this?

[Question] I don't think so, not at all. Unfortunately, some newspapers indulge in sensationalism to whip up sales.

[Answer] Anything that is good or beautiful, any news item that may provide an example for children either isn't printed, or if it is, gets squeezed into one column.

[Question] How do such news items affect children -- take murder stories for example?

[Answer] There are subconscious suggestions. Particularly when our press prints the story as if the murder was an act of heroism...

[Question] How come?

[Answer] Lets say it is a crime of passion. Saw his mother with a man and killed either of them. Presenting this man as a hero would make it an attractive option for children reading such stories. It would increase the child's propensity to crime. Let me give you another example. We have lately been seeing in our newspapers, particularly during the report card season, certain admonitions such as: "Be careful with your children, they may commit suicide." And do you know that after the appearance of such items in the press suicides among children, particularly the smaller ages, have increased? What the press is doing is reminding the child of such things. In a certain sense, to the child, such admonitions come to mean, "If your report card is bad, commit suicide and thereby punish your mother and father."

[Question] What about TV, how does it manage to be harmful?

[Answer] Mr. Colasan, our children are being given a wrong cultural injection by the TV series which have nothing to do with our culture. I don't know whether you've read it. It is reported in the press that in many parts of Anatolia, children are being named after Sue Ellen, Pamela. What could the children do when adults start identifying with TV heroines? The child takes after his mother, father and his immediate environment. Though such things do not upset his mental balance they nevertheless affect his development in undesirable ways.

[Question] We are also watching murders, bank robberies in the films on TV. How do these affect children?

[Answer] Of course, the influences could hardly be positive. Serial films are more significant in this respect. TV series are more dangerous. A child sees a movie once and then forgets about it. But just think of it, our TV has been showing series like **Dallas** and **Flamingo Road** to the Turkish people for weeks on end. Millions of our children have also been exposed to the evil goings on in these shows. This is nothing short of transplantation of a foreign culture to Turkish society.

[Question] Now that our government has opened up Turkey to the world these are only to be expected, aren't they? Our economy is tied to the outside world, our money is tied to the dollar, our prestige is tied to IMF reports... What's wrong with a little cultural bondage? In watching the J.R. of **Dallas** at least we are reminded of the bribers amongst ourselves, and those rogues who con the state treasury and get away scot free! I will ask, professor, one more thing. Our government has declared many publications as 'harmful'. For instance, it is now forbidden to show women's nipples in pictures. They are now covered with stripes. Are these kind of pictures really harmful for children?

[Answer] No, it does not affect as much as the other things I mentioned earlier. After all it is only a picture, not a continuous scene. The child takes one look at it and moves on to the next thing.

[Question] Adults also know this but they are playing to the voters. They took this decision as a vote-getter.

[Answer] I have never seen a child becoming ill on account of seeing the picture of a semi-nude woman.

[Question] Is it possible that nude pictures of women may, in fact, have a positive influence?

[Answer] I don't quite follow. How could it be positive?

[Question] I don't know either. I am simply asking your opinion. Well, for example, adults are known to shore up their morale by looking at such pictures, so similar effects might conceivably take place in children.

[Answer] I really don't know. I have no scientific data or research findings available. But I do know that children would look at these pictures and move on.

[Question] Mrs. Ozturk, I would also like to ask the following. A subject that is continually being taught at our schools is that of Ataturk. Every student, no matter which grade, is taught about Ataturk. Ataturk is ever-present on TV and radio, often several times a day. I wonder whether there are any problems associated with Ataturk that might affect the children's mental health.

[Answer] You have touched upon a very important subject. I do not recall a child seeking therapy due to an Ataturk-related situation. I will give you an example though. We were treating a child having problems at school. During the treatment the subject of Ataturk came up. Complaining about classes he said, "If I open my mouth Ataturk will flow out through my teeth." Of course this was an extremely rude statement. But if you ask me, he wasn't the one responsible for it. I wonder how we presented Ataturk to this child. How did we approach him in our effort to make him love Ataturk so that the child had become like that?

[Question] Yes, why?

[Answer] And why not? The child was 13-14 years old. We had been trying to teach a generation, far removed in years, about Ataturk. It is quite natural for us to try. It is our duty to try. But it is also a question of method and style. How are we teaching our children about Ataturk? We start with 6-year olds in primary school. We make them memorize the major events of Ataturk's life, from cradle to grave, along with 20-30 historical dates. We make reference to the 1800's, 1900's adressing schoolchildren barely grappling with two-digit numbers in mathematics. We tell them to learn and memorize these dates. That is far beyond their mental capacity, and consequently, they view Ataturk not as the savior of the fatherland but someone who causes hardships for them. This is repeated year after year, every time losing further in importance and dignity. So our efforts in teaching Ataturk to young generations becomes counter-productive. As you know, there are two major principles in education: One is, knowledge which is hard to acquire is difficult to love and learn. And the second, a subject repeated too often loses its attraction. As I mentioned earlier, in reference to God, one could either teach by inducing willingness and liking, or ram down their throats. We forget we are teaching primary school students whose concept of numbers does not exceed between 20-29. Ataturk was born in 1881 and died in 1938 -- these dates have to be memorized. These are numbers the child has never heard of and they confuse the child. Would a child love a subject which is so hard for him? These subjects should be fine-tuned according to age, level and willingness to learn.

[Question] Professor, the same thing applies to us adults as well. We hear about Ataturk on TV every day whether warranted or not. Although we love him with full awareness, even we sometimes feel like screaming, "Enough!"

[Answer] Of course... This happens to us as well. You can be assured that I know what is being taught at these schools. If we take a child who doesn't know anything about Ataturk -- who he is, what he has done -- and give him an assignment of 20-30 historical events to be memorized subject to examination you shouldn't be surprised when you hear him say, upon reaching age 13, that Ataturk would spurt through his teeth if he were to open his mouth. I was personally very offended by that instance but I did not get angry with the child. I pitied him.

[Question] What other factors are there, apart from what we have already discussed, that are causing problems for children?

[Answer] The education system is causing a lot of problems for them. The system is based upon memorization. No production of new ideas... Of curse we see the results all around. There is a pervasive apathy towards school. School for children is a place where they have to go. Unfortunately, children do not like school. Actually there should be close coordination between schools and psychiatry clinics. Instead, most teachers are preventing children from coming to us. The interesting thing is that this reaction comes more from teachers of schools catering to wealthier students. Teachers of poor students bring the children themselves.

[Question] Professor, finally, what would be your message concerning the fear of God we talked about earlier? What are you to say to parents and instructors of religion courses?

[Answer] Human beings don't love the things they fear. They avoid what they fear. Parents and instructors are going against their ostensible purpose when they instill fear of God in their children. They should be instilling not fear of God but love of God. Fear of God not only upsets the children mentally but helps foster negative sentiments and thoughts toward God. Religion instructors, if they feel love and respect for Islam, are obliged to ensure that children learn about our religion willingly and with love. If methods of fear are used then the child would follow the courses just to get a passing mark, without any liking or willingness. He would then lose his respect for God and religion. These were the scientific findings of our study conducted among children -- both the healthy and the mentally upset ones.

[Question] I thank you for these very interesting explanations.

12466
CSO: 3554/175

SPECIAL POLICE FOR STRIKE CONTROL

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 pp 3, 19

[Text] Ankara -- A special security force will be maintained for use during strikes and lock-outs, and all the events and negotiations will be voice-recorded or filmed whenever necessary. The regulations, prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, specifying measures to be taken during strikes and lock-outs were published in the Official Gazette and came into effect yesterday. Accordingly, local administrations will maintain a special security force at the ready and with a capability to intervene should it be necessary during strikes and lock-outs. The force would be kept at the locale where events might break out. If necessary, actions during strikes and lock-outs, as well as negotiations between the parties would be recorded by voice recording instruments, photo or movie cameras. The regulations give authority to governors and district governors for establishing a 'Strike and Lock-out Consultative Council' concerned with necessary measures and their implementation. The Council would be discussing probable events during a strike or lock-out, as well as the necessities and deficiencies.

Furthermore, governors and district governors will prepare, depending on the particularities of each workplace, either a separate plan for every workplace or a general framework of measures concerning strikes and lock-outs, and will be authorized to send the plan to the commander of the military unit in closest proximity. During strikes and lock-outs, local security forces will be used initially, and if they prove inadequate commando units of the gendarmerie will be brought into action.

Yilmaz's Reaction

Sevket Yilmaz, chairman of Turk-Is (Turkish Confederation of Labor) has reacted strongly to the regulations prepared by the Ministry of the Interior, 'On Measures To Be Taken by Civil Authorities During Strikes and Lock-Outs'. Said Yilmaz: "Turkey is fast becoming a police state."

12466
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HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION FOUNDED

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 21-27 Jul 86 p 25

[Text] "The Peasants Will Be Indexed," "The Students Will Be Indexed," "Hunger Strike at the Adana Prison," "30 Death Incidents at the Diyarbakir Military Prison," "The Confessions of Torturer Police Officer Sedat Caner," "Surprise Witness at the Siddik Bilgin Trial." The issue of human rights, which has been discussed in these and other similar news stories for a long time, has persisted on the political agenda of Turkey and the West. The persistence of the controversy and the failure to take satisfactory measures have led to a new initiative on this issue: The Human Rights Association.

The work to found the Human Rights Association began 2 to 3 months ago. The participants in this work ranged from intellectuals--so called because of the Intellectuals' Petition--to members of the Association of the Families of the Arrested and Convicted and the defunct Modern Lawyers Association. Although at the outset it was planned to have a broad-based participation, the group of founders was kept limited out of concerns that the completion of all founders' documents would take time and practical problems could crop up. Thus numerous individuals who wanted to be founders were excluded. It is expected that this large group will become members of the association later on.

The latest founders' list has 98 founders. Ten of these founders, including attorneys Nevzat Helvaci and Erbil Tusalp, applied to the Office of the Governor of Ankara to form the Human Rights Association and submitted the necessary forms to Deputy Governor Cengiz Bulut. When a receipt for the forms was not given, Bulut said: "We only record them here. The receipts are given by the Security Directorate." When Bulut said that many associations have been formed recently and that, however, they were later closed, Nevzat Helvaci said: "Please do not talk about closing down so soon."

While the group of founders was leaving the Office of the Governor, it was observed that an official at the exit ensured that they walk out one by one thus helping the plainclothes policemen to film them on videotape.

After the association is granted the status of a corporation it will be able to open branches in various Turkish cities and will be able to register members.

The association's Founders' Council elected the following members to the General Administrative Council: Nevzat Helvaci (General President), Leman Firtina (Deputy General President), Akin Birdal (Secretary General), Aykut Bascil (Deputy Secretary General), Vecihi Timuroglu (General Treasurer), Nuri Karacan, Bekir Doganay, Ibrahim Acan, Erbil Tusalp, Gulten Akin, Saziment Sulekoglu. The members elected to the Supervisory Council are: Ali Bozkurt, Julide Gulizar and Izzet Eray. The members elected to the Honorary Council are: Halit Celenk, Cevat Geray, Veli Devecioglu, Emin Deger, Didar Sensoy. The remaining founders of the association, who include well-known names from the left such as Mehmet Ali Aybar, Aziz Nesin and Murat Belge, are:

Adalet Agaoglu, Adnan Ozyalciner, Ahmet Abakay, Ahmet Bozkurt Caglar, Ahmet Hulusi Kirim, Ahmet Tahtakilic, Akin Birdal, Ali Aydemir, Ali Bozkurt, Ali Sirmen, Alpay Kabacali, Aslan Baser Kafaoglu, Aydin Aybay, Aydin Erdogan, Aykut Bascil, Ayla Akbal, Ayse Simen, Aziz Nesin, Bekir Dogunay, Cahit Talas, Cevat Geray, Didar Sensoy, Emil Galip Sandalci, Emin Deger, Erbil Tusalp, Ercument Ahiroglu, Fatma Cakir, Fatma Umit Sezer, Fevzi Bahattin Argun, Filiz Karakus, Gencay Gursoy, Gulizar Caglayan, Gulten Akin, Gungor Aydin, Haldun Ozen, Halit Celenk, Haluk Gerger, Hamdi Konur, Handan Koc, Hidir Goktas, Hikmet Kocak, Huseyin Ekici, Husnu Ondul, Isik Ozgenturk, Ibrahim Acan, Ibrahim Saydan, Ibrahim Yetkin, Ibrahim Tezan, Ismail Sami Cakmak, Ismet Ozdal Demirdogen, Ismet Pekdemir, Izzet Eray, Julide Gulizar, Kazim Bayraktar, Kemal Kelesoglu, Leman Firtina, Mahmut Tali Ongoren, Mehdi Bektas, Mehmet Ali Aybar, Mehmet Ali Ozpolat, Melahat Sarptunali, Merih Sezen, Mihriban Kirdok, Murat Belge, Muserref Toper, Nebi Barlas, Neriman Deniz, Nevzat Helvaci, Niyazi Agirnasli, Nuri Karacan, Nurkut Inan, Nusret Fisek, Oktay Akinci, Osman Ergin, Osman Oge, Ozcan Oktem, Perihan Akcam, Ragip Zarakoglu, Recep Cure, Rona Aybay, Sacide Cekmeci, Sadik Gurbuz, Sennur Ozyalciner, Serap Yakut, Suphi Gursoytrak, Saziment Sulekoglu, Sirin Tekeli, Sukran Akin, Sukran Ketenci, Tahsin Sulekoglu, Vahide Acan, Vecihi Timuroglu, Veli Devecioglu, Yavuz Onen, Yucel Akinci, Yucel Sayman, Zarif Sel and Zeki Tavscancil.

9588
CSO: 3554/26

SOCIAL TURKEY

CITIZENS DEPRIVED OF PASSPORTS

Ankara YANKI in Turkish 21-27 Jul 86 pp 26-29

[Text] It was the autumn of 1985. Folk poet Ruhi Su was fighting a crucial battle against the fatal disease he had contracted and he was swinging back and forth between life and death. He had been given every type of medical treatment available in Turkey, but his health had not improved. Treatment overseas could perhaps offer hope or at least prolong his life. The necessary applications were filed with the pertinent authorities to enable Ruhi Su to obtain medical treatment overseas, but the Ministry of the Interior found his travel overseas "objectionable." After numerous pleas from Turkey and abroad for several days, the Ministry of the Interior and the Istanbul Martial Law Command were eventually persuaded to grant special permission for the issuance of passport for "a single journey." By that time, however, the rapidly advancing disease had made the passport unnecessary.

Less than a year after that incident, Attorney Orhan Apaydin, a former parliamentary deputy and a former president of the Istanbul Bar Association, suffered the same fate as Ruhi Su: his application for a passport for medical treatment abroad was denied on grounds that he had been a defendant in the Peace Association trial. After numerous petitions and pleas, his hopes of obtaining a passport were improved thanks to the addition, by the Council of Ministers, of a sentence to the first paragraph of the amended Article 22 of the Passport Law. However, once again the move came too late, and 2 to 3 days after the decision of the Council of Ministers Apaydin obtained his eternal passport from the angel of death.

Ruhi Su and Orhan Apaydin are not the only ones who have been prevented from traveling abroad by being denied passports. Numerous Turkish intellectuals have been refused passports and their applications have gone unanswered for many years, with and without reason. This situation has caused resentment, to say the least, in a country which is said to be taking giant strides in democracy. What is the reason for this ban imposed on the overseas travel rights of people who can speak freely in Turkey and whose writings, books, films, poems and ideas can travel abroad? Moreover, this ban has fueled doubts in Europe about the Turkish democracy and has killed many opportunities to promote various facets of our country overseas.

Reason for Ban

Article 23 of the 1982 Constitution says that "everyone has the freedom to travel." However, that sentence is immediately followed by provisions which state that a person's freedom of travel can be restricted by law if the person is subject to criminal investigations and prosecutions and with the purpose preventing criminal acts. Moreover, Article 22 of the Passport Law states that, in addition to other reasons, persons whose travel abroad is determined to be objectionable by the Ministry of the Interior on general security grounds and persons who are accused of various crimes will be denied passports or travel documents. The constitutional rights of a major portion of Turkish intellectuals are restricted by these abstract reasons. The constitutionality of these restrictions cannot be questioned because Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution states that decisions and actions taken in accordance with laws and decrees with the force of law issued during the 12 September period and Law No. 2324 on Constitutional Order cannot be declared unconstitutional.

The denial of permission to Ruhi Su and Orhan Apaydin to travel abroad, even for medical treatment, and their subsequent deaths has led to intense aggravation both at home and abroad and put the government in a difficult position. In the face of the uproar that was caused, the Council of Ministers issued a decree with the force of law which appended the following sentence to the end of the first paragraph of the amended Article 22 of the Passport Law:

"However, in exigent circumstances passports or travel documents serving the function of passports may be issued, at the request of the Minister of the Interior and with the approval of the Prime Minister, to defendants in court cases, except those whose travel to foreign countries has been explicitly banned by courts."

Those Deprived of Passports

Movie actor Tarik Akan is one person who is barred from having a passport. In 1981, Akan was tried in court for offenses cocvered by Article 140 of the Turkish Penal Code, and his passport was revoked during the time of the trial. During that period he was forced to turn down five film offers from abroad. After he was cleared of all the charges brought against him, Akan's efforts to obtain a passport remained fruitless. A year later, he was in court again in connection with the Peace Association trial. Akan, who was one of the defendants in that trial, hoped that he could benefit from the recently enacted decree with the force of law and filed the necessary applications. The Ministry of the Interior and the Office of the Prime Minister agreed that his request to travel abroad for making films is an "exigent circumstance" and issued a passport. Thus, Tarik Akan is the first person who has broken the "passport ban."

Replying to YANKI's questions, Akan said: "We correspond and talk with foreign film producers. If I did not have a contract with a foreign corporation, I would not want to use my passport for touristic purposes." Akan continued:

"This practice does not exist in any other country in the world. A person's freedom of travel cannot be restricted on such flimsy grounds. This practice is unconstitutional."

Other movie-world figures who are barred from carrying passports include Serif Goren, Meral Orhonsay and Zeki Okten. Zeki Okten, who is barred from traveling overseas because he was a defendant in the DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] trial, says that enough time has already been lost and adds: "I hope that this situation is rectified from now on."

Persons Banned Without Reason

The denial of passports to persons who are defendants in court cases has at least some legal basis. However, numerous intellectuals, who have not been charged with any offenses in any trial, who can speak freely in Turkey and who are allowed to make statements to foreign media, are also unable to obtain permission to travel abroad. Moreover, these persons have not been given any reason for such action. One such person is Mehmet Ali Aybar, a former leader of the defunct Turkish Labor Party and the Socialist Revolution Party. Today, Aybar is one of the leading organizers in the work to form a socialist party. As part of that work he organizes gatherings and expresses his views to domestic and foreign press organizations. However, by a double-standard system, Aybar's application for a passport has not even been answered.

Aybar filed his first passport application after 12 September on 17 April 1981 and his second one on 15 January 1983 at the Diplomatic Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He received replies for these applications on 8 March 1983, that is nearly 2 years after the first application was filed. The reply from the Foreign Ministry said: "No reply has yet been received to the letter written to the Ministry of the Interior for the issuance of a passport in your name." Aybar then wrote a letter to Selahattin Cetiner, the interior minister at the time. Aybar said in his letter:

"It is evident that a person's freedom to travel abroad, which is a constitutional right, cannot be restricted by ignoring citizens' applications, except in circumstances specified by law. The truth is that the same illegal methods have been used to deny a passport to my daughter. I have also learned that my wife, who was previously issued a passport, will also be barred from traveling abroad. It is seen that there are attempts to take away one of our legal rights by illegal means and that the course that is being pursued is reminiscent of the principle of collective responsibility that was implemented in the old ages.

"I request, Mr Minister, that you accept my respects with the hope that this arbitrary practice will be ended and that the results will be communicated to me."

However, Aybar has not yet received any reply to this letter and his other petitions.

In his statement to YANKI, Aybar said that he was denied passports previously and described this practice as "political pressure." Aybar continued:

"I cannot see the meaning of this ban. If a person goes overseas, what will he do there? Let us say that he will engage in opposition. Let us assume that he will say that he does not like the actions of the Turkish government and that there is no democracy in the country. I am already saying these things here. There is no need to go abroad to do that."

Stating that this practice is illegal, Aybar added:

"One may claim that there is no democracy and that human rights are not respected in Turkey on the basis of this practice alone. Our officials have no respect for humanity and the people. This has been so since the time of the Ottoman Empire. These things can only be corrected in a socialist system."

'Ministry Orders'

Like Aybar, musician Timur Selcuk has also been denied a passport even though he is not facing any legal prosecution. In 1980, Selcuk turned in his passport to the Passport Department for an extension, but he has not been able to get it back. Selcuk applied to the Passport Department for a new passport in 1983 and 1985, but he was denied a passport on grounds that "there are standing ministry orders." During that period, Selcuk was forced to turn down invitations from Sweden, Germany, France and Australia, and, as he states it, our country lost its chance to be known overseas. Selcuk explained the reasons behind his denial of a passport:

"Before 12 September, the political department kept a watch on the nights in which we participated. They reportedly prepared a 5-page report on my person. Supposedly, I attended the 'democracy and peace night' organized by DISK and leftist slogans were shouted that night. It is alleged that I attended and sang at the 'Nazim Hikmet night' organized by the Turkish Writers' Association. Numerous other similar allegations are made in the report. After 12 September, some smart alecks made up a list on the basis of such reports. These lists were entered into computers. Nowadays, the Ministry of the Interior uses computers to process passport applications. They are not issuing me a passport apparently because the computer flags my name every time I apply."

Selcuk asked: "Were there no prosecutors before 1980?" He continued:

"They never felt the need to investigate me. That being the case, how can my freedom of travel be restricted simply on the basis of reports prepared by the political department?"

Stating that he has plans to give a concert overseas this autumn, Selcuk said that he will try all peaceable and courteous means to obtain a passport. Selcuk added:

"If they still do not issue me a passport, I will resort to pressure tactics through the domestic and foreign press. I will sue them in administrative court and I will make my case heard in all the media. I am not a citizen of silent Turkey. I have been polite and courteous for the last 6 years. Now I am determined to pursue every legal course. No one has the right to restrict my freedom of travel and to prevent me from giving concerts overseas without reason."

An Interesting Practice

The most interesting version of the passport ban practice can be found in Mersin. Mersin's Deputy Mayor Neset Tarhan filed the necessary applications for a passport 3 months ago, but received an answer that he did not expect. A Passport Department official told him that a passport could not be issued to him because his elder brother, Nedim Tarhan, was a defendant in the Peace Association trial and that a passport could be issued if he could produce a document which states that Nedim Tarhan is not under arrest. Nedim Tarhan is a former parliamentary deputy and he was tried in the Peace Association case without being taken into custody. Stating that he was astonished by this situation, Deputy Mayor Neset Tarhan told YANKI:

"I have never been accused of any crimes in any trial. How can the situation of my brother be related to my case? Now I am trying to obtain a document to the effect that my brother is being tried without being under arrest."

Indeed, the refusal to issue a passport to Mersin Deputy Mayor Neset Tarhan is not comprehensible. Above all, this action violates the principle of the individuality of punishment and is therefore unconstitutional. In 20th century Turkey, Neset Tarhan, who is not subject to any legal prosecution and who moreover serves in the important public position of deputy mayor, is denied a passport because his brother is a defendant in a court case.

While publicizing the allegations and views of individuals encountering such practices, that is persons who are deprived of passports, YANKI also asked the Ministry of the Interior about how true these allegations are and if they are true what the reasons are for this implementation. However, the Ministry of the Interior preferred to remain silent and to ignore our queries.

[Boxed item] No Passport, No Response

Attorney Halit Celenk replied to YANKI's questions on constitutional rights of freedom, provisions of the Passport Law and the various practices in force in passport processing procedures.

YANKI: According to the Constitution, under what circumstances can a person's freedom of travel be restricted?

Celenk: Persons who are under investigation, who are subject to criminal prosecution, who are defendants in trials, who owe taxes, who have not completed their military service and who have been ordered by court to remain under general security supervision may have their freedom of travel restricted.

YANKI: What are the legal provisions on this issue?

Celenk: Article 23 of the 1982 Constitution regulates the issue of freedom of travel. That article states that in principle everyone is entitled to freedom of travel. The third and fourth paragraph of the article specifies restrictions on freedom of travel. These restrictions may be imposed in circumstances of criminal investigation or prosecution. The Constitution does not allow any other restrictions.

Additionally, Article 22 of the Passport Law specifies and regulates the circumstances which may be used to deny the issuance of a passport to a person. Although this article states that persons who are under criminal investigation or prosecution cannot be issued passports, these restrictions include a new element which is not contained in the Constitution. This element is that "persons whose departure from the country is found objectionable by the Ministry of the Interior on general security grounds" may not be issued passports.

This provision of Article 22 of the Passport Law contravenes the 1982 Constitution. The government is using this provision arbitrarily and is issuing passports to whoever it likes and refusing passports to whomever it does not like.

YANKI: How are applications for passports processed?

Celenk: Sometimes the administration completely ignores the applications of persons who are not barred by any laws from obtaining passports, and sometimes it rejects their applications by saying that "the issuance of a passport to you has been found objectionable." The administration shows no justifiable or legal reason.

YANKI: Can you give examples of implementations different from what has been specified by law?

Celenk: On 13 February 1984, I applied to the Security Directorate of the Office of the Ankara Governor for an extension of my passport which was about to expire. My application was recorded as number 1324 and a file numbered 213886 was opened. I was told that I could come and take my passport 4 days later. When I went to their office on 17 February 1984, I learned that the Ankara Martial Law Command was queried on whether my departure from the country is objectionable. The Martial Law Command had no objections to my travel overseas. Even so, however, my passport was not returned. At that time I was not under any criminal investigation or prosecution. In subsequent applications, I was told that the Ministry of the Interior was being queried about me. Not only have I not been issued a passport in the months and years that have passed since then, but I learned that my file has been placed in the archives. I did not receive a single written response.

In addition, the administration has sometimes not complied with court decisions on these issues. A client of mine in his twenties was refused a passport even though he was not under any investigation or prosecution. After

I filed a lawsuit at the Ankara Administrative Court, the court overturned the government's decision to withhold the passport to my client. The decision was final. I petitioned the Ministry of the Interior to comply with this decision. The decision has not been complied with 8 months after it was finalized, and my client still does not have a passport.

According to the Constitution, the government is obligated to comply with court decisions. A government which does not comply with court decisions cannot be considered a constitutional government. The Passport Law is one of the most frequently implemented laws in our country.

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CSO: 3554/26

ITALY LEADS IN EEC INFRACTIONS

Rome IL MESSAGGERO in Italian 6 Sep 86 p 4

[Text] Brussels- Among the EEC countries, Italy appears to be the one that more often gives occasion to the Community authorities to intervene to protect community law and to insure fulfillment of the obligations deriving from it. According to a report to the European Parliament on surveillance of application of Community law, prepared by the European Commission, Italy is the leader in violation procedures instituted against individual countries in each of the three phases of Community reaction to national nonperformances: notice letters, justifying rulings, and resort to the Court of Justice.

For the last of these procedures--the extreme means to try to gain respect of the Community rules--from 1979 to last year, according to the European Commission, Italy was involved in 112 cases, followed by Belgium and France 62 each, Germany 29, Ireland 21, the United Kingdom 19, Luxembourg 17, and Greece (in only 3 years of EEC membership) 16, with the Netherlands the same.

The "ranking" is similar for the preceding phases of the infraction procedure: Italy leads with 420 notice letters and 235 justified rulings received.

The breakdown of the infractions by sector of application of the EEC rules shows a concentration for Italy in regard to the domestic market and industrial concerns (22 sentences by the Court of Justice in favor of the Commission, none in favor of Italy), tax affairs (9 to 0), while for transport policy it was 5 to 0.

In regard to social policy, Italy has lost two cases and won one. In agricultural policy, it has lost eight and won one. In regard to this last sector, states the report, "in Italy many violations are the result of the shortages in the border administrative structure, bureaucratic delays, and above all the length of parliamentary procedures that affect the deadlines for conversion of the directives, for implementation of the Court rulings, or for application of the Community initiatives."

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CSO: 3528/8

GOVERNMENT REPORT CALLS GUESTWORKERS ESSENTIAL TO ECONOMY

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 17 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Gerda Strack: "FRG Cannot Do Without Foreign Workers--Commissioner Liselotte Funcke Reports: Make Assimilation Easier--"No Threat to Unemployed Germans"]

[Text] Bonn, 16 September--Foreign workers are "very significant" for the FRG economy, and they will remain indispensable in the future. This is the conclusion reached by the Federal commissioner for foreigners, Liselotte Funcke, in her "Report on Employment of Foreigners" released Tuesday in Bonn.

In the next decade and a half, the number of foreigners in the FRG will "remain approximately the same," according to Mrs Funcke's data. Willingness to return to the home country will decrease, and the length of stay will grow. In order to avoid an "outsider existence" for the foreign population which remains here, for whom the FRG has certainly become a "country of immigration," the commissioner for foreigners urges improved opportunities for assimilation.

Thus, Mrs Funcke demands legal establishment of residence status after 5 to 8 years of residence without the conditions which make it more difficult today, such as proof of a certain size of domicile. For spouses and minor children of foreigners, she demands unhindered subsequent entry into the FRG without waiting periods or age limitations. After residence lasting several years, drawing unemployment compensation would no longer lead to deportation. Finally, it is particularly important that assimilation be made easier for the children of foreigners (the so-called second and third generations).

The significance of foreign workers is often incorrectly estimated, the commissioner believes. Anyone who thinks that foreigners can be replaced by unemployed Germans is failing to recognize the structure of the labor force. One quarter of the unemployed in the FRG are over 40 years old, a quarter have health problems, and approximately half of the unemployed are women. The foreigners work particularly in high-rise and subterranean construction, in underground mining, in foundries, in heavy industry, in automobile assembly, and on the night shift. Unemployed Germans would be out of the question in many cases.

In June 1984 approximately 1.6 million foreigners were required to pay insurance, the report says. The Turks had the largest share, with about

500,000 workers, followed by the Yugoslavs with 289,000 and the Italians with 214,000. The analysis calculated the number of self-supporting foreigners as "about 100,000." Most of them were Italians, Greeks and Turks. In total, there are 4.4 million foreigners in the FRG.

Mrs Funcke stressed that the consumption of these 4.4 million people has a significantly positive effect on the economy. The foreigners paid out more proportionally for recreational electronics, household equipment, furniture and motor vehicles than the German population. In taxes on wages and income alone, the foreigners paid at least DM 10 billion a year. Through their tax payments, they helped to finance the infrastructure.

According to Mrs Funcke, well-educated foreign youths will be needed in the years to come. Population trends reveal that the number of young people who could begin professional training is decreasing rapidly. Without the young foreigners, the number of youths who are available for professional training will fall almost to half of the present graduating class by 1989/90.

Although a general end to unemployment cannot be expected before the year 2000, the commissioner calculates that some branches of the economy will not survive in the future without the employment of foreign workers. Thus in March 1985, 20 percent of the workers in the restaurant and hotel industry were foreigners. In this category particularly, the number of employees will continue to increase.

The employment of foreigners also provides relief for the social security system, according to the Funcke report. While the number of employable persons will drop after 1989, the number of old people will increase. In contrast, foreign workers would still generally be of employable age and, together with the rising generation of foreigners, would relieve the financial burden on the social security system.

9337/12947
CSO: 3620/11

ECONOMIC ITALY

ISTAT STUDY OUTLINES ECONOMIC GROWTH

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 18 Sep 86 p 14

[Article by Felice Saulino: "Mr Rossi Does Not Watch His Spending: Now that He Is Richer, He Eats Better and Is Very Fond of Recreation"]

[Text] ISTAT's [Central Statistics Institute] study on family income portrays a country where the well-being is advancing in the north and center, while in the south there remain dramatic pockets of poverty and unemployment. Consumer goods absorb 82 percent of earnings. Part of the population is not abandoning the traditional habit of saving. A big jump in investments by the companies. The tax burden has grown in 15 years by 16.8 percent. It is now approaching 50 percent, but it bears almost exclusively on employees. The public administration balance is visibly worsening. The state's debts have now dangerously exceeded the threshold of the entire national income.

Rome--He is increasingly rich, and he spends 82 percent of his income on consumption. He is cutting back on eating, and doesn't pay much attention to the bills when he has decided to entertain himself. The model 1985 Italian is presented to us by ISTAT, with the usual lag of the official statistics, in the now traditional "Summary of the National Economic Life," a simplified and popular version of the "General Report on the Country's Economic Situation," which is annually presented to Parliament by the ministers of treasury and budget.

However, it would be wrong to read in a "hedonistic" key the hundreds of figures, tables and percentages that ISTAT has once again assembled in a diligent and irrepressible way.

Last year, more than 16 percent of Italian families were still living on modest if not hunger incomes: in the segment that did not succeed in exceeding 800,000 lira per month. A good 23 percent were a bit better off, because they succeeded in surpassing the threshold of 800,000 to reach a maximum of 1.4 million.

At the other extreme of the pyramid were 9 percent of the families with incomes higher than 2.4 million but not higher than 3 million. And at the peak, a 7.7 percent of privileged with monthly incomes higher than 3 million lira.

Let us look at the issue from another viewpoint. Let us simplify and produce the totals. We are living in a country where 7.7 percent of the population, the element that makes more than 3 million income per month, takes 20 percent of the national income. And this same share of the wealth has to be divided among the 16 percent of the population who do not succeed in earning more than 1.2 million per month. Without mentioning--naturally--the 9 percent of our conationals who live under the survival threshold (600,000 lira per month).

Another Confirmation

The income distribution also confirms the historical gap between north and south: it ranges from an average per capita income, still monthly, of 654,000 lira in the north, to 420,000 in the south, passing through 564,000 in the center.

Another confirmation is the "value" that the labor market continues to attribute to the diploma. In the north, center and the south the employee with diploma always earns more than a higher secondary school graduate. While the latter--obviously--earns increasingly more than someone who has not gone beyond intermediate.

However, it is likely that to a considerable degree these averages reflect tax distortions. As we know, traders and craftsmen usually have incomes that are less evident than those of employees. Thus, the plumber or mechanic consistently shows up poorer than the mental skill employee. However, this conclusion, as we have all repeatedly had occasion to observe, does not always reflect the truth.

The tax "distortion" is also indirectly reflected in the figures supplied by ISTAT in this 20th edition of "Italians' Accounts." Let us see: in barely 15 years the overall tax load has increased by 16.8 percent. In 1970 it was 31.1 percent. In 1985 it had jumped to 47.9 percent. The main increase was in income tax, of which the greatest share is paid by employees. Of every 100 lira of tax revenue, indirect taxes provided 44, compared to 66 in 1970.

The tax injustice reinforces the shift in wealth. The rich are becoming ever richer, and the poor ever poorer. ISTAT does not provide much detail on this. It states only that in 1985 the average Italian succeeded in beating inflation and increasing his income by a good 2.3 percent, reaching the level of 10.778 million lira a year. There is not a single line about the distribution of this increase in the national wealth.

Instead, there are many pages devoted to unemployment. Some 2.471 million people seeking employment: 4.4 percent of the work force. The total unemployment rate reached 10.6 percent in 1985. It is higher for women (17.3); and very high for youth between 14 and 29. It dramatically affects the south (14.7 percent).

The structure of unemployment also confirms what we already knew. There is a constant and unstoppable loss of agricultural employed. Industrial employment is stationary. The new jobs have been created only by services. This is a situation that has been underway for at least 5 years.

Rapid Growth

This picture has frequently prompted less-restrained analysts to a reconfiguration of a post-industrial Italy; a country that having emerged from the industrial economy that characterized it until 30 years ago has passed first to a rapid industrial growth and currently is traveling at an even greater speed toward the post-industrial era. This is true for some realities, for some areas, for some production situations, but not for the great majority of the nation.

The most interesting chapter of the ISTAT study is no doubt that on consumption. Between 1970 and 1985 family consumption increased, at constant prices and thus in real terms, by 42.7 percent. However, the development was neither uniform nor constant.

While 1973 and 1979 were the years of greater increase, 1975 and 1983 were years of decline. However, the trend toward "consumeristic hedonism" resumed in 1984, in combination with the revival of the Western economy and the drop in inflation. And in 1985, with an inflation in single figure, Italians continued to consume at march step, ending the year with a new increase of 1.9 percent.

The structure of consumption, under the pressure of the life models suggested, if not imposed, by advertising, which had overwhelmingly entered Italian homes through private TV, has changed radically. We can say that it has literally overturned. Spending for hygiene, health, training and entertainment almost equals that for food: 121 billion compared to 124.

In the chapter "food," the shifts are even more evident. Of every 1,000 lira spent for food products and beverages, Italians spent an average of 348 on meat, 214 on fruits and vegetables, 118 on pastas, 148 on milk, cheese and eggs, 43 on oils and fats, and 143 on sugar and beverages.

A comparison with the recent past shows that between 1970 and today the income portion devoted to food has changed [illegible] 37 to 29 percent. On the contrary, the portion devoted to hygiene, [illegible] raining, and entertainment in 1970 was little over 28 percent [illegible] rally, if one eats less, one also eats differently. The same quantity of beef. More fish. Less sugar. More butter. Much more milk. More poultry, and above all more pork. Citrus fruit wins out over pears and apples. We like pasta even more, it is not leaving our food habits, but for some time we have been consuming less flour products. The era of the great hunger survives only in the memory of the old people.

As for savings, Italians have put aside one-fifth of available income for a total of 121.557 trillion. A confirmation of the traditional propensity to accumulate on the part of broad elements of the population.

However, the most surprising fact concerns investments. In 1985, they exceeded, in absolute terms, the share of savings: 129.747 trillion lira. A record. At least 431 billion was spent to get licenses and patents. It is one further sign of the great vitality of the country, which has accepted and won the wager of industrial modernization, restructuring and revival.

Behind the success of "Made in Italy" there has for several years been a strong injection of funds for investments in technology and knowledge.

Only in the worse years, in the worse years of the international economic situation, did this march experience some interruptions. That was the case in 1978, when there was a drop of 1.6 percent. In 1979, a new jump (up 10.4 percent). In 1980, it achieved the increase record (20.2). Then 3 years of contraction before a new climb. In 1984, investments increased by 9.9 percent; in 1985 by 3.8 percent.

Classification of Incomes

Distribution of family monthly income by number and percentage of total value

Categories of monthly income (lira)	% Families	% Income
Up to 400,000	2.0	0.3
From 440,001 to 600,000	7.0	2.0
" 600,001 " 800,000	7.2	3.1
" 800,001 " 1,000,000	11.8	6.5
" 1,000,001 " 1,200,000	11.4	6.5
" 1,200,001 " 1,400,000	10.6	8.4
" 1,400,001 " 1,600,000	8.8	8.0
" 1,600,001 " 1,800,000	7.9	8.3
" 1,800,001 " 2,000,000	7.9	9.2
" 2,000,001 " 2,200,000	4.4	5.5
" 2,200,001 " 2,400,000	4.7	6.5
" 2,400,001 " 2,600,000	4.3	6.6
" 2,600,001 " 2,800,000	2.4	4.0
" 2,800,001 " 3,000,000	2.1	3.7
More than 3,000,000	7.7	20.0
Total	100.0	100.0

Major Debtor

While the accounts of the enterprises are turning around, those of the public administration continue to be very bad. In the harsh reality of the 1985 accounting figures, there is revealed 306 trillion in revenue and 402 trillion in expenditure. Sixty-three trillion in interest was spent just to finance the public debt and to repay savers who had bought state bonds.

The major debtor, the Italian state, has to show itself generous toward those citizens who hold in hand the certificates of a public debt that has now exceeded the national income. At this pace 1,000 trillion will be passed in 1988.

A madness. A time bomb that risks exceeding all parameters if the international economic situation becomes more difficult. A drain of wealth that will make problematic a new miracle for "Made in Italy" and endangers the accounts of Italians.

Spending by Italian Families Divided by Categories, Amounts and Percentages



9920
CSO: 3528/8

ECONOMIC INFLUENCE IN MILITARY TAKEOVERS EXAMINED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 11

[Article by Osman Ulagay]

[Text] Today is 12 Sep. Six years have passed since the last military intervention in Turkey, and currently the country is run by civilians. However, as shown by the reactions to the events of the two weeks, the "possibility of military intervention" has not totally disappeared out of the agenda of Turkish politics. Even when there are no discernable signs of discontent in the country a few terrorist acts can be seen to raise questions such as, "What is going on, are we heading back to the old days, or is it once again a case of civilians not being able to cut the muster?" Questions float around when certain politicians, singled out by military governments in the past, are now seen throwing accusations at military governments in general. Reactions flowing from these instances, President Evren's 30 Aug address, for example, raise further question marks. Books on the market which examine the 12 Sep era are now in high demand. As for me, I will attempt to jot down a few thoughts on the "meaning and import of the day", even at the cost of overshooting the boundaries of economic commentary.

Above all else, we have to understand 12 Sep for what it is and is not. In that sense, the rather tortuous conclusion reached by Hasan Cemal in his book 'Fear of Democracy' is an important one. (The new book is an all-nighter like the previous one 'Awakening to the Sound of Tanks', which was the first volume of Cemal's commentary on the 12 Sep era.) Certainly not an admirer of military regimes, Cemal reminds us the civilians' share of the blame for 12 Sep, at several points in the book. There are excerpts from notes kept by the late Turan Gunes which are quite revealing as confessions of a sincere politician. In Dec 78, on the occasion of the declaration of martial law by the Ecevit government, Professor Gunes jots down the following:

Since 50 our politicians have been dependant, whether by deliberate choice or unwillingly, on the armed forces in the governmental or administrative spheres. I have long maintained this view by which I mean this: We tend to leave the question of law and order to the soldiers by declaring martial law for one of two reasons: either we cannot maintain law and order by regular means -- which is an admission of helplessness and a deliberate remission of responsibility -- or we allow matters to degenerate to such an extent that soldiers then seize power whether we like it or not.

As to 12 Sep one would be hard-pressed to maintain that it was the soldiers who 'seized power'. It is more of a 'transfer' of power from civilians to soldiers. This may be the reason why 12 Sep was almost instantly espoused without much of a reaction. It may also explain why the post-12 Sep treatment of the prominent politicians of the pre-12 Sep period has not produced much of a reaction. It would hardly be a coincidence for soldiers, known for their constant surveillance of the public mood, to have timed the intervention just at the point they did -- the 'fruit was ripe and ready to fall', as it were. Thus the question that needs asking at this point is why civilian governments consistently bring affairs to such an end. The answer to this may have to come under several headings.

Firstly, one must concede that a country like Turkey is not easy to govern, or lead in a certain direction. On one side there is the problem of meeting the increasing demands of over 50 million people, most of whom live in rural areas, during a process of rapid change and modernization, and of reconciling the conflicts among differentiating classes in the society. On the other side, there is the issue of Turkey, given its geostrategic location, trying to find the best possible course in an environment of external cross pressures, and being able to stick to that course.

Secondly, one cannot say that civilian institutions in Turkey, particularly political parties, have been able to keep pace with the demands of a rapidly changing and differentiating society, much less come up with solutions to meet these demands. In a country where traditions of civil society and democratic culture do not go deep, when there isn't a consensus even on the rules to be observed when resolving the contradictions and crises created by rapid change, one can easily see why things get out of hand. When politicians, unable to deliver the solutions, prefer to engage in mutual recrimination they bring civil administrations to the point of exhaustion.

Thirdly, civilians in influential positions are able to rationalize their passivity in the face of exhaustion by thinking that "if things go out of hand soldiers would take care of the situation anyway." And some of them might even secretly welcome such a possibility with the expectation that under a military administration their stars might rise and their influence might increase. And the half-hearted attitude of big business when it comes to owning up to democracy further compounds the issue.

While these are the main developments on the civilian side of things it is noticeable that soldiers are taking care to be better prepared in governing the country in case they are called upon to do so when "other avenues are closed". The differences between the 27 May and 12 Sep movements attest to this.

If the idea is not to have further 12 Septembers then civilians would have to stop chattering about and get down to creating solutions, and once the rules of the all-civilian game has been determined, simply stick to them. Bearing in mind that its economic policies rapidly caused the income distribution to deteriorate and further deepen the rift between social classes, its tendency to interpret the 'rules of the game' somewhat randomly, and its proclivity to seek shelter under someone's shadow when things get hot, the Ozal government's record in this regard has been, and that is unfortunate, far from being constructive.

12466
CSO: 3554/17

ECONOMIC TURKEY

EDITORIAL ARGUES AGAINST SINGLE STATE BANK

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Tevfik Gungor]

[Text] There is talk of an interesting 'scenario' these days. The aim is to produce mergers between money-losing state banks and other state banks which have "relatively better" standing, and thus establishing a new bank. The old banks are expected to merge into the corporate identity of the new bank. And with capital infusion coming from the Treasury the new bank will be strengthened, and soon be scaling new heights! Or so goes the argument.

Those not old enough to recall some events of the past, or those who haven't read about or studied these events, are now introducing terribly worn-out 'scenarios' as if they were "seeing the light of day for the first time." And when these are introduced to the public amid great hullaballoo, it is interesting to see that those who are ever-forgetful of the past are quite earnest in their adulation, exclaiming "Wow! What a discovery! These must all be wunder kids!" Of course these exclamations do nothing other than push the authorities and influential circles further towards 'error'.

In 50 a bank was established in Turkey by the name of Turkish Veterans Bank. The shares of this bank was received with great demand, perhaps for the first time, and many small savers became shareholders in this bank. In 59 another bank was established by the name of Turkish Teachers, Public Employees, and Military Officers Bank. A good number of teachers, public employees, and military officers deposited money in this bank. When these two banks collapsed in 59 due to bad management the state intervened and merged the two banks in 59 under the name of Turkish Savings and Credit Bank. Unfortunately, this new bank lasted for about three years and was liquidated in 61.

The establishment of the Anadolu Bank -- currently under consideration for merger with the banking divisions of

Sumerbank, Etibank and Maritime Bank -- took place under similar circumstances. When the Wheat Bank (founded in 55), and Turkish Express Bank (founded in 53) were having problems they were forced by the state to merge. In 62 these two banks were dissolved into the corporate identity of Anadolu Bank, accompanied by great capital infusion from the Treasury.

Experience has so far indicated that a merger of two failing banks does not ensure a strong bank:

1. In this kind of 'scenario' rumor is worse than fact. The banking business is founded upon reputation. It does not help when there is public discussion that a bank is 'in trouble' and that senior management of the bank or senior bureaucrats deliver reams of announcements about the problems of the bank. One or more things are likely to follow in such instances:

-- Depositors withdraw their money

-- Those with money to deposit avoid that bank

-- Serious firms do not enter credit relations with that bank

-- Some customers with outstanding debts to the bank find it convenient not to repay

2. The newly formed bank, created from the debris of two failing banks, does stand much of a chance for the following reasons:

-- Success in inter-bank competition largely depends upon the confidence factor and quality of service. It is quite natural that a bank which comes into existence out of a merger between troubled banks would experience great hardship in inspiring 'confidence'.

-- It is impossible for the new bank, which inherits the personnel of the troubled banks, to establish competent teams offering quality service.

Despite all this, someone gets up and says, "I did it, and it worked." And you bet it does...

12466
CSO: 3554/17

SPAIN SEEN AS POSSIBLE NATO TRAINING GROUND

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 Oct 86 pp 32-33

[Article by Miguel Angel Liso: "NATO Wants Its Pilots Trained in Spain"; first paragraph is CAMBIO 16 introduction]

[Text] The NATO countries would like to have their pilots receive their basic training in Spain. The Government is studying the proposal, at a time when considerable confusion reigns as to the model of our integration in the Alliance. Spain is integrated into the military structure, but not fully integrated into that structure. This seems complicated, but the riddle is to be found in the term "integrated."

Over the next several years, Spain could become one of Europe's most important basic training centers for pilots of the Atlantic Alliance. The countries integrated into NATO have conveyed to the Spanish Government the possibility of creating various training centers in our country, in which the Alliance's future military pilots could be familiarized with jet planes.

The NATO proposal refers to the basic training of the pilots and not to the use of the military firing ranges that exist or that may be created in the future in Spain.

A pilot's basic training consists of learning the techniques used for takeoffs and landings of planes, the handling of navigational instruments, and the learning of different forms of flight: Acrobatic and aerial formations.

During this initial stage, the pilots learn to resolve in tenths of a second any and all types of emergencies that may occur on board, such as the loss of power in an engine, loss of ailerons, a malfunction in the hydraulic systems, and loss of landing gear. During this period, they do not receive training in the use of the complex weapon systems with which a modern fighter plane can be equipped.

Presently, in Spain, our Air Force pilots receive their aerial "baptism" in the schools at San Javier (Murcia) and Salamanca. According to NATO plans, part of these installations could be used for the training of Italian, German and Belgian pilots assigned to the troops of the Alliance.

Under Study

The Government has formed a commission to study the NATO proposal. According to a senior military officer familiar with the matter, it is still under wraps and a report is being prepared as to the advantages and disadvantages involved for Spain in augmenting the number of training planes in our air space and in devoting various zones of our national territory to the training of European pilots.

In principle, according to sources close to the commission, there is considerable hesitation about accepting the Atlantic Alliance's proposal. "The principal obstacle," they say, "is the lack of personnel to devote to these new missions. Unless organizational staffing is increased or NATO instructors come to Spain, it will be impossible to impart that basic training in Spain."

In this senior military officer's view, NATO has its sights set on Spain as a highly suitable place for the training of its pilots, as being one of Europe's best countries for this purpose from the standpoint of its climatology throughout the entire year. Its orographic features, with valleys, planes and mountains very close to each other, make the Peninsula an excellent place for the training of pilots in low-altitude flying techniques.

Military Structure

The NATO proposal that would convert Spain into one of Europe's military pilot training centers followed by only a few weeks the proposal on integration in the Alliance submitted officially in Brussels by Felipe Gonzalez's Government on the heels of the 12 March referendum.

The Spanish proposal is contained in a document of some 80 folios, titled: "General Principles of the Participation Model." This document was classified "Secret" by the Spanish Government and has not been disclosed officially to any of the member countries. What has been disclosed officially is a summary consisting of not more than three folios, in which the philosophy of Spain's participation in NATO has been summarized in the form of nine points.

This latter document, which has been termed a "memorandum," produced a political scandal last week in the Congress of Deputies when the Government declined to provide copies to the different parliamentary groups, owing to its nature as a classified matter.

During the same week that the Government was categorically refusing to publish the "memorandum" and convoking a secret session to discuss it, a magazine published the entire text of the nine points, revealing the fact that it contained no secret that could affect our national security or that of the West. The famous "memorandum" merely confirmed the information published months before by CAMBIO 16 (number 736 of 6 January) and other publications, to the effect that Spain's contribution to the Alliance would be highly significant and that not belonging to the so-called "integrated structure" was but a matter of shading.

As one member of the Government comments, "When, prior to the referendum, Felipe Gonzalez said that Spain would assume its share of responsibility for defense of the West, he was certainly not referring to passing the chocolates around, but to putting soldiers, planes and warships at the service of the Allies, although in the manner most advantageous to us."

A high Defense Ministry official has told CAMBIO 16 that the Government has no tricks up its sleeve with regard to participation and that it finds it perfectly compatible to be a member of all the military committees, maintain an Armed Forces representation in Brussels, train European pilots in Spain, and even to realize joint maneuvers, without being fully integrated into the military structure. "The key," he says enigmatically, "lies in the term 'integrated.'"

In this way, the only difference between Spain and the rest of the European countries, except France, with respect to the military structure, is that our country is neither organically nor hierarchically subordinated to the Alliance's "Integrated Commands" or the executive arms of its military policy.

Thus, while Portugal, Italy and Germany must assign troops to those commands, in peace time as well as in the case of war, Spain will not have to do so. Assuming the case of a conflagration, all Spanish troops, ships and planes would remain under their normal command and would not be required to fight abroad.

The complex consisting of the Integrated Commands--SACEUR (with responsibility for Europe), SACLANT (Atlantic), CINCHAM (North Sea-English Channel) and CUSRPG (United States-Canada)--has enormous power within NATO, with direct access to the topmost military entities of each country, their defense ministers and even their heads of Government.

Coordination

The proposal concerning Spain's participation in the military structure, therefore, requires, according to the Government, close coordination between the military plans of all concerned, so as not to needlessly duplicate the use of human and material resources in zones of common interest.

The principal one of these zones is the so-called strategic Baleares-Straits-Canaries axis, in which Spain centers much of its military power not only to enforce its territorial integrity but also to reinforce, at the same time, the southern flank of the West.

In the event of a conflict, Spanish planes and ships, reinforced with NATO military equipment, would have to control that zone under the command of Spanish generals and admirals, who would obey the orders conveyed to them by the Government of Spain.

Independently of these missions, our country fulfills for the Alliance a role of logistical support for the Allied Armed Forces, in view of the fact that, in the event of an East-West conflict, the Iberian Peninsula would find itself, together with part of France and Great Britain, in the rear echelon. War materiel and contingents of troops needed to man the army units that would carry out the counteroffensive would have to be staged in these zones.

To achieve this coordination and not squander energies in zones of mutual interest, Spain must deploy a significant effort over the next several years, to match our installations with NATO's plans.

This effort must range from the replacing of fuel taps at the Spanish military bases, so that they will be identical with NATO's, to the enlarging of docking and provisioning facilities of Spanish ports, so that the Alliance's ships and tankers can maneuver inside them, to the modernization of our Armed Forces.

9238
CSO; 3548/20

MILITARY

DENMARK

SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WANT SHOULDER-FIRED MISSILES TESTED

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 20 Oct 86 p 7

[Article by Jens J. Krogh]

[Text] The Social Democratic Party is now demanding that the Danish defense forces test the various missile systems before the billion kroner order for 850 portable missiles is placed.

The party's defense policy spokesman, Knud Damgaard, denies that testing has to mean still another delay in the procurement of the missiles. Defense has four different systems to choose between -- American, English, French, and Swedish.

"But the technical experts are themselves very much in doubt about the guidance qualities of the various missiles. This is decisive for whether the missile suits Danish conditions. Therefore the guidance qualities must be tested, and this must be done by testing the American Stinger and the Swedish Robot missile under Danish conditions," Damgaard said.

Guidance Qualities

He pointed out that the guidance qualities in the American Stinger and the French Mistrall system are almost identical. Therefore a test between the Stinger and the Robot is enough for the Social Democrats.

The Norwegian defense department has recently tested the Stinger and the Robot missiles, and this test was favorable to the Robot, so the Norwegians have now given their missile orders to Sweden. However Knud Damgaard rejected the idea that the test results could simply be carried over to Danish conditions, solely for the reason that the geography of the two countries is quite different.

Coproduction

The decision on the acquisition of the missile system has now been delayed. Now the negotiations on Danish coproduction are threatening to go into a deadlock. The Ministry of Industry is now handling the negotiations on coproduction, and the offer that is on the table at the moment is in conflict with the Danish Weapons law.

For example, General Dynamics, which produces the Stinger missile, has offered Danish firms coproduction of ten mechanical and electronic parts that enter into the whole Stinger program -- also the missiles, therefore, that the Americans want to sell to other countries.

But here the Social Democrats demand that Denmark get veto rights if the Americans want to sell the missile to other countries. There can be the risk, for example, that the Americans want to sell Stinger missiles to the contras in Nicaragua, and this must not happen with Danish parts in them, the Social Democratic Party says.

9124
CSO: 3613/16

ARMS, MUNITION DEPOTS NOT ADEQUATELY GUARDED

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 5 Oct 86 p 2

[Article by Otto Ludwig: "The Defense Department Cannot Afford Theft Alarms"]

[Text] The Defense Department does not think it has enough money for electronic supervision of all its weapons and dynamite depots. And this is presumably the reason that thieves were successful in breaking through a reinforced iron door to a bunker with ammunition and explosives at the Farum barracks.

In the theft, which is thought to have occured Wednesday night, 100 kilograms of explosive units were removed, as well as 30 kilograms of dynamite, 600 detonators, and ammunition for handguns. If the explosives have come into the hands of a terrorist group, the theft can have the most serious consequences. The 30 kilograms, for example, are enough to produce about a dozen car bombs. And the action has shaken both the police and the military.

The theft was not discovered until Friday. The thieves cut some very strong locks to a reinforced door. Special tools are necessary for this work.

There is no steady guard at the depot. The area is patrolled by armed guards three to five times a day.

Years ago all military weapons and ammunition dumps were protected by guards most of the day. There are not enough personnel for this today.

Can Easily be Secured

"Times have changed," the duty officer in the Defense Command said. "Today one can easily protect oneself with the help of electronic means."

"But one does not do this everywhere? And in any case not in Farum?"

"No, it is obviously a question of need and of economic means. Many government areas are secured with the help, for example, of TV supervision. One can also use listening equipment. There is a very large selection of this type of hardware on the market. But permission has not been granted to the Defense Department simply to buy these things at will."

This is not the first time that weapons and ammunition have been stolen from a Danish military base. But the theft in Farum is one of the largest of its type in this country up to now.

Sees and Hears Everything

There is a large alarm equipment industry in Denmark. We asked a Danish firm, Alarmat, what was necessary to secure a bunker such as the one that was robbed at the Farum barracks.

"It is actually not so expensive," Director Kent Lau said. "Without having seen the bunker in question, I would guess that we can install TV supervision for 10,000 kroner. To this must be added a relatively small amount for the cable from the camera to the guardpost, where one can check the area on a screen.

"For an additional price, a supervising camera can be mounted on a rotary base that allows the camera to move to and fro.

"If one wants to pay about 40,000 kroner, a so-called time-lab instrument can be installed that records everything the camera sees on a tape. The tape can record for 72 hours. A clock shows the time every single picture was taken. And of course a microphone can be attacked to the camera so that the guard can both see and hear everything that takes place within the camera's range. Furthermore, the guard can -- with the proper equipment -- zoom in and take closeup pictures," Lau said.

9124
CSO: 3613/16

ARTILLERY BRIGADES LACK EXPERIENCED MEN

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 18 Oct 86 p 4

[Article by Jens J. Krogh: "Defense Broken Down"]

[Text] If the Russians come tomorrow, they will have every chance of success in an attack on Zealand.

One part of peace preparation on Zealand has been very seriously weakened and has since the middle of this week actually only been something close to half of what was agreed upon in the defense compromise between the government and the Social Democrats.

In the compromise it was agreed that in each artillery unit in the two Zealand brigades there would be a basic crew with at least 12 months experience behind them. As of this week two Zealand brigade artillery units have consisted completely of new draftees.

"This means in practice that they do not have one single man who is combat ready. Not one man to handle a cannon. Not one to operate antiaircraft missile launchers. Not one for anything," Senior Shop Steward and Gunner Michael Eriksen from the artillery unit at Sjaelsmark Kasserne said. He calls the situation grotesque.

The command of the Second Zealand Brigade, Colonel G.K. Kristensen, confirmed to AKTUELT that it would be difficult to use the artillery units at their present strength.

"The brigade's ready force is not what it has been up to now. This situation must naturally be corrected in a future defense compromise. The army must clearly have its personnel strength considerably increased to meet peace preparations," Kristensen said.

Kristensen has no comment on how the present situation arose.

It takes between four and six months before new recruits can be expected to be able to handle rifles, cannon, and missiles.

The Social Democratic defense policy spokesman, Knud Damgaard, says that the matter will promptly be raised in the 11-man committee.

"The defense commander has simply not given proper consideration to the defense compromise as far as basic personnel are concerned. The agreement was for a regular component of 4,900 gunners and 700 gunner trainees. The recent count is a month old and shows that there are only 4,300 gunners and no gunner trainees," Damgaard said.

9124
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DETAILS OF MILITARY MANEUVERS PROVIDED

Joint Maneuvers Reported with FRG

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by special correspondent Henri de Bresson: "First Armored Division Engaged Before the Main -- A Major Franco-German 'First'"]

[Text] Wurzburg -- A party of "reds" attacked in the loop of the Main, and was contained with difficulty at the level of Wurzburg by the "blues" of the 12th West German armored division and the 1st American infantry division. The small village of Schwandorf was awakened by the din of about 10 Leopard-2 tanks from the 5th West German armored division getting ahead of the "red" forces for a delicate overtaking maneuver with the tanks from the 1st French armored division, which had been holding their ground in front of the river since the previous evening.

A few kilometers away, at a command post hastily set up in the cloak room of the municipal stadium of Theilheim, Lieutenant Colonel Morane, commander of the 1st armored cavalry regiment, took a last satisfied look at his maps. It was time for the morning coffee, after having spent the whole night with the liaison officers of the 4th West German brigade preparing this delicate phase of the maneuvers. "We are in a position to intervene with the allied troops if we are asked to do so," commented the French officer.

The presence of such a large contingent of Frenchmen in Franconia constituted the main event of these "Frankischer Schield" maneuvers which brought together this week 50,000 men and 14,000 vehicles, of which 650 were tanks. Based in Treves, the 1st French armored division had moved 3,500 men and 100 AMX 100-30 tanks. Never before had so many French elements participated in maneuvers so far east in the Federal Republic. "A major first," commented the French army chief of staff, General Maurice Schmitt, who stressed "the perfect integration" between the French and West German units.

The West German defense minister, Mr Manfred Woerner, was not restrained in expressing his satisfaction. "It is a major political and military moment," he said in a short speech delivered in French. This operation demonstrates "the French nation's desire to participate in the defense of the frontline German territory," added Mr Woerner, thanking the French officers. "You are welcome. The people understand it and feel it."

In spite of the reserve of the French military authorities present, the West Germans, who have never hidden their desire to see France become more committed to the defense of their territory, have very good reasons for being satisfied. The 'Frankischer Schield" maneuvers demonstrate a growing desire on the part of Paris to free itself from certain taboos in order to allow for greater cooperation with the West German forces on the side of the integrated military NATO organization. It is not a question of returning to integration within the military set-up of the Western alliance, but rather of finding formulas which will make it possible to reconcile the desire for increased cooperation with the FRG at the traditional level and the French desire to preserve its own military autonomy. "There are a great many possibilities between Franco-German cooperation and the integration of France into NATO," noted General Altenburg, who will return to the headquarters of the allied military organization next week.

Reservist Exercises Near Dijon Described

Paris LE MONDE in French 28/29 Sep 86 p 7

[Article by correspondent Didier Cornaille: "The Burgundy Underground -- 1800 Reservists on Maneuvers"]

[Text] Dijon -- The hills of Auxois, west of Dijon, saw 3 days of skirmishes with automatic arms, of low level helicopter flights and of spectacular landings of commandos who disappeared in a few moments into the depths of the local forests. On Tuesday, 23 September, the staff of the 10th combined divisional regiment [RIAD] met at Sens and at Digoin (Saone-et-Loire). The next day, it was the turn of the ranks to join their units. All the manpower of this 10th RIAD, staff as well as enlisted men, are reservists placed under the authority of Lieutenant Colonel Staghelimi, commander of the military school of Autun. For 3 days he had to defend the Burgundian territory all his men came from (approximately 1800) against an enemy symbolized by a unit of mobile gendarmes or by a handful of men from the contingent.

It was the frist time that this 10th RIAD was maneuvering in the field. It was established only in mid-1985 and it was given its flag on 7 June of the same year, at Alesia, a major historic site in Burgundy. It is, to say the least, a symbol. "After the Maconge exercise," said General Hailaud, commander of the 64th territorial military division, "the 10th RIAD really became the regiment of Burgundy."

Is this concept of units made up of regional reservists who are called to fight on their own terrain, a new one? Not completely, answered the staff members,but it does involve a total reorganization of the reserves.

As a matter of fact, the emphasis all during the Maconge 86 exercise was on the necessary cooperation between the gendarmerie, the people and the 10th RIAD. The "message to be passed on to the people," circulated prior to the maneuvers of the 64th military division, states that "in case of a threat, the goal of the people and of the army units present in the field will be to defend our freedoms."

In case of conflict, the speed and effectiveness of current war resources would cause the territory to be invested very rapidly. The battle then would no longer be face to face between strictly military units. There would no longer be a front, but a kind of hand-to-hand between an invader and the underground.

Hence those units which take after both auxiliary troops of the irregular forces and former national guardsmen. Hence also, the spider web formed by the divisional combined regiments attached to their own terrain.

8463
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MILITARY FRANCE

DGA REPRESENTATIVE DISCUSSES ARMS SALES, COOPERATION

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 16 Oct 86 pp 57-58

[Interview with Jacques Chevallier, general delegate for armaments, by Jean-Pierre Casamayou; date and place not given]

[Text] The General Delegation for Armaments (DGA) is celebrating the 25th anniversary of its establishment. The conference which it is holding on 16 October will have the objective of finding ways of facing up to the challenges of the future. In effect, the DGA doesn't have time to reflect on its past, even though it contributed to lifting the entire armaments industry to high points of achievement: nearly 300,000 steady jobs and third rank in the world in terms of its exports. However, those prosperous times are fading from sight. Jacques Chevallier, the general delegate for armaments, knows this better than anyone. Therefore, he is hastening to develop resources capable of meeting the challenges of a world rapidly changing in both the technological and trade areas. In the interview which he gave to L'USINE NOUVELLE he explained why the DGA and its factories, and all of French defense industry as well, must find new ways of working, cooperating, and exporting.

[Question] You have just made changes among the top executives of the DGA. Is this the beginning of a more basic change--involving your basic legislation, for example?

[Answer] The reorganization of the top management of the DGA was carried out in order to respond more effectively to the concerns of the Ministry of Defense, to satisfy more appropriately the needs of our armed forces--that is the role of the programs of the general delegate for armaments--and to promote exports and cooperation with the general delegate for international relations.

As far as the rest of the DGA is concerned, there is no threat to the position of our personnel. I am not convinced that a change in our basic legislation would provide any solution to our problems.

Look at what is happening in private industry producing land weapons: it's not getting along very well, either. Rather, we are looking for administrative action making it possible to provide greater autonomy to our component parts and more mobility to our personnel. That is, geographic as well as internal mobility.

[Question] Is the situation at your arsenals as bad as people say it is?

[Answer] They are suffering from a problem of not having enough work to do. The GIAT shops are equipped to manufacture artillery and tanks. It is precisely this kind of equipment which is receiving a smaller allocation in the budget. And, as the budgets of our customers and the U. S. dollar are going down, whereas our competitors are increasingly active, we are seeing an unavoidable decline in our exports. Furthermore, the rigid structure of GIAT prevents it from responding to invitations to bid like the one issued for a multiple rocket launcher (MLRS) by the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and France. This is a program under which the construction of the "most important part" has been turned over to Aerospatiale.

Regarding naval construction, the situation is different. The programs for building nuclear submarines are carrying the industry. Furthermore, this kind of industrial activity does not lend itself to export, and it is suffering less than others from the decline in foreign demand.

[Question] How does the CGA "supervise" the armaments industry?

[Answer] I don't like the word "supervise" very much. We tend to say: "It is up to private industrial firms to handle their own affairs. They should not depend on the state." However, each time that we undertake a program, we take into account its impact on each industrial sector. In the same way, we spread out their fixed costs with our orders. There is no use in undertaking a wide range of programs and later cancel them for lack of sufficient budgetary resources.

The second aspect of our activity is financing industrial research and development work. In 1986 this effort amounted to more than 19 billion francs.

[Question] International military cooperation and exports seem to be at a standstill. What are the reasons for these difficulties?

[Answer] There is a lot of talk about international cooperation. However, when it is time for action, there is generally a lot of tears and lamentations. To meet a common need, we wind up with different results, often in the form of a "five-legged sheep." For example, the Franco-German attack helicopter. Regarding the transfer of technology, over the long term this winds up with closing off the market.

Exports? They force us to be competitive and make it possible for us to make money. However, events are developing in an unfavorable way for exports. Look at what is happening with combat aircraft: the western countries have only sold 21 of them since the beginning of 1986. We can no longer emphasize exports! And it is clear that our trade balance in the armaments sector will tend toward equilibrium.

[Question] Should international military cooperation take other forms?

[Answer] First of all, I think that in order to have military cooperation function well, you need an industrial base with a marketing program and not merely political cooperation.

For the future of our armaments industry, I think that the right way to do things is to arrange for increased purchases. We are selling one type of equipment and are buying another. Look at what has just been arranged with Great Britain: we have bought radar equipment from them, and the British have ordered submarine mine-sweeping equipment from us. However, this solution leads to an international division of labor and the loss of certain skills. To avoid this danger, we might think of several sources of procurement and the transfer of workers within the same sector--missiles, for example.

5170
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PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER AT ODDS OVER DEFENSE BUDGET

Paris LIBERATION in French 15 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Jean Guisnel]

[Text] President Francois Mitterrand does nothing by accident. And his frank discussion with reporters on 13 October at the military base at Caylus (Tarn-et-Garonne) was carefully prepared, although whether it would take place was uncertain until the last moment. His very long statement on strategic problems and especially on armaments, intended to ensure the viability of the French nuclear striking force until the beginning of the 21st century, came at a carefully chosen moment. And although he will receive the prime minister, accompanied by the ministers of defense and foreign affairs, on 15 October at the Elysee Palace, without the presence of the chiefs of staff of the armed services, the president will do more than present a survey of the terrain. The discussions within the government on the preparation of the forthcoming military program law are not over, and Francois Mitterrand, who seemed until recently to have retired from the scene to some extent, clearly intends to claim his place--and all of his place-in the debate.

The reservations which he has expressed regarding the S4 missile (calling it a "risky deployment") are quite significant in this respect. Whereas Paul Quiles, the former socialist minister of defense, had decided to freeze this new missile project, Andre Giraud, his successor, has put it back on track, following the views of the prime minister in that respect but also the views of the French Air Force and the powerful General Delegation of Armaments and Jacques Chevallier, its director. Although the views of the Prime Minister's Office have not been made public on so-called "major" equipment programs, such as the nuclear aircraft carrier, the "AWACS" type airborne detection system, or the future combat aircraft derived from the "Rafale," the S4 missile, on the contrary, is now being built. The 1987 military budget, the first under the program law, will allocate 58 million francs in disbursement credits to it and 637 million francs in program authorizations.

By concentrating his criticisms on this weapons system, Francois Mitterrand has therefore unmistakably decided to confront the government and its strategic decisions directly. Planned to enter into service in 1996 with a total of 30 missiles, the S4 reportedly will be 10 meters long, will weigh 9 tons, and will have a range of up to 3,500 kilometers. As President Mitterrand recalled in Caylus, there is nothing revolutionary about that.

since the missile trajectory will be ballistic, like that of the submarine missiles. It will only carry one nuclear warhead, like the American "Pershing" missiles. To support his reservations about this program, the president did not neglect the point that they are already contained in a report of the Committee on Defense of the National Assembly, signed by Paul Andre Wiltzer, a supporter of Raymond Barre, and Jean Pierre Bechter, a member of the RPR. In effect, these two figures emphasized that the Soviets have made substantial progress in countering ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they have stated that the protection of the S4 mobile missile threatens to be questionable.

Towed by a truck, the S4 is intended to be deployed in military camps in peacetime and eventually throughout the country--in a "random" pattern --during periods of tension. Wiltzer and Bechter state: "It is not certain that such a weapons system will remain free to move--its principal advantage--in an environment which could become hostile." Furthermore, they regretted that the "hardened" communications system which the ground-based missiles on the Plateau d'Albion have would not be usable for the S4 missiles, which apparently could not be deployed just anywhere at all but only at points designated for them and which would therefore be strongly protected. These remarks were very welcome to the president, who observed that the conclusions of the report--generally favorable to the S4--were not consistent with the preceding text. He said: "I must say that, although I have expressed some reservations about the conclusions of this report, I personally think that the elements of the analysis which it contains are rather remarkable."

Therefore, in Francois Mitterrand's view the right choice lies in particular in continuing the missile launching nuclear submarine program (SNLE) and especially in the development of the M5, the new missile intended for them. He does not intend to have the future of this program threatened by the S4 program. No doubt, he would not be opposed to the government's purely and simply abandoning--or at least "freezing"--the S4 land-based missile. It would then be possible to adapt the future "M5" missile to the launching silos on the Plateau d'Albion, which "must remain the foundation on which and around which the land-based component (of the French nuclear striking force) should be organized."

If Jacques Chirac wanted to keep Francois Mitterrand out of the military and strategic debate, he has failed.

5170
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PSOE CRITICIZED OVER NATO MEMORANDUM

Madrid EPOCA in Spanish 13 Oct 86 pp 36-37

[Article by Miguel Platon]

[Text] Now, 8 months after the controversial referendum on NATO, the socialist government has still not defined the format of Spain's ties to the Atlantic Alliance, while it is concealing basic information from the Cortes [parliament] and month after month, it continues to strengthen Spain's integration in NATO's military structure.

One of the main arguments used by the opposition last March, when it advocated abstaining on the referendum, was that the government's proposal was confused. The experience of recent months has confirmed this view, not only in members of parliament on the center and right, but also among those on the left.

When the minister of relations with parliament, Virgilio Zapatero, 2 weeks ago refused to send to congress the memorandum that sets forth the principles of Spain's ties with the Alliance, all the parliamentary groups--with the sole exception of the socialists--protested. The ministers of foreign affairs and defense will now have to communicate to parliament the terms of the document sent last May to the secretary general of NATO, Lord Carrington, which was examined by the Atlantic Council shortly afterward.

Political Folklore

The parliamentary incident has two dimensions: one is the serious debate on the role Spain is to play within NATO; the other, with more comic overtones, is the fight about whether or not parliament will get the paper delivered in Brussels, about which both the government and the opposition have orchestrated a strange sort of farce, one that is hard to imagine happening in any other country of Europe.

The most picturesque detail of the case is that the essential lines of this supersecret memorandum were released last May, both by the minister of defense, Narcis Serra, and also by the Spanish delegation to NATO. It is sufficient to review newspaper articles dated between 17 and 25 May to find fairly complete accounts of the basic contents of the Spanish document. But this has not kept the opposition parties from acting in recent days as if this were the very first time they had learned of the existence of the memorandum. Moreover, this is not the only memorandum that Madrid has issued in recent months.

In a quite amazing manner, this particular ceremony of confusion has been stirred up by the government and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]: first of all, when Virgilio Zapatero said that the memorandum was secret, and so could not be revealed to the deputies, in flagrant contradiction with the Official Secrets Act; secondly, when in the full session on Wednesday, 1 October, the minister of foreign affairs, Fernandez-Ordonez, took refuge behind the excuse that the document had been declared confidential by NATO's secretary general, Lord Carrington; and finally when, shortly afterwards, the spokesman for the socialist group, Martin Toval, told the press in the corridors of the chamber that the secret classification had been adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a comment that made Zapatero's hair stand on end.

All the parties involved had created a great uproar about something that had a simple explanation: on 13 May of this year, 2 months after the referendum, the government delivered to Lord Carrington a nine-point memorandum setting forth Madrid's view of the principles on which Spain's participation in the Alliance should be based. Then on 16 May, 3 days later, the official publication of the Alliance, ATLANTIC NEWS, mentioned the existence of this memorandum. The Spanish delegation then revealed the general outlines of the memorandum. A week later, on 22 May, Narcis Serra gave additional information while speaking to Spanish correspondents in the Belgian capital, where he was attending a meeting of the Defense Planning Committee. The content of the minister's statement is given at the end of this article.

"Socialist NATO Does Not Exist"

This parliamentary game-playing on access to the memorandum has partly obscured the indepth issue: the difficulties that Felipe Gonzalez's administration has been having in translating its position in the referendum into something coherent.

At the time of the referendum, the point that Spanish participation would not entail membership in the integrated military structure was included in the question. As many observers pointed out at that time, it is not possible to define what that integrated military structure is and what it is not. Now we see that these observations were correct, and the socialist government is in fact bringing Spain into NATO's military structure, though with some limitations which have bewildered the Alliance. NATO's secretary general, Lord Carrington, has stated publicly that he does not understand what the Madrid government wants.

In NATO, which is a military alliance, there was no distinction at all between its military structure and political structure until in 1966 France decided to limit its participation in NATO. At that time, the Defense Planning Committee was established.

Spain's socialist government, though, has decided to participate in all of NATO's subsidiary organizations in which France does not take part, ranging from the Nuclear Planning Group to the Defense Planning Committee.

The socialists maintain that only integrated commands comprise the famous military structure, an opinion which has caused some bewilderment in Brussels. In the memorandum, though, Spain declared its willingness to undertake military tasks similar to those performed by such commands and in coordination with them. Therefore, the limitation cited in last March's referendum is on the verge of becoming a mere question of semantics.

In the opinion of Javier Ruperez, a PDP [People's Democratic Party] deputy who in 1982 became Spain's first ambassador to the Alliance, "in essence, what is happening is that the socialists have sold a NATO which does not exist: anti-American, without military integration, and outside the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty."

The "Gibmed"

Its refusal to become a part of the Alliance's commands prevents Spain from negotiating for its own command: the Iberian peninsula and its nearby areas therefore remain under the present NATO commands, and the problem of the existence of "Gibmed," the Gibraltar command, remains vivid.

Finally, to the extent that it does not cooperate with "Gibmed," Spain will continue to be unable to participate actively in protecting the Strait of Gibraltar, where, as some high-level navy commanders have commented, it is possible to find all sorts of warships: British, North American, Soviet, French..., but very rarely Spanish ships, due to budget difficulties.

The Nine Points of the Memorandum

1. Spain will participate fully in the Atlantic Council and its subordinate bodies.

2. Spain does not accept the deployment of nuclear weapons in its territory, but this position is compatible with its membership in the Nuclear Planning Group.

3. Spain's contribution to the collective defense system, and in particular to the defense of the Balearic-Strait of Gibraltar-Canaries "axis," will be made "from outside of the integrated military structure."

4. To achieve the necessary coordination, Spain will continue as a full member of the Defense Planning Committee, and Spain's chief of staff will be present in the Military Committee.

5. Spain will take part in military planning activities conducted by the Defense Planning Committee.

6. Spain will take part in logistic coordination of equipment and weapons.

7. Spain wants to participate in infrastructure programs--which will be negotiated on the basis that such programs may also be used to contribute to Spain's own national defense--and in the military budget.

8. Spain will present candidates for the international secretariat and will have a level of responsibility equivalent to the level of its participation.

9. In application of these principles, Spain will in the future prepare specific proposals covering its participation.

This is a summary of a two-page text. The aspects not stated explicitly in May--which will be expanded or revealed to the deputies this week by the ministers of foreign affairs and defense--are related to: the participation by Spanish officers in the international general staff (a support group for the Military Committee); Spain's readiness to communicate Spanish national military plans to the Alliance (including military targets); the desire to conclude coordination agreements with NATO's integrated commands--including "Gibmed," which is based in Gibraltar; and finally--and this is the most controversial point--Spain's willingness to carry out military tasks assigned to it by the Alliance.

As the reader will appreciate, many of these points need further development in order to make Spain's participation more concrete. These issues will have to be negotiated with Brussels.

7679
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MILITARY SPAIN

DEFENSE MINISTRY TO PURCHASE DIGICOM RADAR

Madrid ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA in Spanish 13 Oct 86 p 81

[Text] The Digicom consortium has won out over Telefonica, and is being awarded the 1.5 billion peseta contract for the first phase of the RADITE [Military Automated Integrated Digital Telecommunications Network] project to provide the army with telecommunications equipment.

The defense ministry has just officially awarded the first phase of the RADITE project to Digicom, a consortium of eight companies. Digicom won the bid from Telefonica, the other competitor for the contract. Funding for the RADITE project may amount to about 30 billion pesetas, spread out over 8 years. The final budget will depend on the evolution of the army's requirements. For the time being, the defense officials are proposing an initial phase of 5 billion pesetas to be divided into three parts, the first of which is what has just been awarded to Digicom in a restricted bid.

Who Digicom Is

The Digicom consortium was formed in 1978 at the initiative of the ministries of industry and defense. It is composed of EISA [Industrial Experiments] and EESA [Electronic Equipment], which today both belong to INISEL (the electronics group of the INI [National Institute of Industry]), and Marconi Espanola. In 1985 Standard Electrica and ERIA (which is also part of INISEL) joined Digicom. Standard Electrica came into the consortium because of its work with switching systems, and ERIA because of the leadership role it is acquiring in software. Later Siemens and Page Iberica were also added to the consortium; the German firm has made some very important technological developments in communications. Page Iberica was brought in because of its work in turnkey engineering developments for military projects. So for the first time, companies which have traditionally competed to win contracts have joined together to cooperate in the same project. In the words of Jose Luis Gomez Solera, spokesman for the group (see ACTUALIDAD ECONOMICA no 1,455), "Digicom is a marriage of convenience."

With this decision, the ministry of defense has emphasized a change in course in its policy of acquiring military equipment. Until now, the

Spanish government has purchased defense materiel by trying to obtain the best equipment at the most favorable price. This method has hurt Spain's electronics industry, which is now looking very favorably at this change in strategy that has encouraged some companies which compete in many markets to have no hesitation about joining to work together. The objective of the first phase of the RADITE project is the installation of switching centers, control elements for these centers, and voice and data multiplex equipment for mobile units. According to Jose Luis Gomez Solera, "winning the RADITE project is very important to us, as it will open up new potential markets, both in Spain and internationally."

7679
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EXPENDITURES FOR MILITARY R & D TO INCREASE 50 PERCENT

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 22 Oct 86 p 17

[Text] The secretary of state for defense, Eduardo Serra, yesterday told the Senate's defense committee that the 1987 research and development budget for his ministry will be 15.5 billion pesetas. This is a 50 percent increase from the 1986 r & d budget. According to Serra, 85 percent of this budget will go to the air force, which has the greatest needs.

Recently NATO's top military commander in Europe, Gen Bernard Rogers, expressed doubts about the capability of the Spanish air force to carry out NATO missions. Until the present, such missions have been entrusted to U.S. aircraft stationed at bases in Spain, which the United States and Spain use on a joint basis.

The secretary of state for defense explained that in 1980 the research and development budget was 400 million pesetas; in 1984 it was 2 billion; in 1985, 4 billion; in 1986, 10.5 billion; and in 1987, it will be 15.5 billion pesetas. "We are," he noted, "on the brink of the upper level of spending of the less developed countries, and 5 times lower [in r & d spending] than countries like France, the United Kingdom, and the United States."

Serra pointed out that Spain does not participate in international arms programs by a decision of NATO, but rather that this is an exclusively Spanish decision. Among the international programs toward which the department's investments are being directed, the secretary of state for defense cited EFA-ACE [European Fighter Aircraft] projects. Spain will sign a memorandum for this program tomorrow, after the cabinet last Friday gave the minister of defense the requisite authorization. Another is the Maverick program, an air to air missile for F-18 aircraft, being manufactured in cooperation with five other European countries. There are also other technological cooperation programs. Serra said that neither the Eureka nor Strategic Defense Initiative projects are among these programs.

Serra further stated that for the defense ministry, whether the companies participating in these programs are public or private is a secondary issue.

7679
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PAPER REVEALS SECRET ORDER SIGNED BY EVREN

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 16

[Text] HURRIYET has unearthed the fact that the secret order for the 'Flag Operation' -- implemented by the Turkish armed forces on 12 Sep 80 in keeping with the chain of command -- had been issued by the Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren to relevant echelons of the armed forces two months before the actual operation. Upon examination, the secret order appears to contain very humanitarian views and elements. The order specifies the code name of the operation as 'Flag', and goes on to mention a number of rules to be observed in relations with the public: That the public should be treated very politely, complaints and applications should be heard with patience, in public services one should be helpful toward citizens putting an end to the 'go today, come tomorrow' policy, the citizen should never be treated badly and unfairly, everyone should be accorded objective and equal treatment regardless of political orientation, and so on.

The 'Flag Operation' order, issued on 15 Jul 80 bearing the signature of the Chief of General Staff Gen. Kenan Evren and sent to relevant echelons of the armed forces, reads as follows:

The Turkish armed forces which has assumed full responsibility for the operation aiming to save our esteemed nation from the multi-faceted unrest and anxiety currently prevailing, and bring about a state of security and prosperity in the shortest time possible, and reinstitute the orderly functioning of the state which has been non-existent lately. Whatever the conditions, our armed forces, in shouldering this sacred and historical responsibility, draws its strength from a high sense of duty and responsibility inherent in its personnel which staff its honored ranks, and from the spirit of discipline based upon mutual affection, respect and trust.

The success of these Ataturkist initiatives, which will be sustained by the same spirit, depends upon absolute compliance, at every echelon, on the principles stated below and their implementation with utmost care:

All orders will be implemented in keeping with the chain of command; any individual effort or initiative will not be allowed or tolerated. Various groups and dens of activity -- which consider the extrication of our country out of this chaos inimical to their interests -- would no doubt continue their insidious activities aimed at breaking and shattering the bonds of discipline which constitute the greatest strength of our armed forces. To ensure that the members of the Turkish armed forces are not singly or collectively influenced by such machinations, and to preserve the overall integrity of our forces the following rules are to be observed:

1. All personnel will execute this operation with great humility, utter determination, an overriding sense of patriotism, and full realization of discipline. On no account will the commanders compromise discipline.

2. The operation will succeed throughout the country due to the high sense of duty of armed forces personnel. All personnel, at every echelon, will have duties equal in importance and quite indispensable. This situation should not be subjected to misuse. Though insidious groups eagerly await such things to happen, "irresponsible statements," "all kinds of conversations and discussions," "unwarranted acts and tales of ingenuity, courage and heroism" will be avoided at all costs, and no one will assume the role of spokesman for the armed forces. When necessary, and only then, a simple statement could be issed, underlining the point that our armed forces "are fully capable of resolving every kind of problem to the benefit of the country and nation, in accordance with the principles of Ataturk, and in keeping with the chain of command."

During this period all echelons of the armed forces will be coming into contact with the civilian public. At the moment a good majority want nothing other than the country get rid of all kinds of problems and attain peace and tranquility. So they are siding with the armed forces and offering their support. To ensure that the prestige of the armed forces remains intact in the eyes of the public, and that no erosion takes place in the fund of goodwill existing among the great majority of people, following points will receive utmost attention:

1. In coming into contact with the public, whatever the occasion, extreme politeness will be the order of the day, and extra effort will be made to create a feeling of contentment among the public as a result of this contact, thus reinforcing the feeling of trust.

2. Complaints and applications will be patiently heard, evaluated judiciously, and the slow wheels of bureaucracy notwithstanding, will be processed as quickly as possible.

3. In every office and institution of the state, particularly state economic enterprises, citizens will be helped within the confines of existing rules and regulations, and service will be provided without delay. The 'go today, come tomorrow' policy will most certainly be discontinued, and possible solutions will be sought for the problems of citizens.

4. Whatever the place or time, citizens will not be treated badly, unfairly or unpleasantly.

5. Assuming a know-all pose in matters where one has little knowledge will certainly be avoided hence saving the public from misleading advice. In such instances, the public will be referred to relevant authorities, and all facility and help will be provided.

6. Within the democratic parliamentary system belonging to a political party or holding a political view which is legal is a most natural right. So long as a person or group is not known to engage in activities harmful to the country, everyone will be accorded objective and equal treatment.

7. Assault, pillage, theft, brigandage, behaving like a bully, disobedience to the authorities, making light or fun of them, or insulting them will not be tolerated at all.

8. Separatism, provocation of the people against the administration, obstruction of state authority and enforcement of laws, misleading the public or state forces by disseminating groundless rumors, maintaining contact with illegal organisations while persisting in terrorist acts will be punishable by severe measures within legality, and with a view to putting the perpetrators out of action. And these measures will be maintained on a continuing basis.

9. Legal proceedings will be initiated against those hesitant about the operation, or those who openly oppose it as well as those subscribing to extremist, separatist views.

Morning of 12 Sep

It is now understood that the order to implement the 12 Sep operation -- by which the Turkish armed forces seized power -- was given in early hours of the morning in 11 Sep. The order, issued that morning to relevant echelons of the armed forces, demanded that the 'Flag Operation', issued two months earlier, be put into effect. The 11 Sep order specified that the armed forces take charge of the country at 3 am. The curfew was to take effect at 5 am. The commanders were asked to notify their superiors by 5 pm on 11 Sep indicating that all preparations had been completed with the code, "Roads are clear." Had the operation been postponed the situation would have been relayed to subordinate units by means of the code, "Ahmets are coming." The order also stated that seven communiques would be issued over the radio in early hours of the morning, and that all of them should be treated as an order, and carried out accordingly.

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SEMINAR EXAMINES COUNTRY'S POSITION IN NATO

Effects of Mediterranean Problems Discussed

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 7

[Text] Speaking at a symposium called 'The Effects of Mediterranean Issues on NATO Europe', organized by Marmara University Center of International Strategic Research, Professor Yasar Gurbuz said, "Turkey is the only NATO country whose planes are older than its pilots."

The seminar which started yesterday in the administration building of Marmara University is to last three days. It is attended by 15 experts, scientists and researchers from 9 countries as well as deans and directors of faculties and institutes affiliated with the university.

In his opening speech Professor Orhan Oguz, president of Marmara University, observed that at last year's symposium, which was the first of its kind, the issue was to determine the extent of pollution in the Mediterranean, while this year's focus was Turkey's place in NATO's southern flank. "Our aim is to repeat the success of last year's symposium," said Oguz.

Speaking later, Professor Gurbuz referred to Turkey's neighbors -- their military power and relations with Turkey:

Our one problem with Iraq is their approximately $1 billion outstanding debt to Turkey. Tensions in our relations with Iran seem to be increasing a little every day. As to Russia and Bulgaria, the issues are completely different. And despite being NATO members even Turkey and Greece have their problems. Gurbuz drew attention to Turkey's important role in the southern flank of NATO as well as the existing tensions with our neighbors. He said:

Despite all that Turkey's military equipment is unbelievably outmoded. And the only move toward the renewal of the equipment seems to be the F-16 project. But this project is so slow in moving that I'm afraid by the time it is completed F-16s would be outmoded as well.

Also speaking at the symposium, NATO Assistant Secretary General Dr. George W. Jaeger pointed out that NATO had a peace aspect alongside its military one. He said:

Today the West is ready to be flexible toward the East. However, Eastern Bloc officials seem to be good in talking peace in front of the public but do not articulate the same things once they get to the negotiation table. But lately there has been a perceptible change in Soviet readiness for exerting efforts in a positive direction. Despite all the peaceful initiatives more time as well as more mutual trust would be needed than presently exists to attain disarmament, added Dr.Jaeger. He went on:

In my speech I took particular care not to touch upon the issues between Turkey and Greece. Because like similar problems elsewhere in NATO this is a regional dispute. I chose to define our respective positions in this complicated situation rather than talk about a regional dispute between Turkey and Greece.

Focus on Warsaw Pact Relations, Economic Role

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 5 Sep 86 p 6

[Excerpts] The seminar titled 'The Effects of Mediterranean Issues on the Security of NATO Europe', organized by Marmara University Center of International Strategic Research, started yesterday in the conference room of the university administration building. Making the opening speech, Professor Orhan Oguz, president of Marmara University, underlined the increased importance of Turkey in view of its location facing the Warsaw Pact as well as being in the Middle East where actual wars are taking place. Oguz said:

Through Turkey is placed in such a critical region and is obviously important it is difficult to say it receives enough attention from its NATO allies. Spending on defence at the cost of slowing down its economic development Turkey has not been getting the kind of aid that has been anticipated for years. The rapid modernization program of the Turkish army has not been finalized for one reason or another.

Speaking later, Professor Yasar Gurbuz drew attention to Turkey's relations with its neighbors, touching upon Syrian policies and armament in particular. "Turkey is the only NATO country whose planes are older than its pilots. Its naval vessels are also aged. Turkish army would have to undergo rapid modernization in the near future," said Gurbuz. Reminding listeners that Turkey's military operations on Iraqi soil last month drew Iranian criticism Gurbuz pointed out that "relations between the two contrasting political systems may deteriorate in time," and emphasized "the need to be extremely careful in this respect."

NATO Assistant Secretary General Dr. George Jaeger, speaking at the seminar, said that "being in NATO is akin to being married to 16 women. NATO is not simply an organisation it is a community." Referring to East-West relations, Jaeger described NATO as a deterrent force, saying, "Looked at individual countries there are significant military elements. However, it is hardly a coincidence that the Soviet Union has not attacked us during the last 35 years. The alliance has a deterring aspect. NATO contains democratic countries. These countries got together because people wanted it. This situation has deterred the Soviets for the last 35 years." Preferring not to touch upon problems between Turkey and Greece Jaeger said, "I didn't take up this subject because this is a regional dispute. There are regional disputes in other NATO regions as well."

The opening session was attended by the Greek Consul General in Istanbul Leonidas Hrisantapoulos and high-ranking officers.

In the afternoon session the Director of the Center for Mediterranean Strategic Studies Claude Nigoul presented a paper titled 'Soviet Strategy in the Mediterranean' followed by Professor Armando De Castro from the Lisbon Institute of Strategic and International Studies -- 'The Economic Aspect of the Tension among Western Mediterranean Countries', and Associate Professor Jale Civelek of Marmara University -- 'The Dispute between Turkey and Bulgaria'.

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END

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West Europe Report

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SURVEY SHOWS MAJORITY SUPPORTS USE OF NUCLEAR POWER

Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 18 Sep 86 p 9

[Unattributed Article: "Allensbach Survey Shows Majority Supports Use of Nuclear Power: German Atomic Forum's Survey After Chernobyl"]

[Text] Bonn (DPA)--The German Atomic Forum has found that, even after the catastrophic Soviet reactor accident at Chernobyl, 57 percent of West Germans support the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while 32 percent want to shut down Germany's nuclear power plants. Eleven percent have no definite opinion on the subject. Such were the results of a representative survey taken among 2000 adults published yesterday by the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy.

The survey, which was conducted between May and July, was commissioned by the Information Center for Nucearl Energy and was carried out by the Atomic Forum. The Committee for the Promotion of Peaceful Users of Nuclear Energy explained that, among other things, the respondents were shown a picture of two people arguing. They were then asked to side with one or the other's opinion. One opinion read: "If the FRG were to be the only country to give up nuclear energy, nothing would be gained, because nuclear plants in neighboring countries would still put us at risk" (57 percent agreed). The same 57 percent also agreed with additional statements such as, "we have to build additional nuclear power plants" or "we have to continue to use existing plants." Thirty-four percent said: "We should stop the production of nuclear energy completely and shut down existing nuclear power plants.

The Atomic Forum also said that the number of people opposed to nuclear energy has doubled since 1984, while the number of those advocating nuclear energy has dropped by 12 percent. A similar shift in public opinion was observed after the incident at the U.S. nuclear power plant at Harrisburg in 1979.

The German Atomic Forum pointed to another finding of the Allensbach survey, similar to 1984, that about 42 percent of those polled think nuclear power plants are environmentally cleaner than conventional power plants. Forty-four percent think that nuclear energy makes better sense economically and is cheaper. An overwhelming majority (72 percent) is convinced that the economy would suffer if nuclear energy were abandoned completely. Radioactive waste is still the number-one concern of those questioned (75 percent). Only one-fifth (19 percent) believe that German reactors are as unsafe as the Chernobyl plant.

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WULF-MATHIES FAVORED TO SUCCEED BREIT AS DCB CHIEF IN 1990

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Sep 86 p 9

[Article by KLR: "Speculation About Breit's Succession Favors Ms Wulf-Mathies--Goetz and Viehof Also Candidates for DGB Chairman"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 23 Sep--In early summer, Ernst Breit, 62, was reconfirmed for another 4 years as chief of the Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB). However, rumors are already flying about as to who his successor might be 4 years from now. Trade union insiders mention as a possible "favorite" Monika Wulf-Mathies, born 1942. She comes from the Bonn (SPD) political scene, and currently heads the Union of Public Service, Transportation, and Traffic (OTV). Some say her prospects are enhanced by the fact that she is a woman.

Some trade unionists have come to suspect she harbors such ambitions after her appearance at the last national congress in Hamburg, where she made an impassioned plea for the rights of workers; while at the same time assuring the president of the FRG that "this state, based on federal law, is also our state, a state we have helped to build." Ms Wulf-Mathies added that, "whenever trade unionists take the federal government severly to task, they are actually defending the basic laws of the nation's constitution," adding that a united union is the "most effective weapon against capital and the power of the employer."

Back in May, Ms Wulf-Mathies said that unity also demands self-restraint and the renunciation of maximum positions "should they fail to appeal to a broad audience." She also said that the trade unions' independence from political parties protects them from "being taken in tow" by the parties. To underline her position, the OTV chief said: "Our strength and ability to prevail lies in the very fact that the DGB stands for the German trade union movement itself and knows no pluralism, no particularism, and no political factionalism. That is why we favor a united trade union without ifs and buts."

Whether or not the speculations about Ms Wulf-Mathies as Breit's successor--she would be the first female chief of the DGB--have a serious foundation or not, the question still remains why once more somebody from the Public Services Union--Breit came from the Postal Union--is to head the DGB leadership. Trade union insiders have opined that either the leaders of the "hard industrial trade unions" have no interest in heading the relatively powerless DGB executive organ or that they are too old or would not stand a chance of getting elected.

Trade Unionists Are Amused

Another person mentioned as a possible successor to Breit is Siegfried Bleicher, a member of the DGB's national executive board. He is, among other things, responsible for questions dealing with technology, but he is planning on running for an executive office in the Metalworkers Union this coming October. Trade union officials have no difficulty envisioning CDU-member Hanshorst Viehof, born 1940, as Bleicher's possible successor on the DGB's national executive board. In 1980, Viehof served on the executive board of the Union of Commerce, Banking, and Insurance Workers (HBV), where he was responsible for economic policy. After the "Bonner Development" [Wende], Labor Minister Bluem took him into the ministry as chief of the sections for "labor policy, unemployment insurance, and policies concerning aliens." His appointment caused some puzzlement, not only within the DGB, because the HBV trade union has a reputation of being "left oriented," and nobody knows of instances where Viehof has not agreed with HBV policy.

It was said at that time, too, that Bluem was bent on improving the new government coalition's relations with the trade unions. Viehof stated his new position in 1983, but did not last long. In December 1985, he retired for the time being.

Christian Goetz, who has been brought into the game by his own HBV union, is allegedly another candidate to succeed Bleicher. He takes care of youth employment and is known to be sympathetic to the "left." It seems that several DGB officials have let it be known that they are not keen on having Goetz on the DGB national board. It would take a two-thirds majority of the DGB national executive committee to get Goetz into Bleicher's position.

What so obviously amuses some trade union leaders is the idea that the CDU man, Viehof, could be elected to the DGB national executive board. "Just imagine," they muse, "a third CDU member on the board before the impending national elections," where he would join Ms Irmgard Blaettel and the DGB Vice President Gustav Fehrenbach. After a while, Viehof could replace the aging Fehrenbach, and that way, the DGB executive board would once more have its "usual two CDU members."

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CAVACO SILVA'S RELUCTANCE TO AID UNITA CREATES PROTEST

Cavaco Silva's Attitude 'Perplexing'

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Sep 86 p 1

[Commentary by Vera Lagoa: "September of My Discontent"]

[Excerpts] I say "September of my discontent" because I have actually met people who are not discontented. Surprising but true.

At this moment in September, at this moment at which I am writing--on this Sunday morning--a very fine rain is falling, and it is even dampening my heart. Because my heart is sad. It is discontented.

There is a very fine rain and a gray sky on what was supposed to be a morning with radiant sunshine. But no. That very fine rain and that gray sky can be and are being gotten over.

What cannot be gotten over is the anguish caused by certain statements which I do not understand (does anyone understand them?) and which were made by a prime minister whom I support (critically). Not his statements concerning Timor, because they have already been denied, but those concerning the request or suggestion that support--extremely important support in this case--be withdrawn from UNITA.

Is Cavaco Silva trying to insinuate that if UNITA disappears the Cubans will disappear? Don't make me laugh. Those Cubans will never leave Angola. But if they ever do, it will be precisely because of UNITA's strength and the persistence and courage of Savimbi (to whom I pay tribute for his patriotism). That persistence and courage can continue to manifest themselves only with extremely strong support in the form of financing and weapons. Sa Carneiro--since there is so much insistence, sometimes hypocritical, on his example--always felt that way.

I have no doubt that the United States is supporting Savimbi. Perhaps that makes up for the fact that at one point it was at Luanda's gates but then withdrew. The matter is beyond me. But even today I am ashamed at the way in which the Alvor Accord has been "carried out."

Savimbi says that the matter will be resolved among the Angolans. Very good. That was what the above-mentioned accord said. Fidel intends to keep the Cubans in Angola and said so just recently, which leaves me even more perplexed by Cavaco Silva's (extremely confused) attitude. That is the reason for my discontent.

The rain is continuing to sadden me. Doubts are continuing to sadden Portugal. As the poet would say.

My heart is discontented.

'Realpolitik' Seen Risky

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 13 Sep 86 p 16

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice: "Between Jamba and Luanda"]

[Excerpt] It is true that Cavaco Silva is little more than a novice in matters of international relations and such things, and it is true that no one who wants to tell the truth can say that he is surrounded by renowned and experienced specialists in that field. This is not meant to belittle the intellectual and human qualities (which are not the same thing as experience and knowledge) of the team in charge of foreign affairs, a team which, by the way, I not only admire but also esteem. No one will be surprised, therefore, to see a few errors being committed, a few blunders appearing in their speeches, or a degree of naiveness sometimes appearing in their actions. But for one thing, an intelligent man learns fast, and for another, Cavaco Silva is prime minister for reasons of domestic politics, and in that context, foreign policy is, from the standpoint of the reasons why he is leader, a comparatively secondary field.

That being said, it is worthwhile to bring up the question of the statements concerning UNITA and Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] which have been attributed to him in the media and which, objectively, revealed a veiled hostility toward the guerrilla movements in question and an alignment in his talks with the U.S. administration--based on a view of international politics that is not "realistic"--with defense of the thesis advanced by the petroleum lobby and the Luanda government, which says that when all is said and done, UNITA is an obstacle to "peace" and that stability in the area does not exist because support for UNITA is preventing its annihilation. The media may be reporting his words incorrectly, but it is no secret that the official Portuguese position has changed under the current government. Previously, it was Sa Carneiro's strategy that prevailed (privileged and cordial political relations with UNITA, neutrality on the part of the Portuguese state, and a government-to-government relationship governed by international law with the authorities in Luanda). With Pires de Miranda, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] came to be seen politically as the natural interlocutor, limited only by the fact that it had not yet freed itself of Soviet-Cuban protection--which would be much reduced if UNITA did not exist.

Because of the "arcana" it possesses, international politics is by nature a secretive or discreet area. It may be that domestic public opinion is unaware of factors which, from the standpoint of national interest, justify or even require a tactical or strategic shift. It may even be that the idea that nothing in the Angolan struggle is going to change over the next few years justifies a rapprochement with the MPLA, on which, after all, the big contracts governing exports, investment, or technology transfer depend.

The only thing is that a few doubts and a few certainties must manifestly be considered in this connection. To exemplify, some of the doubts are these: does Portugal's negotiating power with respect to Angola increase or decrease as a result of "alignment" with the government in Luanda? Is it true that "the pressures being exerted on the MPLA by UNITA" are having a moderating effect on Soviet influence--whether seriously or not--or, on the contrary, can it be that if there were no guerrilla warfare, Angola would be a kind of Ivory Coast? Does Portugal's national interest require relations with whoever is in power in Luanda or require that we support the MPLA? In other words, is Portugal's foreign policy in relation to Angola a matter of "Realpolitik" or a policy based on ideological vectors?

There are also a number of certainties which seem undeniable. For good and for evil, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] was once the party enjoying privileged relations with UNITA, but it is now losing that status to the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and the PS [Socialist Party]. Portuguese voters with ties in Africa, who carry decisive weight in domestic political solutions, were showing a significant tendency to vote for the PSD after again taking refuge in abstention following the death of Sa Carneiro or, in some cases, supporting the CDS. Whether rightly or wrongly, those voters are strongly opposed to the MPLA and FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front], and it is no accident that the first forceful criticism of Cavaco Silva that I have heard on that subject over the past few months has come from areas that vote for the PSD.

Beyond those doubts and certainties, one thing seems certain. One of the basic reasons that could justify the Portuguese Government's apparent shift in tactics or strategy is the idea that a neutral position on the Angolan internal struggle has the effect of harming Portuguese economic interests and even its interest in protecting Portuguese who are still working in the area controlled by the MPLA. That is why the advocates of a rapprochement with Luanda usually claim that the opposite thesis is pure idealism, that it is expensive, and that a small country cannot afford to implement it on the external level, especially when dealing with issues and areas that are a priority in its policy.

Let it be admitted that that is true, at least as a hypothesis for argument. And if it is true, the logical consequence is that a political rapprochement with the governments in Angola and Mozambique will have the effect, first of all, of turning Portugal into a privileged interlocutor for those governments and turning Portuguese firms into obvious and favored partners in economic relations, not to mention an immediate end to the generally unpunished and tolerated violations of the most basic human rights of Portuguese working in those countries. So often those workers are arrested and mistreated, and no one hears even the vehement protests by Portuguese authorities that would be justified in such cases.

The fact is that a curious feature exists in relation to the former Portuguese territories in Africa. The stand on UNITA that has been adopted by such countries as France or even the United States is such that Savimbi has even been received as a chief of state, but that has not prevented the Luanda government from wanting closer diplomatic and economic ties. But in the case of Portugal, there are threats one after the other and intensifying boycotts as part of what some people say is an unconscious attempt by Angola to transform Portugal into its colony.

Like everything else, Realpolitik has its advantages and its disadvantages, especially when taken to extremes. The minimum requirement is that it should at least have positive results. And quick ones.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

POSITIVE COMMENTS ON VISIT TO SAVIMBI'S UNITA

Joao Soares Interview

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 11 Sep 86 p 8

[Interview with publisher Joao Soares by Carlos Pires; date and place not given; first paragraph is TEMPO introduction]

[Text] Joao Soares, the son of the president of the republic, was one of the most significantly conspicuous guests at the 6th UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] Congress, which was held in Angolan territory in August and from which he returned last Saturday. According to what he himself told TEMPO, "there was no reason to reject Jonas Savimbi's invitation," which he accepted in his capacity as the first publisher of one of Savimbi's books in Portugal. "I would not want anyone at all, including my father, to be held responsible for an attitude that is strictly my own," he told us. In the opinion of Joao Soares, "the reality of UNITA is very poorly known in Portugal, and it has been the target of a campaign of slander and propaganda that has completely deceived public opinion."

TEMPO: Why did you agree to attend the 6th UNITA Congress?

Joao Soares: I feel that there was no reason to reject Jonas Savimbi's invitation to visit the zone controlled by UNITA in the interior of Angola. Jonas Savimbi is an Angolan politician; he invited me to go there because I was the first to publish a book of his in Portugal, and so there was no reason to reject his invitation.

TEMPO: What was your first impression on encountering the reality of UNITA?

Joao Soares: Frankly, it was one of amazement. Amazement at what has been achieved there--amazement and admiration for the work that has been achieved there in so short a time.

The reality of UNITA is very poorly known in Portugal, it has been the target of a campaign of slander and propaganda that has completely deceived public opinion, and I myself admit that to some extent, I was quite poorly informed about what had happened and is happening in Angola.

TEMPO: Is UNITA accepted by the population it controls? Is it in fact established and organized?

Joao Soares: On the basis of what I was able to observe, I would not be truthful if I did not say that UNITA is extremely well organized and that it has cadres who are solid, intelligent, capable, and trained politically and militarily. It was in fact a very big surprise for me, and it has a leader who is perhaps one of the greatest African leaders of our time. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying it. He is a very cultured man, well educated and well informed, extremely intelligent, and an uncommon speaker.

TEMPO: Were there many foreign guests?

Joao Soares: When we arrived, the congress was practically over. A few foreign delegates had been at the opening session, along with several reporters. Besides them, there were the chairman of Centrist Youth, Manuel Monteiro, a friend of mine named Duarte Teives, and Marise de Oliveira from Nova Nordica, who, like me, had been invited because she is one of Savimbi's publishers.

TEMPO: Do you intend to publish any more books about Jonas Savimbi or UNITA?

Joao Soares: There are no specific plans at the moment, but if the opportunity arises, I will not shy away from doing it.

TEMPO: Didn't the fact that Joao Soares is the son of the president of the republic cause you any problems when it came to accepting UNITA's invitation?

Joao Soares: Well, I must tell you that I did not accept the first invitation, which was issued a week before I left, and the reason was precisely that I did not want to give cause for any speculation or confusion. Obviously, I would not want anyone at all, including my father, to be held responsible for a strictly personal attitude that was entirely up to me.

TEMPO: From what you were able to observe, is the population controlled by UNITA experiencing shortages or not?

Joao Soares: I can tell you I know something about the realities of Africa and especially the Portuguese-speaking countries. I was in Portuguese Guinea and Sao Tome after decolonization and when my father was deported there, and I have also been to Luanda. What I saw in the vast zone controlled by UNITA was enough to permit me to say, as far as the population is concerned, that the situation is not the same in any other Portuguese-speaking African country. The people were wearing shoes, they were adequately dressed and, from what I could see, were not having any problems with food. As a matter of fact, judging from the farming operations we saw, it can be confirmed that in the areas it controls, UNITA is managing to ensure levels of self-supply for the population that are extremely reasonable by African standards.

TEMPO: On the basis of your brief experience in Angolan territory, what is your opinion concerning the future of that country?

Joao Soares: There is an undeniable reality which became very clear at the congress, and it is that it is impossible for the Russians, the Cubans, and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], which brought them into Angola, to eliminate UNITA militarily. UNITA has established itself and now controls a substantial part of Angolan territory. In those circumstances, there will be no solution except a negotiated one, which necessarily means the withdrawal of foreign troops: Russian, Cuban, and also South African if there are any.

TEMPO: One of Jonas Savimbi's objectives is to hold elections in Angola. Does that seem possible to you, or is it utopian?

Joao Soares: I am not an expert on African affairs, but why should elections not be possible in Angola if they were, for example, in former Rhodesia? For that matter, Portugal is bound by the Alvor Accords to hold elections in Angola to determine which of the three Angolan movements that fought against Portuguese colonialism should exercise power in that country in a democratic way.

TEMPO: Do you feel it is reasonable to call UNITA a "puppet group," which is what it is usually called by the government of Jose Eduardo Santos?

Joao Soares: Not at all! I feel that it would not enter anyone's head, especially after observing what UNITA is, to say that UNITA is a puppet group in the service of South Africa or anybody else.

TEMPO: What is the UNITA Army's state of mind toward the MPLA? Could it be said that hatred is being stirred up?

Joao Soares: That is perhaps the thing that surprised me most during my brief visit to Angolan territory. It would be natural to find a lot of propaganda and an atmosphere of hate toward the MPLA, but frankly, I did not observe anything like that. Quite the contrary. The propaganda is directed against the presence of foreign forces, not against the MPLA. UNITA feels that regardless of the mistakes that may have been made by the MPLA's current leadership, it is going to be essential to sit down at the same table to discuss the future of Angola.

CDS Deputy on UNITA

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Sep 86 p 17

[Report on interview with Manuel Monteiro, CDS deputy and chairman of Centrist Youth, by J.L.; date and place not given]

[Text] "According to its chairman, Jonas Savimbi, UNITA wants and desires peace, but for peace to be possible, it is important for the Russians and Cubans to leave Angolan soil. Incidentally, the 40,000 Cubans in Angola (more than the Portuguese Army had there during the war in that former overseas province) are pillaging villages and raping women while the Luanda government stands passively by." That is what we were told by Manuel Monteiro, deputy and chairman of Centrist Youth, concerning the visit he recently made to that African nationalist movement's base in Jamba.

Having attended the 6th UNITA Congress at UNITA's invitation as part of a group of Portuguese guests, Manuel Monteiro was able to get a close look at the reality of the war pitting Savimbi's movement against the communist forces of FAPLA [People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] (MPLA) and the Cubans.

Manuel Monteiro emphasized to us: "One Cuban who had surrendered to UNITA when he was about 17 years of age (he is probably about 21 years old now) told us that he had been told in Cuba that he was going to Angola to fight against South Africa. But he encountered a very different reality later, when he found that his fighting was directed exclusively against UNITA.

"Incidentally, that is not the only peculiarity to be noted in this conflict: SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] and the ANC [African National Congress], which have 'stretched' their main bases into northern Angola (it makes one want to ask if that is where they encounter the South Africans) often serve as the 'advance guard' for the MPLA, according to what I was told by UNITA officials. UNITA's leaders went so far as to say that SWAPO soldiers disguised in their [UNITA's] uniforms enter villages to steal, trying in that way to instigate revolt against Jonas Savimbi's movement."

Manuel Monteiro also told us that UNITA now enjoys solid U.S. arms support and has been progressively establishing itself in Angola, as is shown both by the existing bases and by the untold quantity of Russian war materiel which is captured and later used in the struggle against the MPLA.

Presence of Rosa Coutinho's Mercenaries

Another aspect conveyed to Manuel Monteiro by UNITA's leaders has to do with the presence on Angolan soil of Portuguese mercenaries in the service of the MPLA.

On that subject, the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] leader told us:

"A high official in UNITA, General Wambo, told me that those mercenaries had been hired in Portugal by the regrettably well-known Rosa Coutinho and that their chief purpose is to provide military training for FAPLA's soldiers. Incidentally, according to UNITA leaders, those 'soldiers'--most of them 14, 15, or 16 years of age--are sent to the front with only 2 weeks of military training (Savimbi's movement gives its recruits about 6 months of intensive training)."

At the Jamba base, Manuel Monteiro also visited hospitals, production units, and schools, where he noted that the instruction is given in Portuguese.

He engaged in significant dialogue with a young doctor who, after being connected with the MPLA, now carries on his profession at that UNITA military base:

"He told me about the unique way in which the MPLA treats its war wounded: since it has little time in which to treat them, certain slight injuries to legs or arms are treated by amputation when the victims are not simply abandoned to their fate. The same doctor told me it was imperative for a delegation upholding human rights or even the International Red Cross to check out the conditions in which the MPLA's wounded are 'treated,' because the best treatment is channeled to the Russians and Cubans."

Manuel Monteiro's final impression of his 20-day visit to Angolan territory controlled by UNITA is that "the Portuguese Government cannot continue to ignore the strength and established presence that Jonas Savimbi's movement now has in Angola."

The CDS deputy added: "Ignoring UNITA is not the best way to protect Portuguese interests and the interests of our compatriots who have returned from Angola. It did not ask us to support it publicly; it only wanted Portugal and the Portuguese not to forget that Angola is at war and that its young people are entitled to a better future."

Savimbi Message to Youth

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 11 Sep 86 p 4

[Excerpt] Almost coinciding with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva's statements in Washington concerning support for UNITA, Centrist Youth held a meeting with reporters yesterday to present them with a message sent by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to Portuguese young people.

The message reads as follows:

"This war is leading Angolan young people to their deaths. The Russians and Cubans who are in Angola are using their lives to rob and mistreat our people.

"Portuguese young people, who are living in peace and freedom, cannot remain silent in the face of this situation. Our young people want to live in democracy, freedom, and harmony. Our young people who are combating communist tyranny and dictatorship by giving up their lives for a free Angolan fatherland are hoping for solidarity and support from Portuguese young people.

"We want peace, and we want our young people to have the future they deserve.

"You who have freedom and peace must raise your voices to demand that the Russians and Cubans leave our fatherland so that all of us can live hand in hand."

The chairman of Centrist Youth, Manuel Monteiro, has just returned from Angola, where, at UNITA's invitation, he attended the congress held by Jonas Savimbi's movement and visited several bases in Angolan territory. As is known, the congress was held in the town of Jamba, which UNITA considers "the provisional capital of Angola."

Expressing the position of Centrist Youth--an organization which is autonomous but not independent of the CDS and which therefore shares the views held by that party's leadership--Manuel Monteiro emphasized the West's responsibility in the face of the communist offensive against southern Africa. That offensive is made obvious, incidentally, by the presence of Cuban troops and countless "advisers" from every Eastern country.

In view of that, the chairman of Centrist Youth criticized the statements made the day before yesterday by Cavaco Silva in favor of cutting off the support that the West has been giving UNITA.

On the other hand, Manuel Monteiro expressed his confidence in the possibility that Portuguese would emigrate to Angola if law and order were restored to that country and if the conditions were created for a government that would include participation by UNITA.

Lastly, the leader of the CDS young people's group analyzed the situation in South Africa, emphasizing the level-headed approach that Portugal must take because of the approximately 700,000 Portuguese residing in that country.

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POLITICAL SWEDEN

POLITICIANS CRITICIZE PALMLUND COMMENTS ON REFUGEES

Daily Interviews Palmlund

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "Palmlund Says Sweden Cannot Handle Any More Refugees"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Sweden cannot handle the number of asylum seekers who are coming here today, according to Thord Palmlund, director general of the Immigration Department. The number has doubled since spring. There are not enough resources to give refugees an opportunity to make a good life here. And that in turn affects public opinion and can lead to increased hostility to foreigners.

Refugees come to Sweden from different parts of the world but right now the biggest increase is in the number of Iranian refugees. In the spring there were 600-700 asylum seekers a month. Now the figure has climbed to 1,700 in the past month.

"This is close to the limit of the number we can handle," said Thord Palmlund. "I would like to have a large refugee quota but I can also see that we have more refugees today than we can handle in a satisfactory way."

Thord Palmlund is very sympathetic with all those who want to come to Sweden. Most asylum seekers from Iran are fleeing from a regime that most people would want to get away from, he said, as well as from a bloody war.

"From a purely human point of view it is easy to understand them, regardless of what has happened to their passports and what documents they bring with them. In many cases they have a well-justified fear of staying in their homeland. But even so most of them do not fit the Geneva Convention definition of a refugee.

"Many flee to avoid active military service in Iran and that is something that is very difficult for Swedish authorities to disprove. If that is the case the Swedish Alien Act allows the refugee to stay in this country.

"If they have fled from active service there is a big risk that the authorities may take steps against them," said Thord Palmlund.

"At the moment Sweden has a refugee immigration load that is clearly close to the limit of what we can handle," said the head of the Immigration Department.

"We have a hard time processing the 1,700 people a month who are now seeking asylum in this country. In addition our opportunity to pursue an active refugee policy is limited and this complicates the desirable improved arrangement for international refugee work."

Why Not More?

But Sweden is a big country and a relatively rich one. Why can't we take in more of these suffering and persecuted people?

"The world refugee problem is broader than Iran alone, the country that is currently responsible for the biggest increase," said Thord Palmlund. "The industrialized world cannot solve the problems of the Third World (the developing nations) via immigration. We have limited reception possibilities and those we do have must be used in particular for the refugees who have a strong need to find sanctuary or who have ties to Sweden. Therefore the only thing we can do is check the free flow of refugees. And this applies not only to refugees but to those who want to leave their homelands for other reasons as well."

Danish Example

Thord Palmlund cited Denmark as an example of how hard it is for a country that liberalizes its immigration policy, as that country did 2 years ago. Now the Danes must review their refugee policy. They cannot cope with the rapidly increasing flood of people seeking help.

"The minute we open our borders we can expect a substantial increase in the number of asylum seekers. Sweden has a large geographical area but it is not a question of taking people in and putting them out in the woods. They must be given a real chance to get back on their own feet.

"That in turn is a basic prerequisite if Sweden and the Swedish people are to accept refugees and immigrants without allowing hostility to foreigners to gain a foothold.

"We must try to keep the situation under control," said Thord Palmlund. "If people get the impression that we have unlimited immigration it will stimulate aggression and unrest. A refugee policy that allows immigration within the limits that we can handle and within the limits of what Swedish communities can assimilate is a sensible way of reducing the number of problems."

Important to Set Limits

Restrictions are necessary, according to Thord Palmlund, as well as understanding people's situation. But he feels the administration must be provided with resources. A large part of the negative picture of refugees and immigrants is the fault of inadequate resources. When Swedes see refugees who have no work permit walking around and waiting to hear if they will be allowed to stay, they become irritated.

Warmhearted molders of public opinion sometimes say that Sweden could double the number of refugees it takes in, Thord Palmlund pointed out.

"In 3 years we have increased the number from 5,000 to this year's 12-13,000. Should we double the figure once again?

Thord Palmlund said that there has been an enormous improvement in a short time on the part of communities whose active and positive involvement has helped to create room for more refugees in many cases. Then are things all right the way they are now? No, the head of the Immigration Department did not think so:

"We can't keep up. People are staying too long in refugee camps and that is destructive. There is not enough money for instruction in Swedish which is a prerequisite for adjusting to society. There are big gaps in administration. The policy and the apparatus were not designed for the number of refugees that are coming here now."

Sweden must give the police the resources to enable them to patrol the borders and check passports, trip organizers and other things, in Thord Palmlund's opinion. Has Sweden reached its limit when it comes to its ability to take in people from other countries who are seeking help?

"I will not speculate about that," said Thord Palmlund. "We have pushed our level up and we should be glad that we are taking care of the number of refugees and immigrants we have now and the number that we are continuing to get. But I do not believe there will be any radical changes in policy in this respect."

Parties Support Open Policy

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Mats Carlbom and Bo Westmar: "No Party Support for Palmlund"]

[Text] The time is ripe for the prime minister to initiate an international step concerning the refugee problem. The work to arrive at an agreement on the distribution of refugees among the European countries must be stepped up.

Ingemar Eliasson (Liberal) made these remarks to DAGENS NYHETER and both the Left-Communist Party [VPK] and the Conservatives were in agreement with him.

Thord Palmlund, director general of the Immigration Department, said in a DAGENS NYHETER interview on Saturday that Sweden cannot handle as many asylum seekers as it has today. He pointed out that the number of refugees coming to Sweden has increased from between 600 and 700 in the spring to 1,700 today.

"Thord Palmlund has a unique ability to say the wrong thing at the wrong time," commented Riksdag member Alexander Chrisopoulos, the VPK spokesman on refugee issues.

More Money

"The mistake he makes is to confuse the Immigration Department's budget, which has been cut by Riksdag, with Sweden's resources. And he did so in the middle of the Refugee '86 campaign which led to a positive debate on the refugee question."

VPK feels that more money is needed for the Immigration Department today to enable it to handle the current wave of refugees and that we should have a more generous refugee policy in Sweden in the future than we have today.

The idea that Sweden should put a lid on the number of refugees today was rejected by all the Riksdag parties because that would conflict with the Geneva Convention to which we are committed.

"For many years we have had an uneven influx of refugees," said Ingemar Eliasson. "But it is hard for me to comprehend that we have reached the limit of what we can handle now.

Initiative

"The situation in Europe has reached the point where the prime minister should take the initiative immediately to bring about an international agreement on the distribution of refugees in Europe," said Ingemar Eliasson.

"This is a question of Europe's responsibility to the Third World."

He was fully supported by VPK member Alexander Chrisopoulos.

"Sweden has not done enough to bring about an international agreement on the distribution of refugees," he said. "On the contrary, the European nations are currently competing over the best way to protect their borders from refugees."

The Conservatives also said that we cannot set a ceiling on how many refugees Sweden will accept because that would be contrary to the refugee convention.

"Due to the fact that the number of asylum seekers is very large at certain times, our resources are not always adjusted to the situation," said Gunnel Liljegren, the Conservative Party spokesman on refugee issues and deputy member of the Immigration Department committee.

Increase Resources

"Of course we must increase the resources if there are more refugees. But getting an international agreement in Europe on the distribution of refugees would be something of a feat. I agree with Ingemar Eliasson that the prime minister should take the initiative now to speed up this effort."

Karin Soder of the Center Party also stressed how important it is for countries to cooperate with each other and with the United Nations to solve the refugee problem.

"Of course we can take in more refugees. After all we are a welfare state, even if we are a small one. However I share Thord Palmlund's view that each refugee should have his case reviewed properly and that we must take care of the refugees properly. And for that more money may be necessary," said Karin Soder.

Thord Palmlund is just fishing for more money in the supplemental budget, in the view of Immigration Minister Anita Gradin.

"But Palmlund can calm down, the question is being looked into at this time," said Gradin. "What is involved is more money to strengthen the Immigration Department's research section and extra funds for new refugee camps and additional personnel.

"This kind of thing is tricky because one cannot make a permanent allocation. The stream of refugees tends to come in waves.

"What happens is that refugees have to stay a little longer at the camps and the paper work takes a little longer. But our camps are not that bad," Anita Gradin said.

"If the influx of refugees increases further, we can take a stand on the matter at that time. It is quite a different thing that international cooperation is needed to create regional solutions," said the Immigration Minister.

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ISLAM: ACTIVITIES; LIBYAN, IRANIAN, TURKISH INFLUENCES

Paris ESPRIT in French Oct 86 pp 1-30

[Article by Jean-Francois Legrain: "Islam in France, French Islam"] (Footnote 1) (This text is abridged from a study distributed by the Secretariat of the French Bishops' Council for Relations with Islam) (Footnote 2) (Jean-Francois Legrain is a teacher at the Catholic Institute of Paris)]

[Text] The following study seeks to relieve the exaggerated fears often fed by flagrant ignorance of the facts concerning emigration and immigration. Although it deals with the religious aspect of the character of these communities, nevertheless, it does not deny the importance or even the decisive significance of other factors affecting them. In no case does it conclude that ideological "superstructures" are all powerful in determining their character. To speak in general terms about the "Muslims in France" no doubt is a matter of methodological convenience. (But do we speak of the "Christian people" in France?) In this connection we are speaking of people who, whether voluntarily or not, belong to the Islamic cultural sphere, without prejudging their degree of support for their faith or what their faith says. The great majority of these people belong to the same social category, usually identified by the term "immigrant workers." They are less and less immigrants, despite the rise of ignorant and blind racism. This category of "Islam in France" is beginning a process which will turn it into "French Islam" over the next few decades.

I - The Structures of Islam in France

1 - The Legal Framework

Islam, like other religions practiced in France, is subject to the law of 8 December 1905 "concerning the separation of Churches and the State." It carries on its activities under the legal system of associations, as defined in Title IV of this law relating to cultural associations, or, most often, under the law of 1 July 1901, which grants freedom of association to all citizens, including foreign nationals.

Although the French Republic does not provide monetary support to any religion, nevertheless certain facilities have been made available, principally under pressure of population growth and the establishment of new cities and residential sections. (Among French Catholics, these facilities are called "the cardinal's workshops.") It has been accepted that French communes provide land to cultural associations for only symbolic rents. Furthermore, the budget law of 29 July 1961 states, in Article 11: "In developing municipal areas, loans entered into by local groups or by cultural associations to finance the construction of buildings to meet collective needs of a religious character may be guaranteed by departments or communes. The minister of finance and economic affairs is also authorized to provide a state guarantee for loans made in France for the same purpose by national groups or associations." With regard to Islam, the practice has always rested on an interpretation of the term "developing municipal areas," extended to every commune which has a large community of Islamic origin and which has no place for them to hold religious services.

Table 1 - Muslims in France

Of Foreign Nationality	
Algeria	780,000
Morocco	520,000
Tunisia	200,000
Turkey	165,000
Mali (90% Muslim)	24,340
Senegal (92% Muslim)	33,240
Cameroon (25% Muslim)	14,220
Ivory Coast (30% Muslim)	11,680
Mauritania	5,060
Pakistan	9,000
Shi'ites from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan	60,000 (?)

	Nearly 8.0 million

Of French Nationality	
"French Muslims"	450,000
"Beurs"	400,000
Converts	100,000
Shi'ites (from Madagascar)	5,000

	Nearly 1.0 million

2 - Authority in the Islamic Religion and Community Organizations

Having no authoritative bodies or a hierarchy of organizations recognized by everyone, Islam in France, as is the case elsewhere and especially in Sunnite communities, is experiencing a kind of structural breakdown at the same time that it hears a constant appeal for the unity of the community of believers, founded on the consensus regarding its version of God and his revelation. The observer, therefore, should be aware of the various organizational networks which provide a structure to this community, networks which "are developing, one alongside the other, which are superimposed on each other, and which interact mutually." (Dassetto) (Footnote 1) (See the bibliography at the end of this article).

2.1 - International Muslim Organizations

Following the suppression of the Islamic Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk in 1924, the Muslim countries made several efforts to establish either a new kind of caliphate or a federal structure which would make it possible to encourage the solidarity and the unity of the Islamic world.

The World Islamic League (Rabitat al-alam al-islami), a non-governmental international organization, was established in Mecca in May 1962, at the initiative of Prince Faisal, in a context of internal tensions within the Arab-Muslim world between "progressives" who supported Gamal Abdel Nasser and "moderates" led by Saudi Arabia. Some 31 countries participated in the foundation of this organization and decided to make it a body whose mission was "to achieve the unity and the strengthening of the Muslim world, by fighting against elements which turn the believers away from their faith, by improving the quality of religious instruction, and by increasing the number of publications in the most widely used modern languages, while further expanding the use of Arabic among Muslims." A constituent council acts as the supreme organ of the league, and its secretary general is required to be a Saudi Arabian citizen.

In 1975 the league established a "Conseil superieur mondial des mosquees" [Higher World Council of Mosques], under which regional councils were organized on every continent. The Paris bureau of the league was opened in 1976. In June 1980 the "Conseil continental des mosquees en Europe" [Continental Council of Mosques in Europe] was established in Brussels, where it set up its headquarters. The Third Conference of the Continental Council, held in November 1982, decided on the establishment in Brussels of an Islamic Institute for the training of preachers and imams in Europe. The Paris bureau of the council was charged with organizing the "Conseil europeen pour l'education islamique" [European Council for Islamic Education]. The London of this council was assigned the task of establishing the "Academie europeenne de jurisprudence islamique" [European Academy of Islamic Jurisprudence].

In addition to the distribution of Islamic catechisms and financial aid provided to mosques (4.5 million francs between 1979 and 1983, according to the league, of which 1.36 million francs were distributed in the year 1982-83 to 20 mosques), the league participates very substantially in the Islamic program broadcast every Sunday on TF 1 [French TV channel], through the association "Connaitre l'islam" [Knowing Islam]. Although it is controlled by Saudi Arabia, the league's activities are not limited to the spread of Wahhabi philosophy. No doubt the existence of a certain number of French converts to Islam makes it possible for the league to appreciate more effectively questions regarding the integration of the Muslim community in French society.

The "Ligue islamique" [Islamic League] is the only international Muslim organization presently in Paris. The "Organisation de la conference islamique" [Islamic Conference Organization], whose headquarters are in Jidda, has no office in France. Only the London-based "Conseil islamique d'Europe" [Islamic Council of Europe], accused by its detractors of receiving support from Iran, in December 1984 established in Paris the "Secretariat general pour les travailleurs musulmans en Europe" [General Secretariat for Muslim Workers in Europe].

2.2 - The Networks of Confraternities

The activities of Muslim confraternities (tariqa) are characterized by devotions to the holy founder of Islam on the occasion of visits to his tomb, by submission by the faithful to their sheiks, and by the holding of "dhirkr," or "prayers from the heart" sessions. Based on Koranic law, the activities of the confraternities are aimed at placing the believer and his god in "contact," thanks to the favorable influence of the sheik and the help of ecstatic dances and utterances. The networks established in this way are not just limited to the religious sphere but also extend to political and social life. Most of the present, larger confraternities claim that they were founded in the 12th and 13th centuries.

The very deep roots of the networks of confraternities in the Muslim world lead us to assume their existence in countries where Muslim immigrants have settled. The extent of their organization may vary, depending on the case. Strongly organized networks in their countries of origin (such as the Murids in Africa South of the Sahara) seem to have become better adapted in countries with Muslim immigrants than looser movements (the Tijani's, to speak only of black Muslims). In certain cases the network of confraternities has itself played a major role in the organization of emigration, which may be thought of in terms of a kind of pilgrimage or migration for the welfare of the community. Certain confraternities have even been able to regain a certain amount of dynamism in emigrant communities, providing communities which have broken down with a possibility of reorganizing and protecting themselves against the various forms of alleged aggression by western society, and the maintenance of customs and contacts with their country of origin (for example, the Isawiyya community, which was studied by Sossie Andezian). The interrelation between a confraternity and a nationality of origin, or, rather, an ethnic identity (but we would need more finely tuned research in this area) seems to be of great significance, in fact.

2.3 - Types of Islamic Associations

Despite the unanimous desire of the Muslims not only to transcend national boundaries in the name of the unity of the faith and not even to take such borders into account, nevertheless, Islam in France remains highly fragmented in terms of the borders between the various original nationalities and ethnic groups. Although attendance at religious services may at times deemphasize these differences, the composition of the numerous religious and cultural associations only confirms this tendency toward fragmentation. On the basis of a study of publicly identified associations in Paris which are interested in the religious life of Muslims, we can set down the following types of organizations.

--The first and very large category is made up of strictly religious associations identified as such, whose by-laws, in the great majority of cases, open their membership to all believers of good faith. However, certain associations include in their by-laws a kind of national exclusivism (for example, "Tendance nationale" [National Tendency Association], an Islamic union in France established in May 1979, which accepts only Turks as members).

--A second and much smaller category takes note of its national identity in a name which nevertheless is religious (such as the "Association islamique et cultuelle des marabouts senegalais" [Islamic and Religious Association of Senegalese Marabouts], set up in September 1984; almost all of the associations of "French Muslims" belong to this category and thus constitute a separate group).

--Finally, a third category includes purely national and non-religious associations, to judge from their names, but which, in fact, are also involved in the operation of places for Muslim prayers (for example, "L'Amicale des travailleurs et commercants marocains" [Association of Moroccan Workers and Businessmen], officially registered in February 1974, "L'Association de culture et d'entraide des travailleurs turcs" [The Turkish Workers' Association for Culture and Mutual Assistance], set up in July 1976, etc).

Although the last two categories do not hide their strictly national identity, many associations in the first category in fact have been built up around the core of a single group. At times this core involves a single country. This is the case with almost all of the Turkish associations, such as "L'Association Islamique en France" [The Islamic Association in France], registered in November 1983, and "Tendance nationale" [National Tendency], an Islamic union registered in May, 1979. The officers of the association, "Vivre l'islam en Occident" [Living Islam in the West], registered in December 1984, are exclusively French converts. "L'Association des musulmans de France" [The Association of French Muslims], registered in April 1974, is composed only of French of Algerian origin. "La Mission islamique mondiale" [The World Islamic Mission], registered in in September 1982, consists only of Pakistani. In most cases, this core is multinational, involving people from the Maghreb or Africa South of the Sahara. (To all appearances, these involve a single ethnic community.) However, in these groups a single nationality is much larger than the others: "L'Association cultuelle musulmane" [The Muslim Religious Association] was registered in November 1980 by 23 Mauritanians, seven Malians, two Senegalese, two Ivorians, and two French of African origin. "L'Association cultuelle islamique" [The Islamic Religious Association], registered in June 1969, includes among its 1979 officers eight Algerians, one Tunisian, and one Moroccan. Even an association like "Foi et pratique" [Faith and Practice], registered in September 1972 and known for including groups of several nationalities, included among its officers most recently and publicly listed in Paris 16 Algerians, five Tunisians, three Moroccans, one Senegalese, etc.

The only associations which we have found in Paris where there is a clear desire to include all nationalities are made up of "elite" groups, whether these are associations directly relates to the major national organizations or associations of the liberal professions. The association "Connaitre l'islam," registered in March 1983 and intended to broadcast a religious program on TF 1 on Sunday morning, has figures from all countries on its board of directors, including ambassadors, university professors, jurists, or senior civil servants. "L'Association des medecins musulmans de France" [The Association of Muslim Doctors of France], registered in July 1982, under the auspices of the Paris Mosque, as well as "L'Association des etudiants islamiques" [The Association of Islamic Students], registered in September 1963, draw their officers from all nationalities. Recently established Islamic associations covering all of France (see above) have tried to recruit officers of various nationalities. However, up to the present they have not succeeded in overcoming the deepest kind of national cleavages.

Many members of these associations seem to belong to the first generation of immigrants, with their children prefering cultural and sports associations.

Women are absent from almost all of these associations, with the exception, of course, of "L'Union francaise des femmes musulmanes et de leurs amies" [French Union of Muslim Women and Their Friends] and its related groups. Some converts are also officers of "Vivre l'islam en Occident" or "Islam et Occident" [Islam and the West]. At times, husbands and wives are officers of the same organizations, such as "L'Association unite divine" [The Divine Unity Association], registered in December 1982, or "Mouvement islamique Khadrya" [The Khadrya Islamic Movement].

Almost all of these associations are made up of working class and manual workers. It is appropriate to note that even the least favored groups, most often illiterate, organize themselves and establish associations. An association such as "Regroupement islamique des hamalistes en France" [The Islamic Group of Hamalists of France] has a majority of street sweepers on its board of directors, and the same is true of "L'Association cultuelle musulmane."

To national identification is sometimes added allegiance to this or that government or opposition political party in their countries of origin, an allegiance which is necessarily denied in their by-laws, in accordance with the requirements of the Law of 1901. Among the Turkish associations we find the whole political spectrum of their country of origin represented. This comment could also be applied to the Maghrebian associations in a general way. The African blacks would seem to have escaped from this phenomenon, leaving the political field to political associations and organizing the religious sector on an ethnic or confraternity basis, thus going beyond the borders inherited from the colonial period.

2.3.1 - The Maghrebian Muslims

Algeria has always tried to exercise its authority over all of the Muslim community in France. In doing that it has relied on history, on the number of its citizens (who constitute a substantial stake for its own future), and the senior rank of the Paris mosque, which Algeria has been able to dominate.

The Algerians

"L'Amicale des Algeriens en Europe" [The Association of Algerians in Europe] is a direct expression of the FLN [National Liberation Front]. Above all, it is interested in politics. The association only very rarely is involved in the daily life of its members. For example, it does not seem to organize any activities during Muslim holidays, leaving the way open in this area to institutions depending on the Paris mosque. Those opposed to the Algerian Government, organized around Ben Bella, who advocates a return to religion, express themselves through the "Mouvement de la democratie en Algerie" [Movement for Democracy in Algeria] and its newspaper, AL-BADIL, a periodical published in Arabic and French. It was impossible for us to evaluate their influence on religious foundations.

The Alawiyya

The Algerians are also organized according to their membership in confraternities, despite a loss of momentum on the part of the mystic organizations in the Maghreb, to the benefit of religious associations of all kinds. The Alawiyya is the best known confraternity in France. This association draws its name from Sheik Ahmad ibn Mustafa al-Alawi, its founder (who lived in Mostaganem, Algeria, 1869-1934). It is a part of the tradition of the Darqawiyya confraternity, which goes back to Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhuli, its founder (Tunis, beginning of the 13th century). Established in 1921, this confraternity expanded very quickly spread throughout the Maghreb, not to mention Paris, where a branch was set up in 1924. It organized itself as "L'Association des amis de l'islam" [Association of the Friends of Islam] in 1949, under the presidency of Adda Bentounes (1898-1952), the successor to Sheik al-Alawi. Its headquarters were in Drancy. Khaled Bentounes, his grandson, is now the leader of the association, which is well known for the substantial number of French converts among its members.

Among the other confraternities on which some studies have been made, we might mention the Isawiyya, founded by Sheikh Mohammed Ben Issa from Western Algeria. It is one of the few Islamic confraternities to recruit women members.

The Muslim Institute and the Paris Mosque

The establishment in Paris of the Muslim Institute constituted the first "official" recognition of Islam by the French Republic, in appreciation for the 300,000 to 500,000 Muslims who came from North Africa and Africa South of the Sahara to fight on the Somme and in Champagne during World War I, where many died. A law was approved on 19 August 1920, granting a credit to the "Societe des habous des lieux saints de l'islam" [Society of Habous of the Holy Places of Islam]. Presided over by the chief of protocol of the sultan of Morocco, it was organized with seven active members. (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia each provided two representatives, while Senegal provided one.) The building was dedicated in 1926 by Moulay Youssef, the sultan of Morocco.

Si Hamza Boubakeur, deputy for the oases, was appointed rector of the institute in 1957 by Prime Minister Guy Mollet and served until his resignation in 1982. At first his position was challenged by all of the countries of the Maghreb. (Algeria called him a traitor, while Morocco and Tunisia denounced the Algerian stranglehold on the institute.) Si Hamza was reconciled with Algeria toward the end of the 1960's. At the time of his resignation in 1982, under juridical conditions challenged by French Muslims, he turned the mosque over to the Algerian Government, which appointed Sheik Abbas, the present rector. Since this appointment the Paris mosque has enjoyed substantial aid from the Algerian Government, which is presently financing major work on the restoration of its buildings and an expansion of the hall of prayers to increase its capacity from 1,000 to 3,000 people.

The Paris mosque has various forms of activity. In the religious area it presides over decisions on the calendar of holidays and the hours of prayer. A religious tribunal gives decisions on Muslim affairs. A program of instruction is available to persons wishing to convert to Islam, as well as for Muslim children. The mosque carries on or coordinates a certain number of charitable, social, and religious activities (prison chaplains, boy scouts, etc) and tries to add a large number of associations to its network of "associated mosques" in the provinces of France.

In effect, the Paris mosque tries to present itself as the spokesman for the Muslims in France. Certainly, it is the representative most usually contacted by the government, and the president of France presents his best wishes to the rector of the institute and through him to the Muslim community on the occasion of religious holidays. The Paris mosque has also obtained the support of the "French Muslims," who were well received initially by Si Hamza Boubakeur, the former rector, and who are now reconciled to Algeria to some extent. However, the minister of the interior has always refused to grant the Paris mosque exclusive authority over ritual slaughter of animals, considering that the mosque is not sufficiently representative of the Muslim community.

In effect, the claims of Algeria have always been challenged by the other Maghrebian countries. The Moroccans, in particular, have denounced Algerian control of the Paris mosque, recalling that the mosque was controlled from its establishment and until 1954 by the chief of protocol of the sultan of Morocco. The Turks, in general, ignore this "Arab" institution, and a considerable number of Muslim blacks prefer their networks of confraternities to it. Despite these challenges and boycotts, the Paris mosque remains a kind of symbol of Islam in France, which it tries to unit around it in a great "Islamic assembly" (see above).

The Moroccans

Among Moroccan residents of France two principal associations compete for the support of the community. "L'Amicale des travaileurs et des commercants marocains," which is closely related to the Moroccan Government, manages a large number of mosques throughout France. "L'Association des Marocains en France" [The Association of Moroccans in France], which is close to the opposition to the government, claims to be very active in the daily life of the community, contrary to its Algerian opposite number.

The Derkawa confraternity, founded in the 19th century and very active throughout Morocco, no doubt has a network of supporters in France. However, we have not succeeded in obtaining information on this subject.

The Tunisians

The Tunisian community seems to be little organized in terms of "Official Islam." The religious opposition to the regime of President Bourguiba, such as the MTA (Movement of the Islamic Tendency), is the flag bearer around Sheik Ghannouchi. It carries on a considerable level of activity. The GIF (Islamic Group in France), organized on 14 March 1980, reportedly has a federal structure with the northern part of France for its center of gravity. In terms of presently existing groups, the GIF belongs to "L'Union des organisations islamiques en France" [The Union of Islamic Organizations in France], whose headquarters is in Amiens and which includes about 15 associations throughout the country. Moreover, it has joined "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France" [National Federation of French Muslims (see above). The president of the GIF is the vice president of the federation.

2.3.2 - The Black Muslims

The black Muslims, while maintaining some distance from Maghrebian associations, do not refuse to attend services at the same mosques. Those most disposed to an understanding with the Maghrebians belong to movements inspired by the Wahhabi sect and are found throughout Mali, for example. These groups, which are active, according to Jacques Barou, but have not yet been studied in any detail, reportedly are in contact with the Saudi Arabian Embassy. No doubt they are a minority, but the "Federation nationale des musulmans de France," which is close to the Islamic League and Saudi Arabia, recognizes the unwillingness of associations of black Muslims to affiliate with it.

The black Muslims are particularly known for having considerably developed the marabout system, in some cases mixing it with various animist practices. Many black Muslim religious centers operate in France. The Senegalese Murids are the most active and the best known of these groups.

The Murids

The Murid sect began its life in the Wolof area of Senegal. It was founded in 1886 by Ahmadou Bamba (1852?-1927). This confraternity was based on three principles: love and obedience by man toward God, a desire to travel toward God by fighting against our shortcomings, and working for the good of the community. The last principle characterizes the confraternity, which makes work the equivalent of prayer if people perform it by order of the marabouts. For their part the marabouts take on themselves all of the religious duties of their disciples, the talibes.

The Murid sect, which is linked to Wolof culture, began to develop in France with the massive immigration of Senegalese which took place shortly after independence was achieved. In Paris this activity is based on two principal groups: street merchants who sell bracelets and statues and who have lived until recently on Chalon Island, as well as students living in the "Poniatowski" student residence.

In 1974 "L'Association des etudiants et stagiaires mourides en France" [The Association of Murid Students and Trainees in Europe] began the publication of N'DIGEL, described as "The Voice of the Murid." This brought the association out of a semi-clandestine existence. In 1983 "L'Association internationale d'aide et de diffusion du mouridisme" [The International Association for the Support and Spread of Muridism] was established in Paris, with the objectives of bringing non-Senegalese Mourides out of their life in the shadows, undertaking "a dialogue of cultures, helping and assisting persons in distress, helping them to resettle themselves and to resume their true place in their own surroundings and clarifying the examples and teachings of the great humanists of the world: Ghandi and Sheik Ahmadou Bamba." This association undertakes missionary activity in the Beaubourg section of Paris.

The Marabouts and Other Members of Confraternities

"Le Regroupement islamique des hamalistes en France," which was established in April 1976, most of whose officers are Maliens, venerates the memory of Sheik

Sherif Ahamada Hamaloulak (who died in 1942). It has retained nothing of the Muslim profession of faith except the existence of one God, abandoning the prophecies of Muhammad, as well as prayers toward Mecca. (These have been replaced by prayers toward Nyoro.) "Le Mouvement islamique Khadrya" [Islamic Khadrya Movement] has also been functioning since July 1983.

Beside these known and organized confraternities a certain number of "travelling marabouts" actively seek supporters both among the immigrant population as well as among people of French origin (this open activity characterizes them.). To these potential supporters they speak of all kinds of magical and religious activity (the healing of physical or mental suffering, sorcery, etc). Here we are at the crossroads of traditional African practices, Muslim esotericism, the western taste for exotic esotericism, and the exploitation of individual and collective distress. These "marabouts" do not depend directly on Muslim confraternities but use a wholly Islamic approach to things. According to "Accueil et promotion" [the Welcome and Promotion association] mentioned by Durand, there are about 460 marabouts in Paris, some three-quarters of whom are in the 18th District alone.

"L'Association islamique et cultuelle des marabouts senegalais en France" [The Islamic and Religious Association of Senegalese Marabouts in France] was registered in September 1984 for the purpose of "bringing together the Senegalese working at their profession (sic) as marabouts in France; developing friendly relations among its members through the establishment of a welfare fund intended to provide assistance to social cases and to finance religious ceremonies; and facilitating relations between the Senegalese and French authorities."

2.3.3 - The Turkish Muslims

The Turks live in France in a very significant state of isolation. On the one hand this is a linguistic type of isolation, as the majority of them speak French very badly and have no knowledge of Arabic, the principal language of the Muslim immigrants. It is also a social form of isolation, due to their refusal to mix with other Muslims. In effect, in all of the cases studied, the Turkish community has provided itself with its own prayer and meeting places, refusing to share them with Maghrebians, for example.

Several organizational networks provide a structure to this community. They are characterized by political, ethnic, or even confraternity allegiances, all of which may interact. Although modern Turkey is based on an unbending form of laicism resulting from the reforms of Kemal Ataturk, its historic evolution since the 1950's has made religion an element in political party struggle, and this reality may be observed as clearly in Turkish immigrant communities abroad as in Turkey itself. Almost all of the Turkish political forces have a corresponding association in France.

The Turkish Government carries on continuous activity among the Turkish community and has assigned about 125 teachers to France. These teachers have been recognized by the French Ministry of National Education to teach the Turkish language and culture in Turkish schools.

Beside this official structure Turkish associations abound. Gaye Salom estimates that there are more than 200 of them throughout France. In Paris there is "Culture et entraide des travailleurs turcs" [The Turkish Workers Association for Culture and Mutual Assistance], registered in July 1976. This is known as the spokesman of the Turkish Government to some extent, which carefully supports the concept of laicism while cultivating great respect for religion. "L'Union islamique en France," which was registered in December 1984, reportedly supports the ideas of Erbakkan, founder of the former Party of National Salvation. This association, which supports the Islamicization of Turkish public life, seems to be fairly well represented throughout the French provinces. It is characterized by its defense of free enterprise and a certain kind of work ethic and very often carries on its activities through a network of grocery stores and small business firms, with the office behind the stores serving as a prayer and meeting room. The "L'Association des travailleurs turcs idealistes de Paris" [Association of Idealistic Turkish Workers of Paris], registered in February 1978, reportedly supports the extremist ideas of Turkes. Saudi Arabia and the universalist services of Islam, which are associated with it, reportedly provide assistance to "L'Association islamique en France" [The Islamic Association in France], which was registered in November 1983. The Turkish community in the French provinces seems more structured around religion (and sports) than it is in Paris, where it is more politicized. In the provinces the teaching of the Turkish language often goes hand in hand with the teaching of religion. A large number of "school and parents" associations reportedly are the objects of efforts to bring them under control by certain Islamic movements.

The confraternities, which are very active in Turky in spite of having been officially proscribed, also provide a certain structure to the Turkish community in France, although clandestinely, in view of the risks faced in Turkey. The Alevi Shi'ites, who are relatively more numerous in France than in Turkey and are often Kurds, are organized in political associations and in confraternities. The Naqshbendiyya, one of the confraternities, was for a long time a center of opposition to the ideas of Kemal Ataturk before it moved closer to the Democratic Party of Menderes and then to the pro-Islamic party Erbakkan, of which it is one of the pillars. It is quite possible that the confraternity is close to "L'Union islamique en France", as both of them have connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, whose supreme leader lives in exile in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Bektashi, who claim to be supporters of Haji Bektash (14th century), preach a doctrine close to that of the Alevi, and it is quite probable that some people belong to both organizations. Other, modern confraternities, which appeared in the course of the struggle against Kemal Ataturk, are active in Turkey and reportedly are being organized in France. These include the Sulaymancilar group, established by Sulayman Hilmi Tunalihan (died in 1959) and the Nurdchuluk, established by Said Nusi (died in 1960).

2.3.4 - The Influence of Libya

Although its role may have been depicted in exaggerated form and it may have been represented as supporting international terrorism, Libya has not been inactive in the Islamic immigrant community in France. Its activities are coordinated by the "Comite de la vocation islamique" [Committee of Islamic Vocation], established in Tripoli in May 1972 and intended "to preach the Islamic faith to the peoples of all parts of the world and to train Muslims for the preaching of Islam." The association is also interested in the teaching of the Arabic language. "L'Union des associations islamiques en France" [The Union of Islamic Associations in France], established in February 1982 around the mosque in Mantes-la-Jolie, which is related to this committee, reportedly includes about 15 associations, which have not been able really to expand its influence. The committee publishes RISALAT AL-JIHAD (The Letter of the Jihad), a monthly magazine published in Arabic, English, and France. The publication concerns both Islam, as well as science, technical matters, and modern society. Col Qadhdhafi, the "guide of the Libyan revolution," has no connection with any kind of Islamic fundamentalism in this connection. Certainly, the committee advocates a return to the Koran but after abandoning the tradition of exegesis and jurisprudence considered outmoded and alleged to be guilty of divine pretensions by seeking to legitimize a reputedly divine authority. The committee urges the adoption of a form of Islam which dares to make a revolution by itself and become a world force which will challenge the division of the world between the two super powers. It allegedly seeks to do this for the benefit of the exploited Third World, whose liberation will thus come from the Arab nation. This rejection of traditional Muslim authorities, those of the past as well as those of the present, perhaps explains the reluctance of a large number of the Muslim faithful to follow the Qadhdhafi line.

2.3.5 - The Shi'ites of Iran

It seems that theological, ethnic, linguistic, and political cleavages stand in the way of the establishment of any overall organization for the Shi'ites themselves. However, Mehdi Rouhani, an Iranian born in Qum, represents himself as the leader of the Shi'ite community in Europe. Now resident in France for the past 20 years, for the past few years he has made sharp, verbal attacks against the policies of Ayatollah Khomeyni (see interview in LIBERATION of 23 September 1981, LA VIE of 22 December 1983, and LE MONDE of 4 January 1984.). Rouhani directed "Le Centre islamique iranien de Paris" [The Iranian Islamic Center of Paris] for a long time. He founded it about 20 years ago, before leaving it when it became an instrument for the spread of the ideas of the Iranian Islamic Republic. His influence appears to be limited to the present Iranian opposition.

For its part the Iranian Embassy undertakes a certain amount of activity, having replaced "Le Centre islamique iranien de Paris" on the Rue Jean-Bart after it was closed by the French Government in December 1983.

In any case, Iranian preaching activity goes well beyond the ranks of the Shi'ites. It affects a certain number of Sunni Muslims who, although they have not adopted the Shi'ite faith, are fascinated by the boldness of this form of Islam, which is traditional and modern at the same time. Thus, the Iranian revolution feeds an Islamic ideology of pride and claims, going beyond even national and theological divisions. A small number of French citizens of French origin have also been affected by this form of preaching, and, after they were converted to Islam, have been able to visit Iran.

Iran is not the only country to be active on the Shi'ite scene in France. Lebanese developments over the past few years have led to an expansion in the number of political groups represented in France. The Amal Shi'ite movement and its supporters carry on a certain level of activity which, however, has strictly political connotations and which is aimed only at the Lebanese community.

In the religious field a library for ancient manuscripts was established at the beginning of the 1980's in the Kremlin-Bicetre area of Paris. According to Raymond Delval, its organizers are Arab speaking Shi'ites from Iraq and Lebanon. They have set up an association called "Ahl el-Beit" ("the people of the house of the prophet," that is, the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the Shi'ite imams) in 1985. The association publishes a periodical called AHL EL-BEIT in Paris, and has issued a certain number of small pamphlets both in Arabic and France on statements coming from Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'ites. Some prayer manuals have also been translated into French.

AL-MUNTAKA is a magazine published in French, English, and Arabic. Over the past several years it has been the spokesman of the Sunni Muslims who support the Iranian revolution. The bulk of the articles are signed by Middle Easterners, but we may also find there translations of Maudoudi, the founder of the activist Pakistani element, and of Ghanouchi, the leader of the Tunisian MTI.

2.3.6 - The 'French Muslims'

Although they are known under the generic name of "French Muslims," the community of former harkis [North Africans who served in the French Army] has never known how to organize itself or has been unable to do so. Some 250 associations, located in about 30 French departments, try to advance the interests of this or that group, clan, or family, but there are only a few of them which have any real number of members and influence. According to Veyne-Sanchez, only two associations can pretend to have some claim to represent this group: "Le Front national des rapatries francais de confession islamique" [The National Front of French Repatriates of the Islamic Faith] and "La Confederation des Francais musulmans rapatries et leurs amis" [The Confederation of Repatriated French Muslims and Their Friends. "La Convention nationale des Francais musulmans" [The Convention of French Muslims] was established in February 1984 "to coordinate the activities of the associations of French Muslims, with a view to working for national unity, progress, and justice." This kind of association seeks above all to defend the economic and political interests of its members. Many small associations have been established elsewhere and administer the mosques used by the harkis. The relations with Si Hamza Boubakeur and the recent policy carried out by Algeria and Sheik Abbas convinced these associations of the usefulness of belonging to "Le Rassemblement islamique" [The Islamic Rally] organized around the Paris mosque. Sheik Abbas is rather frequently active in resolving various problems affecting the activities in Algeria of the children of the harkis

2.3.7 - The French Converts

The French converts to Islam come from highly varied backgrounds and are not members of well defined organizations. However, the organization "Vivre l'islam en Occident," which was registered in Paris in December 1984, has the objective of "bringing together westerners who have joined the Islamic faith, as well as their descendants" and "to provide for those who become Muslims an initial contact with the Islamic community." The association aims at "combining our efforts to establish favorable conditions for the growth of authentic Islamic values in and around us" and "encouraging by all available means instruction in Muslim doctrine, principles, and rituals, while taking into account the manner of thought of western minds." Its founder is Yacoub Roty, who is also president of "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France." This kind of association, which is an outgrowth of the thinking of Rene Guenon, seeks to act as a bridge between Europe and Islam and refuses refuses to fall into the use of extremist language which are impenetrable to the West. We may also find many French converts to Islam in the organizations "Connaitre l'islam", "L'Islam et l'Occident," or even "Les Amis de l'islam" [The Friends of Islam].

2.4 - Associative Groups

The Muslim community has made several attempts aimed at resolving its national division into splinter groups by establishing a single structure intended to become both the official spokesman of the community with the government and the unquestioned spokesman of all of its members. However, no association, federation, or assembly of groups has succeeded in emerging above the others and overcoming existing divisions. The Turks in general and the blacks, in many cases, remain outside these groupings. The remainder of the Islamic community, whose majority is made up of Muslims of Maghrebian origin to whom have been added a few other nationalities, is presently divided up between, on the one hand, the Paris mosque, which is known for its contacts with Algeria, and, on the other hand, "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France," which was established in association with the World Islamic League.

2.4.1 - The Higher Council of Islamic Affairs

In 1981 Si Hamza Boubakeur, then rector of the Paris mosque, tried to establish "Le Conseil superieur des affaires islamiques en France" [The Higher Council of Islamic Affairs in France (majlis)]. The effort failed in view of the attitude of many communities which, while recognizing the urgency of the questions under consideration and the need to provide positive answers for them, refused to follow the rector.

2.4.2 - The Islamic Consistory of France

A short-lived proposal to establish "Le Consistoire islamique de France" [The Islamic Consistory of France] was considered in May 1984, in opposition to the Paris mosque and at the initiative of Mohamed Belmekki, a former French non-commissioned officer of Algerian origin. It was too much an individual effort and marked by the past. It did not succeed, and Belmekki returned to anonymity.

2.4.3 - The Islamic Rally and the National Federation

Two other efforts at regrouping Islamic organizations have been made since 1985. On 27 April 1985 the Paris mosque organized "Le Rassemblement islamique" [The Islamic Rally] in Lille to study arrangements for an improved integration of Islam in French society, putting an end to the dispersion of the Muslim community. The idea of establishing a Higher Islamic Council came up once again.

Starting from the same recognition of the divisions in the Muslim community in France, other associations also decided to respond to this proposal, but by fixing responsibility on "nationalist influences," and denouncing "the under handed struggle for hegemony" to which the community was subjected. These Islamic associations met on 26 October 1985 at the Palais des Congres in Paris and decided to establish a federation which came into existence on 30 November under the name of "La Federation nationale des musulmans de France" (al-Jami'a al-qawmiyya li-muslimi Fransa).

The president of this federation is Yacoub Roty, a French citizens whose parents were converted to Islam. He is also president of "Vivre l'islam en Occident." The "Ligue islamique mondiale" is accused by the detractors of the federation of having been the moving body in its establishment, with Roty himself working in its Paris office. Roty claims to have the support of about 170 Islamic associations spread out throughout France. He himself estimates the total number of these associations at about 500. Turks, Moroccans, Tunisians, and French citizens reportedly support the federation, whereas the black are said to have remained out of it, while the Algerians have boycotted it.

The Paris mosque reacted sharply to the establishment of this federation, accusing it of misunderstanding the mosque's role of representing and unifying the Muslim community in France, which it considered only natural. It called for the establishment of a new Islamic Rally, whose first meeting was held in Lyon, this time on 14 December 1985. Some 5,000 Muslims participated in this meeting, including many personalities who came from various Muslim countries.

According to Sheik Guessoum, its vice rector, the Islamic Rally organized around the Paris mosque, reportedly includes 300 associations of all nationalities. The immense majority of them are of Algerian origin, either as Algerian citizens or French Muslims born in Algeria. Although the Paris mosque seems, in effect, to have failed in part in its effort to expand its influence beyond the Algerian community, in any case it achieved a kind of reconciliation among the sons of Algeria who had been divided by the Algerian independence war. In this connection Sheik Abbas only continued the efforts of Si Hamza. However, the suggestion made in Lyon to establish a Higher Islamic Council was considered premature and has not led to anything up to now.

2.4.4 - The 'Faith and Practice' Organization

A single movement of some importance, including Maghrebian immigrants and others, refuses to join either the Islamic Rally around the Paris mosque or the National Federation of French Muslims. This is the "Foi et pratique" group, affiliated to the Jamaat Tabligh wa Dawa of Pakistan (an assembly for preaching and mobilization). Founded by Mawlana Muhammad Iliyas (1885-1944) and solidly organized in the New Delhi region, this movement has flourished in the Muslim world, thanks to its characteristic network of preachers. In effect, the group insists on the need for a simple and demanding type of religious initiation, centered on the profession of the faith and giving priority simultaneously to the interior life of the soul and the public practice of the faith (the men wear beards and jellabas and the women wear scarves and a long garment; they participate in public prayers.). This is done to make an impression and to encourage those who have fallen away from the true faith to return to its practice. It is the duty of each of its members to devote a certain number of hours, days, and months during their lives to work as itinerant preachers.

The French Section of the Tabligh was registered in Paris in September 1972. At the request of the government, it gave up its idea of calling itself the Association of Good Morals and adopted the name "Foi et pratique." At present this association reportedly includes about 30 subsidiary groups and operates three mosques in Paris. Although it is resolutely "internationalist," its most recent Board of Directors registered in Paris includes a very large majority of Algerians (16), compared to five Tunisians, three Moroccans, and one Senegalese. Its president is Sheik Mohammed Hammami, a Tunisian. Since 1977 the association has owned the Chateau de Villemain in Grisy (Department of Seine-et-Marne) and intends to establish a teaching center there.

Contacts with other Muslim communities throughout the world are maintained through the exchange of itinerant preachers. The members of the Tabligh carry on their activities, both in the mosques which they control, as well as in all other places of prayer; and through the sending of "missionaries" who preach when the time comes for sermons or at the end of prayers, as provided for by the tradition of hospitality due to men with religious knowledge. They also carry on their activities in cafes, movie theaters, and business firms frequented by Muslims, where they denounce the abandonment of religious practice.

This activism has met with some reticence on the part of the Paris mosque, which supports more discretion and tolerance. This movement, which has achieved a certain expansion in the last few years, has reportedly added few new recruits recently.

II - Religious Practice

No systematic study is yet available regarding the Muslim profession of faith and level of religious practice in France. Following the analysis of Sossie Andezian (1986), it is appropriate to distinguish between religious practices of an individual character (daily prayers and food and purification practices), family practices (circumcision, mariage, death, and the return from the pilgrimage to Mecca), and community practices (Friday prayers during the middle of the day; prayers during Ramadan, Aid al-Saghir, and Aid al-Kabir; and the pilgrimage to Mecca), not to mention so-called "popular" practices in connection with the activities of confraternities (for example, dhikr [prayer] meetings).

1. - Individual Practices

For the most part, daily prayers are in private (at least as far as the women are concerned), and, given the present state of our knowledge, it is impossible for us to estimate the extent of individual practice of the Muslim faith in figures. The only study which we have seen a reference to (by Camilleri, mentioned by Sammut; we have not been able to find a copy of the original) compares the attitude of parents and children in the Maghreb. It reports that, although 97 percent of the fathers said they are Muslims, only 73 percent of the young people still claimed this religious affiliation. (Some 30 percent of the young Algerians admitted they had lost their faith, compared to 25 percent of the young Moroccans and 20 percent of the young Tunisians.) About 48 percent of the parents still observe daily prayers, compared to only 3 percent of the children. About 45 percent of the parents state that they still read the Koran, compared to 13 percent of the children. It seems apparent that emigration, by initially relieving social pressures, has involved a certain abandonment of the daily practice of prayers.

Prohibitions on certain foods, relating as much to culture as to religion, seem to be very generally respected, particularly as far as the consumption of pork is concerned, but including alcoholic beverages as well, at least among the working class elements. However, some changes have occurred, with some of those queried consuming prohibited foods in canteens at places of work, while observing the prohibition at home. The increase in the number of religious abbatoirs over the past few years would tend to confirm a desire to continue to observe the regulations on food. According to the Camilleri study, some 95 percent of the parents observe the prohibition on the consumption of pork and alcoholic beverages, compared to 69 percent of the young people.

2. Family Practices

Family practices, which tend to strengthen relationships, both among those living abroad and between those living abroad and their country of origin, are closely followed. In many cases these practices are common in the country of birth, at least as far as mariage and circumcision are concerned. The return from the pilgrimage to Mecca is the occasion for extensive celebrations with neighbors. At the time of death many families spent substantial amounts of money arranging for the return of the remains to "Muslim soil." Moreover, a type of insurance has been proposed to facilitate this practice. The Muslim custom of burying the dead with their heads in the direction of Mecca is not always possible in French cemeteries, which is a further motivation for the desire to return the remains to a Muslim country. Until recently, the Muslim cemetery in Bobigny took care of the needs of the Muslim community in the Paris area. However, it is now almost filled. Certain cities have now set out a Muslim section in their cemeteries.

3. Community Practices

The great festival of the sacrifice of a sheep, at the close of the week of pilgrimage, no doubt remains the high point of the Muslim year and the most often mentioned identifying sign of Muslim orientation, as the studies by Bruno Etienne show. Many families contribute to buying a living sheep and then slaughter it according to the Muslim rite, under semi-clandestine circumstances. Depending on the customs of the country, the festival is also an occasion for gatherings among families dispersed throughout the country and among the residents of the same building or residential section. According to Camilleri's study, some 95 percent of the parents celebrate religious festivals. The rate of celebration by young people is about 76 percent, the highest level of positive responses in this study. However, Bruno Etienne particularly noted the total ignorance of young people regarding the religious significance of these festivals, which have become sociological occasions.

The observation of Ramadan is also a powerful sign of identity. A great majority of the immigrants respect the daytime fast, despite difficulties related to work requirements. Social pressure plays a role difficult to evaluate in this connection. However, it is certain that a large number of Muslims who have little respect for daily prayers nevertheless observe Ramadan. According to Camilleri, some 93 percent of the parents observe the fast, compared to 42 percent of the young people. All social life is transformed during Ramadan, with community activity postponed until night time, when it is full of conviviality and festive meals.

The pilgrimage to Mecca, with the increases in the cost of transportation, is of concern to only a minority. In 1985 4,000 pilgrims reportedly left France for the Muslim Holy Land by air or in special buses, compared to 6,000 in 1982 (see LIBERATION of 13 August 1985).

The practice of collective prayer has not yet been studied in statistical terms. According to Bruno Etienne (March 1985), less than 10 percent of the Muslims participate in public prayers on Friday in France. (Marseille has about 4,000 places in the mosque for a population of 150,000 Muslims.) On the other hand, we have rather precise studies concerning the situation in Belgium. According to Dassetto, on the average, 6 to 8 percent of the total Muslim population attends services at the mosque on Fridays. Those attending include, in the first place, adult men (who make up 28 percent of the population), with a rate of attendance almost equal among the Turks and men from the Maghreb. Between 2 and 3 percent of those attending Friday services at the mosque are women.

This masculine aspect of collective prayers (accentuated during the pilgrimage to Mecca) may also be observed in France for reasons unrelated to immigration as such. Because of various prohibitions concerning the segregation of the sexes, the role of women in Islam is much more concerned with private religious life. This should not be interpreted here in only the individual sense of the word (for certainly, there are many women who pray at home.) but also in the sense of collective religious practices by women in the home. In many studies bearing on the "social networks of immigrant, Maghrebian women in southern France," Andesian has shown very clearly the great frequency of this kind of religious meetings, often conducted in connection with the rites of the confraternities. Andesian has also brought out the fundamental role of women and their neighborhood networks in the establishment of organizations which carry on ritual practices (women who wash the bodies of the dead, religious singing groups, etc) and in reminding the men and the whole family of everything dealing with the communication and application of religious practices.

4. Religious Establishments

The construction of mosques and places of prayer in Muslim immigrant communities is a recent phenomenon. For a long time the Paris mosque was the only one in France with that name, although a few, temporary places of prayer were open here and there. It was necessary to wait until the end of the 1960's to see the beginning of the process of construction of public religious centers. Since that time we have seen the progress structuralization of the Islamic faith in France, the increased demand for religious ceremonies, the near abandonment of any idea of returning to their countries of origin in the case of many immigrants, the possibility offered to foreigners of establishing their own associations and the various forms of aid provided by French charitable or public organizations, Muslim states, and supra-national Islamic organizations. As a result, the number of places of prayer (mosques, prayer rooms, simple shrines, and Islamic centers) has continued to increase. Although this tendency has been clearly evident, the relevant figures have been a matter of controversy, up to now.

Following a certain amount of research, we have concluded that the total number of Muslim places of prayer, in the broadest sense of the word, was 941 as of the end of 1985, with the annual and geographic breakdown as follows.

Year	Centers	Other Places	Total
1976	93	38	131
1977	109	53	162
1978	125	72	197
1979	157	107	264
1980	178	144	322
1981	197	180	377
1982	212	239	451
1983	228	292	520
1984	234	344	578
1985	238	381	619
No Date	187	135	322
TOTAL	425	516	941



Pace of Establishment of Places of Prayer by Year

Although these figures appear to be accurate, we cannot pretend that they are precisely correct. For example, we made a census of 59 places of prayer in the Department of Bouches-du-Rhone. For the Marseille municipal area alone Bruno Etienne lists 18 places of prayer which might be considered mosques and 80 to 100 other places of prayer in caves and in apartment buildings (see "Les temps modernes" [Modern Times], March 1984, p 1620). Our figures cover places of prayer which might be considered permanent and open to all persons, whether they involve rooms in homes or factories or shrines and mosques belonging to publicly registered associations. We may consider that in areas with large Muslim populations these figures are certainly underestimated, in the sense that, beside these places of prayer which have some kind of official status, there is a very large number of meeting places which are eventually used for religious purposes, in apartments, caves, or in rooms behind stores.

The chronological curve above clearly shows a steady increase in the number of places of prayer established. We were unable to go back to the period before 1976 and obtain precise figures. There is reason to believe that this increase began in about 1972. Although these centers very broadly benefited from the opening of these places of prayer in a major way (there also in accordance with a regular curve), they reached the point of being properly equipped at the beginning of the 1980's, with 1983 marking a period of near stagnation. It was in 1981 that the curve recording the establishment of places of prayer outside the home passed the curve of places of prayer within workers' residences and reflected a very substantial increase. The general increase in the size of the immigrant population which had abandoned any intention of returning to their countries of origin and the growing trend toward family reunion in France can explain this acceleration. The possibility once again offered to foreigners of freely establishing associations among themselves no doubt played an encouraging role in this process. However, the demand for religious services played the principal role.


Number of Places of Prayer by Department (1985)

4.1 - Places of Prayer in Centers for Workers

With the increase in immigration, the French Government, at the beginning of the 1960's, developed a network of residential centers for workers throughout France, managed either by public organizations (SONACOTRA) or by semi-public or private associations (ADEF, AFTAM, SOUNDIATA, ASSOTRAF, etc). Most of these centers were intended for the use of bachelors. The increase in family immigration led to the "takeover" of entire residential areas, outside these workers' ghettos.

By the middle of the 1970's, when there were many strikes organized by the residents of these workers' centers, the opening of a place of prayer was often included in the list of claims. The immense majority of the centers for

Muslims are now equipped with such places of prayer, with the exception of those set up by the ADEF (managed by the employers of the building and metals industry). First of all, they were opened in pre-existing places (on the ground floor or in the basement, without any external sign of their use). For almost the past 10 years they have most often been included by the architect in the plans for a new building. At times these plans have sought, as in the case of SONACOTRA, to give a characteristic Islamic touch to the place of prayer and to its surroundings.

The place of prayer in the center belongs to the category of "collective residential locations." In general, its management is entirely left to the residents. Some of the managers of the centers do not even have a key to the place of prayer. A resident of the center, who is usually chosen by the community on the basis of his knowledge of religious affairs, acts as the imam responsible for the place. He seems to be chosen by unanimity in the majority of cases. The only problems arise in certain centers where workers of several ethnic groups live, reflecting rivalry between the black and the Maghrebian communities. To avoid this kind of frictions, which affect not only religious practices, certain organizations have tried as far as possible to set up centers housing a single ethnic group: Maghrebians in one location and blacks in another. Often, Turkish workers live in the cities themselves, in view of the extent to which they live together in family groups. For example, centers housing several ethnic groups at SONACOTRA only account for 10 to 15 percent of the total. On the other hand, AFTAM centers housing a single ethnic group, so-called "dormitory centers," in fact only account for 10 percent of the total.

The furnishing and maintenance of the prayer centers are financed by contributions made by the residents. In the case of SONACOTRA centers, a subsidy is provided, taken from the general budget for the operation of the place. Religious services are open to the residents of the center. Often, they are quite free to invite people from outside the center to attend, to the extent that security considerations permit. It seems that this kind of openhanded attitude is relatively limited, as Maghrebian families are reluctant to send their children to centers for bachelors. It is understood that there is no question of a woman going there alone. A greater degree of openness is reportedly practiced by the blacks, who are less concerned about the segregation of the sexes. In certain cases (the SONACOTRA centers in the Lyon area, for example) the managers of the centers have reached a tacit agreement with an Islamic association (or a network of associations) which wishes to be recognized as the manager of the place of prayer. In other cases, on the contrary (at ADEF centers, for example), there have been refusals to recognize this or that association, as the management has sought to have its exclusive discretionary powers respected through the use of every means available. Koranic teaching is almost wholly absent from these centers because the majority of the people concerned are bachelors. However, such teaching is sometimes available for the residents of the center and their friends, given by preachers passing through the area, for example.

4.2 - Places of Prayer "in Town"

The process of establishment of a place of prayer outside worker centers closely resembles the organization of religious or cultural associations, as these are rather often intended to manager the places of prayer. It is interesting to recall the distinction made by Dassetto and Bastenier (1985) regarding Belgium, where they note two kinds of social organizations involved in the organization of these mosques. They state: "The most frequently found kind brings together heads of families, on the basis of nationality and by neighborhood, village, or suburb and, often enough, in terms of ethnic and family ties. This involves places of prayer which perform a function limited to the area where they have been set up."

This practice noted in Belgium can also be observed in France, particularly in cities of medium size. When the local immigrant community, which is often homogenous in terms of national origins, decides to provide itself with a place of prayer (which often does double duty as a school for religious and language instruction), it organizes a subscription of funds, most of the time. At times the sums of money raised may be considerable, taking into consideration the modest income of the people involved. At times the Muslims themselves take part in the construction activity. At Mantes-la-Jolie, for example, the construction of the mosque took 1 year. A total of three Portuguese workers were paid, and they supervised the other workers, who were almost all volunteers (Mohamed Bekouchi). At times the association asks for help from the government of the residents' country of origin. The local government authorities are also asked for a contribution. Town authorities may be asked to provide land at a token rent, to guarantee loans, or even to provide a public building. The Christian religious authorities are also contacted, and many Muslim places of prayer have begun to function in the basement of churches or in parish halls. The World Muslim League may also be asked to contribute in certain cases. Its assistance most often is in the form of providing legal counsel or advice in teaching practices. At times, but more rarely, it provides financial help. According to the World Muslim League itself, about 50 of the places of prayer reportedly benefit from regular financial assistance, out of the 400 listed by its Paris office, and the total amount of money involved reportedly was 6 million francs during the period 1980-85. Andesian commented that, "in a situation where immigrants are concerned, the organization of religious activities is more the work of the faithful themselves" than that of religious or state institutions, which often only provide help later. The majority of the places of prayer opened outside the workers' centers are in this category.

Then Dassetto notes other "places of prayer (which) are established by religious movements. They are locally established, but their range of influence is wider and more extensive, involving the members and sympathizers of the movement." The mosques associated with the Tabligh illustrate perfectly this second category, which has reportedly become common in the last few years. This type of movement seeks to establish or "regain" places of prayer. However, it seems to be in the minority. Dassetto adds, with regard to Belgium: "These places of prayer, and particularly those affecting the local community, are rather quickly infiltrated by agents representing religious interests of another kind." He mentions in this connection the Directorate of Religious Affairs of Turkey, the Consulate of Morocco, and the Islamic Center of Brussels (associated with the World Islamic League). These remarks, in general, can also be applied to the French case and add to what we have said about the associations.

The majority of the Muslim countries try to expand their control or their influence, in most cases under cover of religious associations which are not necessarily direct projections of the various governments. For example, it is Saudi Arabia which provides some assistance through the Islamic League and the Council of Mosques. It appears that it also provides some more direct subsidies through the various Wahhabi associations operating among the black community. Although the Association of Algerians in Europe has always served as a transmission belt for the FLN, it only manages a limited number of places of worship. It is the Paris mosque which operates the "Algerian religious network." Turkey has been no less active, and we were able to observe the extreme diversity of the Turkish associations in France. It seems that the Turkish consulates do not hesitate to conduct inquiries and intervene in certain places of worship, in order to "clean things up," either directly or under cover of affiliated associations.

Finally, Dassetto has remarked that in Belgium, "The mosques, with only very rare exceptions, appear to be distinctly national institutions. This is denied elsewhere by the faithful themselves in the name of the universality of Islam." This kind of grouping on an ethnic and national basis is also found in France, at least regarding mosques of the first type described above. Religious movements of a universalist kind have a tendency to stand above these divisions, without really succeeding in doing so. However, it is appropriate to comment that this kind of division, which is so strongly marked in the case of the associations, is less so when it is a matter of attending a place of worship. In this connection Bruno Etienne states that in "Marseille in any case the mosque, as a place of community prayer, is transnational." Nevertheless, we may remark a clear separation of the Turks, who pray by themselves, most of the time, and even refuse to attend places of worship which are not reserved for them (see the case of Mantes in Bekouchi, pp 47-60). The other nationalities reportedly have a tendency to accept praying together, although coexistence between Maghrebians and blacks can arouse some problems, at times. Attendance at mosques, as far as possible, has a tendency to be divided into three categories: the Maghrebians and the blacks, on the one hand, can attend services together. The Turks stand apart.

III. The Muslim Cultures

As we near the end of this study, we appreciate the extreme diversity of the Muslim community in France, which is divided in terms of its ethnic and national origins. The literature published both by the (Libyan) Committee of Islamic Identity as well as the World Islamic League or the Paris mosque is the same: works of piety and of Islamic learning spread about in the whole Muslim world. The situation of the Muslim immigrants in France as such does not appear to provide a powerful and unifying framework giving birth to a specific culture. Following Kepel's thesis (in ESPRIT of June 1985, p 9), we might speak of "Muslim sub-cultures which share the field of Islamic Culture." This culture itself does not take into account the whole of the cultural life lived by the people concerned."

1. 'Tranquil' Islam

The first category is made up, in particular, of the older people, the first generation immigrants. Many of them practice a kind of popular and customary

Islam, a "tranquil" variety of their faith (see SANS FRONTIERE, March 1984), in which they try to subject themselves to God and to his commandments. This group has a certain amount of social cohesion and a nostalgic memory of a country which seems to be farther and farther removed from them. At first these people were not particularly religious. The decline in social pressures helped them in this respect. Among the harkis, this phenomenon is reflected to the extreme by a clear wish to integrate themselves in the French community, for example, by choosing French first names. As emigration from their countries of origin has become a continuing phenomenon, the arrival of families and the problem of the education of the children, the various social and economic crises, and the general atmosphere of relying on religion, have led immigrants of the first generation to try to rediscover their original culture and religion, with all of the difficulties related to this process.

Bastenier (in "Culture-Mosaique") has strongly condemned the ambiguities of the "cult" of some western intellectuals who search for an alleged "original culture" made up of "cultural differences," clearly recognized or fantasized on the basis of external signs, "clothing, language, culinary and religious practices, or systems of family or social relationships which specifically mark an immigrant as a foreigner and confine him to this status." Bastenier speaks of "cultural crumbs," "scattered debris taken out of context, surviving elements among the immigrants of an old system of cultural references whose foolishness daily life makes them experience clearly."

In effect, the "return" to religious and customary practices has taken place in such a context of distress. The example of the first generation of "French Muslims" is particularly significant in this regard by its clinging to traditional values and ancestral customs (for example, the cloistering of women and prohibitions on certain foods) observed after a period of voluntary assimilation. According to Wormser, these Harkis have said of themselves that "they are wearing themselves out in vain by trying to adapt themselves to a style of life which brings them nothing. They gather together, they meet, they make a contribution for the preparation and burial of their dead, they collect rather poor souvenirs of the religious practices of their childhood, with faith and superstition mixed together, they read the Koran and speak in their mother tongue, the dialect of their region, a nostalgia for which hurts them more and more."

The return to religious observance has also taken place in the context of an expressed desire to keep contact with their heritage and their country of origin, despite the distance that has developed over the years. In this sense ancestral customs and religious practices are parts of a single whole. Although the older people are convinced of the need to continue this attitude of submission to an order of things which they consider divine, they are just as much aware of their inability to transmit this attitude of submission to their children and to explain its history and reasons to them. In a general way the Muslim people in France are ignorant of the foundations of their religion. Many of them are illiterate and have never had any formal religious education. Faced with the abandonment of religious practices and the faith on the part of the younger generation, the older people feel helpless and appeal to the educated elite in their community. The Koranic schools, despite the recent expansion in their numbers, do not seem to be enough to provide for this transmission of the faith, either because they are fundamentally not adapted to the present situation affecting Muslim immigrants in a western country, or because there are not enough of them. The various Muslim associations, and particularly the organization, "Vivre l'Islam en Occident," The World Islamic League, and the Paris mosque, have been alerted to this question and are aware of the urgent need to produce a message of faith adapted to this new reality. As Roty has said, Islam must leave the shanty town in which many Muslim immigrants live and regain its status as a source of worthwhile and balanced discourse.

Onto these customary and popular practices, situated between black magic and a reliance on charismatic preachers, has been grafted a more active practice of orthodox Islam. That is where leaders of the Muslim elite who are concerned with training the young are trying to seize their chance. An increased attendance at the mosques should make it possible to provide improved teaching of the faith and of the foundations of religious practices. In effect, for many of the immigrants of the first generation, the rediscovery of God and of his laws involves more frequent attendance at the mosques.

Psychosociology has interested itself in this phenomenon and has advanced a certain number of hypotheses to explain it. In the view of many people, "the mosque is a meeting place which makes possible the establishment of a social network and the rebuilding of a society which emigration had fragmented" (Dassetto). Moreover, this concept can be applied with as much reason to the significant increase in the number of cafes for men and immigrant businesses (religious slaughter houses, grocery stores, clothing stores, bookstores, etc), which are centers for living within an Islamic connotation. A psychosocial hypothesis has also advanced the concept of the mosque as a positive pole of purity, of certainty, and of stability, in the face of a soiled environment, the negator of cultural identity and social regulation. This hypothesis of identity makes the mosque into a kind of incarnation of a cultural identity which is most often pushed aside, denied, or scorned. National and religious identities then become mixed, and the mosques serve simultaneously as places of prayer, properly speaking, and school where national languages are taught as much as religion. A third hypothesis insists on the mosque as a place for the expression of the views of adult men, whose identity and authority are in crisis in view of the emancipation of the young people, the expansion in the role of women, questions regarding the reason for their continuing to live in a country where they are immigrants, and unemployment, which affects a growing number of them. Finally, the increase in the number of the mosques can be interpreted as the sign of settlement for people who have abandoned their intention of returning to their country of origin and who are consequently taking the necessary measures to settle down, which they often do not dare to express openly (Dassetto and Charnay).

2. The Second Generation

Contrary to a widespread view, the second generation of Muslim immigrants does not belong, in large numbers, to the category of militant Muslims. Quite the contrary, the second generation constitutes one of the targets of militant Islam. The young Muslims have not abandoned living a balanced life in France, integrated into this society which has become their own, for better or worse. Without any doubt, they suffer from a certain gap between a culture with Islamic connotations, that of their parents, and a French culture which is more or less laicized and Christian. However, they do not necessarily think of this situation in terms of exclusion. The immense expansion in initiatives coming from the young Muslims demonstrates a will to develop a new culture adapted to the situation, respectful both of integration with French culture and a certain, particular cultural identity. Many analysts have had too great a tendency to treat the second generation as a separate entity, forgetting that it belongs, quite simply, to the younger generation in the suburbs of any city, more or less left out of things.

3. The Islamic Militant

The third category is made up of those Islamic militants of whom the media speak so often, feeding the fear of an "Muslim fundamentalist wave." However, these Muslims only belong to an Islamic "sub culture" who live alongside many others who are more widely found but less articulate. The Islamic militant begins with a negative view of the emigration of Muslims out of their own countries. In such a situation the Muslim believer, in this view, risks losing his religious identity by becoming assimilated to a non-Muslim society. In this view, emigration is only the tragic consequence of the historic defeat of the Muslims by the West, and the responsibility for this lies at the door of their leaders who no longer practice the Islamic faith. Western society, in the view of the Islamic militant, is the quintessence of atheistic materialism, determined to exploit to the utmost the Muslim people who incarnate spirituality. Hence, the destruction of the religion of Muslim immigrants is the surest guarantee of their inertia in the face of this murderous aggression. In such a situation the true believer becomes a militant, aware of having been invested with the mission of safeguarding community identity founded on religion.

Therefore, the Islamic militant fights against two enemies: unbelieving western society, on the one hand, which allegedly does not know how to provide immigrants with decent living conditions. On the other hand, he fights against the "Leftist" immigrant who is the supporter of a flexible integration into western society. The Islamic militant only thinks of emigration in terms of two alternatives: either remain in the West, but only on condition of being protected by a pure and committed kind of Islam which would make it possible for the Muslim immigrant to draw some advantage from the West, while excluding any cultural or social participation in it. Or, the return of the weakest elements to their own country, as they are incapable of resisting the siren song of this allegedly western form of materialism. Therefore, the Islamic militant follows a policy of extravagant promises and radicalization, caught in the insoluble contradiction of claiming the status of "a resident having the rights of a citizen without being one. The Islamic militant lives in the society of the immigrants but is opposed to it. He dreams of a situation where his co-religionists would live in the West but remain independent of it" (Dhaouadi, p 118).

This militant elitism draws its ideology from the abundant Islamic extremist literature coming from the Near East, North Africa, and the Indian sub continent, at times relayed by various organizations with their headquarters in London and in the Federal Republic of Germany (for the element of the Muslim Brotherhood which tends to support Syria). The Iranian revolution, without providing these Islamic militants with any real ideological tools, due to its Shi'ite orientation, gives him pride and courage.

The works of the founding fathers of the "Association des Freres Musulmans" [The Muslim Brotherhood] have pride of place in all of the Islamic bookstores in France. The association, which was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, advocates a progressive return to Islam on the part of Muslim society through reforms and the defense of the Islamic and Arab nation against the aggression coming from the West. Above all, its concerns are moralistic and pietistic. However, all of the works of the founding fathers are re-read by the Islamic militants in the light of the radical ideas of Sayyid Qotb, an Egyptian theologian hanged by Nasser in 1966, and his imitators. The governments of the unbelievers, considered responsible for the abandonment of the Islamic faith by many Muslims, are earmarked for punishment by the true believers. However, according to Kepel (ESPRIT, June 1985), the French Government is not a target in this context. The political targets remain in the countries of Muslim emigration. The responsible authorities, considered perverse in the eyes of the Islamic militants, are considered guilty of causing the economic and social crises endured by the people, who have therefore been forced into emigration at the risk of their spiritual perdition.

All of the statements of the great figures of the Islamic militant appeal are distributed, either by cassette recordings or by pamphlets and books, through the whole network of bookstores, "grocery stores" (in the broadest sense of the word), and places of prayer. In terms of the cassette recordings, all records have been broken by chanted versions of the Koran and by the sermons of Sheik Kichk, an Egyptian (analyzed by Kepel in LE PROPHETE ET PHARAON) [The Prophet and Pharoh], who was a victim of persecution by Anwar Sadat. Sheik Kichk is a master of the thought of Islamic militants throughout the world. The sermons by Sheik Kichk (several hundred of them, published in collected form in Cairo) are also distributed in the form of small pamphlets. Among the best sellers of this kind of literature, published both in Arabic, as well as in English and French, are the works of Sayyid Qotb, who was the first among the Muslim Brotherhood to analyze the Islamic society of the 1960's in terms of "Jahiliya," that form of "barbarism" which preceded the preaching of the Koran, and those of Abou-l-Ala al-Maudoudi, the Pakistani theoretician of the Islamic state and of religious militantism (he died in 1979). The Islamic militants also have their "national" ideologists, such as Rachid Ghanouchi, leader of the "Mouvement de la tendance islamique tunisien" [Tunisian Movement of the Islamic Tendency], and Abd Assalam Yassine, organizer of religious opposition to the sultan of Morocco.

Several publications figure in the range of magazines popular with the Islamic militants. AL-GHURABA [The Strangers], a monthly magazine published in London by the "L'Association des etudiants musulmans dans le Royaume-Uni et Irlande" [Association of Muslim Students in the United Kingdom and Ireland], in cooperation with "L'Union des associations islamiques en Europe" [The Union of Islamic Associations in Europe]. It is a specialized publication aimed at the immigrant communities and is widely distributed in France. Typical of this kind of publication, the articles in it are above all "political," listing all of the crises and acts of aggression suffered by the Muslim communities throughout the world. The "West" is, of course, denounced in it, but so are all of the governments of "unbelievers" in Muslim countries. In competition with militancy of Iranian origin, AL-MOUSLIMOUN (The Muslims), a weekly published in Saudi Arabia, makes space available to various leaders of the "Muslim Brotherhood" type and other, more radical factions. Other publications still to be found in bookstores catering to Islamic militants are AL-DAWA (The Call), published by "Le Centre culturel islamique d'Autriche" [The Islamic Cultural Center in Austria], which is close to the Muslim Brotherhood; AL-MUJTAMA (Society), published in Kuwait by "L'Association de la reforme sociale" [The Association for Social Reform; AL-MUSLIM (The Muslim), published by the "Islamic Party" of Libya; or AL-ALAM AL-ISLAMI (The Islamic World), a supplement to AL-ALAM, published in London, which advocates ideas close to those of the Iranian revolution.

This militant form of Islam appears to affect only a relatively limited category of the Muslim community in France. Its activism and its "visibility" in mosques and public places (bookstores in particular) have succeeded in making people believe, incorrectly, that it has remarkable influence. Not all of those who listen to Sheik Kichk and those who read Maudoudi are terrorists, ready to destabilize France and the West. Certainly, the audience reached by preachers of this kind extends beyond the limited circle of Islamic militants. The message, the tradition, and the kind of Islamic pride regained and publicly proclaimed have attracted more than one isolated and lonely immigrant. However, in many cases the message will not go beyond providing moral and spiritual consolation. On the other hand, among the Islamic militants themselves, this kind of message does not lead to appeals for an Islamic revolution in France. The target remains the leaders of the countries of origin of the immigrants. However, the danger of such an ideology lies in the systematic exaggeration of the allegedly specific character of the "Muslim," both in his own country and as an immigrant living abroad. Any reasoned and balanced integration of the Muslim community in France is rejected at once, thereby deliberately leading to limiting Muslims to living in ghettos and thereby leading to violence.

However, such a message hides one of its fundamental aspects: although the Islamic militants denounce (and with what violence!) the iniquity of the governments in their countries of origin which virtually forced them to move to the countries to which they emigrated, they do not, for all of that, speak of returning to their own countries, at least as far as they are personally concerned, these new elites who are capable of defending themselves against the threats coming from "materialist" society. They openly call themselves Muslims in France and are convinced that they will remain so. Each and every one of them takes advantage of the material advantages of this same "materialist" society, to varying degrees, of course. Their message, which they claim is free of any western influence, is only, in fact, the product of their time, roughly indicating the response to their crisis of identity.

At times this elitist form of militant Islam reflects in its uncompromising religious message--although in fraudulent form--an extreme claim to identity recently expressed by certain young people in the second generation of "French Muslims," among others. According to Wormser, for this new generation born in France, "a return to their countries of origin is a much more complex reality" than that of their parents, which resembles our first category of "tranquil Muslims." "They know, in their heart of hearts, that they will live in France all of their life. They think and reflect in western fashion. They feel their Arab identity as a kind of heritage. The majority of them do not understood or speak Arabic very well, particularly the teenagers. Many of them try to learn Arabic, but, for the moment, the Islamic religion fascinates them, without their being able to practice it. They establish groups to talk about it and inform themselves about it, but they do not read the Koran, nor do they participate in Islamic prayers. They have little taste for family traditions. Algeria has become a myth for them, a "land flowing with milk and honey," which they confuse with Islam as a whole. With pride and assurance they claim all of Arab civilization. This is a cultural fact. Their Islam is a kind of lay religion. They need happiness and equality. Thanks to the triumphant force of Islam today, thanks to the impact and the appearance of the Islam of the past, they hope to come and sit at the banquet table of modern France, as rich and honored people." In such a context the appeal to Islam in effect relates much more to a phantasmic kind of identity than to a religion, properly speaking, and still less does it relate to terrorism. We see here a dream of an identity never achieved, without the means of living it and expressing it.

Islam in France or French Islam? The question comes up when we consider the identities alleged to be possessed by the people coming from the Islamic part of the world. We have been able to observe the quite considerable potential of ethnic and national identity in the various groups and associations of the Islamic community. Little distinction is made between ancestral customs and religious rules, despite the constant appeals for the unity of the Islamic people. However, the question is posed in radically different form for the parents than for the children. Although the first generation has resumed the practice of its customs once again, responding to radical calls for cutting itself off from the modern world, the second generation, in general, seems to be orienting itself toward a feeling of belonging to French society. This feeling is critical and varies from place to place, of course, but Islamic religious identity has shaped itself in some way to conform to the contours of a common citizenship with French youth confronted with the questions of unemployment and being ignored by economic and social life. With the growth of its second generation, Islam in France is becoming French Islam, a form of Islam still in the process of becoming, shaken by the crises of rejection or charismatic appeals, but a form of Islam changed by its belonging to a new generation of the French people.

Up to now the appeal of militant Islam seem to have failed to mobilize the masses of the suburbs of the large cities. Although attitudes of violence are displayed toward French society, these probably reflect the feelings of rejection felt by a whole generation of young French people toward a system which is seen as crushing and discarding them. Finally, speaking of Islam in France or even of French Islam still reflects a kind of improper simplification, in view of the diversity of messages and practices related consciously or unconsciously to Muslim culture.

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EYSKENS VIEWS POSSIBILITY OF TAX REFORM

Brussels LE SOIR in French 22 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Guy Depas: "Mark Eyskens and Tax Reform: Buds Only Open In The Spring"]

[Text] Cut down, simplify and, in one word, reduce taxation: The project is already in the works! But Minister of Finance Mark Eyskens advises "caution," concurring on that point with the conventional Martens: "Buds will open in the spring only if enough sap has risen."

Prices fall? Taxes rise! Short of revenues, the last two governments were forced to divert taxes from their traditional intent by appropriating for the benefit of the state the gain due to the wage reduction. In short, Belgium, as OECD just pointed out in a recent report on compared tax systems--see our Thursday issue--is hereafter listed as one of the three countries to make the western "hit parade" for the lemon prize: 46.73 percent of the gross national product was absorbed by the public treasury, a level that may have been exceeded since then if we are to believe the remarks made by the minister of finance himself. Aggravating circumstance: Nowhere else, or almost nowhere else, does the range of withdrawals seems, through the escalation of scales and, above all, that of special levies, as poorly correlated as in Belgium.

Made legal as a means of economic efficiency and clarification of fraudulent techniques, the deduction from capital income levied at the source, criticizes the left, is scandalously insufficient when compared to the tax rates on work-related income. And the right does not fail to point out that the geometrical progression of marginal rates, further strengthened by the recent increase of special dues, led large segments of the population to lose their motivation: A gross wage of 1.5 million thus cost 1,885,000 francs to the employer and leaves a net buying power of only 883,511 francs to the employee, or barely 45 percent of the onset wage!

Excessive? Undoubtedly. A short time ago, the National Bank itself pointed out that this development was leading us straight to an economic Malthusianism reaction. All of this is going to be changed. How? When? There lies the problem, told us Mark Eyskens.

"Confusion Is Lying In Wait For Us"

He declares: "The more aware we are of the abuses of the tax system, the more we demand its reform. And the more we demand it, the more we politicize the problem: Now, not a day goes by that someone, from the majority as well as the opposition, does not speak up to submit his suggestion." The minister believes that these interferences are regrettable and dangerous. "Confusion is lying in wait for us."

Mark Eyskens recalls that the tax system cannot be managed as an independent policy. Is the current income tax rate scandalous? Of course. "This scandal, however, is due to another one: That of state expenses. The prime minister is absolutely right when he contends that no tax decrease will be possible as long as a reorganization plan has not been implemented."

Budget First

Guy Verhofstadt, Mark Eyskens' colleague in charge of budget, implies to anyone who wants to listen to him that now is the right time to prepare a reform that could be implemented in a very short time. Mark Eyskens replies: "Agreed and disagreed. Everyone knows from experience that there can be a tremendous margin between a draft and an implemented budget. As it stands, a request to implement the 1987 draft budget has yet to be made." For him, nothing concrete can be undertaken before that budget is checked, which will be done in February, to prove its reliability. "You see," says the minister, "If Verhofstadt succeeds in reducing expenses, I will succeed in reducing taxes. If he fails, however..."

Much More Than a 3 Percent Drop?

In the final analysis, what is the procedure advocated by Mark Eyskens? It is broken down into two stages: First, budgetary control and, then, the tabling of a reform project, on which, moreover, work was immediately begun and which could be approved in 1987, to be implemented in 1988 at the earliest.

What project? The minister of finance says that it must tackle three issues at the same time: Simplification of the system; unmerciful curtailing of tax expenses; and decrease of the real pressure of direct taxes which should be accompanied by a rebalancing between the latter and indirect taxes (on consumption).

A tax relief which could amount to 2 or 3 percent? Mark Eyskens replies: "Be serious. It would be much too little to be both politically profitable and economically efficient." So much the better!

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ECONOMIC BELGIUM

VERHOFSTADT ANNOUNCES 1987 BUDGET

Brussels LE SOIR in French 25 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Guy Depas: "The 1987 Budget Is Ready: Verhofstadt Remains Cautious"]

[Text] The 1987 budget is ready. Amounting initially to 194.8 billion, the savings expected from the Val Duchesse plan were reduced to 191.2 billion, following the verification of all available data. The difference is due essentially to the easing of the tax system of preretirees to whom, after the lengthy July political arbitrations, the budgetary "conclave" decided to reserve a less austere fate than it had considered at the onset.

According to Minister Verhofstadt's computations, this 3.6 billion shortage in earnings, however, does not mortgage the appointed reorganization objective. The probable deficit between state revenues and expenses, which we must bring ourselves to finance through a loan, remains estimated at 417.8 billion, or the equivalent of 8.1 percent of the gross national product, as compared to an assumed 567.5 billion, or 11.5 percent of the 1986 GNP.

To be sure, since the conclusion of the work of that conclave, the vice-prime minister and PVV minister of budget has not been idle as it has sometimes been contended. Presiding most of the summer over what used to be called the "ax committee," which has been coyly rebaptized the "joint discussions committee," he succeeded in trimming a further 24.5 billion off the expenses that his colleagues were hoping to be able to secure.

The proof is, he reported to a limited Council of Ministers, that, having downgraded the first estimates of economic growth to take into account the orientation of the economic situation proclaimed everywhere (therefore a probable reduction of revenues amounting to 9.4 billion as compared to the early outline) all sectors continue to hold their own.

[Relative] Caution...

Guy Verhofstadt, says that caution is the banner under which the 1987 budget is being formulated. The "obvious" overestimate, 68 billion according to Guy Spitaels, "relatively marginal but nonetheless real," 15.5 billion according to the National Bank, of the 1986 deficit used as a basis for the 1987 computation is not being taken into consideration. On the contrary, since, by changing the prospects of the nominal economic growth from 3.9 percent to 3.7 percent in 1986 and to over 4 percent, according to some analysts such as OECD, Kreditbank, etc, the initially set 624 billion net balance to be financed, should policy remain unchanged, that is to say, without the effects of Val Duchesse, was finally increased to 633.5 billion.

...Relative [Caution]?

The minister of budget who, however, in view of the latest developments, may be rashly speculating in that area, says that caution is needed in estimating the probable exchange rate of the dollar and interest rates, these rates which we know directly influence the public debt charge. Choosing an average rate of 42 francs for one dollar in 1987, it is actually lower than the current rate (42.11 on Tuesday). As for the interest rate reached, it is 7.6 percent, slightly lower than the one currently in effect in the marketplace.

Be that as it may, figures for the 1987 budget profil are as follows: 1,868.4 billion for expenses and 1,452.6 billion for revenues leaving (including 2 billion for treasury expenses) a deficit of 417.8 billion to be financed through a loan.

A "paper" or "truth" budget? Only time will tell. Still, politically, the adventure is already odd and...significant: Probably for the first time in the budgetary history of the past 20 or 30 years, the opposition is not contesting the work of the government by accusing it of committing the sin of optimism. It is on the contrary the pessimism of the estimates that it criticizes in the name of social interest.

There is no doubt about it, Martens is the smasher that he claims to be. A smasher of taboos, that is.

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ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

MANNESMANN TO CUT WORK FORCE BY 20 PERCENT IN THREE CITIES

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 12 Sep 86 p 10

[Article by Leonhard Spielhofer: "The Pipe Business Runs Out of Steam--Mannesmann Bets on Personnel Cuts"]

[Text] The Mannesmann people and their pipe plants ran into heavy weather this year. Beset for several years by worldwide overcapacity and collapsing prices, the firm suffered a twofold hail of misfortune in the first half-year. First, the dollar exchange rate fell sharply. Mannesmann is especially hard hit, although a good share of pipeline production is sold on a dollar basis.

But that wasn't all. With falling oil prices, oil company management's desire to invest also fell rapidly. Mannesmann, the largest German pipe producer by far with an annual capacity of around 3 million tons, felt the effects directly in its order books. From January to June 1986, orders for seamless pipes declined by 40 percent -- and these represent just two-thirds of total output. Even the Soviet Union and China held back on large orders and, in contrast to previous years, were counted out as anchors to windward. As a final blow, international prices for steel pipe gave further ground.

Now the managers reached for the alarm bell. "The pipe plants," they wrote in their report to the executive bodies of the parent company, "reached an existence-threatening crisis." To overcome it, they see only one remedy: 6,500 of 30,000 currently employed plant workers will have to leave in coming months as early retirees or (the younger ones) by dismissal with notice, financially cushioned with separation payments. The plant management also fears 1,000 genuine firings.

Particularly affected are the plants in Duisburg, Muelheim/Ruhr and Duesseldorf. Now that locations in Hellenthal, Mindelheim and Solingen-Ohligs have been given up, the plant in Duesseldorf-Lierenfeld is to be sacrificed. Changes are also in store for the so-called medium pipe trains in Rath near Duesseldorf and Bous in the Saar.

But it was not so great a surprise when the storm broke over the subsidiary, which represents barely a third of the conflomerate's turnover of DM18 billion and, with 30,000 workers, two-fifths of its domestic labor force. Ever since

1980 there have been rumblings in the pipeline business. After 30 years of unbroken and sometimes steeply rising rates of increase, it was then that the first big break occurred in the curve of worldwide steel pipe consumption. At the same time, however, excess capacity burgeoned, again unleashing vigorous price wars. The robust world of steel pipe--not so long ago rated a critical stragetic comomdity in American eyes and placed by Washington on the list of goods embargoed for delivery to the Soviet Union--belongs to the past.

The Mannesmann pipe business slipped into the red as early as 1983 and 1984. It would have fallen immeasurably deeper if the FRG had complied with the U.S. veto on the german-Russian gas pipeline deal at the beginning of the 1980's, which was worth billions. Last year the company merely broke even. In 1986 and 1987, management actually expects record losses which will probably amount to well over half a billion Deutsche marks and set off crises which will bring into question the firm's viability. In any case, a revenue loss (possibly occurring quite soon) averaging DM100 per ton means over DM200 million less in earnings. The fall in the dollar exchange rate, lower capacity utilization and price declines are assuredly having a far greater effect than the DM100 difference would imply.

Increased sales are hardly to be expected. On the contrary. Japan, complains the in-house report, is equipped with the most modern and productive steel plants in the Western World, and overwhelms its competitors in the traditional markets of Western Europe, as in the United States, with the sharp-edged weapon of price. But newcomers such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or South Korea are also successfully trying out their own blades. With plants that are sometimes quite modern, low wages and favorable raw material costs, they are able more and more to make up for low productivity. In price, but also in quality, they have been able for some time to meet German and European competition and to destroy step by step its image, cultivated for decades, of technological leadership. That was how Mannesmann once achieved great size.

Wistfully, the company recalls better times: "Steel pipes are largely perfected and standardized mass production items. Possibilities of distinguishing oneself from a competitor in a positive sense through the product are limited to isolated cases of especially high customer demands." Parallels abound in the rest of Western Europe's steel industry, whose crises had been accompanied by similar arguments.

At the same time the domestic market is much too small for Mannesmann, at its present capacity, to hold its head even slightly above water. Fully 2.2 million tons of steel pipe consumption annually are available within the FRG, and of that quantity 1 million tons are firmly in the hands of importers. Two-thirds of the Mannesmann pipe works' facilities would go unutilized without exports.

Escape routes such as the production of other steel products do not exist, for the traditional enterprise is the only large supplier whose mills may produce nothing but steel for its own use. That is a consequence of the agreement concluded in 1970 with Thyssen, under which Thyssen in Duisburg withdrew from pipe manufacture in favor of Mannesmann. In return, Mannesmann gave up rolled steel manufacture. Since then, Thyssen has held a one-fourth share in Mannesmann's pipe works. What proved to be an advantage for Mannesmann during the 10 years of a Europe-wide steel crisis--independence of crisis cartels and EC control--is now becoming more and more a straitjacket. For the Mannesmann group as a whole, of course, pipes long ago ceased playing first fiddle. The weaker units were reorganized early on. Little by little, the Rexroth, Demag (both in machinery manufacture), Hartmann & Braun and Kienzle (electrical engineering) shareholdings were acquired. The transformation from a steel producing to a "technology" firm is still the top goal of the conglomerate's strategy.

In order to bring costs and revenues back into balance, management views wage costs alone as "the sole type of expenditure capable of being significantly influenced by the firm." Since 1980 the work force has shrunk by about a third. Once a further 6,500 workers have left, every second job in the pipe works will have been abolished within a few years.

With the additional personnel reductions, costs will have been reduced by nearly DM400 million a year. Another DM120 million is to be saved by additional rationalization measures. Steps toward modernization, to be sure, were constantly under way in earlier years. Since 1977, steel consumption per ton of pipe fell from 1,300 to 1,200 kilograms, and energy consumption from 880 kilograms of hard coal to 760 kilograms. And the index of cost per man-hour was reduced during this period from 100 to 60 today--a greater fall, thanks to higher productivity, than was to be expected from the job elimination figures.

12991/12624
CSO: 3620/13

COMMISSION STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNTS REPORTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 19/20 Oct 86 p 13

[Text] The Commission on Social Security Accounts met on 17 October to consider the changes in the accounts under the general system since July 1986, which were summarized in the first bulletin on the situation published by the commission. The forecast by the commission is a little more pessimistic than the published forecasts for July.

In effect a net decline in the rate of receipts (contributions received) was observed, compared to 1985 and the first few months of 1986. This development is a result of deflation. If this change continues, receipts for all of 1986 could be 0.3 percent below the forecasts made for the year. However, one cannot be certain that we will not see the improvement recorded at the end of 1985, particularly if the number of salaried employees remains stable.

In parallel fashion expenditures was slightly higher than the forecasts made in all areas. This was particularly the case with health insurance, where there was an "increase" in pharmacy and laboratory analysis expenditures, and also and more recently in the case of hospitalization costs. Fortunately, the division of hospitalization expenditures between the different systems of health insurance may be more favorable than anticipated in the case of the general system, which would reduce these costs by about 1 point (about 1.7 billion francs).

This is also the case with retired persons, for whom increased expenditures in the order of 800 million francs (up by about 0.6 percent) are anticipated, as a result of a larger number of persons reaching retirement age who had received relatively higher salaries and who contributed to social security for a longer period of time. Finally, the same observation has been made regarding family allowances for reasons which are still not clear. Does this reflect a more rapid increase in allocations for young children, an extension of the period of schooling, and therefore a later date for children's leaving the family home?

Furthermore, the continued decline of end of the month social security balances since the "peak" reached at the end of February 1986 (48 billion francs), down to 19.8 billion francs at the end of September 1986, could accelerate by the end of 1986, if the trend of expenditures and receipts should be confirmed in the last few months of the year.

5170
CSO: 3519/17

COST, METHODS FOR PRIVATIZATION REVIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO ECONOMIE in French 20 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Henri d'Armagnac]

[Text] "One method: the importance of the stakes affecting the credibility of government action." No doubt, this is the most critical chapter, with all of its nuances and allowances for relativity, as well as the most original aspect of the preliminary report presented by Alain Griotteray, special reporter for the Commission on Finance of the National Assembly. The essence of the report is the real cost of the nationalization of property, its context and method, and the preparation and evaluation of the privatization program.

The behavior of the state, presently a stockholder in the denationalization program, is important. This is an element of the equation with several aspects. The first statement by Alain Griotteray on the matter is: "When it offers to the public securities which belong to it, the state cannot behave like an ordinary vendor." The writer says that there is a double obligation for the state: first, trying to obtain a price related to the economic value of the assets which it has at its disposal. Then, its second concern, which is not in conflict with the first: "The state cannot fail to be interested in what becomes of the securities it sells, as far as their increase in price on the market is concerned, as well as the subsequent transfers of property rights they will be subject to." This is a difficult task because, after the sale, the state cannot allow itself to take corrective action to repair any damage which has been done.

An Initial Lack of Clarity

The credibility of the state, as the current stockholder, also implies that the question of "immediately setting up one or several solid nuclei" must be dealt with in a frank and realistic way. As we have said in these pages, the question comes up through the diversity of the procedures involved in getting the process under way and the distribution of capital, eventually outside the market, and the development of a solid nucleus among the shareholders of certain companies subject to privatization. The question also comes up in connection with the criteria for an eventual decision in this sense.

In his view Alain Griotteray thinks that it is clear that "public service firms and even more particularly large financial establishments having a very broad range of customers (such as the Credit Lyonnais, the Societe Generale de Banque, and the Banque National de Paris) can credibly function on the basis of a highly dispersed group of stockholders, particularly if a substantial proportion of their customers, as well as their personnel, are encouraged to purchase their securities." He recalls the British example, under which British Telecoms today has 1.6 million individual stockholders, whereas as many as 96 percent of its employees have responded to the offer to buy stock reserved for them.

Certainly, there are industrial companies which simultaneously have a large amount of shares available on the market and a very dispersed group of stockholders. We might mention here, in particular, Air Liquide in France and IBM in the United States. However, other companies would be exposed to a number of risks if they were prohibited from setting up stable and clearly individualized groups of stockholders. This is a key point in the report, an essential question today for a number of large companies subject to privatization.

The report reflects an attitude of clarity and avoids polemics, but it agrees with the views of many investors regarding the financial market: "It is difficult to believe that companies such as Paribas or Suez, which continue principally as trading banks and firms managing investment portfolios, could not agree to having a substantial portion of their capital controlled by one or several, internationally recognized company groups (either already existing or to be established in the future). The very nature of their activity implies that their leaders may refer in a powerful way to the legitimacy resulting from the direct control of capital."

It should be noted that the reporter considers that " the problem posed by insurance companies results rather from the need to bring together, in connection with the privatization program, existing companies of their respective sector, in order to form blocs of stockholders and carry out joint investments. In effect, it is appropriate to strengthen existing entities (UAP, the largest French insurance company, now ranks 25th in the world). The government seems not to wish to make public its position on this problem, whereas apparently it was aware of the facts.

Here is the position adopted by Alain Griotteray: he cannot adopt an attitude which gives priority to subsequent reclassification efforts, through purchases and associations in the market, without, however, ignoring the previous preparations made. He fears that: "For some time to come this initial lack of clarity will affect the ability of responsible groups to act. At the international level this would increase the vulnerability of the groups most open to the outside world."

Neither can we ignore or forget that many small savers interested in the eventual acquisition of securities would want to know which groups would play an operational role in this or that company before making their decision to invest. The author thinks that the method determined on for the privatization of TF1 [French TV channel] is, "if not more convenient, at least clearer." This method consists of clearly designating investors to provide a portion of the capital reserved for them.

Regarding the broad range of stockholders, a political term dear to the government, Alain Griotteray thinks that this is an opportunity which should be seized. He feels that this can be an "occasion for the rediscovery of business enterprise by individual families," following a period during which the rate of family savings declined from 18.6 percent of disposable income in 1975 to 12.3 percent of disposable income in 1985.

However, he has this warning to express against the distribution of stock to the employees of a company: "In the name of a certain kind of relationship between capital and labor, excessively onerous obligations should not be imposed on them and particularly too draconian prohibitions on reselling their stock." Freedom is essential.

Regarding the exceptional and temporary characteristics of government measures adopted to limit foreign investments, Alain Griotteray emphasizes that, above all, "a financial market should be open to foreigners."

It should be recalled that American residents of France at the most have no more than 8 to 9 million francs invested in French securities, whereas the American pension funds alone annually handle in all financial markets a portfolio of 1.6 trillion dollars. One must also say that international investors should have broader access to the Paris financial market, if only as a prelude to the complete opening of the European financial market.

5170
CSO: 3519/17

INTENSIVE TRAINING SCHEDULE OF HOME DEFENSE BRIGADE DETAILED

Bonn LOYAL in German May 86 pp 24, 25

[Article by Alix Gordian: "Simply Phenomenal--Reservists in the Home Defense Brigade"; first paragraph is LOYAL introduction]

[Text] When talk within the field army turns to the home defense brigades, that is, the territorial army, one frequently encounters faint smiles suggestive of mild disdain. By contrast, higher-ranking officials in the field army within the Ministry of Defense tell another story: "When I am with the territorial army, I am among soldiers; with the others I am not so sure." The first part of this statement should be underlined three times, because many a field army unit could take a page from the quality of training, motivation, operational readiness, and adaptability of the reservists. The mission of the territorial army is clearly defined: The brigades have the task of defending the rear combat zone--to fight against hostile airborne units or other forces that have penetrated--in order to maintain the field army's freedom of maneuver. They may also be assigned to a corps for missions within the corps' rear area or even closer to the front. Assignment to a field army division is also possible, and, therefore, they may be involved in the movement of units at the forward edge of battle. Home defense brigades must also master the art of collaboration with allied forces.

However, since they are cadre units, for the most part the brigades are highly dependent on mobilization. For that reason, the training of reservists assumes a special importance. Reserve soldiers, for the same reason, appreciate a mobilization assignment to units of the territorial army. During their reserve training they feel appreciated and truly integrated; their training is excellent and, above all, they are needed. The soldiers in active units know that they are dependent on the reservists.

The territorial army's accomplishments in this area--grossly and consistently underestimated by the field army--are clearly demonstrated, for instance, by Home Defense Brigade 54 located at Trier in the Territorial Command South. This major formation, with its units and motorized infantry training centers, is deployed at 11 locations over a wide area between Trier, Zweibruecken, Kaiserslautern, Mainz, and Lahnstein.

While active units of the home defense brigades train the reservists themselves, reservists of the equipment units are trained in one of five motorized infantry training centers, as are those assigned directly to the brigade or to military region or military subregion commands.

As entire motorized infantry battalion of a home defense regiment--as it exists, for instance, at military region commands--is then activated for this purpose. Training lasts for 12 days, the first 6 of which are devoted to theoretical training in an appropriate center. The second part of the training takes place at a maneuver site, where the battalion undergoes a self-contained combat exercise.

The training center commanders manage 18 such sessions per year. Each session involves 100 to 150 men ranging from private first class to captain. Roughly 8,000 alert reservists were thus trained in 1985. Since 1977 each of the five training centers has trained an average of 34,000 reservists in state-of-the-art military know-how and ability.

"All of them are first class," comments Lt Col Lothar Imme, commander of Center 54/1 at Mainz, where primarily staff and supply reservists receive their instruction. "Although their motivation in the beginning ranges from zero to enthusiastic, they all want to be challenged and in the end they all come away with the feeling of being needed and of having accomplished something." Complete motorized infantrymen for area and site defense are being trained by Lt Col Heddo Maeder. "We recruit these people primarily from the regions where they may actually have to defend sites."

The first half of the 12 days of training is devoted to leadership training, and the second half to practical applications, which takes place at a maneuver area. In this context, Maeder pointed out a fact that should come as good news to reservists in view of last February's cold spell: The latest suits designed to protect against cold and wetness are a success. The reservists can receive this equipment from their respective military subregion commands, if requested in time, before arriving at the training site. The commanders of the other three training centers have, on the whole, had similar experiences with the reservists. "Their cooperation is good as long as their training is geared toward operational employment. This means training them sufficiently in the tasks they must accomplish so that they can generally perform these tasks."

Ready To Commit Themselves

Lt Col Heinz Riedl, commander of Center 54/4 in Zweibruecken--the only one in Military District IV with a training course for noncommissioned officers-- is very enthusiastic about reserve soldiers: "Their commitment is simply phenomenol! This is true whether they are soldiers who can be employed immediately or who have barely looked at a gun. Their willingness to cooperate is extremely high."

Nor do reservists pose a problem for the active units of Home Defense Brigade 54. Supply Company 540, for instance, in February adopted the fellowship unit of reservists at Greimerath near Saarbruecken, and prepared a document to that effect. The reservists in turn showed their appreciation by presenting a homemade gun, modeled after an original from the time of Frederick the Great, which now occupies a place of honor at the company's garrison in Trier.

In the fall, the brigade will participate in the 1986 army maneuver "Franconian Shield" as the only major self-contained unit of the territorial army. Half of the 2,600 soldiers participating in the exercise will be reservists. Their active comrades are already being prepared for this mobilization exercise, and their own training is being further improved.

For this purpose, Col August Benischke, commander of the "54th," was able to consolidate his active units in the circular deployment area at the "in-house" Baumholder maneuver site, which is located in the center of this area. "We are very happy about this," commented General Staff Major Dieter Schuster, Brigade G-3, "because only rarely do we have the opportunity for everybody to train together."

At Baumholder, vigorous efforts were being made, and not only because of the cold which the soldiers actually ignored because their new winter outfits were most effective. Colonel Benischke really knows how to challenge his men. Regardless of whether they were men from an armored battalion with M-48s, field artillery men, or motorized infantrymen on an M-111, "there were no soldiers who were not outside once a day on the firing range," the commander said. The reason for this was the fact that "combat firing of combined arms" was being emphasized during this 14-day period and was carefully observed by the commander of Military District IV, Major General Holzfuss. The state of training of the soldiers, from staff to supply and maintenance companies, was striking. Everyone--enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers--could be seen in the field almost daily during combat training. Which member of a staff unit of the field army would have such intensive, if any, "ground contact?"

Also amazing was the manner in which even the most junior recruits at guard positions at the entrance to the firing range would report when the commander's car pulled up. They excuted their control duties carefully and with assurance, particularly in the dark late one evening when the pennant on the ILTIS and the the occupants could not be recognized easily. Colonel Benischke was consequently not stinting with his praise, which he continued to offer almost effusively when assessing the general results of the firing exercise. It was thus easy for commanders and assistant commanders to perform their functions. The reservists will have the same experience when reporting in September. At that time the leadership and operational personnel--officers, selected noncommissioned officers and drivers, a total of 632 soldiers--will be the first to be called to various garrisons and transferred to Baumholder for a so-called test run. There they will be briefed for 3 days by active personnel and soldiers of the motorized infantry training centers. The remaining roughly 700 reservists will arrive subsequently.

According to Colonel Benische's plan, all reservists will first participate in an intensive exercise at Baumholder followed by a crossing of the Rhine, which, for all practical purposes, constitutes their entry into the large-scale "Franconian Shield" maneuver.

A Great Training Success for Both Sides

"Participation," said Major Schuster, "should be such that one cannot tell the difference between the field army and the home defense brigade." However, since alert reservists can be called only once a year for combat training, from now till fall Brigade 54 will conduct 18 official events for a total of 25 days in preparation for "Franconian Shield." Primarily officers and noncommissioned officers will be invited. Because of the limited availability of the men, these will be primarily weekend events. This has recently become easier, since day-long official events can now be counted as military training, which is important because of the required promotion periods.

There can be no question that reservists are being accepted by the active units of Home Defense Brigade 54. "It is a great success for the training of both components," comments Colonel Benischke. "The field army needs only about 20 percent reservists to reach a company's required complement. We need 50 percent, which is also the decisive difference for acquiring the mental attitude needed to take this task seriously. It is a lengthy training process if one is only rarely involved," said the commander. "With regard to taking the reservists seriously--and they us--we are far ahead of the field army!"

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CSO: 3620/39

MINISTER DISCUSSES DEFENSE POLICY, COOPERATION

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 86 pp 14-15

[Interview with French Minister of Defense Andre Giraud, date and place not specified: "I am Strongly in Favor of German-French Cooperation"]

[Text] Since the parliamentary elections of 16 March 1986 France had had a new administration headed by Gaullist Jacques Chirac, who appointed Andre Giraud, born in 1925 in Bordeaux, as minister of defense in his cabinet. Inasmuch as the new minister of defense was confronted immediately upon taking office with the problems besetting German-French arms cooperation--which is practically at the point of paralysis--he took this opportunity of expressing his position on several questions addressed to him by WEHRTECHNIK.

[Question] France now has a new administration. Does this mean that it now has a new defense policy? If so, could you provide some details on it?

[Answer] To defend one's country means to protect it against any kind of threat to which it may be exposed. Defense is necessarily a national matter, that is, it cannot be determined by party politics. The military aspect is obviously not the only one to be taken into consideration, but it is the essential one: our armed forces must be seen as a reliable and non-controversial element of our desire for independence. I intend to enhance France's capacity to defend itself by concentrating my activities upon three points: to preserve traditional military values; to adapt our armament to technological progress; and to strive for steady support by the nation to its armed forces.

[Question] Were there any decisions made or projects initiated by your predecessors in the previous administration which you consider to have been mistakes and which you would aim to correct as quickly as possible?

[Answer] There has been a delay in equipping our armed forces under the provisions of the 84/88 Program. This delay is currently being carefully examined.

[Question] Certain French and foreign sources are criticizing the "force de frappe", claiming that it absorbs too large a share of the defense budget to the detriment of the main conventional weapon systems. Do you agree with this analysis? If so, what will you do to improve the situation?

[Answer] The "force de frappe" is the cornerstone of French defense and the funds expended in its behalf cannot be considered out of context and in comparison with the so-called conventional defense.

[Question] It is now a fact that the U.S. SDI program will be implemented. The U.S. administration has been successful in obtaining agreement and participation in it on the part of the leading European members of NATO. This creates a risk for France to become isolated politically and technologically, with a threat to the credibility of the "force de frappe." What is France's position in this respect?

[Answer] It will be a long time before the SDI program will have the capability of developing an autonomous defense system in space. This program has produced an essential insight: Washington no longer talks about removing nuclear deterrence, or replacing it with an alternative solution. Defense in space and nuclear deterrence, those cornerstones of our security system, now appear to be complementary solutions rather than competing ones.

[Question] During the past year the French government has decided to withdraw from the European EFA Combat aircraft project. Later on, President Mitterand proposed a cooperative and harmonizing venture for the EFA and the national RAFALE program with respect to components. What is the official position of the new administration? Is there discussion about rejoining the EFA project, or are the reasons for France's withdrawal, as decided by the previous administration, still valid? The joint German-French PAH-2/HAC program is currently stuck in a critical phase. What intentions does the administration have to get this project going again?

[Answer] Technological progress and system costs are growing at such a rate that, for the sake of purely maintaining continuity, one would be forced gradually to convert the entire national budget to a defense budget. It is no longer possible to manufacture all the needed materiel in a single country. Cooperation thus becomes a basic prerequisite for modern defense. Either every single piece of equipment is developed by a team of 12 participants, or a decision is made for a sensible distribution of technical responsibility, thus making optimum use of each country's capabilities. The second method is more effective by far.

Personally, I lean toward a general search for a balance of responsibilities, rather than doing this for each individual project. I am a great champion of German-French cooperation, but we are finding ourselves in an absurd situation. We are independently developing a modern tank which is said to be superior to the LEOPARD 2, which is, however, very difficult. On the other hand, the Germans and the French are involved in a helicopter program which does not satisfy anyone and which is unlikely to fulfill the potential of our helicopter development experience, which has amply proven itself. In looking at the sum total of our armament requirements, it should be possible to define a global balance of areas of responsibilities and industrial utilization. This is the idea which I have proposed to the DRG defense minister.

[Question] The new administration plans to reprivatize most of the enterprises which have come under state control during the last few years. What part does the defense industry play in this?

[Answer] As far as the defense plants are concerned, if their employees work under the same conditions as civil servants do, they must also be subject to the same rules. We have no plans to make changes in the status of the defense plants. Nor do we plan to manufacture weapons there which are not needed. As far as privatization is concerned, this question must be approached pragmatically and without ideological prejudices. Even if it makes sense that there is a private defense industry to enable innovators, which are not necessarily members of the civil service, to perform useful work, we nevertheless have no intention of changing the status of most of the existing state-owned enterprises. Under no circumstances must French defense industries be permitted to come under the control of foreign capital. If subcontracting leads to multinational ventures, they must remain under French control.

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MARKET, PARTNERS FOR RAFALE REPORTEDLY LACKING

Paris LIBERATION in French 16 Sep 86 p 15

[Article by Frederic Fillioux: "Strategy: Dassault is Backing Rafale, Despite Problems. Technologically superior, the French aircraft should find market openings. However, the competition is tough."]

[Text] On a double page of the American magazine AVIATION WEEK, an advertisement for Avions Marcel Dassault Breguet Aviation (AMDBA) announces the technological advance of its newest product, the Rafale, which has just had a remarkable demonstration at the Farnborough air show: "1995 is today." On a second level, this advertisement might also reflect the subconscious of the company. Its future from now until the end of the century is essentially tied to this new aircraft. The market for corporate aircraft is stagnating and accounts for only 10 percent of Dassault's orders, the total of which reached 19.6 billion francs in 1985.

The future for the Rafale is uncertain, as the remainder of the current or future production of the company is subject to the pressure of a vice in which European and American jaws tend to reduce its market share. The choice, which has consisted of developing a new fighter plane in competition with a European consortium is a bold gamble. Dassault confidently believes that the technological superiority of the Rafale is itself sufficient to insure commercial outlets. For the French aircraft manufacturer, it is unthinkable for them to contribute their know-how as a wedding gift to the consortium and, in the final analysis, only receive one-fourth of the benefits.

From a technical standpoint, the move seems to have been a good one. The European EAP (Experimental Aircraft Program) only had an unimpressive showing at Farnborough and the spectators saw some characteristics which could be disadvantageous in terms of strictly technological competition with the Rafale. The question is: Which arguments will dictate the choice of potential buyers? Will they be on a technical or political level? Study of the current situation is hardly encouraging for the Rafale.

The failure of the "market of the century"--Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish--to the advantage of the Americans risks having a negative effect on the Rafale because it involves replacing the F-16. One doesn't change to a different supplier like that. As for the German, British, Italian and

Spanish markets, being a participant in the Eurofighter (European fighter plane) program, it would be unlikely that they would betray the consortium by buying a French product. Madrid has gone further by preferring the American Hornet to the French Mirage 2000 for the time being; this market was recently eliminated for the Vaucresson company. Even the Saudis have abandoned the Mirage by buying the German-Italian Panavia.

What is left for Dassault, which over the short term must make do with its Mirage 2000? Developing countries eager for French armaments are bad credit risks. "We cannot say anything," it is said at company headquarters, "but we are confident. Contacts made at Farnborough have convinced us that several countries--Europeans and others--are interested in the Rafale...." At present, the only sure thing comes from the French Army; it intends to purchase 335 aircraft, of which 85 are for the Navy. However, this assurance has not been followed by financing. Serge Dassault has continually been asking the Ministry of Defense for financing which would allow him to carry out tests of the prototype beyond next year. The Rafale program is extremely demanding: it will require an additional 27 billion francs between now and 1995.... "In one way or another, the government will pay," commented an Air Force officer. "There is a future for the French aerospace industry."

In financial circles, unwavering confidence is displayed. The technical nature of the company is in itself a guarantee of a long-term outlook. Dassault's work on the Hermes spacecraft, the interest American manufacturers have shown in the technological breakthroughs in advanced materials and in computer-aided aircraft design provide a certain amount of assurance for the stockholders. However, stock market analysts are convinced that increased foreign collaboration has become essential. Contacts with large companies such as Northrop, Lockheed, or Mitsubishi, which Dassault is open to, are welcomed as positive signs. The French manufacturer has maintained silence on this subject since it concerns the state of its research on techniques allowing an aircraft to go undetected by radar.

The Stealth (stealth bomber) will be the basic gamble for the end of the century. In this particular area, where the shape of an aircraft is just as important as the materials it is made from, the Dassault researchers are much further along than they will admit.... This could give the Rafale a decisive advantage over its European competition. This is an advantage which will be enough to counteract political maneuvers affecting the signing of large military contracts.

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MILITARY FRANCE

DCAN STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AT CHERBOURG SHIPYARDS DESCRIBED

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 13 Sep 86 pp 4-9

[Article by Gen Castellan, Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction]

[Text] Located at the tip of the Cotentin peninsula, the Cherbourg naval construction and weapons yard does not enjoy what might be called the most favorable of industrial geographic environments. With its work force of 4,850, it far outstrips all other plants in the Normandy region. The only industry that may be compared with it is the COGEMA complex at The Hague, which reprocesses spent fuel rods from nuclear power plants. The other industries are far smaller: Alcatel, with a work force of 1,100, the CMN naval shipyard, with 1,050, and the nuclear-powered electrical generating plant at Flamanville, with 500 workers.

5,000 Workers and Two Submarines

The Cherbourg DCAN is indeed a huge industrial undertaking. Top-level personnel (engineers in shipyard operations, experts in studies and technologies, officers in the technical and administrative branch) contract engineers and engineer technicians engaged in design and construction) number 221; that works out to a 4.5-percent cadre rate, which is extremely low by comparison with levels common in comparable industrial sectors. Second-level personnel (executive cadres) number 660.

In addition to these 4,850 people, some 800 or so more in 1986, worked in the various DCAN installations on construction, refitting, or maintenance under subcontracting arrangements with private firms. The subcontracting figure is expected to grow considerably in 1988 and over the following years.

DCAN's organization is remarkably simple, and ideally suited to production of its single product: submarines. Its organization is based primarily on two major sections:

--the Design and Testing Section, including the Office of Ship Design and the Center for technical testing and evaluations at Cherbourg (CETEC);

--the production section, including all of DCAN's shops and yards.

In addition to these two mega-sections, there are the usual sections: personnel, acquisition and finance, infrastructure and logistics, and another group specially created to study refitting of the construction sector. A recently created quality control section embraces all the services responsible for monitoring and insuring the quality of our products, while a powerful bank of computers is busy in particular on developing a major system for computer-assisted design and fabrication, as well as computerized production management.

Missions Centered on New Construction

The percentage distribution of on-the-job hours for DCAN's labor force in 1985, according to the major production lines shows that fleet and munitions activities (11.2 percent) is relatively marginal. Following the retirement of the experimental submarine Gymnote in mid-1986, this sector is busy with the small fleet of surface craft based in Cherbourg: dispatch boats, sub-chasers, and minesweepers, coastal patrol boats and tenders.

Our "miscellaneous" activities (5.8 percent) account for an equally minimal percentage of on-the-job hours for the labor force; however, that "miscellaneous" category includes general studies of equipment and installations on submarines built at CETEC, and which are vital to the development of future vessels.

The biggest share of our activity (83 percent) lies in new construction or major refitting for submarines, which is the prime mission at DCAN Cherbourg. After serving as technical support for STCAN in defining the technical specifications for submarines, DCAN Cherbourg was assigned the task of submarine development and construction. Nevertheless, the following missions are outside DCAN Cherbourg's province when it comes to new construction:

--The nuclear reactor that powers the submarine is built by CEA, working with the naval construction and naval weapons establishment (ECAN) at Indret as a sub-contractor;

--The propulsion system, which is also handled by ECAN at Indret;

--The vast majority of equipment for weapons system and navigation is supplied by STCAN, while DCAN Cherbourg is in charge of their on-board verification and installation, as well as for testing them.

SNLE: Today, It's All Retrofitting

DCAN Cherbourg has built all the SNLEs now in service: the latest one was the Inflexible, carrying the M4 missile; it was delivered early in 1985.

It no longer builds any SNLEs, but it handles all repairs and retrofitting on those that carried the M 20 missile to ready them to receive the M4 missile. Cherbourg tackled the first retrofitting, on the Tonnant in 1985, and the job should be finished by 1987, to be followed by that of the Terrible. The Indomptable and the Foudroyant will be retrofitted at Brest.

This retrofitting activity emerges at Cherbourg with the activation of a nuclear sector; a nuclear shop equipped to handle on- and off-loadings as well as storage for fuel elements in the nuclear propulsion system went into operation at the beginning of 1985 to handle Tonnant's nuclear "heart."

Building SNAs

DCAN Cherbourg has been assigned the mission of building Rubis-type submarines.

SNAs 1 and 2, the Ruby and the Sapphire are already in service, based at Toulon.

The SNA 3, the Casablanca, was unveiled at official testing late in April 1986 and will be operational very early in 1987. SNA 4, the Emerald, was launched in April 1986; it will be entered in official tests in mid-1987.

SNA 5 right now is building in drydock; it will be launched in mid-1987.

SNA 6 was put in drydock in mid-1986; most of the sections of its thick hull are already built.

Lastly, SNA 7's armor plates have been delivered and construction of the thick hull sections began in 1986.

SNA 8, called for in the military plans, has not yet been authorized.

SNLE-NG Gets More Power

After a relative decline in the work load in 1987, due to the impossibility of handling retrofits for both Tonnant and Terrible simultaneously, DCAN Cherbourg will be getting a very heavy work-load in 1988, 1989, and 1990, running far beyond the yearly 7 million hours of production, attributable primarily to the commissioning of the first SNLE-NG, concomitant with continuation of construction of the SNA and with the retrofit for the Terrible.

A basic feature of DCAN Cherbourg is the considerable size of the unit of production it turns out by comparison with its annual volume of business. Accordingly, building a single SNA represents 50 percent of its annual volume of business, retrofitting a SNLE to receive the M4 means a year's work, and building an SNLE means half again as much work per year.

This feature has the advantage of relatively simple management; the small number of products in work makes it easier to hold down the costs of these products. There is another side to that, though, which is the extreme sensitivity of industrial management of the entire operation to a major change in the timetable for construction of ships abuilding.

DCAN Cherbourg's future, as a result, lies in building SNLE-NGs. Preparations for that future can be seen in two remarkable lines of focus for these exceptional efforts: one has to do with complete overhaul of DCAN's construction sector; the other concerns a great many studies that will be needed to prepare for construction of the first SNLE-NG.

New Construction Dock; No More Skid Launches

The construction docks at DCAN Cherbourg, although they had undergone some improvements in connection with the current SNLEs, insofar as their basic structures are concerned, date back to the last century. The practical impossibility of relying on these infrastructures to build submarines even bigger than the current Redoutable type led us to the decision to build an entirely new complex.

The dimensions adopted for this complex will enable us to build submarines 150 meters long and displacing 14,000 tons in surface operation at the rate of one every 24 months, and the potential for possible further expansion to build 170-meter boats with 16,000 ton displacement, and to step up our production rate.

This increase in size as well as the thickness of armor required means that we are going to need tremendous casting and moulding capacity: our biggest press will be upgraded from 4,000 tons to 12,000 tons; the conveyor will have to be built with a new steel with very high elasticity, whose standard thickness must be on the order of 75 mm (about 30 mm is required in the current SNLEs); our largest milling machine must be able to handle pieces weighing 250 tons and measuring 13 mm in diameter instead of pieces weighing 50 tons and measuring 11 mm in diameter.

The undertaking was turned to advantage in the task of defining new construction measures aimed at enhancing productivity and at insuring better quality control. The new submarines will no longer be built in canted docks and launched on completion, but built in level docks and launched by a special device.

The basic idea is construction in "sections"; the submarine will be built on the basis of a limited number of cylindrical slices (five of them in the case of the SNLE-NG) called sections; the sections will not be fitted together until a much later stage in the work; this approach will enable us to get well along toward installation of these sections by taking advantage of easy access through the stern and bow. The vessel will be launched practically complete and its stay in the finishing yard will be very short by comparison with our current submarines.

The principle of flat construction, however, poses two problems: the first is to devise a transport system capable of moving the sections (more than 2,000 tons), and then moving the submarines (more than 10,000 tons); the approach we have chosen is a system of "walkers," a kind of jacks that will allow step-by-step movements. The system already exists, but it will need further development before it is fit to carry loads of that order.

The second is to devise a launching system: such a system is currently in the study stages, and several possible solutions are available.

Finally, one last research goal is improvements in working conditions. DCAN Cherbourg's installations--some of them, as I said earlier--date back to the last century and conditions in general made improvements imperative. We took advantage of the disruption entailed in the new construction to do something effective about the principal health hazards: noise and smoke. Considerable effort went into the hull division to distance the noisiest areas from the rest of the yard and soundproof them. The results have been remarkable. Furthermore, oxyacetylene torches, which were used to cut through plates and were a major source of toxic fumes, are now used in a separate wing of the plant proper.

Studies Under Way for the New Generation of SNLEs

The SNLE-NG boats of the future, insofar as concerns DCAN Cherbourg, will be innovative, thanks to:

--Use of a new steel with very high elasticity. Winning approval for this new steel and the concomitant alterations in welding procedures has involved some very complicated studies. The features of this welding process involve very high temperatures, which make manual welding extremely difficult. Furthermore, the huge quantities of metal to be moved make manual procedures very laborious in a number of instances. Besides, a majority of welds will be done by means of various automatic procedures, according to the specifications of the welds.

The adoption of the new steel, the vast size of the structures to be built, and the thickness of the metal involved will call for complicated and repeated testing. A great many models have been built and tested, then destroyed in CETEC's high-pressure test chambers. These are backed up by a testing and approval structure consisting of a full-scale section of a submarine, now nearing completion.

--The concern with getting the quietest possible boat. The studies required to attain an acceptable level of operating stealth to counter the future threat are extremely complex. It would have been impossible to conduct such studies properly without a powerful CFAO system already developed and tested. This system, which required major efforts and a good deal of time on the part of the computer people, but also and most importantly, on the part of the Study Bureau personnel, will be operational by the fall of 1986.

--A new construction method. Building a ship in sections means that you have to take the changes into account from the very beginning of studies. Making such allowance is reflected on one hand by special studies on installation so as to assure the soundness of the connections and, on the other, by ample lead-time for completion of studies, a departure from earlier practice, so that sections may be installed on time; this latter injunction is vital if we are to achieve the anticipated gain in productivity from the sectional construction system.



A Landscape Redrawn

Overall view of the shipyard: top, left: South Zone
1. New hull shop
2. Future construction yard (assembly sheds for SNLEs)
3. Launching device for the SNLEs
4. Old docks 3 and 4 (used for SNA assembly)


Avant Refonte
Après Refonte
Nord
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
Le chantier de construction des sous-marins.

Submarine Construction Yards

Before expansion and reorganization (bottom, left)
1. Docks 3 and 4
2. SNLE prefabrication
3. Cast-iron construction shops
4. SMA prefabrication

After expansion and reorganization (bottom, right)
5. Docks 3 and 4
6. Section prefabrication
7. SNLE launching ramp
8. Construction yard
9. Hull Shop

A Future Filled With Promise

DCAN Cherbourg today stands in the forefront of the most advanced industrial undertakings in France and in the world. Neither its prestigious past nor its latter-day achievements mean more to it than a step in its history; the skills of its people, their pride and enthusiasm are totally focused on preparing for a future that looks promising indeed.

[Box insert, pp 8, 9]

The shops sector consists primarily of a new hull yard as well as new buildings for painting, plumbing, and monitoring welded structures. The hull yard contains six major bays. Three of these bays are used for work on relatively small elements, in shaping, test-sampling, assembly, and adjustments. Two bays house the great milling machines for thick plates and the giant lathe that finishes the couplings. The third bay handles construction of the interior bulkheads for the new submarines.

The construction sector occupies two very large bays: one for heavy prefabrication where the sections are built, and a fabrication bay proper, where the sections are positioned, installations made, and then joined together to form the complete submarine. These two main bays are flanked standard support shops and by a nuclear assembly shop.

The buildings for painting, plumbing, and inspection of welded components are now 100-percent operational.

The first three bays in the hull shop are operational; the two heavy machinery bays are now in the process of installation and will be operational by the end of this year, as will the bulkhead-construction bay.

The old cast-iron buildings, and a portion of the light-metals shop are now being demolished to make room for construction of the expanded yards which will begin in the fall of 1986 and be operational in 1988.

6182/5915
CSO: 3519/4

DECREASING ENERGY COSTS HELP REDUCE DEFICIT

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Oct 86 p 35

[Unattributed article: "Energy Makes the Difference -- France's Foreign Trade During First 6 Months of 1986"]

[Text] The French Foreign Trade Center [CFCE] noted that during the first 6 months of 1986 France's foreign trade balance, recorded in FOB-FOB customs figures (Footnote 1) (Imports and exports are calculated free on board, FOB, while import results calculated by the month take into account the cost of insurance an freight, CIF.), showed a deficit of 10.7 billion francs gross (as against 18.2 billion during the first 6 months of 1985) and of 7.2 billion in figures corrected for seasonal variations (as against 14.2 billion).

The main figures for the first 6 months of the year, compared to the first 6 months of the previous year, are as follows:

- Stability of the balance for agricultural food products (plus 12.5 billion francs, as against plus 13.3 billion);

- A 40.3 billion franc reduction of the energy bill (minus 59.2 billion as against minus 99.5 billion) due to a drop in the price of imported petroleum products;

- A very strong erosion of the surplus of industrial products (plus 19.3 billion as against plus 45.2 billion). On a monthly average, manufactured products, which had a surplus of 7.5 billion francs in 1985, have dropped to a surplus of 3.2 billion during the first 6 months of 1986.

Geographic Evolution

Looking at the details of the industrial balance, one notes that raw materials and semi-finished products have lost 11.5 billion francs, private professional equipment 9.7 billion, electronics for mass consumption 1.9 billion, automobiles-commercial vehicles and spare parts 1.6 billion and common consumer goods 4.8 billion. Only military equipment has gone up, going from plus 13.9 billion francs during the first 6 months of 1985 to plus 17.5 billion during the first 6 months of 1986.

The balance by zone and by country, in gross figures, shows the following variations:

- Slight improvement of the deficit with the OECD countries (minus 40 billion as against minus 43.8 billion);

- An improvement also in the deficit with the EEC countries (minus 29.5 billion as against minus 38.6 billion). This improvement is due to better trade with Great Britain (plus 13.6 billion from one half year to the next) and the Netherlands (plus 3.2 billion), both of which are energy exporting countries. But the balance of trade with the Federal Republic of Germany, our main trading partner, is deteriorating noticeably (minus 18.4 billion as against minus 13.8 billion).

Similarly, there is a continued deterioration of our deficits with the United States and Japan.

- Improvement with the OPEC countries, where the deficit went from minus 16.8 billion francs during the first 6 months of 1985 to minus 8.2 billion during the first 6 months of 1986.

8463
CSO: 3519/7 END

JPRS-WER-86-118

5 DECEMBER 1986

West Europe Report

REFERENCE AID

ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND SPECIAL TERMS IN THE PRESS OF GREECE AND CYPRUS

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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5 DECEMBER 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

REFERENCE AID

ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND SPECIAL TERMS IN THE PRESS OF GREECE AND CYPRUS

This reference aid consists of a general list of abbreviations, acronyms, and special terms commonly found in the Greek press and in the Greek-language press of Cyprus [C].

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Abbreviations and Acronyms 1

NOTE: THIS REPORT SUPERSEDES JPRS 70158, 14 November 1977

GREEK LANGUAGE TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM

Α	α	a	Τ	τ	t
Β	β	v	Υ	υ	y
Γ	γ	g	Φ	φ	f
Δ	δ	d	Χ	χ	kh
Ε	ε	e	Ψ	ψ	ps
Ζ	ζ	z	Ω	ω	o
Η	η	i	αι		ai
Θ	θ	th	ει		ei
Ι	ι	i	οι		oi
Κ	κ	k	υι		yi
Λ	λ	l	αυ		av
Μ	μ	m	ευ		ev
Ν	ν	n	ηυ		iv
Ξ	ξ	x	ου		ou
Ο	ο	o	γγ		ng
Π	π	p	γκ		ng; initially, g
Ρ	ρ	r	μπ		mb; initially, b
Σ	σ final: ς	s	ντ		nd; initially, d
			omit all diacriticals		

This transliteration system will be used for all personal names, expressions, and geographic names, with the following exceptions:

GREECE: Athens, Piraeus, Crete, Rhodes, Salonica, Ionian, and Aegean

CYPRUS: Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca, Kyrenia, Famagusta, and Paphos

GREECE - NOMES

1. Aitoloakarnania
2. Argolis
3. Arkadia
4. Arta
5. Attiki
6. Akhaia
7. Voiotia
8. Grevena
9. Drama
10. Dodekanisos
11. Evros
12. Evvoia
13. Evrytania
14. Zakynthos
15. Ileia
16. Imathia
17. Irakleion
18. Thesprotia
19. Salonica
20. Ioannina
21. Kavala
22. Karditsa
23. Kastoria
24. Kerkyra
25. Kefallinia
26. Kilkis
27. Kozani
28. Korinthia
29. Kyklades
30. Lakonia
31. Larisa
32. Lasithion
33. Lesvos
34. Levkas
35. Magnisia
36. Messinia
37. Xanthi
38. Piraeus
39. Pella
40. Pieria
41. Preveza
42. Rethymni
43. Rodopi
44. Samos
45. Serrai
46. Trikala
47. Fthiotis
48. Florina
49. Fokis
50. Khalkidiki
51. Khania
52. Khios

LISTING OF GREEK-CYPRIOT MINISTRIES

Official name of government: Kypriaki Dimokratia--Cypriot Republic

Proedros	President
Ypourgeion Amynis	Ministry of Defense
" Dikaiosynis	" " Justice
" Emboriou kai Viomikhanias	" " Commerce and Industry
" Ergasias kai Koinonikon Asfaliseon	" " Labor and Social Insurance
" Esoterikon	" " Interior
" Exoterikon	" " Foreign Affairs
" Georgias kai Fysikon Poron	" " Agriculture and Natural Resources
" Oikonomikon	" " Finance
" Paideias	" " Education
" Proedrias	" to the President
" Syngoinonion kai Ergon	" " Communications and Works
" Ygeias	" " Health

LISTING OF GREEK MINISTRIES

Official name of government: Elliniki Dimokratia--Hellenic Republic

Proedros	President
Prothypourgos	Prime Minister
Andiproedros	Deputy Prime Minister
Ypourgeion Aigaiou	Ministry for the Aegean
" Dikaiosinis	" of Justice
" Emborikis Navtilias	" " Merchant Marine
" Emboriou	" " Commerce
" Ergasias	" " Labor
" Esoterikon kai Dimosias Taxeos	" " Interior and Public Order
" Ethnikis Amynis	" " National Defense
" Ethnikis Oikonomias	" " National Economy
" Exoterikon	" " Foreign Affairs
" Georgias	" " Agriculture
" Metaforon kai Epikoinonion	" " Transport and Communications
" Oikonomikon	" " Finance
" Paideias kai Thriskevmaton	" " Education and Religious Affairs
" Perivallondos, Khorotaxias kai Dimosion Ergon	" " Environment, Town Planning, and Public Works
" Politismou	" " Culture
" Proedreias	" to the Prime Minister
" Viomikhanias, Energias kai Tekhnologias	" " Industry, Energy, and Technology
" Voreiou Ellados	" " Northern Greece
" Ygeias, Pronoias kai Koinonikon Asfaliseon	" " Health, Welfare, and Social Insurance

GREEK ARMED FORCES

ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS *	ARMY	AIR FORCE	NAVY
GENERAL	Stratigos	Pterarkhos	Navarkhos Admiral
LT GENERAL	Andistratigos	Andipterarkhos	Andinavarkhos Vice Admiral
MAJOR GENERAL	Ypostratigos	Ypopterarkhos	Yponavarkhos Rear Admiral
BRIG GENERAL	Taxiarkhos	Taxiarkhos	Arkhiploiarkhos Commodore
COLONEL	Syndagmatarkhis	Sminarkhos	Ploiarkhos Captain
LT COLONEL	Andisyndagmatarkhis	Andisminarkhos	Andiploiarkhos Commander
MAJOR	Tagmatarkhis	Episminagos	Plotarkhis Lt Commander
CAPTAIN	Lokhagos	Sminagos	Ypoploiarkhos Lieutenant
1ST LIEUTENANT	Ypolokhagos	Yposminagos	Anthypoploiarkhos Lt (jg)
2D LIEUTENANT	Anthypolokhagos	Anthyposminagos	Simaioforos Ensign
WARRANT OFFICER	Anthypaspistis	Anthypaspistis	Anthypaspistis Chf Warrant Off Sr Gr
	Arkhilokhias Sgt Maj	Arkhisminias Chf Mst Sgt	Arkhikelevstis Master Chf Petty Officer
	Epilokhias 1st Sgt	Episminias Sr Mst Sgt	Epikelevstis Senior Chf Petty Officer
	Lokhias Sgt	Sminias Staff Sgt	Kelevstis Chf Petty Officer
	Dekanevs Corporal	Yposminias Airman 1st Class	Diopos Petty Officer
	Ypodekanevs	NA	Ypodiopos

WARRANT OFFICER			
	Pvt 1st Class		Seaman
	Stratiotis Pvt	NA	Navtis Apprentice Seaman

* Use these English equivalents unless otherwise indicated.

GREEK POLICE RANKS

ELLINIKI ASTYNOMIA -- EL.AS.

As a result of the enactment of the October 1984 Security Corps Unification Law, the Greek Gendamerie Corps (Soma Ellinikis Khorofylakis) and the Cities Police (Astynomia Poleos) were merged into the new ELLINIKI ASTYNOMIA -- EL.AS. (Greek Police).

Andistratigos	Lieutenant General
Ypostratigos	Major General
Taxiarkhos	Brigadier General
Astynomikos Dievthyndis	Colonel
Ypodievthyndis	Lieutenant Colonel
Astynomos A'	Major
Astynomos B'	Captain
Ypastynomos A'	First Lieutenant
Ypastynomos B'	Second Lieutenant
Anthypastynomos	Warrent Officer
Arkhifylakas	Sergeant
Astyfylakas	Police Officer

GREEK-CYPRIOT POLICE RANKS

Arkhigos Astynomias	Chief of Police
Yparkhigos Astynomias	Deputy Chief
Anaplirotis Yparkhigos Astynomias	Alternate Deputy Chief
Voithos Arkhigos Astynomias	Assistant Chief
Anaplirotis Voithos Arkhigos Astynomias	Alternate Assistant Chief
Anoteros Astynomos	Chief Superintendent
Prosorinos Anoteros Astynomos	Acting Chief Superintendent
Astynomos A' and B'	Superintendent A' and B'
Anaplirotis Astynomos A' and B'	Alternate Superintendent A' and B'
Anoteros Ypastynomos	Chief Inspector
Ypastynomos	Inspector
Anaplirotis Ypastynomos	Alternate Inspector
Lokhias	Sergeant
Astyfylax	Constable

TERMINOLOGY - GREECE

Anaplirotis; Anaplirotis Ypourgos	Alternate Minister
Anaplirotis Genikos Grammatevs	Alternate Secretary General
Anev Khartofylakiou	Without Portfolio
Dimotikon Symvoulion	Municipal Council
Perifereiakos Dioikitis	District Governor
Proedros tis Voulis	President of the Chamber of Deputies
Symvoulevtiki Epitropi	Advisory Committee
Symvoulion Epikrateias	Council of State
Syndagmatikon Dikastirion	Constitutional Court
Tmima Diakopon	Recess Committee (of the Chamber of Deputies)
Voulevtis Epikrateias	Deputy At-Large
Vouli	Chamber of Deputies
Yfypourgos	Deputy Minister
Ypourgos	Minister

JUDICIAL SYSTEM - GREECE

Criminal Courts

1.	Ptaismatodikeion	Police or Magistrate's Court
2.	Plimmeliodikeion	Misdemeanors Court
3.	Kakourgiodikeion	Assize Court
4.	Avtoforon	Court of Summary Jurisdiction

Civil Courts

1.	Eirinodikeion	Justice of Peace Court
2.	Protodikeion	Court of First Instance

Appellate Courts

1.	Areios Pagos (highest) two sections: civil and criminal	Areios Pagos (Cassation Court)
2.	Efeteion (2d highest)	Court of Appeals

Administrative Courts

1.	Symvoulion Epikrateias	Council of State
2.	Perifereiakon Symvoulion	Regional Council
3.	Elengtikon Symvoulion	Auditing Council (attached to Ministry of Finance)

TERMINOLOGY - CYPRUS

Anotaton Dikastirion	Supreme Court (formerly referred to as High Court)
Eparkhia	District
Genikos Elengtis	Auditor General
Syndagmatikon Dikastirion	Constitutional Court
Voulevtis	Deputy
Vouli Andiprosopon	House of Representatives

LISTING OF GREEK-CYPRIOT LABOR UNIONS

1. PEO-Affiliated Labor Unions:

Pankypria Syndekhnia Emboroviomikhanikon Ergatoypallilon	Pan-Cyprian Union of Commercial Employees
Pankypria Syndekhnia Ergaton Ependysis kai Ypodisis	Pan-Cyprian Union of Garment and Shoe Workers
Pankypria Syndekhnia Ergaton Georgias, Dason, kai Genikon Ergaton	Pan-Cyprian Union of Farm, Forest, and General Workers
Pankypria Syndekhnia Ergaton Metaforon kai Genikon Ergaton	Pan-Cyprian Union of Transport and General Workers
Pankypria Syndekhnia Kyvernitikon kai Stratiotikon Ypallilon	Pan-Cyprian Union of Government and Military Workers
Pankypria Syndekhnia Limenergaton, Akhthoforon, Ergaton Apothikon kai Alieias	Pan-Cyprian Union of Port Workers, Porters and Warehouse and Fishing Workers
Pankypria Syndekhnia Metallorykhon	Pan-Cyprian Miners Union
Pankypria Syndekhnia Mikhanotekhniton kai Ilektrotekhniton	Pan-Cyprian Union of Machinists and Electricians
Pankypria Syndekhnia Oikodomon, Xylourgon kai Genikon Ergaton	Pan-Cyprian Union of Construction Workers, Carpenters, and General Workers
Pankypria Syndekhnia Ypallilon Xenodokheion kai Kendron Anapsykhis	Pan-Cyprian Union of Hotel, Restaurant, and Recreation Center Employees

Union of Afaneia General Workers

Union of EME (Hellenic Mining Company) Workers

Union of Famagusta Municipal Workers and Employees

Union of Fasouri General Workers

Union of Larnaca Boatmen

Union of Larnaca Dental Workers

Union of Larnaca Industrial Workers

Union of Levkara General Workers

Union of Limassol Cement Plant Workers

Union of Limassol Industrial Workers

Union of Limassol Municipal Workers and Employees

Union of News Vendors

Union of Nicosia Industrial Workers

Union of Paphos General Workers

Union of Press and Printing Workers

Union of Provisions Workers

Union of Pyrgos Tyllirias General Workers

Union of Woodcutters

Union of Xeros and Lefka Miners and General Workers

2. SEK-Affiliated Labor Unions:

EPOPAI (See abbreviations listing)

EPOYET (See abbreviations listing)

Federation of Commercial Employees

Federation of Construction and General Workers

Federation of Government and Military Workers

Federation of Industrial and General Workers

Federation of Miners

Federation of Transport and Farm Workers

3. Other Labor Unions (See abbreviations listing for expansions)

- DEOK
- ETYK
- OELMEK
- PASYDY
- PEEA
- POAS
- POED
- POVEK

DICTIONARIES RECOMMENDED FOR USE
BY GREEK-LANGUAGE TRANSLATORS

1. MEGA SYNKHRONON ELLINO-ANGLIKON LEXIKON, 1974
   (Great Modern Greek-English Dictionary)
   Author: Elevtherios Arkhondakis
   Publisher: the author

2. MEGA ELLINO-ANGLIKON LEXIKON
   (Great Greek-English Dictionary)
   Author: William Crighton
   Publisher: Elevtheroudakis Bookstore, Athens

3. ANDILEXIKON (Thesaurus)
   Author: Theol. Vostantzoglou
   Publisher: the author

4. PENGUIN-HELLENEWS ANGLO-ELLINIKON LEXIKON
   (Penguin-Hellenews English-Greek Dictionary)
   Author: Compilation by G.N. Garmonsway from THE PENGUIN ENGLISH DICTIONARY
   Publisher: HELLENEWS-PAIDIA,
   39, Amarousiou--Khalandriou Road
   Amarousion, Athens, Greece

5. ELEVTHEROUDAKI NEOTATON ELLINOANGLIKON LEXIKON (60,000 words) 1,012 pages
   (Newest Greek-English Dictionary)
   Publisher: N. Nikas & Co
   Elevtheroudakis Bookstore
   4 Nikis St.
   Athens (T.126), Greece

6. ELLINO-ANGLIKON LEXIKON OIKONOMIKON ORON 200 pages
   (Greek-English Glossary of Economic Terminology)
   Publisher: "ATHENS DAILY POST"
   1970
   57 Stadiou Odos
   Athens, Greece

WEIGHT AND MEASURE EQUIVALENTS

Weights and measures in common use in Cyprus and their equivalents in British and metric weights and measures.

The "donum" is a Cyprus measure of land equivalent to 1,600 square yards, 1,338 square meters, 0.3306 acre or 0.134 hectare.

The "oke" is a Cyprus weight equivalent to 1.125 quarts, 2.8264 pounds, 1.278 liters or kgs.

The "pic" or "pihes" is a Cyprus linear measure equivalent to 2 feet, 60.96 cms.

Units in Cyprus	British	Metric
Length		
1 inch	1 inch	2.54 cms
1 foot	12 inches or 0.333 yard	30.48 cms
1 yard	3 feet	91.4389 cms
1 meter	39.37 inches or 1.0936143 yards	100 cms
1 pic (textiles)	2 feet	60.96 cms
1 chain	66 feet	20.1168 meters
1 pole	5 1/2 yards	5.0202 meters
1 furlong	220 yards	201.168 meters
1 kilometer	3,280.8 feet or 0.62137 mile	1,000 meters
1 statute mile	5,280 feet or 8 furlongs or 1,760 yards	1,609.31493 meters
1 nautical mile	6,080 feet or 2,026 yards	1,853.123 meters
1 Cyprus mile (used by the peasants, not official)	3 statute miles or 1 league	4,827.9448 meters --

Units in Cyprus	British	Metric
Land Measures		
1 square foot	144 square inches	0.0929 square meters
1 square yard	9 square feet	0.836126 square meters
1 square meter	1,550 square inches or 10.7639 square feet 1.196 square yards	--
1 evlek (local measure)	400 square yards	334.45 square meters
1 donum or scala 4 evleks	14,400 square feet or 1,600 square yards or 0.3306 acre	1,338 square meters
1 acre 3.025 donums	43,560 square feet or 4,820 square yards	4,046.85 square meters
1 hectare 7.475 donums	2.4711 acres	10,000 square meters
1 square km 747.49 donums	247.11 acres 0.386 square mile	100 hectares
1 square mile 1,936 donums	640 acres	2.59 square kms or 229 hectares
Capacity		
1 reputed pint 112 drams	--	0.381 liter
1 pint 178.9 drams	--	0.5682 liter
1 liter	1.7598 pints	1,000.03 cubic cm

Units in Cyprus	British	Metric
Length		
1 Cyprus liter (olive oil) 2.5 okes	2.8 quarts	3.182 liters
1 oke (liquids) 400 drams	1.125 quarts	1.278 liters
1 kilo	1 bushel	36.368 liters
1 kilo wheat = 21 okes barley = 16 okes oats = 13 okes vetches = 24 okes	--	--
1 kartos (used by peasants) 4 okes	4.5 quarts	5.114 liters
1 kouza (jar) 8 okes	2.25 Imperial gallons	10.228 liters
1 gomari or donkey load 128 okes (liquids)	36 Imperial gallons	163.636 liters
1 gallon-Imperial 3.5 okes	1.20094 U.S. gallons	4.54596 liters
1 gallon-U.S. 2.9 okes	0.83268 Imperial gallons	3.78533 liters
Weight		
1 ounce 9 drams	--	28.575 grams
1 dram	0.112 ounce	3.175 grams
1 onje or onke 100 drams	11.2 ounces or 0.22 pound	317.5 grams

Units in Cyprus	British	Metric
1 pound 144 drams	16 ounces	457.2 grams
1 kilo or kilogram 314.9 drams	1 quart or 2.2046 pounds	1,000 grams
1 oke 400 drams	2.8264 pounds or 2.8 pounds	1.27 kgs
1 kantar (local, general) 44 okes	124.3616 pounds	55.882 kgs
1 kantar, Aleppo (for carobs) 180 okes	504 pounds	228.6 kgs
1 kantar (onions and fuel) 200 okes	560 pounds	254.01 kgs
1 kantar (ordinary) (CWT) 40 okes	112 pounds	50.8 kgs
1 CWT (English) 40 okes	112 pounds	50.8 kgs
1 CWT (U.S.) 36 okes	100 pounds	45.72 kgs
1 stone 5.04 okes	14 pounds	6.35 kgs
1 ton, long (English ton) 800 okes	2,240 pounds (20 cwt)	1,016 kgs or 1.016 metric tons
1 ton, short 708 okes	2,000 pounds	907 kgs or 0.907 metric ton
1 ton, metric (French ton) 787 okes	2,204 pounds	1,000 kgs

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A

ABBREV	ENGLISH
A'; a' (alfa)	
Protos, -i, -on; en; ena	1st; first, I; one
A	
Ano	Ano [as in A. Khora, Ano Khora; literal translation is "Upper"]
A/A	
Andiaeroporik-os, -i, -on	AA (antiaircraft)
AA	
Anexartiti Aristera	Independent Left
Aoratoi Agonistai	Invisible Fighters
Arkhi Anadasmon	Land Redistribution Authority
Arkhigeion Aeroporias	Air Force Command
AAE	
Aeroporikon Arkhigeion Ellados	Greek Air Force Command
Arkhigeion Aeroporikis Ekpaidevseos	Air Force Training Command
AAEEGA	
Agrotiki Anonymi Elliniki Etairia Genikon Asfaliseon	Greek Agricultural General Insurance Company
AAM	
Andidiktatorikon Agrotikon Metopon	Antidictatorial Agrarian Front
AAMPE	
Andifasistiki Andiimperialistiki Mathitiki Parataxi Ellados	Antifascist, Anti-Imperialist Student Faction of Greece
AAMY	
Andidiktatorikon Agrotikon Metopon Ypaithrou	Antidictatorial Agrarian Front in the Rural Areas
AANE	
Andifasistiki Andiimperialistiki Neolaia Ellados	Antifascist Anti-Imperialist Youth of Greece

AAP	Arkhigeion Astynomias Poleon	Cities Police HQ
	Arkhigos (stolou) Aigaiou Pelagous	Commander, Aegean Sea (Fleet)
AAS	Anotaton Agrotikon Symvoulion	Supreme Agrarian Council
AASP	Andifasistiki Andiimperialistiki Spoudastiki Parataxi	Antifascist Anti-Imperialist Student Faction
AASPE	Andiimperialistiki Andifasistiki Spoudastiki Parataxi Ellados	Anti-Imperialistic Antifascist Student Faction of Greece
AASPET	Andiimperialistiki Andifasistiki Spoudastiki Parataxi Ergazomenon Tekhnikon	Anti-Imperialist Antifascist Student Faction of Working Technicians
AD	Agoranomiki Diataxi	Marketing Decree
	Amesos Drasis	Immediate Action
ADA	Amesos Drasis Astynomias	Immediate Action Police
	Anotati Dioikisis Aeroporias	Supreme Air Force Command
	Astynomiki Dievthynsis Athinon	Athens Police Directorate
ADE	Anexartiti Dimokratiki Enosi	Independent Democratic Union
ADEDY	Anotati Dioikousa Epitropi Dimosion Ypallilon	Supreme Civil Servants Administrative Committee
ADISK	Adesmevti Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi	Free Democratic Trade Union Movement
ADK	Arkhigeion Dynameon Katadromon	Raiding Forces Command
ADKh	Anotera Dioikisis Khorofylakis	Supreme Gendermery Command

ADKhP	Anotera Dioikisis Khorofylakis Peiraios	Supreme Gendarmery Command of Piraeus
ADP	Astynomiki Dievthynsi Peiraios	Piraeus Police Directorate
ADS	Anotaton Dikastikon Symvoulion	Supreme Judicial Council
ADSEN	Anotera Dimosia Skholi Emborikou Navtikou	Higher Public Merchant Marine School
ADSKh	Anexartitos Dimokratikos Syndesmos Khanion	Independent Democratic Association of Khania
ae	anonymos etaireia	joint stock company; loosely: corporation (Inc.)
AEA	Amesos Epemvasis Aeronomias	Immediate Intervention Airport Police
AED	Anotaton Eidikon Dikastirion	Supreme Special Court
	Arkhigeion Enoplon Dynameon	Armed Forces Command
AEE	Anotati Eforevtiki Epitropi	Supreme Supervisory Committee
AEENA	Anotati Epitropi Elengkhou Navtikon Atykhimaton	Supreme Council for the Verification of Maritime Accidents
AEEY	Anonymos Elliniki Etaireia Ydaton	Greek Water Supply Company
AEI	Anotata Ekpaidevtika Idrymata	Advanced Educational Institutions
AEKhP	Amesos Epemvasis Khorofylakis Proastion	Immediate Intervention Suburbs Gendarmery
AEKP	Anotati Epitropi Kratikon Promitheion	Supreme State Supplies Committee [See YKP]

AELS	Amesos Epemvasis Limenikou Somatos	Immediate Intervention Port Corps
AEM	Amerikaniki Oikonomiki Apostoli	American Economic Mission
	Andidiktatoriko Ergatiko Metopo	Antidictatorial Labor Front
AEN	Alkimos Ethniki Neolaia	Valiant National Youth [C]
AEP	Aeroskafos Engairou Proeidopoiiseos	Airborne Warning and Control System Use: AWACS
	Akathariston Engkhorion Proion	Gross National Product
	Anotati Epitropi Promitheion	Supreme Supply Committee
AEPPI	Anonymos Etaireia Prostasias tis Pnevmatikis Idioktisias	Company for the Protection of Intellectual Property
AEPYS	Anotati Epitropi Promitheion Ypourgeiou Stratiotikon	Supreme Supply Committee of the Ministry of the Army
AES	Amesos Epemvasis Stratonomias	Immediate Intervention Military Police
	Anotaton Ekpaidevtikon Symvoulion	Supreme Educational Council
AESKEN		[See EASKEN]
AET	Aravikai Epanastatikai Taxiarkhiai	Arab Revolutionary Brigades
AETA	Anotati Epitropi Teloneiakon Amfisvitiseon	Supreme Committee for Customs Disputes
AETOS	Andistasiaki Ethniki Vasiliki Organosis Ellinon	Greek National Resistance Royalist Organization

AEVAL	Anonymos Etaireia Viomikhanias Azotoukhon Lipasmaton	Nitrogenous Fertilizers Corporation
AEVE	Agrotiki Enosis Voreiou Ellados	Agrarian Union of Northern Greece
AFD	Anexartiti Filelevthera Dimokratia	Independent Liberal Democracy
AFEDK	Agrotiki Filelevtheri Enosis tou Dimokratikou Kendrou	Liberal Agrarian Union of the Democratic Center
Afoi; A/foi	Adelfoi	Brothers
A/GES	Arkhigos/Genikou Epiteleiou Stratou	Chief, Army General Staff
AGET	Anonymos Geniki Etaireia Tsimendon	General Cement Corporation
AGROK	Agrotika Oikistika Kendra	Rural Housing Centers
AGSA	Anotati Geoponiki Skholi Athinon	Advanced Agricultural School of Athens
A(G)SOA	Anotaton (Gnomodotikon) Symvoulion Oikonomikis Anaptyxeos	Supreme (Advisory) Council for Economic Development
AHEPA		American-Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association
AIK	Arkhi Ilektrismou Kyprou	Cyprus Electricity Authority [C]
AK	Agoranomikos Kodix	Marketing Code
	Agrotikos Kodix	Agricultural Code

	Andiproedros tis Kyverniseos	Deputy Premier [automobile license plate designation]
	Astikos Kodix	Civil Code
AKDD	Ananeotiki Kinisi Dimokratikon Dikigoron	Restorative Movement of Democratic Lawyers
AKE	Adesmevti Kinisis Eirinis	Non-Aligned Peace Movement
	Agrotikon Komma Ellados	Agrarian Party of Greece
	Andidiktatoriko Kinima Ellados	Antidictatorial Movement of Greece
	Anexartiti Kinisi gia tin Elevtheria	Independent Movement for Freedom
	Anexartitos Koinopolitiki Enosi	Independent Commonwealth Union
AKED	Ananeotiki Kinisi Ergazomenon sto Dimosio	Restorative Movement of Workers in the Public Service
AKEL	Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou	Restorative Party of the Working People [the Communist Party of Cyprus] [C]
AKG	Avtonomi Kinisi Gynaikon	Independent Movement of Women
AKh	Arkhigeio Khorofylakis	Gendarmery Headquarters
AKhS	Anotaton Khimikon Symvoulion	Supreme Chemical Council
AKK	Ananges Kefalaiou Kiniseos	Working Capital Needs
AKKE	Agonistiki Kinisi Kyprion Ergazomenon	Militant Movement of Cypriot Workers [C]
AKOE	Apelevtherotiko Kinima Omofylofilon Ellados	Greek Gay Liberation Movement

AKYDID	Anexartiti Kinisi Ypallilon Dioikitikon Dikastirion	Independent Movement of Administrative Courts Employees
AKYSDE	Anotero Kendriko Ypiresiako Symvoulio Dimotikis Ekpaidevsis	Higher Central Service Council for Public Education
AM	Avtou Makariotis	His Beatitude [used for Patriarchs of Alexandira, Antioch, Jerusalem, Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria; Metropolitan of Poland, and Archbishop of Cyprus]
AMEE	Agonistikon Metopon Ellinon Exoterikou	Fighting Front of Greeks Abroad
	Apelevtherotikon Metopon Ellinon Exoterikou	Liberation Front of Greeks Abroad
AMOS	Agrotikai Metavatikai Oikokyriakai Skholai	Rural Mobile Domestic Arts Schools
AN	Anangastikos Nomos	Emergency Law
Andi-EFEE	Andidiktatoriki Ethniki Foititiki Enosis Ellados	Antidictatorial National Student Union of Greece
ANE	Alkimos Neolaia EOKA B	EOKA B Valiant Youth [C]
ANKE	Anexartiti Kinisi gia tin Elevtheria	Independent Movement for Freedom
anot.	anotat-os, -i, -on	max.; maximum; supreme
ANS	Anotaton Navtikon Symvoulion	Supreme Naval Council
ANTESI	Anonymi Navtiliaki Touristiki Etaireia Samou-Ikarias	Samos-Ikaria Shipping and Tourist Company

anth/khos	anthypoploiarkhos	lieutenant junior grade (Navy); LTJG.
ANYE	Anotati Navtiki Ygeionomiki Epitropi	Supreme Naval Medical Board
AO	Anatheoritiki Omada	Revisionist Group
	Athlitikos Omilos	Athletic Club [plus initial letter of club name]
AODA	Ananeotiki Omada Dimokratikis Aristeras	Restorative Group of the Democratic Left
AOEK	Avtonomos Organismos Ellinikou Kapnou	Autonomous Greek Tobacco Organization
	Avtonomos Organismos Ergatikis Katoikias	Autonomous Organization for Workers' Housing
AOE-KVO	Amerikaniki Omospondia Ergasias kai Kongresson Viomikhanikon Organoseon	Use: AFL-CIO
AOKP	Asfalistikos Organismos Kindynon Polemou	War Risks Insurance Organization
AON	Anorthotiki Organosis Neon	Restorative Organization of Youth [C]
AOOA	Avtonomos Oikodomikos Organismos Axiomatikon	Officers' Autonomous Construction Organization
AOS	Anotaton Oikonomikon Symvoulion	Supreme Economic Council
a/p	atmoploion	S/S; SS; steamship
AP	Agonistiki Protoporeia	Struggling Vanguard
	Andikratiki Pali	Anti-State Struggle

	Andivallistikos Pyravlos	Anti-Ballistic Missile Use: ABM
	Arkhigeion Pyrovolikou	Artillery Command
	Astynomia Poleon	Cities Police
APE	Athinaikon Praktoreion Eidiseon	Athens News Agency [See Ath. Pr.]
APEDA	Ananeotiki Parataxi Epangelmation Dikigoron Athinon	Renewal Faction of Practicing Attorneys of Athens
APIK	Adesmevti Proodevtiki Iatriki Kinisi	Independent Progressive Physicians' Movement
APOEA	Anotati Panellinios Omospondia Efedron Axiomatikon	Supreme Panhellenic Reserve Officers Federation
APOEAA	Anotati Panellinios Omospondia Efedron Axiomatikon kai Anthypaspiston	Supreme Panhellenic Reserve Officers and Warrant Officers Federation
apof.	apofasis	decision; decree
APOTP	Anotati Panellinios Omospondia Travmation kai Polemiston Opliton	Supreme Panhellenic Federation of Wounded and Combatant Soldiers
APP	Athinon, Peiraios, Perikhoron	(of) Athens, Piraeus, Suburbs
APS	Agonistiki Parataxi Spoudaston	Student Fighting Faction
	Anotaton Peitharkhikon Symvoulion	Supreme Disciplinary Council
	Arkhigeion Pyrosvestikou Somatos	Fire Corps Headquarters
APSP	Anotati Panellinios Synomospondia Polyteknon	Supreme Panhellenic Confederation of Parents of Large Families

APTh	Aristoteleion Panepistimion Thessalonikis	Salonica Aristoteleion University
APYSDE	Anotera Perifereiaka Ypiresiaka Symvoulia Dimotikis Ekpaidevseos	Higher Regional Service Councils for Elementary Education
ARDD	Ananeotiki Kinisi Dimokratikon Dikigoron	Restorative Movement of Democratic Lawyers
ARES	Avtonomi Rezospastiki Enosi Stratioton	Autonomous Radical Soldiers Union
ARI	avtomatos rythmistis ikhou	automatic volume control
arith. prot.	arithmos protokollou	Registry Number
AROL	Anexartiti Rizospastiki Organosis Lemesou	Independent Radical Organization of Limassol [C]
AS	akoustiki sykhnotis	audio frequency; AF
	Anexartitos Syndesmos	Independent Association
	Arkhigeion Stratou	Army Command
ASA	Agrotiki Synetairistiki Allilengyi	Agricultural Cooperative Solidarity
	Anotaton Stratiotikon Arkhigeion	Higher Military Command
	Anotaton Symvoulion Aeroporias	Supreme Air Force Council
	Anotaton Symvoulion Anasyngrotiseos	Supreme Reconstruction Council
ASAED	Anotaton Symvoulion Athlitismou Enoplon Dynameon	Supreme Armed Forces Athletic Council
ASDAK	Anotati Stratiotiki Dioikisis Amynis Kyprou	Supreme Military Command for Cyprus Defense [C]

ASDAN	Anotati Stratiotiki Dioikisis Attikis kai Nison	Supreme Military Command of Attiki and the Islands
ASDE	Anotati Symmakhiki Dioikisis Evropi	Supreme Command Europe Use: SACEUR
ASDEN	Anotera Stratiotiki Dioikisis Esoterikou kai Nison	Higher Military Command for the Interior and Islands
ASDEP	Anotaton Symvoulion Dioikiseos Ekpaidevtikou Prosopikou	Supreme Administrative Council of Teachers
ASDIK	Adesmevti Syndikalistiki Dimosioypalliliki Kinisi	Free Civil Servants Trade Union Movement
ASDIS	Adesmevti Syndikalistiki Dimokratiki Synergasia	Nonaligned Democratic Trade Union Coalition
ASDY	Anotaton Symvoulion Dimosion Ypiresion	Supreme Council of Civil Services
ASE	Andikommounistiki Stavroforia Elladas	Anticommunist Crusade of Greece
	Anotaton Symvoulion Ergasias	Supreme Labor Council
ASEA	Anotaton Symvoulion Ethnikis Amynis	Supreme National Defense Council
ASEAED	Anotati Syndonistiki Epitropi Athlitismou Enoplon Dynameon	Armed Forces Supreme Coordinating Committee for Sports
ASED	Agonistiki Synergasia Epangelmation Dikigoron	Combative Collaboration of Professional Lawyers
	Andifasistikos Syndesmos Ellinon Dimosiografon	Antifascist Union of Greek Journalists
	Anotaton Symvoulion Enoplon Dynameon	Supreme Armed Forces Council

ASEDO	Anotati Syndonistiki Epitropi Dimosioypallilikon Organoseon	Supreme Coordinating Committee of Civil Servant Organizations
ASEEAI	Anotati Syndonistiki Epitropi Ethnikon Agonon Ipeirou	Supreme Coordinating Committee for the National Struggles of Ipeiros
ASEO	Anexartitai Synergazomenai Ergatoypallilikai Organoseis	Independent Cooperating Worker-Employee Organizations
ASEP	Anotaton Symvoulion Ekpaidevtikou Programmatos	Educational Program Supreme Council
ASETEM	Anoteri Skholi Ekpaidevtikon Tekhnologon Mikhanikon	Higher Institute of Technological Engineers Educators
ASEV	Anangastikos Synetairismos Engeion Veltioseon	Land Reclamation Cooperative [plus the initial letter of the district in which located]
ASF	Asfaleia	Security [A reference to General Security] [official designation: Athens General Security Subdirectorate]
ASGDT	Anoteri Skholi Grafikon kai Diakosmitikon Tekhnon	Higher School of Graphic and Decorative Arts
ASGME	Anotati Synomospondia Goneon Mathiton Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Parents of Students of Greece
ASK	Agonistiki Sosialistiki Kinisi	Combative Socialist Movement
	Anotati Skholi Kinimatografon	Advanced Cinematographers' School
	Anotaton Symvoulion Kriseos	Supreme Rating Council
ASKE	Agonistiko Sosialistiko Komma Ellados	Combative Socialist Party of Greece
	Andiprosopevtiki Synelevsis Koinonikou Elengkhou	Representative Council on Social Control

	Anoteri Skholi Koinonikis Ergasias	Advanced Social Work School
ASKT	Anotati Skholi Kalon Tekhnon	Advanced Fine Arts School
ASL	Anotato Symvoulio Limenikou	Supreme Port Council
ASMAE	Anotati Synomospondia Mikroidioktiton Avtokiniton Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Small Vehicle Owners of Greece
ASNA	Anotato Symvoulio Navtikon Atykhimaton	Maritime Accidents Supreme Council
ASO	Anexartiti Sosialistiki Omada	Independent Socialist Group
	Avtonomos Stafidikos Organismos	Autonomous Currant Organization
ASOEE	Anotati Skholi Oikonomikon kai Emborikon Epistimon	Advanced School of Economic and Commercial Sciences
ASOO	Anotati Skholi Oikiakis Oikonomias	Advanced Home Economics School [name of location usually follows name of school]
ASOP	Anotato Symvoulio Oikonomikis Politikis	Supreme Economic Policy Council
ASOPEF	Athinaikos Syllogos Oikogeneion Politikon Exoriston kai Fylakismenon	Athenian Association of Families of Political Exiles and Prisoners
ASP	Anotati Skholi Polemou	Advanced War School (Army)
	Atomikos Stavros Protimiseos	Individual Preference Vote
ASPA	Astikai Syngoinoniai Periokhis Athinon	Athens Area Urban Communications

ASPE		
	Anotati Synomospondia Polemiston Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Combatants of Greece
ASPIDA		
	Axiomatikoi, Sosate Patrida, Idanika Dimokratias kai Axiokratia	Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals of Democracy, and Meritocracy
ASPTE		
	Anotati Synomospondia Polemiston-Travmation Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Wounded Combatants of Greece
A'SS		
	Proton Soma Stratou	First Army Corps
ASS		
	Anotaton Stratiotikon Symvoulion	Supreme Military Council
	Anotaton Syndonistikon Symvoulion	Supreme Coordination Council
ASSE		
	Anotati Synomospondia Syndaxioukhon Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Pensioners of Greece
	Anoteri Skholi Stelekhon Epikheiriseon	Higher School for Company Officials
ASSGME		
	Anotati Synomospondia Syllogon Goneon Mathiton Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Associations of Parents of Students of Greece
ASSYKP		
	Anoteri Skholi Stelekhon Ygeias kai Koinonikis Pronoias	Higher School for Health and Social Welfare Officials
ASTEG		
	Anoteri Skholi Geoponias kai Ardevseos Dasoponias	Higher School for Agricultural and Forestry Irrigation
ASTEM		
	Anoteri Skholi Tekhnologon Mikhanikon	Higher School for Machine Technicians
ASTER		
	Anoteri Skholi Touristikon Epangelmaton Rodou	Rhodes Higher Institute of Tourist Professions
ASTET		
	Anoteri Skholi Tekhnologon Trofimon	Higher School for Food Specialists

ASTOK	Astika Oikistika Kendra	Urban Housing Centers
ASVE	Anotati Synomospondia Viotekhnon Ellados	Supreme Confederation of Craftsmen of Greece
ASYE	Anotati Stratiotiki Ygeionomiki Epitropi	Supreme Army Medical Board
ASYGEF	Anotato Symvoulio Georgikon Farmakon	Supreme Council for Agricultural Chemicals
AT	Arkhigeion Tethorakismenon	Armored Command
ATA	Arkhigeion Taktikis Aeroporias	Tactical Air Force Command
	Avtomati Timarithmiki Anaprosarmogi	Automatic Cost of Living Readjustment
ATD	Avtonomos Tourkiki Dioikisis	Autonomous Turkish Administration
ATE	Agrotiki Topiki Enosis	Agrarian Local Union [C] [name applied to PEK locals]
	Agrotiki Trapeza Ellados	Agricultural Bank of Greece
ATES	Anoteres Tekhnikes Epangelmatikes Skholes	Higher Technical Training Schools
AThP	Avtou Theiotati Panagiotis	His (Most Divine) Holiness [used for Patriarch of Constantinople only]
Ath. Pr.	Athinaikon Praktoreion	Athens [News] Agency [See APE]
ATI	Anotaton Tekhnologikon Instituton	Advanced Technological Institute
	Athinaikon Tekhnologikon Institouton	Athens Technological Institute

ATK	Arkhi Tilepikoinonion Kyprou	Cyprus Telecommunications Authority [See also CYTA] [C]
ATM	Avtomati Tameiologistiki Mikhani	Automatic Teller Machine
ATO	Athinaikos Tekhnologikos Omilos	Athens Technological Club
AVEX	Anonymos Viomikhaniki Etaireia Xyleias	Industrial Lumber Company
AVIS	Agrotiki Viomikhania Sandorinis	Sandorini Agricultural Industry
AVKh	Arkhigeion Vasilikis Khorofylakis	Royal Gendarmery HQ
AVS	Anotera Viomikhaniki Skholi	Advanced Industrial School (followed by name)
AVSP	Anotati Viomikhaniki Skholi Peiraios	Advanced Industrial School of Piraeus
avx. ar.	avxon arithmos	serial number
AVYP	Apothiki Vaseos Ylikou Polemou	Base Ordnance Depot
ax/kos	axiomatikos	commissioned officer
AYE	Anotati Ygeionomiki Epitropi	Supreme Medical Board
AYEA	Anaplirotis Ypourgos Ethnikis Amynis	Alternate Minister of National Defense
	Anotati Ygeionomiki Epitropi Aeroporias	Supreme Air Force Health Committee

AYP	Amerikaniki Ypiresia Pliroforion	United States Information Service Use: USIS
AYS	Anotaton Ygeionomikon Symvoulion	Supreme Health Council
AYSME	Anotaton Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Supreme Administrative Council for Secondary Education
AYSSE	Anotaton Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Stoikheiodous Ekpaidevseos	Supreme Administrative Council for Elementary Education

C

CBC	[See RIK] [C]
CMC	Cyprus Mines Corporation Use: KME [C]
CYTA	Cyprus Telecommunications Authority [See also SYTA] [C]

D

D'; d' (delta)	Tetart-os, -i, -on; tessara	4th; fourth; IV; four
d.	despoinis	Miss
DA	Diethnis Amnistia	Use: Amnesty International
	Dievthynsi Agrofylakis	Agrarian Police Directorate
	Dievthynsis Allodapon	Aliens' Directorate
	Dimokratiki Allagi	Democratic Change
	Dimokratiki Amyna	Democratic Defense
	Dimokratikos Agonas	Democratic Struggle
	Dimos Athinon	Municipality of Athens [license plate designation]
	Dioikiseis Agrofylakis	Agrarian Police Commands
DAAM	Dievthynsi Arkheiou Mnimeion kai Dimosievmaton	Archives, Monuments, and Publications Directorate
DA-DE	Dimokratikos Agonas-Dimokratiki Enotita	Democratic Struggle-Democratic Unity
DAE	Diethnis Andikarkiniki Enosis	International Cancer Union
	Diethnis Astronavtiki Etaireia	International Astronautical Society
	Dikastirion Aeroporikon Epitaxeon	Air Force Requisitions Court
	Dioikisis Aeroporikis Ekpaidevseos	Air Force Training Command
DAK	Dimokratiki Andifasistiki Kinisi	Democratic Antifascist Movement
DAKDY	Dimokratiki Anexartiti Kinisi Dimosion Ypallilon	Democratic Independent Movement of Civil Servants

DAKE	Dimokratiki Anexartiti Kinisi Ergazomenon	Democratic Independent Workers Movement
DAKEDA	Dimokratiki Ananeotiki Kinisi Epangelmation Dikigoron Athinon	Democratic Restorative Movement of Professional Lawyers of Athens
DAKKME	Dimokratiki Anexartiti Kinisis Kathigiton Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Democratic Independent Movement of Secondary Education Teachers
DAMK	Diakheirisis Andalaximon Mousoulmanikon Ktimaton	Administration for Exchangeable Moslem Properties
DAN	Dimokratiki Andistasis Neon	Democratic Youth Resistance
DANE	Dodekanisiaki Anonymi Navtiliaki Etaireia	Dodekanisos Shipping Company
DANI	Dimokratia-Anexartisia Nomou Imathias	Democracy-Independence of Imathia Nome
DAP	Diakheirisis Andallaximou Periousias	Management of Exchangeable Estates
	Dievthynsis Astynomias Proastion	Suburbs Police Directorate
	Dimokratiki Ananeotiki Protoporeia	Democratic Renewal Vanguard
DAPP	Dievthynsi Astynomias Proastion Protevousas	Police Directorate for Athens Suburbs
DAS	Dimokratiki Agonistiki Synergasia	Democratic Militant Cooperation
DASA	Dimokratiki Andistasis Spoudaston Athinon	Democratic Resistance of Athens Students
DAS-114	Dimokratiki Andistasis Spoudaston	Democratic Resistance of Students

DASK	Dimokratiki Avtonomi Syndikalistiki Kinisi	Democratic Autonomous Trade Union Movement
DASPE	Dimokratiki Aristeri Syndikalistiki Parataxi Elladas	Democratic Left Labor Faction of Greece
DASPEN	Dimokratiki Avtonomi Syndikalistiki Parataxi Ellinikon Navpigeion	Democratic Autonomous Greek Shipyards Trade Union Faction
D(d)	Dysis, dytikos	West, western, westerly
DDDD	Devterovathmion Dioikitikon Diaititikon Dikastirion	Second Degree Administrative and Arbitration Court
DDF	Dimokratikes Dynameis Foititon	Student Democratic Forces
DDSE	Dioikitiko Dikastirio Stratiotikon Epitaxeon	Military Requisitions Administrative Court
	Dioikitikon Dikastirion Stratiotikon Epitaxeon	Army Requisitions Administrative Court
DE	Dapanes Exypiretisis	Service Expenditures
	Dimokratiki Enosis	Democratic Union [C]
	Dioikitiki Epitropi	Administrative Committee
DEA	Dimoiria Eidikis Apostolis	Special Mission Platoon
	Dimokratiki Epitropi Andistaseos	Democratic Resistance Committee
DEAK	Diethni Epitropi Allilengyis pros tin Kyprou	International Committee for Solidarity Toward Cyprus [C]
DEAN	Diethnis Epitropi Aeronavtilias	International Air Navigation Commission Use: IANC

DED	Dimosio Exoteriki Daneismo	Foreign Public Borrowing
DEE	Diethnes Emborikon Epimelitirion	International Chamber of Commerce
	Dioikisis Exoterikou Emboriou	Foreign Trade Administration
DEEAS	Dievthynsis Epopteias kai Elengkhou Aktoploikon Syngoinonion	Directorate for Supervision and Control of Coastal Shipping Communications
DEEE	Dievthynsis Ekpaidevseos Ellinopaidon Exoterikou	Directorate for the Education of Greek Children Abroad
DEEN	Dievthynsis Ekpaidevseos Emborikou Navtikou	Merchant Marine Training Directorate
DEES	Diethnis Epitropi Erythrou Stavrou	International Red Cross Committee
DEF	Diethnis Enosis Foititon	International Union of Students Use: IUS
DEFA	Dimosia Epikheirisis Fotaeriou Athinon	Athens Municipal Gas Enterprise
	Dimotiki Epikheirisis Fotaeriou Athinon	Athens Public Gas Corporation
DEI	Dimosia Epikheirisis Ilektrismou	Public Power Corporation
DEK	Dimokratiki Enosis Kendrou	Democratic Center Union
	Dimokratikon Enotikon Komma	Democratic Union Party [C]
	Dimokratikon Ethnikon Komma	Democratic National Party [C]
DEKA	Dimokratikon Ethnikon Kinima Andistaseos	Democratic National Resistance Movement

DEKE	Dimokratikon Ergatikon Kinima Ellados	Democratic Labor Movement of Greece
DEKFA	Dimokratiki Enosis Kyprion Foititon Athinas	Democratic Union of Cypriot Students of Athens [C]
DEKh	Dimosio Exoteriko Khreos	Foreign Public Debt
DEKO	Dimosies Epikheiriseis kai Organismoi	Public Firms and Organizations
DEM	Dievthynsis Enaerion Metaforon	Air Transport Directorate
	Dievthynsis Ergon Mikhanikou	Engineering Projects Directorate
DEME	Diakyvernitiki Epitropi Metanastevseos ex Evropis	Intergovernmental Committee for European Emigration Use: ICEM
DEN	Dievthynsis Elengkhou Navsiploias	Navigation Controls Directorate
DENEK	Dimokratiki Enosis Neolaias Kyprou	Democratic Union of Cypriot Youth [C]
DENG	Dimokratiki Enosi Neon Gynaikon	Democratic Union of Young Women
DENKA	Diakommatiki Epitropi Neolaion Kypriakou Agonos	Interparty Committee of Youth for Cypriot Struggle [C]
DEOK	Dimokratiki Ergatiki Omospondia Kyprou	Democratic Labor Federation of Cyprus [C]
DEOL	Dievthynsis Epopteias Organoseos Limenon	Port Organization Supervision Directorate
DEON	Dioikitiki Epitropi Oikou Navtou	Sailors' Home Administrative Committee

DEP	Didaktikon Erevnitikon Prosopikon	Teaching and Research Personnel
	Dimosia Epikheirisis Petrelaiou	Public Petroleum Corporation
DEPA	Dimotiki Epikheirisi Politistikis Anaptyxis	Municipal Enterprise for Cultural Development
DEPANOM	Dimosia Epikheirisi Anegersis Nosokomeiakon Monadon	Public Firm for the Construction of Hospital Units
DEPAThA	Dievthynsis Efedron Polemiston, Agoniston, Thymaton kai Anapiron	Reserve Combatants, Fighters, Victims, and Disabled Directorate
DEPE	Diakheiristiki Epitropi Ploion ex Epanorthoseon	Administrative Committee of Ships Obtained From Reparations
DEPOS	Dimosia Epikheirisis Poleodomiseos, Oikismou kai Stegaseos	Public Enterprise for Town Planning, Housing, and Shelter
DES	Diethnis Erythros Stavros	International Red Cross
	Dievthynsis Ethnikou Stolou	National Fleet Command
	Dimosia Emboriki Skholi	Public Commercial School
DESAS	Dioikousa Epitropi Syllogon Anoteron Skholon	Administrative Committee of Associations of Higher Schools
DESK	Dimokratiki Enotita Syndikalistikon Kiniseon	Democratic Union of Trade Union Movements
DESP	Dimokratiki Enotiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi	Democratic Unifying Trade Union Faction
DESPA	Dimokratiki Enotiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi Athinon	Democratic Unifying Trade Union Faction of Athens
	Dioikousa Epitropi Syllogon Panepistimiou Athinon	Administrative Committee of Athens University Associations

SPO	Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi Odondoiatron	Democratic Syndicalist Faction of Dentists
ET	Diethnis Enosis Tilepikoinion	International Telecommunications Union Use: ITU
	Diethnis Enosis Tourismou	International Tourism Alliance Use: AIT [Alliance Internationale de Tourisme]
ETh	Diethnis Ekthesis Thessalonikis	Salonica International Fair
ETROP	Diethnis Ekthesis Trofimon kai Poton	International Exposition of Food and Beverages
ex	dexamenoploion	tanker (ship) [See also D/P]
EY	Diethnis Ethelondiki Ypiresia	International Volunteer Service
	Dievthynsis Englimatologikon Ypiresion	Criminal Services Directorate
EYAKh	Dimotiki Epikheirisis Ydrevsis kai Apokhetevsis Khanion	Public Enterprise for Water Supply and Drainage of Khania
EYAL	Dimotiki Epikheirisi Ydrevsis kai Apokhetevsis Larisas	Municipal Water and Sewage Company of Larisa
	Dimotiki Epikheirisi Ydrevsis kai Apokhetevsis Loutrakiou	Municipal Water and Sewage Company of Loutraki
FD	Devterovathmion Forologikon Dikastirion	Tax Court of the Second Instance
FP	Dievthynsis Fytikis Paragogis	Plant Production Directorate
GADE	Dievthynsis Genikon Arkheion, Dimosievmaton kai Ethimotypias	General Archives, Publications, and Protocol Directorate

DGE	Diethnes Grafeion Ergasias	International Labor Office Use: ILO
DGEP	Dievthynsis Georgikis Ekpaidevseos kai Pliroforion	Agricultural Training and Information Directorate
DGKh	dektis genikis khriseos	general purpose receiver
DGMP	Dievthynsis Georgooikonomikon Meleton kai Programmatismou	Agro-Economic Studies and Planning Directorate
DIA	Dievthynsis Iatrikis Andilipseos	Medical Assistance Directorate
DIE	Diethnis Ilektrologiki Epitropi	International Electrological Committee
DIKASA	Diepistimonikon Kendron Anagnorisis Titlon Spoudon Allodapis	Inter-Professional Center for the Recognition of Degrees for Studies Abroad
DIKELTEE	Dimokratiki Kinisi Ekpaidevtikon Leitourgon Tekhnikis kai Epangelmatikis Ekpaidevseos	Democratic Movement of Technical and Business Training Teachers
DIKEP	Dimokratiki Kinisi Epistimonon	Democratic Movement of Professionals
DIKEVE	Dimokratiki Kinisis Emboron, Viotekhnon kai Epangelmation	Democratic Movement of Merchants, Handicraftsmen, and Businessmen
DIKI	Dimokratiki Kinisi	Democratic Movement
	Dimokratiki Kinisi Iatron	Democratic Movement of Doctors
DIKIDI	Dimokratiki Kinisi Dimosiografon	Democratic Movement of Journalists

DIKIDNE	Dimokratiki Kinisi Daskalon Nipiagogon	Democratic Movement of Kindergarten Teachers
DIKIF	Dimokratiki Kinisi Foititon	Democratic Student Movement
DIKIO	Dimokratiki Kinisi Oikonomologon	Democratic Economists Movement
DIKIS	Dimokratiki Kinisi Sidirodromikon	Democratic Movement of Railway Workers
DIKO	Dimokratiko Komma	Democratic Party [C]
DIMAK	Dimokratiki Mathitiki Kinisi	Democratic Student Movement
DIOM	Dievthynsis Organoseos kai Methodon	Organization and Methods Directorate
DIPAKFA	Dimokratiki Parataxi Kyprion Foititon Athinon	Democratic Faction of Cypriot Students in Athens [C]
DIPSEA	Dievthynsis Politikis Skhediaseos Ektaktou Anangis	Emergency Policy Planning Directorate
DIRKI	Dimokratiki Rizospastiki Kinisi Ergazomenon	Democratic Radical Movement of Workers
DIRKIS	Dimokratiki Rizospastiki Kinisi Syndikaliston	Democratic Radical Movement of Unionists
DIS	Diarkis Iera Synodos	Standing Holy Synod
	Dievthynsis Istorias Stratou	Army History Directorate
DISAK	Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Agonistiki Kinisi Kathigiton	Democratic Trade Unionist and Militant Movement of Professors
DISPA	Diethnis Synandisis Perifereiakis Anaptyxeos	International Meeting on Regional Development

DISPE	Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi Ergazomenon	Democratic Trade Unionist Workers Party
DISS	Diethnes Instituton Stratigikon Spoudon	International Institute of Strategic Services
DISY	Dimokratikos Synagermos	Democratic Rally [C]
DISYA	Dimokratiko Syndikalistiko Kinima	Democratic Trade Union Movement
DIT	Diethnes Institouton Typou	International Press Institute
DITh	Diethnes Institouton Theatrou	International Theater Institute
DK	Diaplanitiko Komma	Interplanetary Party
	Dimokratiko Komma	Democratic Party [C]
DKED	Dimokratiki Kinisi Epangelmation Dikigoron	Democratic Movement of Professional Lawyers
DKEL	Dimokratikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou	Democratic Party of the Working People [C]
DKF	Dimokratiki Kinisi Foititon	Democratic Movement of Students
DKh	Dimosia Khrisis	Public vehicle; vehicle for hire [automobile license plate designation]
DKK	Dimotikos kai Koinotikos Kodix	Municipal and Communal Code
DKKE	Dimokratiki Kinisi Kyprion Ergazomenon	Democratic Movement of Cypriot Workers [C]
DKL	Dievthynsis Kratikon Lakheion	State Lotteries Directorate

DKM	Dimokratiki Kinisis Mikhanikon	Democratic Movement of Engineers
DKNG	Dimokratiki Kinisis Nosokomeiakon Giatron	Democratic Movement of Hospital Physicians
DKNGL	Dimokratiko Kinima Neolaias Grigoriou Lambraki	Grigorios Lambrakis Youth Democratic Movement
DKO	Diethnistiki Kommounistiki Omada	Internatinalist Communist Group
DKOG	Dievthynsis Kataskevon Odon kai Gefyron	Highways and Bridges Construction Directorate
DLA	Dievthynsis Limenikis Astynomias	Port Police Directorate
DMEA	Dimosyndiritoi Monades Ethnofylakis Amynis	State-Supported National Guard Defense Units
DMK	Dimokratikon Metarrythmistikon Komma	Democratic Reform Party
DN	Dimokratiki Neolaia	Democratic Youth
D/ndis	Dievthyndis	Manager; Director
DNE	Diethnis Navtikon Epimelitirion	International Maritime Chamber
	Dievthynsis Navtikis Ekpaidevseos	Naval Training Command
	Dioikisis Navtikis Ekpaidevseos	Naval Training Command
DNL	Dimokratiki Neolaia Lambraki	Lambrakis Democratic Youth
DNLE	Dimokratiki Neolaia Lambraki Ellados	Lambrakis Democratic Youth of Greece
DNSO	Diakyvernitikos Navtiliakos	Intergovernmental Maritime

	Symvoulevtikos Organismos	Consultation Organization Use: IMCO
DNT	Diethnes Nomismatikon Tameion	International Monetary Fund Use: IMF
DOA	Diethnis Olymbiaki Akadimia	International Olympic Academy
	Diethnis Omospondia Andistasiakon	International Resistance Federation
DOAE	Diethnis Organismos Atomikis Energeias	International Atomic Energy Agency Use: IAEA
DOAP	Diethnis Organismos Apokatastaseos Prosfygon	International Refugee Organization Use: IRO
DOAT	Diethnis Omospondia Athlitikou Typou	International Federation of Sports Publications
DOD	Diethnis Omospondia Dimosiografon	International Federation of Journalists Use: IFJ
DODEN	Diethnis Organismos Doryforikon Epikoinonion Navtilias	International Maritime Satellite System Use: INMARSAT
DOE	Didaskaliki Omospondia Ellados	Teachers Federation of Greece
	Diethnis Oikonomiki Epitropi	International Economic Committee
	Diethnis Oikonomikos Elengkhos	International Economic Control
	Diethnis Organosis Ergasias	International Labor Office Use: ILO
DOEM	Diethnis Omospondia Ergaton Metaforas	International Transport Workers Federation Use: ITWF

DOES		
	Diethnis Omospondia ton Ergatikon Syndikaton	International Federation of Trade Unions Use: IFTU
DOI/GEA		
	Dievthynsi Oikonomikon tou Genikou Epiteleiou Aeroporias	Finance Command of the Air Force General Staff
DOKhES		
	Diethnis Omospondia ton Khristianikon Ergatikon Syndikaton	International Federation of Christian Trade Unions Use: IFCTU
dol(l)		
	dollarion (pl.-ia)	dollar(s)
DOM		
	Diethneis Odikes Metafores	International Road Transportations
	Diethnis Omospondia Metaforon	International Transportation Federation
DON		
	Dievthynsis Okeanoporon Navtilias	Oceangoing Merchant Marine Directorate
DONL		
	Dimokratiki Omada Navtilias Londinou	Democratic Seamen's Group of London
DOOKh		
	Dimokratiki Organosi Opliton Khorofylakis	Democratic Organization of Enlisted Gendarmery Men
DOOP		
	Diethnis Omospondia Oikogeneiakou Programmatismou	International Family Planning Federation
DOPA		
	Diethnis Organismos Politikis Aeroporias	International Civil Aviation Organization
	Dimosthenikos Omilos Politistikis Anaptyxeos	Demosthenes Group for Cultural Development
DOS		
	Dioikisis Oikonomikis Synergasias	Economic Cooperation Administration Use: ECA

D/P	Dexamenoploion	Tanker [ship] [See also dex.]
DP	Dimokratiki Parataxi	Democratic Front [C]
	Dimokratiki Poreia	Democratic Path
DPK	Dimokratiki Panepistimiaki Kinisi	Democratic University Movement
DPKK	Dimokratikon Proodevtikon Komma Kyprou	Democratic Progressive Party of Cyprus [C]
DPM	Diplomatoukhos Politikos Mikhanikos	Certified [Graduate] Civil Engineer
DPN	Dievthynsis Pronoias Navtikou	Navy Welfare Directorate
DPP	Dievthynsis Prostasias Perivallondos	Environmental Protection Directorate
DPSEA	Dievthynsi Politikis Skhediaseos Ektaktou Anangis	Emergency Political Planning Directorate
DPV	Dievthinsis Polemikis Viomikhanias	War Industry Directorate
DPYPA	Dioikisi Pyrosvestikis Ypiresias Poleos Athinon	Athens Fire Department Administration
DPYPP	Dioikisi Pyrosvestikis Ypiresias Poleos Peiraios	Piraeus Fire Department Administration
DS	Dimokratikos Synagermos	Democratic Rally [C]
	Dimokratiki Synergasia	Democratic Cooperation
	Dioikitikon Symvoulion	Administrative Council

DSA	Dievthynsi Syndiriseos Arkhaiotiton	Antiquities Conservation Directorate
	Dievthynsis Stratiotikou Arkheiou	Military Archives Directorate
	Dikigorikos Syllogos Athinon	Athens Bar Association
	Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Allagi	Democratic Labor Change
DSE	Dimokratikos Stratos Ellados	Democratic Army of Greece
DSEES	Diethnis Synomospondia Elevtheron Ergatikon Syndikaton	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Use: ICFTU
DSEN	Dimosios Skholi Emborikou Navtikou	Public School for the Merchant Marine
DSK	diakoptomena syndiroumena kymata	interrupted continuous waves
	Dimokratikon Syndikalistikon Kinima	Democratic Labor Movement
DSM	Dimokratikon Syndikalistikon Metopon	Democratic Labor Front
DSMAEN	Dimosia Skholi Metekpaidevsis Axiomatikon Emborikis Navtilias	Public School for Post-Graduate Training of Merchant Marine Officers
DSNED	Dimokratikos Syndesmos Neon Epistimonon kai Dianooumenon	Democratic Association of Young Professionals and Intellectuals
DSNO	Diakyvernitikos Symvoulevtikos Navtiliakos Organismos	Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization Use: IMCO
DSO	Diakyvernitikos Symvoulevtikos Organismos	Intergovernmental Consultants Organization

DSP	Dimokratiki Sosialistiki Parataxi	Democratic Socialist Faction
DSPO	See DESPO	
DTA	Diethnes Tameion Anaptyxeos	International Development Fund Use: IDF
	Diethnis Trapeza Anasyngrotiseos	International Bank for Reconstruction Use: IBRD
	Dievthynsi Touristikis Astynomias	Tourist Police Directorate
	Dynameis Takheias Anaptyxeos	Rapid Deployment Forces
	Dynami Takheias Anaptyxeos	Rapid Deployment Force
DTAA	Diethnis Trapeza Anasyngrotiseos kai Anaptyxeos	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Use: IBRD
DThIP	Diagnostiko kai Therapevtiko Institouto Peiraia	Piraeus Diagnostic and Therapeutic Institute
DThKM	Dievthynsis Thalassion Kratikon Metaforon	State Maritime Transport Administration
DThM	Dievthynsis Thalassion Metaforon	Maritime Transport Administration
DTK	Deiktis Timon Katanalosis	Consumer Price Index
DTY	Dievthynsi Tekhnikon Ypiresion	Technical Services Directorate
DTYN	Dievthynsis Tekhnikis Ypiresias Nomou	Directorate of the Technical Services of the Nome [plus initial letter of the nome]
DVD		

	Dytiko-voreio-dytikos	west-northwest; WNW
DVP	Diipeirotikos Vallistikos Pyravlos	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Use: ICBM
DXMS	Dievthynsis Xenon kai Meionotikon Skholon	Foreign and Minority Schools Directorate
DY	Dimosia Ypiresia	Civil Service
	Dimosios Ypallilos	Civil servant
DYK	Dynameis Ypovrykhion Katastrofon	Underwater Demolition Forces
DYKFE	Dimokratiki Yperkommatiki Kinisi Foititon Ellados	Democratic Supra-Party Movement of Greek Students
DYKO	Dievthinsis Ypiresion Koinovoulevtikis Omados	Directorate of Parliamentary Group Services (Parliamentary Liaison to the Premier)
DYY	Dievthynsis Ydrografikis Ypiresias	Hydrographic Service Directorate
DZP	Dievthynsis Zoikis Paragogis	Animal Production Directorate

E

E'; e' (epsilon)	pempt-os, -i, -on; pende	fifth; 5th; V; five
e.a.	en apostrateia	retired (military)
EA	Efedros Axiomatikos	Reserve officer
	Enomeni Aristera	United Left
	Enosi Agroton	Farmers' Union
	Epanastatiki Aristera	Revolutionary Left
	Ethniki Allilengyi	National Solidarity
EAA	Elliniki Aeroporiki Astynomia	Greek Air Police [Now Aeronomia, q.v.]
	Etaireia Anaptyxeos Alieias	Association for the Development of Fishing
	Ethnikon Asteroskopeion Athinon	Athens National Observatory
EAAA	Enosis Apostraton Axiomatikon Aeroporias	Union of Retired Air Force Officers
EAAEI	Epitropi Adeias Askiseos tou Epangelmatos tou Ithopiou	Actors' Licensing Committee
EAAS	Enosis Apostraton Axiomatikon Stratou	Union of Retired Army Officers
EAAVA	Enosis Apostraton Axiomatikon Vasilikis Aeroporias	Union of Retired Royal Air Force Officers
EAAVE	Epitropi Agonos Avtokinitiston Voreiou Ellados	Struggle Committee of Drivers of Northern Greece
EADE	Epitropi Apokatastaseos tis Dimokratias eis tin Ellada	Committee for the Restoration of Democracy in Greece

	Ethniki Andidiktatoriki Dimokratiki Enotis	National Antidictatorial Democratic Unity
EAE	Elliniki Andikarkiniki Etaireia	Greek Cancer Society
	Elliniki Astronavtiki Etaireia	Greek Astronautical Society
	Ethniki Anagennisis Ellinon	National Renaissance of the Greek People
EAEE	Ellinikai Andidiktatorikai Epitropai Exoterikou	Greek Antidictatorial Committees Abroad
EAEP	Ethniki Arkhi Exasfaliseos Poiotitos	National Authority for Quality Control
EAGE	Ethniki Akadimia Grammaton kai Epistimon	National Academy of Letters and Sciences
EAI	Ellinikon Andikarkinikon Institouton (Agiou Savva)	Greek Cancer Institute (Ag. Savvas)
EAISE	Enosis Alievtikon kai Ikhthyotrofikon Synetairismon Ellados	Union of Fishing and Piscicultural Cooperatives of Greece
EAK	Elliniko Anadimiourgiko Komma	Greek Renascence Party
	Elliniko Ananeotiko Komma	Greek Restorative Movement
	Enosis Agroton Kyprou	Union of Cypriot Farmers [C]
	Ethnikon Agronomikon Komma	National Agrarian Party
	Ethnikon Agrotikon Komma	National Agrarian Party
	Evropaiki Amyntiki Koinotis	European Defense Community Use: EDC
EAKN	Ethnikon Athlitikon Kendron Neotitos (Agiou Kosma)	National Youth Athletic Center (Ag. Kosmas)

EAL		
	Enosis Agoniston Levkosias	Union of Nicosia Fighters [C]
	Etaireia Astikon Leoforeion	Urban Buses Company [C]
EAM		
	Eniaion Armenikon Metopon	United Armenian Front
	Ethnikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon	National Liberation Front
EAN		
	Elliniki Andidiktatoriki Neolaia	Greek Antidictatorial Youth
EANE		
	Ethniki Andikommounistiki Neolaia Ellados	National Anticommunist Youth of Greece
EAO		
	Ethnikai Andartikai Omades	National Guerrilla Groups
EAOK		
	Ethnikai Andikommounistikai Omades Kynigon	National Anticommunist Hunters' Groups
EAP		
	Epitropi Analyseos kai Programatismou	Analysis and Planning Committee
	Epitropi Apokatastaseos Prosfygon	Refugee Resettlement Committee
EAPDTh		
	Epitropi dia tin Apokatastasin kai Prostasian Dimokratikon Thesmon	Committee for the Restoration and Protection of Democratic Institutions
EAPODE		
	Etairia Analyseos Programmatismou, Organoseos kai Dioikiseos Ergon	Analysis, Programming, Organization, and Management Company
EAR		
	Elliniki Anatoliki Roumeli	Greek Eastern Roumelia
EAS		
	Ellinikos Antiapoikiakos Syndesmos	Greek Anti-Colonialist League
	Epikheirisis Astikon Syngoinonion	Urban Transportation Company

	Ethnikos Andidiktatorikos Stratos	National Antidictatorial Army
	Ethnikos Apelevtherotikos Stratos	National Liberation Army
	Ethnikos Apelevtherotikos Synaspismos	National Liberation Alliance [C]
EASA	Ethniki Akadimia Somatikis Agogis	National Physical Education Academy
EASE	Ethnikon Andifasistikon Symvoulion Ergazomenon	National Antifascist Council of Workers
EASK	Enosis Athlitikon Syndakton Kyprou	Cypriot Sports Writers Union [C]
EASKEN	Eniaia Andidiktatoriki Syndikalistiki Kinisi Ellinon Navtergaton	United Antidictatorial Labor Movement of Greek Seamen [organized in W. Germany (Hamburg) in July 67] [also appears as AESKEN]
EASTE	Enosis Apofoiton Skholon Touristikon Epangelmaton	Union of Tourism Schools Graduates
EAT	Eidikon Anakritikon Tmima	Special Investigating Section (of ESA)
EATOP	Epitropi Avtodioikiseos kai Topikon Provlimaton	Committee for Local Self-Government and Local Problems
EAV	Elliniki Aeroporiki Viomikhania	Greek Aircraft Industry
EAYO	Enosis Anapiron Ypaxiomatikon kai Opliton	Union of Disabled Non-Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men
ed.	edafion	paragraph, verse [of Bible]
ED	Enoplai Dynameis	Armed Forces

EDA	Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera	United Democratic Left
	Epitropai Dimosias Asfaleias	Public Security Committees
EDAN	Epitropi Dimosias Asfaleias Nomou	Nome Public Security Committee
EDAP	Enosis Dikaiomaton Anthropou kai Politou	Union of Rights of Man and Citizen
	Epitropi Diakheiriseos Andallaximou Periousias	Committee for the Administration of Exchangeable Estates
EDDE	Enosis Dimokratikon Dikigoron Ellados	Union of Democratic Lawyers of Greece
EDE	Elliniki Diethnistiki Enosi	Greek Internationalist Union
	Ergatiki Diethnikistiki Enosi (Trotskyite)	Workers Internationalist Union
	Ethniki Dimokratiki Enosis	National Democratic Union
EDEE	Enosis Diafimistikon Epikheiriseon Ellados	Union of Greek Advertising Enterprises
EDEK	Elevthero Dimokratiko Ergatiko Kinima	Free Democratic Labor Movement
	Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosis Kendrou	United Democratic Union of the Center [C]
EDEKA	Etairia Dikaiou tis Ergasias kai Koinonikis Asfalisis	Society for Labor Justice and Social Security
EDEMED	Etaireia Diakheiriseos Eidon Monopolion tou Ellinikou Dimosiou	Company for the Administration of Commodities Sold by Greek Public Monopolies
EDEN	Eniaia Dimokratiki Enosis Neon	United Democratic Union of Youth [C]

EDES	Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnikos Syndesmos	Greek Democratic National League
EDIK	Enosi Dimokratikou Kendrou	Democratic Center Union [formerly EK-ND]
EDIN	Elliniki Dimokratiki Neolaia	Greek Democratic Youth [also appears as ELDIN]
EDISK	Enotiki Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi	United Democratic Trade Unionist Movement
EDK	Elliniko Dimokratiko Komma	Greek Democratic Party
	Ellinikon Dimokratikon Kinima	Greek Democratic Movement
EDKD	Epitropi Dimosion Kipon kai Dendrostoikheion	Committee on Public Gardens and Tree Plantings
EDKE	Enosis Dimon kai Koinotiton Ellados	Union of Municipalities and Communes of Greece
EDMA	Eniaion Dimokratikon Metopon Anadimiourgias	United Democratic Regeneration Front [C]
EDME	Endolodokhos Diakheiriseos Mikhanikou Exoplismou	Administrative Agent for Mechanical Equipment
EDNE	Enosis Dimokratikis Neolaias Ellados	United Democratic Youth of Greece
EDNLA	Elliniki Dimokratiki Neolaia Lambraki Avstralias	Greek Democratic Lambrakis Youth of Australia
EDOEAP	Eniaios Dimosiografikos Organismos Epikourikis Asfaliseos kai Perithalpseos	United Journalistic Organization of Auxiliary Insurance and Relief

EDON	Eniaia Dimokratiki Organosis Neon	United Democratic Youth Organization [C] [also given as Eniaia Dimokratiki Organosis Neolaias]
EDOP/DEI	Enosis Dioikitikou kai Oikonomikou Prosopikou/Dimosia Epikheirisis Ilektrismou	Union of Administrative and Financial Personnel of the Public Power Corporation
EDP	Ellinika Diylistiria Petrelaiou	Greek Oil Refineries
	Epikourikon Didaktikon Prosopikon	Auxiliary Teaching Personnel
	Epistimoniko Didaktiko Prosopiko	Scientific Teaching Personnel
EDSSA	Evreia Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Synergasia Athinon	Broad Democratic Labor Collaboration of Athens
EDSSP	Evreia Dimokratiki Syndikalistiki Synergasia Peiraios	Broad Democratic Labor Collaboration of Piraeus
EDTDE	Epitropi Diapistoseos Timon Dimosion Ergon	Committee for Determining Public Projects Costs
EDTP	Eidiko Dioikitiko kai Tekhniko Prosopiko	Special Administrative and Technical Personnel
EDY	Enosis Diplomatikon Ypallilon	Union of Diplomatic Employees
EDYP	Etaireia Diakheiriseos Ypengyon Prosodon	Company for the Administration of Accountable Revenues
EDYTh	Enosis Dimosion Ypallilon Thessalonikis	Salonica Civil Servants Union
e.e.	enestotos etous	of this year; of the current year
	eterorrythmos etaireia	limited or registered partnership

EE	Ektelestiki Epitropi	Executive Committee
	Elengtiki Epitropi	Control Committee
	Elevtheroi Ellines	Free Greeks
	Eparkhiaki Epitropi	District Committee [C]
	Epitropi Epilogis	Selection Committee
	Ergatiki Estia	Labor Hearth
EEA	Enosi Efimeridopolon Athinon	Union of Athens Newspaper Vendors
	Enosis Efedron Axiomatikon	Union of Reserve Officers
	Epangelmatikon Epimelitirion Athinon	Athens Chamber of Commerce
EEAA	Enosis Ellinon Apostraton Axiomatikon	Union of Retired Greek Officers
EEAAP	Ethniki Enosis Anapiron Axiomatikon Polemou	National Union of War-Disabled Military Officers
EEAE	Elliniki Epitropi Atomikis Energeias	Greek Atomic Energy Committee
EEAE	Epitropi Enaskiseos Arkhitektonikou Elengkhou	Committee for the Exercise of Architectural Control
EEAKh	Elliniki Epitropi Allilengyis gia tin Khili	Greek Committee of Solidarity for Chile
EEAM	Ellinikon Epanastatikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon	Greek Revolutionary Liberation Front
	Ergatikon Ethnikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon	Workers National Liberation Front
EEAR	Enosis Ellinon Anatolikis Romylias	Union of Greeks of Eastern Romylia

EEASTh	Enosis Ergatoypallilon Astikis Syngoinonias Thessalonikis	Union of Workers of Salonica Urban Transport
EED	Ellinikai Enoploi Dynameis	Greek Armed Forces
	Enosi Emmisthon Dikigoron	Union of Salaried Attorneys
	Enosis Epistimonon Dimokritou	Union of Scientists of the Dimokritos Nuclear Center
EEDA	Elliniki Epitropi Dikaiomaton tou Anthropou	Greek Human Rights Committee
	Enosis Epangelmation Dikigoron Athinon	Union of Practicing Attorneys of Athens
EEDAP	Elliniki Enosis per ton Dikaiomaton tou Anthropou kai tou Politou	Greek Union for the Rights of Man and Citizen
EEDDA	Elliniki Epitropi Diethnous Dimokratikis Allilengis	Greek Committee for International Democratic Solidarity
	Elliniki Epitropi gia Diethni Dimokratiki Allilengyi	Greek Committee for International Democratic Solidarity
EEDE	Elliniki Etaireia Dioikiseos Epikheiriseon	Greek Association for Business Management
	Enosis Ellinon Dikaston kai Eisangeleon	Union of Greek Judges and Prosecutors
EEDK	Eniaion Ethnikon Dimokratikon Komma	United National Democratic Party [C] [See EK]
EEDS	Elliniki Enosi Diermineon Synedrion	Greek Union of Conference Interpreters
	Elliniki Etairia Dimosion Skheseon	Greek Public Relations Society
EEDTDE	Eidiki Epitropi Diapistoseos Timon Dimosion Ergon	Special Committee for the Verification of Public Works Costs

EEDYE	Elliniki Epitropi gia tin Diethni Yfesi kai Eirini	Greek Committee for International Detente and Peace
EEE	Elliniki Epitropi Eirinis	Greek Peace Committee
	Enosi Ellinon Ethnikiston	Union of Greek Nationalists
	Enosis Ellinon Efopliston	Union of Greek Shipowners
	Epangelmatikon Epimelitirion Ellados	Professional Chamber of Greece
	Ethniki Enosis Ellinon	National Union of Greece
EEEDEE	Ethniki Elliniki Epitropi Diethnous Emborikou Epimelitiriou	National Greek Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce
EEEE	Ektelestiki Epitropi Exoterikou Emboriou	Foreign Trade Executive Committee
	Evropaiki Enosis Elevtherou Emboriou	European Free Trade Association Use: EFTA
EE-EE	Ellines Ethnikistai-Ethnikistai Ellines	Greek Nationalists-Nationalist Greeks
EEEF	Elliniki Ethniki Enosis Kata tis Fimatioseos	Greek National Anti-Tuberculosis Association
EEEL	Ethniki Etaireia Ellinon Logotekhnon	National Association of Greek Writers
EEEP	Enosis Efopliston Epivatikon Ploion	Union of Passenger Ship Owners
	Ethniko Engkheiridio Exasfaliseos Poiotitos	National Quality Control Manual
EEEV	Elevtheroi Ellines Epanaferoun Vasilea	Free Greeks Reinstate King
	Enosis Ellinon Exagogeon Vamvakos	Union of Greek Cotton Exporters

EEF	Enosi Ellinon Fysikon	Union of Greek Physicists
	Etaireia Ellinon Filologon	Association of Greek Philologists
EEK	Elevtheron Ergatikon Kendron	Free Labor Center [C] Use: SEK (q.v.) Labor Center] [Abbreviation usually followed by initial of town in which located]
	Epitropi Erevnis Kostous	Cost Research Committee
	Epitropi tis Evropaikis Koinotitos	European Community Commission
	Ethnikon Enotikon Komma	National Unifying Party
EEKA	Ethniki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos	National Committee for the Cypriot Struggle
EEKETP	Elliniki Etaireia tis Kosmiteias Ethnikou Topeiou kai Poleon	Greek Society for National Landscape and Cities Beautification
EEKh	Enosis Ellinon Khimikon	Union of Greek Chemists
EEKhPL	Elliniki Etaireia Khimikon Proiondon kai Lipasmaton	Greek Chemical Products and Fertilizer Company
EEL	Enosis Ellinon Logotekhnon	Association of Greek Writers
EELAP	Enosis Eispraktoron Leoforeion Athinon-Peiraios	Union of Athens-Piraeus Bus Collectors
EEM	Enosis Ellinon Mousourgon	Greek Composers Union
	Ethniki Etaireia Meleton	National Research Society
EEN	Enosis Ellinidon Nomikon	Union of Greek Women Attorneys
EENA	Enosis Ellinon Neon Axiomatikon	Union of Young Greek Officers

EENSL		
	Elliniki Epitropi Navtiliakis Synergasias Londinou	Greek Committee of London for Maritime Cooperation [See also ENEL]
EEO		
	Enosis Eisagogeon Osprion	Union of Legume Importers
	Ethniki Ergatiki Omospondia	National Labor Federation [C]
EEOE		
	Elliniki Etaireia Okeanografikon Erevnon	Greek Oceanographic Research Society
	Enotiki Epitropi ton Oikodomon Ellados	Unifying Committee of Builders of Greece
EEOO		
	Elliniki Etaireia Oinon kai Oinopnevmaton	Greek Wines and Spirits Association
EEOPO		
	Ergatiki Epitropi Organotikis Protovoulias Oikodomon	Labor Committee for the Organizational Initiative of Construction Workers
EEOTh		
	Enosis Ergatotekhniton Oikodomon Thessalonikis	Union of Construction Technicians of Salonica
EEP		
	Eidikon Ekpaidevtikon Prosopikon	Special Training Personnel
	Ekprosopos Exasfaliseos Poiotitos	Quality Control Representative
	Enoploi Epanastatikoi Pyrines	Armed Revolutionary Cells
	Epangelmatikon Epimelitirion Peiraios	Piraeus Chamber of Commerce
	Evropaiki Enosis Pliromon	European Payments Union Use: EPU
EEPAP		
	Elliniki Etaireia Prostasias Anapiron Paidon	Greek Association for the Protection of Handicapped Children
EEPDE		
	Enosis Ellinon Panepistimiakon Dytikis Evropis	Union of Greek University Graduates of Western Europe

EEPE	Elliniki Epitropi Pyrinikis Energeias	Greek Nuclear Energy Commission
EEPF	Elliniki Etaireia Prostasias tis Fyseos	Greek Society for the Protection of Nature
EEPK	Etaireia Ellinikou Pyritidopoieiou kai Kalykopoieiou	Greek Gunpowder and Cartridge Manufacturing Company
EEPMK	Etaireia Epistimonikon kai Politistikon Meleton Kyprou	Scientific and Cultural Research Society of Cyprus [C]
EEPOIE	Ekpaidevtikos, Epistimonikos kai Politistikos Organismos ton Inomenon Ethnon	Use: UNESCO
EEPP	Epitropi Epanapatrismou Politikon Prosfygon	Committee for the Repatriation of Political Refugees
EEPsPs	Elliniki Etaireia Psykhoanalytikis Psykhotherapeias	Greek Society for Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy
EEPThP	Elliniki Enosi Prostasias Thalassiou Perivallondos	Greek Association for the Protection of Marine Environment
EERA	Epitropi Elengkhou Rypanseos tis Atmosfairas	Air Pollution Control Committee
EES	Elevtheron Ergatikon Somateion	Free Labor Union [C] [Used in reference to SEK unions]
	Ellinikos Erythros Stavros	Greek Red Cross
	Enosis Ellinon Sidiroviomikhanon	Union of Greek Iron Industrialists
	Etaireia Ellinikon Spoudon	Greek Studies Association
	Etairia Ellinon Skinotheton	Greek Stage Managers Society

EESAK	Elliniki Epitropi Seismologias kai Andiseismikon Kataskevon	Greek Committee for Seismology and Earthquake-Proof Construction
EESV	Ethniki Enosi Stemmatos Voreioelladiton	National Union of Northern Greeks for the Crown
EET	Ellinikes Erythres Taxiarkhies	Greek Red Brigades
EETA	Enosis Ergaton Typou Athinon	Athens Press Workers Union
EETE	Epimelitirion Eikastikon Tekhnon Ellados	Fine Arts Chamber of Greece
	Epitropi Elengkhou Timologiou Exagogon	Export Price Control Committee
EEThEM	Elliniki Etairia Theoritikis kai Efirmosmenis Mikhanikis	Greek Association for Theoretical and Applied Engineering
EEThS	Etaireia Ellinon Theatrikon Syngrafeon	Greek Playwrights Association
EEV	Enosis Epangelmation kai Viotekhnon	Union of Tradesmen and Craftsmen [plus initial letter of district]
EEVaSS	Elliniki Epitropi gia tin Valkaniki Synennoisi kai Synergasia	Greek Committee for Balkan Understanding and Cooperation
EEVP	Ektelestiki Epitropi Vasilikis Pronoias	Royal Welfare Executive Committee
	Enosis Exagogeon Viomikhanikon Proiondon	Union of Industrial Goods Exporters
EEVS	Elliniki Epitropi gia tin Valkaniki Synergasia	Greek Committee for Balkan Cooperation
EEVVE	Ethniki Enosi Vasilofronon Voreiou Ellados	National Union of Northern Greek Royalists

EEY	Elliniki Etaireia Ydaton	Greek Water Company
	Epitropi Ekpaidevtikis Ypiresias	Educational Services Committee
EEYDAP	Elliniki Epitropi Yper ton Dikaiomaton tou Anthropou kai Politou	Greek Committee for the Rights of Man and Citizen
EEYEE	Elliniki Etaireia Ydravlikon kai Exygiantikon Ergon	Greek Association for Water and Sanitation Projects
EEYkaiE	Elliniki Epitropi gia Yfesi kai Eirini	Greek Committee for Detente and Peace
EF	Ethniki Froura	National Guard [C]
	Ethnikon Fos	National Light
EFAK	Enosis Filon tou Aravikou Kosmou	Association of Friends of the Arab World
Ef.Bi.Ai.		Use: FBI
EFE	Elliniki Filoteliki Etaireia	Greek Philatelic Society
	Elliniki Fotografiki Etaireia	Greek Photographic Society
	Ethniki Froura Elladas	National Guard of Greece
EFEE	Ethniki Foititiki Enosis Ellados	National Student Union of Greece [See also Andi-EFEE]
EFEK	Ethniki Foititiki Enosis Kyprou	National Union of Cypriot Students [C]
EFEX	Ypiresia Efodion ek tou Exoterikou	Foreign Supplies Office

EFIAP	Enosis Fymatikon Isfalismenon Athinon-Peiraios	Athens-Piraeus Union of Insured Tuberculars
EFOA	Elliniki Filathlos Omospondia Andisfairiseos	Greek Lawn Tennis Athletic Federation
EFOEA	Elliniki Filathlos Omospondia Epitrapeziou Andisfairiseos	Greek Table Tennis Athletic Federation
EFP	Epitropi Physikou Perivallondos	Natural Environment Committee
EFPA	Enosis Foititon Panepistimiou Athinon	Union of Athens University Students
EFSA	Epistimonikos kai Filologikos Syllogos Ammokhostou	Famagusta Professional and Literary Association [C]
EFSEE	Ethniki Foititiki Spoudastiki Enosis Ellados	National Union of Students of Greece
EG	Ektelestikon Grafeion	Executive Office
	Eparkhiakon Grafeion	District Office [C]
	Eparkhiakos Grammatevs	District Secretary [C]
	Epitelikon Grafeion	Staff Office
EGAE	Etaireia Genikon Apothikon Ellados	General Warehouses Company of Greece
EGAK	Elliniko Gynaikeio Andipyriniko Kinima	Greek Women's Anti-Nuclear Movement
EGE	Enosis Gynaikon Ellados	Union of Greek Women
EGEA	Eidikon Grafeion Exypiretiseos Aeroskafon	Special Aircraft Services Office

EGEPPVE	Eidikon Grafeion Epanepikismou Paramethorion Periokhon Voreiou Ellados	Special Office for the Resettlement of Frontier Areas of Northern Greece
EGK	Enosis Gynaikon Kritis	Union of Cretan Women
EGLS	Elliniko Geniko Logistiko Skhedio	Greek General Accounting Plan
EGNY	Ellinika Grafeia Navtikon Ypiresion	Greek Maritime Services Offices
EGS	Enosis Georgikon Synetairismon	Union of Farm Cooperatives [followed by initial letter of district]
	Eparkhiaki Geniki Synelevsis	Metropolitan General Assembly [Orthodox Church of Greece]
	Ethnikos Gymnastikos Syllogos	National Gymnastic Club
EGSAThPE	Ethniki Geniki Synomospondia Anapiron kai Thymaton Polemou Ellados	Greek National General Confederation of Handicapped and Victims of War
EGSI	Enosis Georgikon Synetairismon Irakleiou	Union of Irakleion Agricultural Cooperatives
EGSKP	Ethnikon Gnomodotikon Symvoulion Koinonikis Politikis	National Advisory Council for Social Policy
EIAA	Ethnikon Idryma Apokatastaseos Anapiron	National Foundation for Rehabilitation of Handicapped Persons
EIDAD	Ellinikon Institouton Diethnous kai Allodapou Dikaiou	Greek Institute of International and Foreign Law
EIE	Elliniki Ilektriki Etaireia	Greek Electric Company
	Ethnikon Idryma Erevnon	National Research Foundation

EIET	Enosis Idioktiton Eparkhiakou Typou	Union of Provincial Press Owners
EIGT	Ellinikon Institouton Grafikon Tekhnon	Greek Institute of Graphic Arts
EIIEA	Enosis Idioktiton Imerision Efimeridon Athinon	Union of Athens Daily Newspaper Owners
EIIEE	Enosis Idioktiton Imerision Eparkhiakon Efimeridon	Union of Daily Provincial Newspaper Owners
	Eikosti Oktovriou [appears as 20^1 Oktovriou]	Use: 20th October (Movement)
EIM	Elliniko Institouto Marketing	Greek Marketing Institute
	Ellinikon Institouton Modas	Greek Fashion Institute
	Enosis Iptamenon Mikhanikon	Union of Flight Engineers
EIN	Ethniko Idryma Neotitos	National Youth Foundation
EINAP	Enosis Iatron Nosokomeion Athinon-Peiraios	Union of Doctors of Athens-Piraeus Hospitals
EIO	Elliniki Istioploiki Omospondia	Greek Sailing Federation
	Ellinikos Ippikos Omilos	Greek Riding Club
EIP	Ellinikon Institouton Paster	Greek Pasteur Institute
EIPA	Enosis Iptamenon Politikis Aeroporias	Union of Civil Aviation Flying Personnel
EIPEP	Ethnikon Idryma Prostasias Ergazomenou Paidiou	National Foundation for the Protection of the Working Child

EIPNP	Elliniko Institouto Prostasias Navtikis Paradosis	Greek Institute for the Preservation of Maritime Traditions
EIPT	Enosis Idioktiton Periodikou Typou	Union of Owners of the Periodical Press
EIS	Ellinikoi Ilektrikoi Sidirodromoi	Greek Electric Railways
	Etaireia Ilektrikon Sidirodromon	Greek Electric Railways [See ISP]
EISF	Enosis Iptamenon Synodon kai Frontiston	Union of Flight Stewards and Stewardesses
EI-VP	Ethnikon Idryma-Vasilevs Pavlos	King Paul National Foundation
EIVVE	Elliniko Idryma Vasikis Viologikis Erevnas	Greek Institute for Basic Biological Research
EK	Efimeris tis Kyverniseos	Government Gazette
	Eniaion Komma	United Party [C]
	Enosis Kendrou	Center Union [Party]
	Ergatikon Kendron	Labor Center
EKA	Enosis Klostoyfandourgon Athinon	Athens Textile Workers Union
	Enosis Kyprion Agroton	Union of Cypriot Farmers [C]
	Enosis Kyprion Anglias	Union of Cypriots in England [C]
	Ergatikon Kendron Athinon	Athens Labor Center
	Ergatikon Kinima Allagis	Labor Movement for a Change
	Ergatoypalliliko Kendro Athinas	Worker-Employee Center of Athens
	Etaireia Kypriakon Aerogrammon	Cyprus Airways [C]
	Evropaiki Koini Agora	European Common Market Use: ECM

EKAE	Ergatiki Kinisis dia ton Afoplismon kai tin Eirinin	Labor Movement for Disarmament and Peace
	Evropaiki Koinotis Atomikis Energeias	European Atomic Energy Community Use: EAEC
EKAKh	Evropaiki Koinopraxia Anthrakos kai Khalyvos	European Coal and Steel Community Use: ECSC
EKAS	Ellino-Kypriakos Apelevtherotikos Stratos	Greek-Cypriot Liberation Army [See also KRKO] [C]
EKATE	Epimelitirion Kalon Tekhnon	Chamber of Fine Arts
EKDD	Ethniko Kendron Dimosias Dioikiseos	National Public Administration Center
EKDITh	Ellinikon Kendron Diethnous Institoutou Theatrou	Greek Center of the International Institute of the Theater
EKDYE	Ergatiki Kinisis dia tin Diethni Yfesin kai Eirinin	Labor Movement for International Detente and Peace
EKE	Eidiko Kendro Ekpaidevseos	Special Training Center [C]
	Elliniki Ktiniatriki Etaireia	Greek Veterinary Association
	Ellinikos Kodix Epangelmaton	Greek Job Classification Code
	Enosis Kyprion Ellados	Union of Cypriots in Greece [C]
	Ethniki Kinisi Ellinon	National Movement of Greeks
	Ethnikon Komma Ellados	National Party of Greece
EKED	Ethniki Koinoniki Ekpolistiki Drasis	National Social and Cultural Action
EKEDG	Ethniki Kinisi Ellinon Dytikis Germanias	National Movement of Greeks in West Germany

EKEES	Eidiki Koinovoulevtiki Epitropi Epexergasias tou Syndagmatos	Special Parliamentary Committee for the Elaboration of the Constitution
EKEK	Erevnitikon Kendron Kritis	Crete Research Center
EKEkaiP	Elliniko Kinima Eirinis kai Politismou	Greek Committee for Peace and Civilization
EKEKh	Ekpaidevtikon Kendron Efedron Kheiriston	Reserve Pilots' Training Center
EKEL	Eniaia Kinisi Ekmetallevomenou Laou	United Movement of Exploited People
EKEOP	Eidikon Kendron Ekpaidevseos Oreivatikou Pyrovolikou	Special Mountain Artillery Training Center
EKEP	Eniaion Komma Ethnikofronou Parataxeos	Unified Nationalist Alignment Party [C]
	Ethnikon Kendron Perivallondos	National Center for the Environment
EKES	Enotiki Kinisi Elevtheron Syndikaliston	Unifying Movement of Free Trade Unionists
EKETE	Elliniki Kratiki Etairia Tekhnikon Ergon	Greek State Company for Technical Projects
EKF	Enosis Kyprion Foititon [Londinou]	Cypriot Student Union [London] [C]
EKFSE	Enosis Kyprion Foititon [Sovietikis Enoseos]	Cypriot Student Union [Soviet Union] [C]
EKGE	Etairia Ergon kai Genikon Epikheiriseon	Projects and General Enterprises Company
EKh	Ethniki Khorofylaki	National Gendarmery

EKhDEVDG	Elliniki Khristianiki Dimokratiki Enosi Vasilofronon Dytikis Germanias	Greek Christian Democratic Union of Royalists of West Germany
EKhE	Elliniki Khristianokoinoniki Enosis	Greek Christian Socialist Union
EKhEE	Enosis Kheirourgikon Etaireion Ellados	Union of Greek Surgical Associations
EKhKE	Ethniko Khristiano-dimokratikon Komma Ellados	National Christian Democratic Party of Greece
EKhPa	Enosis Kheiriston Politikis Aeroporias	Civil Aviation Pilots Association
EKhPL	Etaireia Khorikon Proiondon kai Lipasmaton	Domestic Products and Fertilizers Company
EKhS	Ethniko Khorotaxiko Symvoulio	National Zoning Council
EKK	Enopoiitiki Kinisi Kentrou	Unification Movement of the Center
	Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Komma	Revolutionary Communist Party
EKK - t	Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Komma - trotskistiko	Revolutionary Communist Party - trotskyite
EKKA	Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apelevtherosis	National and Social Liberation [Organization]
EKKE	Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Kinima Elladas	Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece [Maoist]
	Ethniko Kommounistiko Komma Ellados	National Communist Party of Greece
	Ethnikon Kendron Koinonikon Erevnon	National Center for Social Research

EK-ND	Enosis Kendrou-Neai Dynameis	Center Union-New Forces [See EDIK]
EKO	Eidikes Kommatikes Organoseis	Special Party Organizations
	Elliniki Kopilatiki Omospondia	Greek Rowing Federation
EKOF	Elliniki Kolymvitiki Omospondia Filathlon	Greek Swimming Federation [of Sportsmen]
	Ethniki Koinoniki Organosis Foititon	National Social Organization of Students
EKOFNS	Elliniki Kopilatiki Omospondia Filathlon Navtikon Somateion	Greek Rowing Federation of Sportsmen of Boating Clubs
EKON	Elliniki Kommounistiki Neolaia "Rigas Feraios"	Greek Communist Youth "Rigas Feraios" [formerly known as RIGAS]
EKOTE	Enosis Kataskevaston Oikodomikon-Tekhnikon Ergon	Union of Construction and Technical Projects Builders
EKP		[See EKEP]
	elakhiston koinon pollaplasion	least common multiple
	Elliniko Kendro Paragogikotitos	Greek Productivity Center
	Epitropi Kratikon Promitheion	State Supplies Committee
	Ergatikon Kendron Patron	Patras Labor Center
	Ergatikon Kendron Peiraios	Piraeus Labor Center
EKPA	Ethniko kai Kapodistriako Panepistimion Athinon	National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
EKPE	Evropaikon Kendron Pyrinikon Erevnon	European Nuclear Research Center
EKS	Epanastatikos Kommounistikos Syndesmos	Revolutionary Communist League

EKSE	Ekstratevtikon Soma Ellados	Greek Expeditionary Force
EKSK	Elliniki Koinotiki Synelevsis Kyprou	Greek Communal Chamber of Cyprus [C]
EKTE	Ellinikos Kodix Epangelmaton	Greek Job Classification Code
	Ethniki Ktimatiki Trapeza tis Ellados	National Land Bank of Greece
EKTEL	Enopoiimenon Koinon Tameion Eispraxeon Leoforeion	United Joint Bus Collections Fund
EKTENPOL	Ethnoktimatiki AE Energou Poleodomias	National Land Company for Active Urban Development
EKVS	Elliniki Kinisis dia tin Valkanikin Synennoisin	Greek Movement for a Balkan Understanding
EKYSY	Enosis Kyprion Syndaxioukhon	Cypriot Pensioners' Union [C]
ELA	Ellinikos Laikos Agonas	Greek People's Struggle
	Enomenos Laikos Agonas	United People's Struggle
	Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas	Revolutionary People's Struggle
ELAN	Ethnikon Laikon Apelevtherotikon Navtikon	National People's Liberation Navy
ELAS	Ethnikos Laikos Apelevtherotikos Stratos	National People's Liberation Army
EL.AS	Ethniki Astynomia	Greek Police
ELD	Enosis Laikis Dimokratias	Popular Democratic Union
ELDIN		[See EDIN]

ELDYK	Ellinikai Dynameis Kyprou	Greek Forces of Cyprus
ELE	Ethniki Laiki Enotis	National Popular Unity
ELEGP	Eidikos Logariasmos Engyiseos Georgikon Prooiondon	Special Account for the Guaranteeing of Agricultural Products
ELEK	Elliniko Leninistiko Epanastatiko Kinima	Greek Leninist Revolutionary Struggle
ELEPAAP	Elliniki Etairia Prostasias kai Apokatastaseos Anapiron Paidon	Greek Association for the Protection and Rehabilitation of Disabled Children
ELEPEKh	Ellinikes Ependyseis Petrelaioeidon kai Khimikon	Greek Investments for Petroleum and Chemical Products
ELETET	Elliniki Etairia Epistimon-Tekhnologon Trofimon	Greek Association of Food Scientists and Specialists
ELEVME	Elliniki Etaireia Viomikhanikon kai Metallevtikon Ependiseon	Greek Industrial and Mining Investments Company
ELK	Ellinikon Laikon Kinima	Greek Popular Movement
	Ethnikon Laikon Komma	National Popular Party
	Evropaiko Laiko Komma	European People's Party
ELKAD	Eidikos Logariasmos Koinonikon Asfaliseon Dodekanisou	Dodekanisos Social Insurance Special Account
ELKEPA		[See El Ke Pa]
El Ke Pa	Ellinikon Kendron Paragogikotitos	Greek Productivity Center
ELKESIP	Elliniko Kendro Simansis Proiondon	Greek Center for Product Marking

ELKI	Elliniko Laiko Kinima	Greek Popular Movement
ELKIPE	Elliniko Kinima Prostasias Ergazomenon	Greek Movement for the Protection of Workers
ELM	Enotiko Laiko Metopo	Unifying Popular Front
	Evropaikes Logistikes Monades	European Currency Units Use: ECU
ELME	Enosis Leitourgon Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Union of Intermediate School Teachers
ELMES	Ellinikai Mesogeiakai Grammai	Greek Mediterranean Lines
ELMOK	Ellinikon Monarkhikon Kinima	Greek Monarchist Movement
ELOT	Ellinikos Organisomos Typopoiisis	Greek Organization for Standardization
ELPA	Elliniki Leskhi Periigiseon kai Avtokinitou	Greek Automobile and Touring Club
ELPE	Elliniki Politiki Etairia	Greek Political Association
ELPOE	Elliniko Politiko Ergostasio	Greek Political Workshop
El PO ER	Elevthero Politiko Ergastirio	Free Political Laboratory
ELS	Elliniki Lyriki Skini	Greek Lyric Theater
ELSE	Elliniki Synomospondia Ergasias	Greek Labor Confederation
ELTA	Ellinika Takhydromeia	Greek Posts
ELV	Etaireia Laikis Vasis	Popular Base Association

ELVIL	Elliniki Viomikhania Lipasmaton	Greek Fertilizer Industry
ELVISSAK	Elliniki Viomikhania Synthetikon Sakkon	Greek Synthetic Bag Industry
ELYPAL	Elliniki Yperpondios Alieia	Greek Overseas Fishing
EM	Ethnikon Metopon	National Front [C]
E-M	Eikonoklastes - Midenistes	Iconoclasts - Nihilists
EMA	Elliniki Mousiki Akadimia	Greek Music Academy
EMAD	Efippa Mikta Apospasmata Dioxeos	Mounted Joint Pursuit Detachments
EMAK	Ethnikon Metopon Agoniston Kyprou	National Front of Fighters [C]
EMAKE	Etaireia Meleton Anaptyxeos kai Ependyseon	Developmental Studies and Investments Company
EMBROS	Etairia Meletis Provlimaton Syllogikon	Association for the Study of Collective Problems
EMDAI	Enosis Mousoulmanon Didaskalon Apofoiton ton Iero-spoudastirion	Union of Moslem Teacher Graduates of the Religious Schools
EMDP	Etaireia Metaforas kai Diyliseos Petrelaion	Petroleum Transport and Refining Company
EMDY	Enosis Mikhanikon Dimosion Ypallilon	Union of Civil Service Engineers
EMDYDAS	Enosis Mikhanikon Dimosion Ypallilon Diplomatoukhon Anotaton Skholon	Union of Civil Service Engineer Graduates of Advanced Schools

EME	Elliniki Mathimatiki Etaireia	Greek Mathematics Society
	Elliniki Metallevtiki Etaireia	Hellenic Mines Corporation [C]
	Enosis Mousoulmanon Ellados	Union of Moslems of Greece
	Ethnikon Metopon Ellados	National Front of Greece
EMEA	Etaireia Meleton Ethnikis Amynis	Association for National Defense Studies
EMEK	Ethniki Mathitiki Enosis Kyprou	National Student Union of Cyprus [C]
EMEKEL	Eniaion Metopon Ergaton kai Ergazomenou Laou	United Front of Workers and Working People
EMEO	Esoteriki Makedoniki Epanastatiki Organosis	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
EMEP	Etaireia Meletis Ellinikon Provlimaton	Society for the Study of Greek Problems
EMK	Ethniko Meteorologiko Kendro	National Meteorological Center
EMKE	Ethnikon Metarrythmistikon Komma Ellados	National Reformation Party of Greece
EMKIE	Ellinikon Morfotikon Kendron Inomenon Ethnon	United Nations Educational Center of Greece
EMP	Ellinikon Metsovion Polytekhneion	Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School [also referred to as National Technical University of Athens]
EMPO	Emborikos Paremvatikos Organismos	Trade Interventionist Organization
EMS	Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon (Thessaloniki)	Macedonian Studies Association (Salonica)

EMT	Enosis Mikhanikon Thalassis	Marine Engineers Union
EMVELP	Elliniki Metallevtiki kai Viomikhaniki Etaireia Lignitorykheion Ptolemaidos	Greek Mining and Industrial Company of the Ptolemais Lignite Mines
EMY	Eidiki Merimna Yperilikon	Special Care for the Aged
	Ethniki Meteorologiki Ypiresia	National Meteorological Service
EMYE	Enosis Mikropoliton Yfandikon Eidon	Union of Woven Fabrics Merchants
EN	Elpidoforoi Neoi	Young Hopefuls
	Emborikon Navtikon	Merchant Marine
ENAD	Enosis Neon Agiou Dometiou	Youth Union of Agios Dometios [C]
ENE	Epitropi Nomothetikis Exousiodotiseos	Legislative Authorization Committee
	Etaireia Neon Epistimonon	Association of Young Professionals
	Ethniki Neolaia Elladas	Greek National Youth
ENEK	Enosi Neon Epistimonon Kyprou	Young Professionals Union of Cyprus [C]
	Enosis Elevthero-Koinoniston	Union of Free Socialists
ENEL	Elliniki Navtiliaki Epitropi Londinou	Greek Maritime Committee of London
ENM	Evropaiki Nomismatiki Monas	European Monetary Unit
ENS	Enosi Neon Sosialiston	Union of Young Socialists

ENT	Evropaikon Nomismatikon Tameion	European Monetary Fund (formerly European Payments Union) Use: EMF
ENYVA	Enosis Ypallilon Vrettanikon Arkhon	Union of British Authorities Employees [C]
EOA	Epitropi Olymbiakon Agonon	Olympic Games Committee
	Ethniki Organosis Axiomatikon	National Organization of Officers
EOAAYL	Enosis Odigon Avtokiniton Astikon kai Yperastikon Leoforeion	Union of Drivers of Urban and Suburban Buses
EOAVE	Enosis Odigon Avtokiniton Voreiou Ellados	Drivers' Union of Northern Greece
EODYL	Elevthera Organosis Dimotikon Ypallilon Levkosias	Free Organization of Nicosia Civil Servants [C]
EOEA	Elliniki Omospondia Erasitekhnon Alieias	Greek Federation of Amateur Fishermen
	Ethnikai Omades Ellinon Andarton	National Groups of Greek Guerrillas [Zervas-led]
EOED	Epistimonikos Omilos Erevnon Diastimatos	Scientific Association for Space Research
EOEE	Epitropi Oikonomikou Elengkhou Endypon	Committee for Financial Audit of Publications
EOEKh	Ethnikos Organismos Ellinikis Kheirotekhnias	National Organization of Greek Handicrafts
EOEP	Ethnikos Organismos Ellinon Patrioton	National Organization of Greek Patriots
EOF	Ethnikos Organismos Farmakon	National Drug Administration

EOFP	Elliniki Omospondia Filathlon	Greek Sports Fans Federation
EOK	Ethnikos Organismos Kapnou	National Tobacco Organization
	Ethnikos Organismos Katoikias	National Housing Organization
	Evropaiki Oikonomiki Koinotis	European Economic Community Use: EEC
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston [Also: Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou Agonos]	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters [C]
EOKhA	Ethnikos Organismos Khristianikis Allilengyis	National Christian Solidarity Organization
EOM	Epanastatiki Organosi Makhitis	Revolutionary Fighter Organization
EOMA	Epikourikos Organismos Metaforon di'Avtokinitou	Auxiliary Vehicular Transport Organization
EOMMEHh	Ellinikos Organismos Mikromesaion Epikheiriseon kai Kheirotekhnias	Hellenic Organization of Medium- and Small-Size Enterprises and Handicrafts
EOMTA	Enosis Oikogeneion Makhomenon Travmation, Anapiron	Union of Families of Injured and Disabled Fighters
EON	Ethniki Organosis Neolaias	National Youth Organization
EOP	Elliniki Omospondia Pygmakhias	Greek Boxing Federation
	Ethnikos Organismos Pronoias	National Welfare Organization
	Evropaikos Organismos Paragogikotitos	European Productivity Organization
EOPAE	Ethniki Omospondia Prosopikou Avtokiniton Ellados	National Federation of Automotive Personnel of Greece

EOPSA	Ellinikos Organismos Pnevmatikis kai Somatikis Agogis	Greek Organization for Mental and Physical Health
EOS	Ellinikos Oreivatikos Syndesmos	Greek Mountaineering League
	Ethnikos Organismos Syndaxeon	National Pensions Organization
EOSI	Ethniki Omospondia Syndaxioukhon IKA	National Federation of IKA Pensioners
EOT	Ellinikos Organismos Tourismou	Greek Tourist Organization
EOY	Epitropi Oikonomikon Ypotheseon	Economic Affairs Committee
EOYESK	Eniaia Organosis Ypallilon Epitropis Sitiron	United Organization of Wheat Board Employees [C]
EP	Enotiki Parataxis	Unifying [pro-enosis] Faction [C]
	Epitropi Poleos	City Committee
	Ergatiki Pali	Worker Struggle
	Ethniki Parataxi	National Array
epa	en polemiki apostrateia	[in] Standby Reserve [status]
EPA	Epikheirisis Poleodomikis Anasyngrotisis	Urban Planning Reconstruction Company
	Epitropi Programmatismou kai Anaptyxeos	Planning and Development Committee
	Epitropi Promitheion Anasyngrotiseos	Reconstruction Supply Committee
	Etaireia Prostasias Anilikon	Society for the Protection of Minors
	Evropaikon Programma Anorthoseos	European Recovery Plan

EPAAL	Epitropi Allilengyis pros tous Aravikous Laous	Committee for Solidarity with the Arab Peoples [C]
EPAEA	Epitropi Protovoulias dia tin Anagnorisin tis Ethnikis Andistaseos [Also given as: Epitropi Protovoulias Anagnoriseos Ethnikis Andistaseos]	Committee of Initiative for Recognition of the National Resistance
EPAEEA	Eniaia Patriotiki Enosi Ellinon Amvourgou	United Patriotic Union of Hamburg [W. Germany] Greeks
EPAF	Enosi Palis Aristeron Foititon	Union of Leftist Students Struggle
EPAS	Enosi Palis Aristeron Spoudaston	Leftist Student Struggle Union
EPAThPE	Enosis Peripterioukhon Anapiron kai Thimaton Polemou Ellados	Union of Kiosk Owner Disabled and Victims of War of Greece
epd	en polemiki diathesimotiti	[in] Ready Reserve [status]
epe	etaireia periorismenis evthynis	limited liability company
EPE	Ethniki Parataxi Ellinidon	National Faction of Greek Women
EPEK	Ethniki Proodevtiki Enosis Kendrou	National Progressive Union of the Center
EPEKA	Ethniki Patriotiki Enosis Kypriakou Agonos	National Patriotic Union of the Cyprus Struggle [C]
EPEL	Ethniki Parataxis Ergazomenou Laou	National Working People's Faction
EPEN	Ethniki Politiki Enosi	National Political Union [C]

EPET	Ethnikon Programma Erevnon kai Tekhnologias	National Research and Technology Program
EPEXEV	Epitropi Exoikonomiseos Energeias stin Viomikhania	Committee for Energy Conservation in Industry
EPIEA	Enosis Prosopikou Imerision Efimeridon Athinon	Union of Athens Daily Newspaper Employees
EPKA	Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos	Cyprus Struggle Committee [C]
EPL	Elliniki Periigitiki Leskhi	Greek Travel Club
EPM	Ellinikon Patriotikon Metopon	Greek Patriotic Front
	Enosis Polyteknon Miteron	Union of Mothers of Many Children
EPNE	Enosis Prosopikou Nosilevtiriou Evangelismos	Evangelismos Hospital Personnel Union
EPO	Ethniki Podosfairiki Omospondia	National Soccer Federation
EPOEIAL	Ethniki Panelladiki Omospondia Epangelmation Idioktiton Astikon Leoforeion	National Panhellenic Federation of Operator-Owners of Urban Buses
EPOET	Elevthera Pankyprios Organosis Ergatoypallilon Tilepikoinonion	Free Pan-Cyprian Organization of Telecommunications Workers [C]
EPOIZO	Enosis gia tin Poiotita Zois	Union for Quality of Life
EPOK	Ellinikon Politistikon Kinima	Greek Cultural Movement
	Ellinikos Pnevmatikos Omilos Kyprou	Greek Cultural Club of Cyprus [C]
EPOL	Ellinikos Pnevmatikos Omilos Larnakos	Greek Cultural Club of Larnaca [C]

EPON	Ethniki Panelliniki Organosis Neon	National Panhellenic Youth Organization
EPOPAI	Elevthera Pankyprios Omospondia Prosopikou Arkhis Ilektrismou	Free Pan-Cyprian Federation of Cyprus Electricity Authority Personnel [C]
EP-OR	Elliniki Epistimoniki Etaireia Organoseos Ergasias	Greek Scientific Association for Work Organization
EPOS-IKA	Ethniki Panelladiki Epitropi Syndaxioukhon IKA	National Panhellenic Federation of IKA Pensioners
EPOYET	Ergatiki Pankypriaki Omospondia Ypallilon Esoterikon Tilepikoinonion	Pan-Cyprian Federation of Inland Telecommunications Employees [C]
EPOYSY	Elevthera Pankypriaki Omospondia Synergatikon Ypallilon	Free Pan-Cyprian Union of Employees of Cooperatives [C]
EPP	Elliniki Polemiki Perithalpsis	Greek War Relief
	Epitropi Politikou Programmatismou	Program Policy Committee
	Etaireia Prostasias Paidiou	Child Protection Society
EPPPD	Epitropi dia tin Proaspisin tou Pnevmatikou Politismou kai tis Dimokratias	Committee for the Defense of Cultural Civilization and Democracy
EPS	Ethniko Pliroforiko Systima	National Information System
	Ethnikos Paidikos Stathmos	National Child Care Center (plus initial letter of district)
EPSA	Enosis Podosfairikon Somateion Athinon	Union of Soccer Clubs of Athens
EPTA	Ethniki Protoporia Tetartis Avgoustou	National Vanguard of the Fourth of August

EPTEA	Etairia Programmatismou Touristikis Ekmetallevseos kai Anaptyxeos	Company for Planning Tourist Development and Operation
ER	enallassomenon revma	AC; alternating current
ERE	Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis	National Radical Union
EREN	Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis Neolaias	National Radical Youth Union
EREP	Ethniki Reformistiki Ergatoypalliliki Parataxis	National Reformist Workers Faction
ERFL	Epitropi Rythmiseos Fortoekfortoseon Limenos	Committee for Regulating Port Cargo Handling Operations
ERFX	Epitropi Rythmiseos Fortoekfortoseon Xiras	Committee for Regulating Freight Handling Operations on Land [followed by the name of the city]
ERG-AS	Ergatikos Andifasistikos Syndesmos	Workers' Anti-Fascist League
ERK	Ergatiki Reformistiki Kinisi	Workers Reformist Movement
ERT	Elliniki Radiofonia kai Tileorasis	Greek Radio and Television
ERYEA	Elliniki Etaireia Erevnis Elengkhou Rypanseos Ydaton, Edafous, Aeros	Greek Research Association for the Control of Water, Land, and Air Pollution
ES	Ektakton Symvoulion	Emergency Council
	Ektelestikon Symvoulion	Executive Council
	Ellinikos Stratos	Greek Army

	Ellinikos Synagermos	Greek Rally
	endiamesos sykhnotis	intermediate frequency
	Epanastatikoi Sosialistes	Revolutionary Socialists
	Epitropi Sitiron	Wheat Board [C]
	Epitropi zia to Strato	Committee for the Army (anarchist group)
	Epoptikon Symvoulion	Inspection Council
	Ethniki Sotiria	National Salvation
ESA	Elliniki Stratiotiki Astynomia	Greek Military Police
	Emborikos Syllogos Athinon	Commercial Chamber of Athens
ESAK	Ellinikon Stratiotikon Apospasma Kyprou	Greek Army Contingent on Cyprus
	Eniaia Syndikalistiki Andidiktatoriki Kinisi	United Antidictatorial Labor Movement
ESAK-S	Eniaia Syndikalistiki Andidiktatoriki Kinisi-Synergazomenoi	United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating
ESAP	Ethniko Symvoulio Anaptyxis kai Programmatismou	National Development and Planning Council
	Ethniko Symvoulio Anotatis Paideias	National Council of Advanced Education
	Ethnikos Syndesmos Anapiron Polemou	National League of Persons Disabled by War
ESAPE	Ethnikon Symvoulion Anotatis Paideias kai Erevnon	National Council of Advanced Education and Research
ESAT	Enosis Syndakton Athinaikou Typou	Union of Athens Newspaper Editors
ESDD	Ethniki Skholi Dimosias Dioikiseos	National School for Public Administration

ESDE	Elevtheri Sosialistiki Dimokratiki Enosis	Free Socialist Democratic Union
ESDE/AM/S	Elliniki Sosialistiki Dimokratiki Enosis/Apelevtherotiko Metopo/"Spartakos"	Greek Socialist Democratic Union/Liberation Front/"Spartakos"
ESDIN	Elliniki Sosialistiki Dimokratiki Neolaia	Greek Socialist Democratic Youth
ESDON	Elliniki Sosialdimokratiki Organosi Neon	Greek Social Democratic Youth Organization
ESDY	Enosi Syndaxioukhon Dimosion Ypallilon	Civil Service Pensioners' Union [C]
ESE	Enosis Synetairistikon Etaireion	Union of Cooperative Companies
	Ethniki Sosialistiki Enosis	National Socialist Union [C]
	Ethnikon Symvoulion Energeias	National Energy Council
	Ethnikon Symvoulion Erevnon	National Research Council
	Ethnikos Synagermos Ellinon	National Rally of Greeks
ESEA	Enosis Sympolemiston Ethnikou Agonos	Union of Fellow-Combatants in the National Struggle [C]
	Epitropi Syndonismou tou Enotikou Agonos	Coordinating Committee for the Enosis Struggle [C]
	Ethnikos Syndesmos Ellinon Axiomatikon	National League of Greek Officers
ESEAK	Enosis Syllogon Ellinon Apofoiton Kyprou	Union of Greek Alumni Associations of Cyprus [C]
ESEDES	Elliniki Synomospondia Elevtheron Dimokratikon Ergatikon Syndikaton	Greek Federation of Free Democratic Labor Unions

ESEE	Ethniki Sosialistiki Enosi Ellados	National Socialist Union of Greece
	Ethniko-sosialistiki Enosi Ellados	[use rendering above]
ESEEA	Ethnikon Symvoulion Epistimonikis Erevnis kai Anaptyxeos	National Council for Scientific Research and Development
ESEKA	Elliniki Syndonistiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonas	Greek Coordinating Committee of the Cyprus Struggle
ESEN	Ekklisiastikon Symvoulion Enoriakou Naou	Church Parish Council
ESEPP	Enosis Syngenon Ellinon Politikon Prosfygon	Union of Relatives of Political Refugees
ESGP	Epitropi gia to Syndonismo Georgikis Paragogis	Committee for the Coordination of Agricultural Production
ESIEA	Enosis Syndakton Imerision Efimeridon Athinon	Union of Athens Daily Newspaper Editors
ESIEMTh	Enosis Syndakton Imerision Efimeridon Makedonias kai Thrakis	Union of Daily Newspaper Editors of Macedonia and Thraki
ESIP	Ethniko Symvoulio Idiotikis Protovoulias	National Private Initiative Council
ESK	Enosis Syndakton Kyprou	Union of Cypriot Editors [C]
	Enotiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi	United Trade Unionist Movement
	Epanastatikos Kommounistikos Syndesmos	Revolutionary Communist Association
	Evropaiki Sosialistiki Kinisi	European Socialist Movement
ESKA	Enotiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi Athinon	Unifying Labor Movement of Athens

ESKE	Eniaion Sosialistikon Komma Ellados	United Socialist Party of Greece
	Eniaion Syndikalistikon Kinima Ellados	United Labor Movement of Greece
	Ergatikon Syndekhniakon Komma Ellados	Worker Labor Union Party of Greece
ESKP	Ethniko Symvoulio Khorotaxias kai Perivallondos	National Zoning and Environment Council
	Ethnikon Symvoulion Koinonikis Pronoias	National Social Welfare Council
ESKS	Enosis Stafidergostasiarkhon Korinthiakis Stafidas	Union of Corinthian Currant Processing Plant Owners
ESN	Elliniki Sosialistiki Neolaia	Greek Socialist Youth
	Erythros Stavros Neotitos	Youth Red Cross
ESNE	Enosis Sidirodromikon Notiou Ellados	Union of Railwaymen of Southern Greece
ESNK	Ethnikon Symvoulion Neolaias Kyprou	National Council of Cypriot Youth [C]
ESOKA	Ethnikon Symvoulion Oikonomikis kai Koinonikis Anaptyxeos	National Council of Economic and Social Development
ESON	Elliniki Sosialistiki Neolaia	Greek Socialist Youth [successor to ESN]
ESOP	Epitropi Syndonismou Oikonomikis Politikis	Economic Policy Coordinating Committee
	Ethniki Sosialistiki Organosis Panellinon	National Socialist Organization of Panhellenes
	Ethnikon Symvoulion Oikonomikis Politikis	National Economic Policy Council

ESP	Emborikos Syllogos Peiraios	Commercial Chamber of Piraeus
ESPA	Ethniko Systima Prostasias apo tin Anergia	National System for Unemployment Protection
ESPE	Eniaia Sosialistiki Parataxi Ellados	United Socialist Front of Greece
ESPT	Enosis Syndakton Periodikou Typou	Union of Editors of the Periodical Press
ESS	Ergatikon Symvoulevtikon Soma	Labor Advisory Board [C]
ESSD	Enosis Sovietikon Sosialistikon Dimokration	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Use: USSR
ESSE	Etaireia Syntheton, Syngrafeon, kai Ekdoton	Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
ESSN	Epitropi Statioton, Sminiton, Navton	Committee of Soldiers, Airmen, and Sailors (anarchist group)
ESSO	Ekpaidevtiki Seira Stratevsimon Opliton	Enlisted Conscript Training Course
ESSP	Eniaia Sosialistiki Syndikalistiki Parataxis	United Socialist Labor Faction
ESSPA	Enosis Syllogon Spoudaston Paidagogikon Akadimion	Union of Societies of Students at Pedagogical Academies
EST	Enosis ton Syndikaton Trapezon	Federation of Bank Unions
ESTh	Emborikos Syllogos Thessalonikis	Salonica Trade Association
ESTIT	Ethnikos Syndesmos Trokhiodromikon kai Ilektrotekhniton Thessalonikis	National Association of Tramway and Electrical Technicians of Salonica

ESY	Ethniko Systima Ygeias	National Health System
	Ethnikon Symvoulion Ygeias	National Health Council
ESYE	Ethniki Statistiki Ypiresia Ellados	National Statistical Service of Greece
ESYOAL	Ethnikos Syndesmos Ypallilon Odigon Aftokiniton Lesvou	National League of Employee Drivers of Automobiles of Lesvos
ET	Ethnikon Typografeion	National Printing Office
ETA	endeiknyomeni takhytis aeros	indicated air speed
	Epitropi Taxikis Allilengyis	Committee for Class Solidarity
	Ergatiki Taxiki Allilengyi	Working Class Solidarity
	Evropaikon Tameion Anaptyxeos	European Development Fund
ETANAL	Etaireia Anaptyxeos Alieias	Fishing Development Company
ETBAA	Enosis Tekhniton Beton Arme Athinon	Union of Athens Reinforced Concrete Technicians
ETDDTh	Enosis Tourkon Didaskalon Dytikis Thrakis	Union of Turkish Teachers of Western Thrace
ETE	Emboriki Trapeza Ellados	Commercial Bank of Greece
	Ethniki Trapeza Ellados	National Bank of Greece
	Evropaiki Trapeza Ependyseon	European Investment Bank
ETEAP	Etaireia Tekhnikou Exoplismou kai Axiopoiiseos (nopon georgikon) Proiondon	Company for Providing Technical Equipment and Marketing Fresh Farm Products

ETEEFO	Eidikon Tameion Elengkhou kai Epopteias Forologias Oinopnevmatos	Special Fund for the Control and Supervision of Alcoholic Beverage Taxation
ETEGAEM	Epikourikon Tameion Exodou Gerondon kai Anikanon Ergaton Metallou	Aged and Disabled Metal Workers Auxiliary Fund
ETEM	Epikourikon Tameion Ergatoypallilon Metallou	Metal Workers and Employees Auxiliary Fund
ETEO	Eidikon Tameion Eparkhiakis Odopoiias	Special Fund for Provincial Road Construction [followed by the initial of the nome in which located]
ETERPS	Eidiko Tameio Efarmogis Rythmistikon-Poleodomikon Skhedion	Special Fund for Implementing Regulatory and City Planning Projects
ETETh	Etaireia Tekhnikon Ergon Thessalonikis	Salonica Technical Projects Company
ETEVA	Ethniki Trapeza Ependyseon Viomikhanikis Anaptyxeos	National Investment Bank for Industrial Development
EThE	Elliniki Thalassia Enosis	Greek Maritime Union
EThEN	Ethniki Enosis Neon	National Youth Union
EthIGME	Ethnikon Idryma Geologikon kai Metallevtikon Erevnon	National Institute of Geological and Mineral Research
EThOP	Ethnikos Organismos Pliroforikis	National Information Organization
ETIPTA	Enosi Tekhnikon Imerisiou kai Periodikou Typou Athinon	Union of Athens Daily and Periodical Press Technical Workers

ETKA	Eparkhiakon Tameion Koinonikon Asfaliseon	District Social Insurance Fund [C]
ETKO	Etaireia Kypriakon Oinon	Cyprus Wines Corporation [C]
ETMA	Elliniki Trapeza Mesis Anatolis	Greek Bank of the Middle East
ETMLE	Eidikon Tameion Mikhanimaton Limenikon Ergon	Special Fund for Port Projects Machinery
ETMOA	Eidikon Tameion Monimon Odostromaton Athinon	Athens Special Fund for Permanent Road Surfaces
ETN	Enosis Tourkikis Neolaias	Union of Turkish Youth
ETO	Eidikon Tagma Opliton	Soldiers' Special Battalion
	Ellinikos Tapitourgikos Organismos	Greek Carpet Manufacturers Organization
ETPA	Evropaiko Tameio Perifereiakis Anaptyxeos	European Fund for Regional Development
ETVA	Elliniki Trapeza Viomikhanikis Anaptyxeos	Hellenic Industrial Development Bank
ETVKYA	Enosis Tekhniton-Voithon Kalorifer-Ydravlikon Athinon	Union of Athens Heating and Plumbing Technicans and Helpers
ETY	Eidikes Teloneiakes Ypiresies	Special Customs Services
	Enosis Trapezitikon Ypallilon	Union of Bank Employees
ETYAP	Epikourikon Tameion Ypallilon Astynomias Poleon	Cities Police Employees Auxiliary Fund
ETYK	Enosis Trapezitikon Ypallilon Kyprou	Union of Cyprus Bank Employees [C]

ETYPS	Eidikon Tameion Ypallilon Pyrosvestikou Somatos	Special Fund for Employees of the Fire Corps
EV	Enosis Viotekhnon	Union of Craftsmen
EVA	Elliniki Vasiliki Aeroporia	Royal Greek Air Force
	Elliniki Viomikhania Aporrypandikon	Greek Detergents Industry
EVAY	Ethniki Viomikhania Aeroporikou Ylikou	National Aircraft Equipment Industry
EVE	Elliniki Vasiliki Enosis	Greek Royalist Union
	Emborikon kai Viomikhanikon Epimelitirion	Chamber of Commerce and Industry [the initial letter of the name of the city is added to the abbreviation]
EVEL	Emboriko kai Viomikhaniko Epimelitirio Lemesou	Limassol Chamber of Commerce and Industry [C]
EVEV	Ethniki Vasiliki Enosi Voreioelladiton	National Royalist Union of Northern Greeks
EVGA	Elliniki Viomikhania Galaktos	Greek Milk Industry
EVIM	Elliniki Viomikhania Ilektrikon Mikhanimaton	Greek Electric Appliances Industry
EVIP	Elliniki Viomikhania Prokataskevon	Greek Prefabricated Products Industry
EVKh	Elliniki Vasiliki Khorofylaki	Greek Royal Gendarmery
EVKXV	Enosis Viotekhnon Katergasias Xylou Volou	Volos Union of Wood Craftsmen

EVO	Elliniki Viotekhnia Oplon	Greek Arms Industry
EVON	Ethniki Vasiliki Organosi Neon	National Royalist Youth Organization
EVPE	Epitropi Voitheias Prosfygon en Elladi	Refugees Service Committee for Greece
EVS	Elliniki Viomikhania Sakkhareos	Greek Sugar Industry
	Epitropi gia tin Valkanikin Synennoisin	Committee for a Balkan Understanding
	Epitropi Viomikhanikon Skheseon	Industrial Relations Committee [C]
	Etaireia Vyzandinon Spoudon	Society of Byzantine Studies
EVSA	Enosis Viotekhnikon Somateion Athinon	Union of Craft Associations of Athens
EXAE	Enosis Xenon Aeroporikon Etaireion	Union of Foreign Airlines Companies
EXE	Enosis Xenodokheion Ellados	Hotel Union of Greece
EXTE	Ellinikai Xenodokheiakai Touristikai Epikheiriseis	Greek Tourist Hotel Enterprises
EY	ekriktikai ylai	explosives
	Endoli Ypourgou	By direction of the minister [appears on public documents over the signature of the official who signs]
	Epiteliki Ypiresia	Staff Service
EYA	Ethniki Ypiresia Aimodosias	National Blood Donation Service
EYAIK	Enosis Ypallilon Arkhis Ilektrismou Kyprou	Union of Cyprus Electricity Authority Personnel [C]

EYAP	Etaireia Ydrevseos kai Apokhetevseos Protevousis	Capital Area Water Supply and Drainage Company
EYAT	Enosis Ypallilon Athinaikou Typou	Union of Athens Press Employees
EYDE	Eidiki Ypiresia Dimosion Ergon	Public Works Special Service
EYEO	Eidiki Ypiresia Ethnikon Odon	Special National Roads Service
EYIAA	Ellinikon Ydroviologikon Institouton Akadimias Athinon	Greek Hydrobiological Institute of the Academy of Athens
EYKhOP	Eidiki Ypiresia Khorotaxias Oikismou kai Perivallondos	Special Zoning, Housing, and Environment Service
EYP	Ethniki Ypiresia Pliroforion	National Intelligence Service
EYPE	Ethniki Ypiresia Petrelaioeidon Ellados	National Petroleum Products Service of Greece
EYPT	Enosis Ypallilikou Prosopikou Typou	Union of Press Employees
EYRIK	Enosis Ypallilon Radiofonikou Idrymatos Kyprou	Union of Cyprus Broadcasting Company Employees [C]
EYS	Eidiki Ypiresia Stegaseos	Special Service for Housing (Social Services Ministry activity)
EYYE	Eidiki Ypiresia Ydravlikon Ergon	Special Service for Water and Sewer Projects [followed by initial of district]
EZES	Evropaiki Zoni Elevtheron Synallagon	European Free Trade Area Use: . EFTA

EZLP	Elevthera Zoni Limenos Peiraios	Piraeus Port Free Zone
EZLTh	Elevthera Zoni Limenos Thessalonikis	Salonica Port Free Zone [See also: EZTh]
EZTh	Elevthera Zoni Thessalonikis	Salonica Free Zone

F

F'; f' (fi)	pendakosia; pendakosiostos	five hundred; five hundredth; 500th; D
FAP	Foros Akinitou Periousias	Real Estate Tax
FDAF	Forologikon Dikastirion Amesou Forologias	Tax Court for Direct Taxes
f/di	(frondidi)	c/o
FDK	Filelevtheron Dimokratikon Kendron	Liberal Democratic Center
FDTh	Foros Dimosion Theamaton	Public Entertainment Tax
FE	Filiki Etaireia	Society of Friends
FEA	Filodasiki Enosi Athinon	Athens Friends of the Forest Association
FEAK	Foititiki Epitropi Allilengyis pros tous Kyprious	Student Committee of Solidarity for the Cypriots
FEAKA	Foititiki Epitropi Allilengyis dia ton Kypriakon Agona	Student Solidarity Committee for the Cypriot Struggle
FEAPTh	Foititiki Enosis Aristoteleiou Panepistimiou Thessalonikis	University of Salonica Student Union
FEK	Filelevtheri Enosis Kendrou	Liberal Union of the Center [C]
	Foititiki Enosis Kyprion	Cypriot Student Union [C]
	Fyllon Efimeridos Kyverniseos	Government Gazette issue [Number]
FENK	Filoproodevtiki Enosis Neon Kaisarianis	Progressive Union of Kaisariani Youth

FEOP	Foititiki Epitropi Organotikis Protovoulias	Student Committee for Organizational Initiative
FFP	Filelevtheri Foititiki Parataxi	Liberal Student Faction
FIDE-SKE	Filelevthera Dimokratiki Enosis--Sosialistiko Komma Ellados	Liberal Democratic Union--Socialist Party of Greece
FIDK		[Also FiDK; FiDiK: See FDK]
FILESY	Filelevthero Systima Ygeias	Liberal Health System
FKE	Foros Kyklou Ergasion	Business Turnover Tax
FKP	Foros Katharas Prosodou	Tax on Net Income
FMSNP	Fysiolatrikos Morfotikos Syllogos Neon Peramatos Peiraios	The Perama, Piraeus Nature Lovers and Cultural Youth Club
FO	Fasistiki Organosis	Fascist Organization
FPA	Foros Prostithemenis Axias	Value Added Tax
FPEP	Foititiki Pnevmatiki Estia Peiraios	Piraeus Spiritual Home for Students
FS	Filoproodos Syllogos Anthoupoleos-Neas Ionias	Anthoupolis-Nea Ionia Progressive Association
FSNP	Foititikos Syllogos Nikaias Peiraios	Nikaia, Piraeus Student Club
FThS	Foititikos Theologikos Syndesmos	Theological Association of Students

G

G'; g' (gamma)	Tritos, -i, -on; treis, tria	3d; third; III; three
Gall. Prak.	Gallikon Praktoreion	(Agence France-Presse) French Press Agency
GAYPS	Geniki Apothiki Ylikou Pyrosvestikou Somatos	General Firefighting Corps Materiel Depot
GDA	Geniki Dievthynsi Agrofylakis	Agrarian Police General Directorate
GDD	Geniki Dioikisis Dodekanisou	Dodekanises General Administration
GDDD	Geniki Dievthynsis Dimosias Dioikiseos	Public Administration General Directorate
GDEA	Geniki Dievthynsis Ethnikis Asfaleias	National Security General Directorate
GDF	Geniki Dievthynsis Forologias	General Directorate of Taxation
GDKP	Geniki Dievthynsis Kyvernitikis Politikis	Government Policy General Directorate
GDP	Geniki Dievthynsis Ploion	General Directorate of Ships
	Geniki Dievthynsis Programmatismou	General Directorate of Planning
	Grafeion Dimosion Pliroforion	Public Information Office
GDPA	Geniki Dievthynsis Politikis Amynis	Civil Defense General Directorate
GDPP	Geniki Dievthynsis Prosopikou Ploion	Ship Personnel General Directorate

GDT	Geniki Dievthynsis Teloneion	Customs General Directorate
	Geniki Dievthynsis Takhydromeion	Post Offices General Directorate
GDTP	Geniki Dievthynsis Typou kai Pliroforion	General Directorate of Press and Information
GDVE	Geniki Dioikisis Voreiou Ellados	General Administration of Northern Greece
GEA	Genikon Epiteleion Aeroporias	Air Force General Staff
GE	Grafeio Eparkhion	Provinces Office [KKE (Int)]
GEDPA	Genikon Epiteleion Dioikiseos Politikis Amynis	Civil Defense General Administrative Staff [C]
GeDPA/Khoras	Geniki Dievthynsis Politikis Amynis tis Khoras	General Directorate of National Civil Defense
GEE	Geotekhnikon Epimelitirion Ellados	Geotechnical Chamber of Greece
	Grafeion Evreseos Ergasias	Employment Office
GEEF	Genikon Epiteleion Ethnikis Frouras	National Guard General Staff [C]
GEEThA	Genikon Epiteleion Ethnikis Amynis	National Defense General Staff
GEK	Geniki Epitropi Katanomon	General Apportionment Committee
GEKMOA	Grafeion Elengkhou Kataskevon Monimon Odostromaton Athinon	Office for the Checking of Construction of Athens Permanent Road Surfaces

GEKO	Grafeion Elengkhou Kataskevis Odon	Road Construction Control Office [followed by initial letter of name of district]
GEL	Grafeion Ergasias Limenos ...	Labor Office of the Port of [name of district]
GEM	Gnomodotiki Epitropi Meleton	Advisory Committee on Studies
GEME	Geniki Etaireia Meleton kai Ekmetallevseon	General Research and Mining Company
GEMEE	Geniki Etaireia Metallevtikon Erevnon kai Ekmetallevseon	General Company for Mineral Prospecting and Exploitation
GEMMKA	Grammateia tis Gnomodotikis Epitropis Mitroou Meletiton kai Kanonismou Anatheseos	Advisory Committee Secretariat of the Researcher Registry and [Contract] Assignment Regulations
GEN	Genikon Epiteleion Navtikou	Naval General Staff
GENE	Grafeion Evreseos Navtikis Ergasias	Merchant Seamen Employment Office
GEOTEE	Geotekhnikon Epimelitirion Ellados	Geotechnical Chamber of Greece
GES	Genikon Epiteleion Stratou	Army General Staff
	Genikos Epitheoritis Stratou	Army Inspector General
GESASE	Geniki Synomospondia Agrotikon Syllogon Ellados	General Confederation of Greek Agricultural Unions
GESY	Geniki Ekklisiastiki Synelevsis	General Ecclesiastical Assembly
GEVEV	Geniki Etaireia Viomikhanikon Epikheiriseon Volou	General Association of Volos Industrial Enterprises

GG	Genikos Grammatevs	Secretary General
GGA	Geniki Grammateia Athlitismou	General Secretariat of Athletics
GGEA	Geniki Grammateia Exoskholikou Athlitismou	General Secretariat of Extracurricular Athletics
GGTP	Geniki Grammateia Typou kai Pliroforion	General Secretariat for Press and Information
GKhK	Genikon Khimeion Kratous	State General Chemical Laboratory
GKOE	Grafeio Kommatikon Organoseon Exoterikou	Office of Party Organization Abroad [KKE (Int)]
GLD	Germaniki Laiki Dimokratia	German Democratic Republic Use: GDR
GLK	Genikon Logistirion Kratous	General State Accounting Office
GNA	Geniko Nosokomeio Aeroporias	Air Force General Hospital
GNP	Geniko Nosokomeio Patron	Patras General Hospital
GOAE	Grammateia Oikonomikis Anasyngrotisis Epikheiriseon	Secretariat for the Economic Reconstruction of Companies
GODOS	Geniki Dievthinsis Diethnon Oikonomikon Skheseon	General Directorate of International Economic Relations
GOEV	Genikos Organismos Engeion Veltioseon	General Organization for Land Reclamation
GOK	Genikos Oikodomikos Kanonismos Kratous	General State Building Regulations

GOPDEI	Geniki Omospondia Prosopikou Dimosias Epikheiriseos Ilektrismou	General Federation of Public Power Corporation Personnel
GOYPP	Germaniki Omospondiaki Ypiresia Prostasias tou Politevmatos	Federal German Service for the Protection of the State
GP	Grafeion Periokhis	Regional Office
	Grafeion Programmatismou	Planning Office
GPA	Grafeion Poleodomias Athinon	Athens City Planning Office
GPP	Grafeion Pliforion kai Paraponon	Information and Complaints Office
Gram.	Grammateia	Secretariat
GRNSK	Grafeion Nomikou Symvoulou Kratous	State Legal Council Office
GS	Genikon Symvoulion	General Council
	Gymnastikos Syllogos	Gymnastics Club
GSAE	Geniki Synomospondia Avtokiniston Ellados	General Confederation of Motorists of Greece
GSAS		[See GESASE]
GSAThP	Geniki Synomospondia Anapiron kai Thymaton	General Confederation of Handicapped and Victims
GSAVE	Geniki Synomospondia Avtokiniston Voreiou Ellados	General Confederation of Drivers of Northern Greece
GSDE	Genikon Symfonon Dasmon kai Emboriou	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Use: GATT

GSEAE	Geniki Synomospondia Epangelmation Avtokiniston Ellados	General Confederation of Professional Drivers of Greece
GSEE	Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados	Greek General Confederation of Labor
GSEVE	Geniki Synomospondia Epangelmation kai Viotekhnon Ellados	General Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Greece
GSL	Georgikos Syllogos Lysis	Agricultural Society of Lysi [C]
GSN	Genikon Stratiotikon Nosokomeion	Army General Hospital
GSP	Grafeion Skhediou Poleos	City Plan Office
GSPE	Geniki Synomospondia Polemiston Ellados	General Confederation of Greek Combatants
GSPPE	Geniki Synomospondia Palaion Polemiston Ellados	General Confederation of Greek Veterans
GSSEE	Geniki Synomospondia Syndaxioukhon Ergatoypallilon Ellados	General Confederation of Pensioned Workers of Greece
GTP	Grafeio Typou kai Pliroforion	Press and Information Office
GY	Genikai Ypiresiai	General Services
GYS	Geografiki Ypiresia Stratou	Army Geographic Service

I

I'; i' (iota)	Dekatos, -i, -on; deka	10th; tenth; X; ten
I'; i' (ita)	ogdoos, -i, -on, okto	8th; eighth; VIII; eight
IA'; ia'	Endekatos, -i, -on; endeka	11th; eleventh; XI; eleven
IAD	Inomeni Araviki Dimokratia	United Arab Republic Use: UAR
IAKE	Idryma Anaptyxeos Koinonikis Ergasias	Foundation for the Development of Social Work
IAKh	Idiais avtou khersi	[To be delivered] To the addressee in person; To the addressee only
ID	Imerisia Diatagi	Order of the Day
	Imerisia Diataxis	Daily Agenda
IDE	Institouto Diarkous Epimorfoseos	Institute for Continuing Training
	Institouton Dasikon Erevnon	Forestry Research Institute
IDEA	Ieros Desmos Ellinon Andi-kommouniston	Sacred Bond of Greek Anticommunists
	Ieros Desmos Ellinon Axiomatikon	Sacred Bond of Greek Officers
IDIP	Institouto Dioikiseos Paragogis	Production Administration Institute
Id. Yp.	Idiaitera Ypiresia	Special Service [in datelines]
IEAP	Ilektriki Etaireia Athinon-Peiraios	Athens-Piraeus Electric Company
IED	ilektroenergetiki dynamis	EMF; electromotive force

IEE	Institouto Erevnon Epikoinonias	Communications Research Institute
IEEE	Istoriki kai Ethnologiki Etaireia tis Ellados	Greek Historical and Ethnological Society
IEK	Idryma Ergazomenou Koritsiou	Working Girls' Foundation
IEM	Ilektriki Etaireia Metaforon	Electric Transport Company, Ltd.
IENTh	Institouton Erevnis Nosimaton Thorakos	Thoracic Diseases Research Institute
i/f	istioforon	sailer; sail vessel; sailboat; sailing ship
IGE	Institouton Geoponikon Epistimon	Agricultural Sciences Institute
IGEKE	Institouto Georgooikonomikon kai Koinoniologikon Erevnon	Agro-Economic and Sociological Research Institute
IGEY	Institouton Geologias kai Erevnon Ypedafous	Geology and Subsoil Research Institute Use: EthIGME [q.v.]
IGM	Institouton Georgikis Mikhanologias	Agricultural Engineering Institute
IGME	Idryma Geologikon kai Metallevtikon Erevnon	Institute for Geological and Mineral Research
IKA	Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon	Social Insurance Foundation
IKF	Institouton Kalliterevseos Fyton	Plant Improvement Institute
IKh	Idiotikis Khriseos	(For) Private (Use) [automobile license plate designation]

IKOA	Institouton Koinonikis kai Oikonomikis Anasyngrotiseos	Social and Economic Reconstruction Institute
IKY	Idryma Kratikon Ypotrofion	State Scholarships Institute
ILPAP	Ilektrokinita Leoforeia Periokhis Athinon-Peiraios	Electric-Powered Buses of the Athens-Piraeus Area
ILTE	Ioniki kai Laiki Trapeza tis Ellados	Ionian and People's Bank of Greece
IMEO	Institouto Meletis Ellinikis Oikonomias	Institute for the Study of the Greek Economy
IMGE		[See IGME]
IMKhA	Idryma Meleton tis Khersonisou tou Aimou	Aimos Peninsula Studies Foundation (a Macedonian studies society in Salonica)
IMM	ilektromagnitikai monades	EMU; electromagnetic units
ImSND	Imikiniton Nosokomeion Diakomidis	Semimobile Evacuation Hospital
INKA	Institouton Prostasias Katanaloton	Consumer Protection Institute
Inom. Typ	Inomenos Typos	United Press Use: UP
IOD	Institouto Oikonomikis Dioikiseos	Economic Administration Institute
IOKAE	Institouton Okeanografikon kai Alievtikon Meleton	Institute of Oceanographic and Fishing Studies
IOP	Istioploikos Omilos Peiraios	Piraeus Sailing Club

IOVE	Idryma Oikonomikon kai Viomikhanikon Erevnon	Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research
	Institouto Oikonomikon kai Viomikhanikon Erevnon	Institute of Economic and Industrial Research
IPA	Inomenai Politeiai Amerikis	Use: USA
	Institouto Perifereiakis Anaptyxeos	Regional Development Institute
IPAP	Idryma Prostasias Aprosarmoston Paidon	Institute for the Protection of Handicapped Children
IPK	Ilektroniko Pliroforiako Kentro	Computerized Information Center
ISA	Iatrikos Syllogos Athinon	Athens Medical Association
ISAP	Ilektrikoi Sidirodromoi Athinon-Peiraias A. E.	Athens-Piraeus Electric Railways
ISI	Iera Synodos tis Ierarkhias	Holy Synod of the Hierarchy
ISM	ilektrostatikai monades	ESU; electrostatic units
ISP	Ilektrikoi Sidirodromoi Protevousis	Capital Electrical Railways [Formerly EIS]
IVDZ	Institouton Veltioseos kai Diatrofis Zoon	Animal Husbandry Institute
IXET	Institouto Xenodokheiakon kai Episitistikon Tekhnon	Hotel and Food Trades Institute
IYE	Institouto Ypotropikon kai Elaias	Institute for Sub-Tropical Plants and Olive Trees

K

K'; k' (kappa)	eikoston, -i, -os; eikosi	twentieth; 20th; XX; twenty
K	Kato	Kato [as in K. Khora, Kato Khora; literally "Lower"]
k.a.	kai alla	et cetera
KA	Koini Agora	Common Market
	Komma Anasyngrotiseos	Reconstruction Party
	Kypriakes Aerogrammes	Cyprus Airlines [C]
KAA	Kendrikos Aerolimin Athinon	Ellinikon (Athens) Airport
	Kendro Allodapon Athinon	Athens Aliens Center
	Kentrikos Apokhetevtikos Agogos	Central Sewage Pipe
	Komma Adesmevtis Anexartisias	Nonaligned Independence Party
KAAPV	Kendron Apokatastaseos Anapiron Paidon Voulas	Voula Rehabilitation Center for Crippled Children
KAD	Kendron Amesou Draseos	Instant Response Center
KADKY	Klados Asfaliseos Dimotikon kai Koinotikon Ypallilon	Municipal and Communal Employees Insurance Branch
KADY	Kanonismos Allilografias Dimosion Ypiresion	Public Services Correspondence Regulations
KAE	Komma Agroton kai Ergazomenon	Agrarian and Workers Party
KAF	Kefalaion Apozimioseos Fortoekfortoton	Stevedores Compensation Fund
pa		
KAMDE	Kanonismos Anatheseos Meleton	Regulation for the Assignment of

	Dimosion Ependyseon	Studies for Public Investments
KAMPDE	Kanonismos Anatheseos Meleton Programmatos Dimosion Ependyseon	Regulation for the Assignment of Studies Under the Public Investments Program
KAP	Kefalaion Asfaliseos Pistoseon	Credit Insurance Fund
	Kendro Allodapon Peiraios	Piraeus Aliens Center
	Koini Agrotiki Politiki	Joint Agricultural Policy
KAPAPs	Kendron Apokatastaseos Politikon Anapiron Psykhikou	Psykhiko Rehabilitation Center for Handicapped Civilians
KAPI	Kendron Anoiktis Prostasias Ilikiomenon	Center for the Free Protection of the Elderly
KAS	Kendrikon Arkhailogikon Symvoulion	Central Archeological Council
KASK	Kinisi Allagis Synetairistikou Kinimatos	Movement for Change in the Cooperative Movement
KAT	Kendron Anoteras Tekhnologias	Advanced Technology Center
	Kendron Apokatastaseos Travmation	Rehabilitation Center for the Injured
KATE	Kendra Anoteras Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos	Higher Technical Education Centers
KATEE	Kendra Anoteras Tekhnikis kai Epangelmatikis Ekpaidevseos	Higher Technical and Vocational Training Centers
Katot.	Katotat-os, -i, -on	min.; minimum

KD	Kaini Diathiki	New Testament
	Kathara Diathesima	Net Liquid Assets
KDAS	Koini Dievthynsis ton Aktoploikon Syngoinonion	Coastal Communications Joint Directorate
KDE	Kendron Didaskalias Enilikon	Adult Education Center
	Kommounistiki Diethnistiki Enosi	Communist Internationalist Union
KDG	Kinisi Dimokratikon Gynaikon	Movement of Democratic Women
KDGTh	Kinisis Dimokratikon Gynaikon Thessalonikis	Salonica Democratic Women's Movement
KDKE	Kommounistiko Diethnistiko Kinima Elladas	Communist Internationalist Movement of Greece
kdmos	kodarithmos	code number
KDO	Kendrika Dioikitika Organa	Central Administrative Organs
	Kendriki Dioikitiki Organosis	Central Administrative Organization
KDS	Kendrika Dioikitika Somata	Central Administrative Bodies
	Kendrikon Dioikitikon Symvoulion	Central Administrative Council
	Kendron Dierkhomenon Stratou	Army Transients Center
	Komma Dimokratikou Sosialismou	Democratic Socialist Party
KE	Kendriki Epitropi	Central Committee
	Komma Ellinososialiston	Greek Socialists Party
	Kyvernitiki Epitropi	Government Committee
	Kyvernitikos Epitropos	Government Commissioner

KEA	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Anapiron	Training Center for the Handicapped
	Kendron Ethnikis Asfaleias	National Security Center
	Kinima Eniaias Aristeras	United Left Movement
	Kinima Epanastatikis Aristeras	Movement of the Revolutionary Left
	Kinima Ethnikis Andistaseos	National Resistance Movement
	Kinisis Ethnikis Anadimiourgias	National Regeneration Movement [Grivas] [C]
	Koini Evropaiki Agora	European Common Market Use: ECM
	Komma Ethnikis Anagenniseos	National Rebirth Party
	Kratikon Ergostasion Aeroplanon	State Aircraft Factory
KEADEA	Kinima gia Ethniki Anexartisia Diethni Eirini kai Afoplismo	Movement for National Independence, International Peace and Disarmament
	Kinisi gia Ethniki Anerxartisia, Dimokratia, Eirini kai Afoplismo	Movement for National Independence, Democracy, Peace, and Disarmament
KEAE	Kendron Erevnon Atomikis Energeias (Andidrastir Kholargou)	Atomic Energy Research Center (Kholargos Reactor)
KEAEM	Kendron Erevnon Astronomias kai Efirmosmenon Mathimatikon	Center for Astronomy and Applied Mathematics Research
KEAK	Kendriki Epitropi Apokatastaseos Kratoumenon	Central Committee for the Rehabilitation of Prisoners
	Kinima Ethnikis Apokatastaseos Kyprou	Movement for the National Restoration of Cyprus [C]
KEAN	Kinima Ethnikis Anagenniseos	National Rebirth Movement
	Klados Epikourikis Asfaliseos Navtikon	Seamen's Auxiliary Insurance Branch

KEAP	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Anorthodoxou Polemou	Unconventional Warfare Training Center
KEAR		[phonetic rendering] Use: CARE
KEAT	Kendron Ekpaidevseos kai Apokatastasis Tyflon	Center for the Training and Rehabilitation of the Blind [C]
KeATA	Kendriki Agora Trofimon Athinon	Athens Central Food Market
KED	Kendriki Epitropi Daneion	Central Loans Committee
	Kendriki Epitropi Diaitisias	Central Arbitration Committee
	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Diavivaseon	Communications Training Center
	Kinima Ethnikis Draseos	Movement for National Action
	Komma Ethnikis Draseos	National Action Party
	Kratiki Ekmetallevsis Dason	State Exploitation of Forests
	Ktimatiki Etaireia Dimosiou	Public Land Company
KEDKE	Kendriki Enosis ton Dimon kai Koinotiton tis Ellados	Central Union of Municipalities and Communes of Greece
KEE	Kendriki Elengtiki Epitropi	Central Control Committee [C]
	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Efedron	Reserves Training Center
	Kendron Englimatologikon Erevnon	Criminology Research Center
	Koinoniki Enosis Epistimonon	Social Union of Professionals
	Komma Ergazomenon Ellados	Greek Workers' Party
KEEA	Kypriaki Enosis Epangelmation Avtokinitiston	Cypriot Union of Professional Drivers [C]
KEED	Kendro Ekpaidevseos Eidikon Dynameon	Special Forces Training Center

	Kinisi gia ton Ekdimokratismo ton Enoplon Dynameon	Movement for the Democratization of the Armed Forces
	Kinisis Ethnikis Enoseos Dexias	National Unification Movement of the Right [C]
KEEE	Kendriki Eklogiki Epitropi Ethnikofronon	Central Electoral Committee of Nationalists [C]
	Kiniton Epidimiologikon Ergastirion Erevnon	Mobile Epidemiological Research Laboratory
KEEES	Kendron Ekdoseos Ergon Ellinon Syngrafeon	Center for the Publication of Greek Authors' Works
KEEF	Kratikon Ergastirion Elengkhou Farmakon	National Drug Control Laboratory
KEEK	Kendron Erevnis tis Ellinikis Koinonias	Center for Research on Greek Society
	Kentriki Epitropi Epilogis kai Kritirion	Selection and Criteria Central Committee
KEEM	Kendro Exagogikon Erevnon kai Meleton	Exports Research and Studies Center
	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Efodiasmou kai Metaforon	Supply and Transportation Training Center
KEEP	Kendron Epikheirimatikis Epikoinonias kai Provolis	Center for Entrepreneurial Communication and Projection
KEEPTh	Kendriki Eforevtiki Epitropi Paidopoleon Thessalonikis	Central Supervisory Committee for Salonica Children's Centers
KEES	Komma Ethnikis ton Ellinon Sotirias	Party for the National Salvation of Greeks
KEEThA	Kendron Erevnon Ethnikis Amynis	National Defense Research Center

kef.	kefalaion	chapter [of document]
KEFE	Kendriki Enosis Froutoparagogon Ellados	Central Fruitgrowers Union of Greece
KEGE	Kendriki Epitropi Genikon Exetaseon	General Testing Central Committee
	Kendron Erevnon kai Georgikis Ekpaidevseos	Research and Agricultural Training Center
	Kendron Georgikis Ekpaidevseos	Agricultural Training Center
KEGEPOA	Kendriki Gnomodotiki Epitropi Programmatos Oikonomikis Politikis	Central Advisory Committee for Economic Policy Programs
KEK	Kendra Ergazomenou Koritsiou	Working Girls' Centers
	Kendron Epangelmatikis Katartiseos	Vocational Training Center
	Kypriakon Ethnikon Komma	Cypriot National Party [C]
	Kyvernitiki Epitropi Kapnou	Government Tobacco Committee
KEKATE	Kendron Mathiteias kai Takhyrrythmou Epangelmatikis Katartiseos Enilikon	Apprenticeship and Rapid Vocational Training Center for Adults
KeKE	Kendriki Kallitekhniki Epitropi	Central Artistic Committee
KEKMA	Kinisi Gia Eniaio Komma Marxistikis Aristeras	Movement for a United Party of the Marxist Left
KEKN	Kendron Ergazomenon Koritsion kai Neotiton	Center for Working Girls and Youths
KELS	Kendron Ekpaidevseos tou Limenikou Somatos	Port Corps Training Center

KELV	Kendriki Epitropi Logistikon Vivlion	Central Accounts Board
KEM	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Mikhanikou	Engineers Training Center
	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Mikhanokiniton	Mechanized Forces Training Center
	Kommounistiko Epanastatiko Metopo	Communist Revolutionary Front
	Kypriaki Etaireia Metaforon	Cyprus Transport Company [C]
KEME	Kendron Ekpaidevtikon Meleton kai Epimorphosis	Center for Educational Research and Training
	Kendron Epitheoriseos Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Secondary Education Supervision Center
	Kinisis Ellinon Metarrythmiston	Movement of Greek Reformists
KEMEDI	Kendron Metafraston kai Diermineon	Translators and Interpreters Center
KEMEP	Kendron Meleton Politikis	Policy Studies Center
KEMK	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Monadon Katadromon	Commando Forces Training Center
KEML	Kinisi Ellinon Marxiston-Leniniston	Movement of Greek Marxist-Leninists
KEN	Kendra Ergazomenou Neou	Working Young Men's Centers
	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Neosyllekton	Recruit Training Center
KENE	Kendriki Epitropi Nomothetikis Ergasias	Central Legislative Processing Committee
	Kendriki Nomoparaskevastiki Epitropi	Central Law Preparation Committee

KEOAKh	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Oreinou Agonos-Khionodromon	Mountain Combat and Skiiing Training Center
KEOM	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Oreinon Metaforon	Mountain Transport Training Center
KEOS	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Oplon-Somaton	Arms and Corps Training Center
KEOSOE	Kendriki Enosis Oinopoiitikon Synetairistikon Organoseon Ellados	Central Union of Wine Cooperative Organizations of Greece
KEP	Kendriki Epitropi Protathlimatos	Central Championship Committee [of the Greek Soccer Federation]
	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Pyrovolikou	Artillery Training Center
	Kendron Epangelmatikou Prosanatolismou	Occupational Orientation Center
KEPA	Kendron Endatikon Programmaton Anaptyxeos	Center of Intensive Development Planning
	Kendron Paragogikotitos	Productivity Center
KEPE	Kendriki Epitropi Prosfygon Ellados	Central Committee of Greek Refugees
	Kendron Programmatismou kai Oikonomikon Erevnon	Center for Planning and Economic Research [Also reported as Center for Planning and Research]
KEPEL	Kynigetiki Enosis Poleos-Eparkhias Lemesou	Limassol City and District Hunters Union [C]
KEPES	Kendriki Epitropi Prostasias tis Engkhoriou Sitoparagogis	Central Committee for the Protection of Domestic Wheat Production
KEPO	Kendriki Epitropi Perifereiakis Organoseos	Regional Organization Central Committee

KEPOA	Kendriki Epitropi Programmatos Oikonomikis Anaptyxeos	Central Committee for the Economic Development Program
KEPOS	Koinofelis Epikheirisis Poleodomias, Oikismou kai Stegaseos	Town Planning and Housing Public Utility Enterprise (See: KEPOS below)
	Kratiki Epikheirisis Poleodomias, Oikismou, Stegaseos	State Town Planning and Housing Enterprise
KEPPE	Kendriki Epitropi Politikon Prosfygon Ellados	Central Committee of Greek Political Refugees
KES	Kendriki Epitropi Sporoparagogis	Seed Production Central Committee
	Kendrikon Ekklisiastikon Symvoulion	Central Ecclesiastical Council
	Kendrikon Epoptikon Symvoulion	Central Supervisory Council
	Kendron Elevtheron Spoudon	Independent Studies Center
	Kinima Elevtherou Syndikalismou	Free Labor Movement
	Kinima Ethnikis Sotirias	Movement for National Salvation [C]
	Kommounistikos Epanastatikos Syndesmos	Communist Revolutionary League
KESA	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Stratiotikis Astynomias	Military Police Training Center
KESY	Kendrikon Symvoulion Ygeias	Central Health Council
KET	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Tethorakismenon	Armored Forces Training Center
KETA	Kendron Erevnas kai Tekhnologias tis Aeroporias	Aviation Research and Technology Center
KETE	Kendra Epangelmatikis kai Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos	Vocational and Technical Education Centers

KETS	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Tekhnikou Somatos	Technical Corps Training Center
KEVA	Kendriki Epitropi Voreioipeirotikou Agonos	Central Committee of the Northern Ipeiros Struggle [See also KEVIA]
	Kendron Ethnikis Viomikhanikis Anaptyxeos	Center for National Industrial Development
	Kendron Viotekhnikis Anaptyxeos	Center for Development of Crafts
KEVE	Kypriakon Emborikon kai Viomikhanikon Epimelitirion	Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry [C]
KEVIA	Kendriki Epitropi Voreioipeirotikou Agonos	Central Committee of the Northern Ipeiros Struggle [See also KEVA]
KEVOP	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Vareon Oplon Pezikou	Infantry Heavy Weapons Training Center
KEY	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Ygeionomikou	Medical Service Training Center
KEYP	Kendron Ekpaidevseos Ylikou Polemou	Ordnance Training Center
KF	Komma Filelevtheron	Liberal Party [Also: Filelevtheron Komma]
KFKP	Kodix Forologias Katharas Prosodou	Net Income Tax Code
KFS	Kodix Forologikon Stoikheion	Tax Revenue Data Code
KFSKh	Kinisi Foititon Skholis Khimikon	Chemistry School Students Movement
KGE	Kendron Georgikis Ekpaidevseos	Agricultural Training Center

KGEN	Kendriko Grafeio tis Ergatikis Neolaias	Central Office for Working Youth [C]
Kh'; kh' (khi)	exakosia; exakosiostos, -i, -on	six hundred; six hundredth; 600th; DC
Kh"	Khatzi	[Abbreviation for Khatzi, as in Khatzigeorgiou] [C]
KhAN	Khristianiki Adelfotis Neon	YMCA
KhD	khamilon dynamikon	low potential
KhE	Khristiano-koinoniki Enosis	Christian Socialist Union
KhEN	Khristianiki Enosis Neanidon	YWCA
KhEP	Khrimatistirion Emborevmaton Peiraios	Piraeus Commodity Exchange
kh/gr	khiliogrammon	kg; kilogram
KhGSEE	Khristianiki Geniki Synomospondia Ergazomenon Ellados	Christian General Confederation of Greek Workers
KhP	khamili piesis	LP; low pressure
KhRIKE	Khristiano-dimokratikon Koinonikon Komma Ellados	Greek Christian Democratic Party [Also appears as KhRISKE]
KhRISKEL	Khristiano-dimokratikon Komma tis Ellados	Christian Democratic Party of Greece
KhS	khamili sykhnotis	LF; low frequency
KhSK	Khristiano-sosialistiki Kinisi	Christian Socialist Movement

	Khristianososialistiki Spoudastiki Kinisi	Christian Socialist Student Movement
KhT	khamili tasis	low voltage
KIKhN	Kiniton Kheirourgikon Nosokomeion	Mobile [Army] Surgical Hospital
KIMA	Kypriakon Istorikon Mouseion kai Arkheion	Cypriot Historical Museum and Archives [C]
KIND	Kodix Idiotikou Navtikou Dikaiou	Code of Private Maritime Law
Kinima 20^{is} Oktovriou		[See Eikosti Oktovriou]
KIPAEA	Kinisi gia ton Polymeri Afoplismo, tin Elevtheria kai tin Asfaleia tis Evropis	Movement for Multilateral Disarmament, Freedom, and Security of Europe
KIS	Kendrikon Israilitikon Symvoulion	Central Jewish Council
KIYKY	Kendron Ilektronikon Ypologiston Koinonikon Ypiresion	Social Services Computer Center
KK	Kommounistikon Komma	Communist Party
KKA	Kinima Kypriakis Andistaseos	Cypriot Resistance Movement [C]
	Kodix Koinonikis Asfaliseos	Social Insurance Code
	Kommounistikon Komma Alvanias	Albanian Communist Party
KKDDY	Kodix Katastaseos Dimosion Dioikitikon Ypallilon	Public Administrative Employees Schedule Code
KKE	Kommounistikon Komma Ellados	Greek Communist Party
KKE/ML	Kommounistiko Komma Elladas/Marxiston-Leniniston	Greek Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist

KKh	Katastatikos Khartis	Charter
	koroi khorikotitos	net tons; net tonnage [See KKKh]
KKhT	Ktimatologikon kai Khorometrikon Tmima	Cadastral and Zoning Department
KKK	Kommounistikon Komma Kyprou	Communist Party of Cyprus [C] [See AKEL]
	Kosmofysikon kai Kosmotheikon Kinima	Cosmophysic and Cosmotheist Movement
KKKh	koroi katharas khorikotitos	NRT; net register(ed) tonnage [See KKh]
KKON	Koinonikon Kendron Oikogeneias kai Neotitos	Family and Youth Social Center
KKP	Kendron Koinonikis Pronoias	Social Welfare Center
KKSE	Kommounistikon Komma Sovietikis Enoseos	Use: CPSU
KKSFA	Kypros-Koreatikos Syndesmos Filias kai Allilengyis	Cyprus-Korea Friendship and Solidarity League [C]
KKV	Kommounistikon Komma Voulgarias	Bulgarian Communist Party
KLN	Kypriaki Leskhi Neolaias	Cypriot Youth Club [London] [C]
klp	kai loipa	et cetera
KLP	Kendrikon Limenarkheion Peiraios	Piraeus Central Port Authority
km	kyvika metra	cubic meters

KMAS	Kendron Mesogeiakon kai Aravikon Spoudon	Mediterranean and Arab Studies Center
KME	Kendron Marxistikon Erevnon	Marxist Research Center
	Kypriaki Metallevtiki Etaireia	Cyprus Mines Corporation [See CMC] [C]
KMEA	Kinitai Monades Ethnofylakis Amynis	National Guard Mobile Defense Units
KMG	Kendrikon Morfotikon Grafeion	Central Educational Office
KMM	Kendron Mesogeiakon Meleton	Mediterranean Studies Center
KMME	Kendron Marxistikon Meleton kai Erevnon	Center for Marxist Studies and Research
KMODD	Kendron Metekpaidevseos Organon Dimosias Dioikiseos	Advanced Training Center for Public Administration Officials
KNA	Kommounistiki Neolaia Athinon	Communist Youth of Athens
KNDA	Kendro Neotitos Dimou Athinon	Athens Municipality Youth Center
KNDK	Kodix Nomon Dimon kai Koinotiton	Law Code for Municipalities and Communes
KNE	Kendro Neoellinikon Erevnon	Neohellenic Research Center
	Kommounistiki Neolaia Ellados	Greek Communist Youth
KNE-ODIGITIS		Greek Communist Youth--Guide
KNF	Komma Neon Filelevtheron	Young Liberals' Party
KNFK	Kodix Nomon Forologias Kapnou	Code of Tobacco Tax Laws

KNS	Kinisi Neon Sosialiston	Movement of Young Socialists
KNThVE	Kendron Nosimaton Thorakos Voreiou Ellados	Northern Greece Center for Thoracic Diseases
KO	Kommatiki Omas	Party Group; Also: Parliamentary Group
	Kommatiki Organosis	Party Organization [plus the initial letter of the district or sector of the organization]
KOA	Kommatiki Organosi Akhtidas	Sector Party Organization
	Kommounistiki Organosis Aeroporias	Communist Organization for the Air Force
	Kommounistiki Organosis Athinon	Communist Organization of Athens
	Kratiki Orkhistra Athinon	Athens State Orchestra
	Kypriakos Organismos Anaptyxeos	Cypriot Development Organization [C]
	Kypriakos Organismos Athlitismou	Cypriot Athletic Organization [C]
KOAP	Kommounistiki Organosis Astynomias Poleon	Communist Organization for the Cities Police
KODISO	Komma Dimokratikou Sosialismou	Democratic Socialism Party
KOE	Kapnemboriki Omospondia tis Ellados	Tobacco Merchants' Federation of Greece
	Kendron Oikonomikon Erevnon	Economic Research Center
	Kendron Okeanologikon Erevnon	Center for Oceanological Research
	Kommatiki Organosi Ellados	Party Organization of Greece
KOEK	Kallitekhnikos Organismos Ellinikon Kinimatografon	Artistic Organization of the Greek Cinema

KOEP	Kendron Oikonomikon Erevnon kai Programmatismou	Economic Research and Programming Center
KOG	Kendrikon Organotikon Grafeion	Central Organizational Office [C]
	Kendrikos Organotikos Grammatevs	Central Organizational Secretary
KOGV	Kypriakos Organismos Galaktomikis Viomikhanias	Cyprus Dairy Industry Organization [C]
k.o.k.	kai outo kathexis	and so forth
KOK	Kodix Odikis Kykloforias	Traffic Code
	Kynigetiki Omospondia Kyprou	Cyprus Hunting Federation [C]
KOKh	Kommounistiki Organosis Khorofylakis	Gendarmery Communist Organization
kokh	koroi olikis khoritikotitos	GRT; gross register tons
KOKN	Koinofelis Organismos Kykladon Nison	Public Benefit Organization for the Kyklades Islands
KOLS	Kommounistiki Organosis Limenikou Somatos	Communist Organization for the Port Corps
KOM	Kiniti Odondoiatriki Monas	Mobile Dental Unit
K.O. MAKHITIS	Kommounistiki Organosis Makhitis	Fighter Communist Organization
KOMDE	Kratikos Organismos Mikhanimaton Dimosion Ergon	State Organization for Public Works Machinery
KOMEP	KOMMOUNISTIKI EPITHEORISI	Communist Review [Published abroad by KKE (Int) Central Committee during 1969-74 period]

KOMPRA	Kendriki Organosis Makhimon Pyrosveston Attikis	Central Organization of Combatant Firemen of Attiki
KOMThE	KOMMOUNISTIKI THEORITIKI EPITHEORISI	Communist Theoretical Review
KON	Kendron Oikogeneias kai Neotitos	Family and Youth Center
Kon/polis	Konstandinoupolis [Also: "I Poli"]	Constantinople Use: Istanbul
KOP	Kommatiki Organosi Perifereias	Area Party Organization
	Kommatiki Organosi Poleos	City Party Organization
	Kommatiki Organosis Periokhis	Regional Party Organization
	Kommounistiki Organosis Peiraios	Communist Organization of Piraeus
	Kypriaki Omospondia Podosfairou	Cyprus Soccer Federation [C]
KPE	Kendron Politikis Erevnis	Political Research Center
KPEE	Kendro Politikis Erevnis kai Epimorfoseos	Center for Political Research and Training
KOPEP	Kypriakos Organismos Protypon kai Elengkhou Poiotitos	Cypriot Organization for Quality Control and Standards [C]
KOS	Kendrikon Oikonomikon Symvoulion	Central Economic Council
	Kommounistiki Organosis Stratou	Communist Organization for the Army
	Kyvernitikon Oikonomikon Symvoulion	Government Economic Council
KOSSA	Kommatikos Organismos Stratou-Somaton Asfaleias [Also seen as: Kommounistiki Organosis Stratou kai Somaton Asfaleias]	Army and Security Forces Party Organization [Army and Security Forces Communist Organization]

KOT	Kypriakos Organismos Tourismou	Cyprus Tourism Organization [C]
KOTh	Kommounistiki Organosis Thessalonikis	Communist Organization of Salonica
KOV	Kommatiki Organosi Vaseos	Base Party Organization
	Kommounistiki Organosis Vaseos	Communist Base Organization
KOVN	Kommounistiki Organosis Vasilikou Navtikou	Communist Organization of the Royal Navy
KP	Komma Panevropis	Pan-European Party
	Komma Proodevtikon	Progressive Party
KPA	Kinisis Prosfygon Ammokhostou	Famagusta Refugees Movement [C]
KPAP	Kendron Prostasias Anapirou Paidiou	Center for the Protection of the Handicapped Child
KPD	Kodix Poinikis Dikonomias	Code of Criminal Procedure
	Kodix Politikis Dikonomias	Code of Civil Procedure
	Kratiki Ploti Dexameni	State Floating Dock
KPED	Kendron Pyrinikon Erevnon Dimokritos	Dimokritos Nuclear Research Center [See EKPE and KEAE]
KPEE	Kendro Politikis Erevnas kai Epimorfosis	Center for Political Research and Training
KPFN	Kefalaion Prostasias Fymatikon Navtikon	Insurance Fund for Tubercular Seamen
KPOE	Kendron Programmatismou kai Oikonomikon Erevnon	Center for Programming and Economic Research

KPsO	Kendron Psykhagogias Opliton	Enlisted Men's Recreation Center
KPsY	Kendron Psykhikis Ygieinis	Mental Health Center
KRAK	Kato Rossia, Ameriki, Kina	Down With Russia, America, China [Movement]
KRSEDE	Kendrikos Radiofonikos Stathmos Enoplon Dynameon Ellados	Main Radio Station of the Armed Forces of Greece
KS	Kendrikon Symvoulion	Central Council
	Kritiki Syspirosi	Critical Thinking Group [Marxist-Leninist-Maoist group]
KSAN	Kendrikos Stathmos Avtokiniton Navtikou	Naval Central Vehicle Station
KSD	Kodix Stratiotikis Dikaiosynis	Code of Military Justice
KSES	Kendriki Synetairistiki Enosis Sykoparagogon	Central Fig Producers Cooperative Union
KSF	Kyprosovietikos Syndesmos Filias	Cypriot-Soviet Friendship Society [C]
KSK	Kypriakos Syndesmos Katanaloton	Cypriot Consumers Association [C]
KSO	Kendron Symbarastaseos Oikogeneias	Family Assistance Center
KSOP	Kypriakos Syndesmos Oikogeneiakou Programmatismou	Cypriot Family Planning Union [C]
KSOS	Koinopraxia Synetairistikon Organoseon Soultaninas	Association of Sultana Cooperative Organizations

KSP	Kendrikos Stathmos Paragogis	Central Productivity Station
	Komma Sosialistikis Protovoulias	Socialist Initiative Party
KSPY	Kendron Syndonismou Pyron Ypostirixeos	Fire Support Coordination Center
KST	Kendriki Synergatiki Trapeza	Central Cooperative Bank [C]
KSYLE	Kendrikos Stathmos Yperastikon Leoforeion Ellados	Interurban Bus Lines of Greece Central Station
KT	Kendro Tekmiriosis	Documentation Center
	Ktimatiki Trapeza	Land Bank [See EKTE]
KTA	Kendrikon Takhydromeion Athinon	Athens Main Post Office
KTE	Kendron Tekhnologikon Efarmogon	Applied Technology Center
	Koinonia ton Ethnon	Use: League of Nations
	Koinovoulevtikos Tomeas Ergasias	Parliamentary Work Sector
KTEE	Kendron Takhyrrythmou Ekpaidevseos Enilikon	Accelerated Training Center for Adults
	Kendron Takhyrrythmou Epangelmatikis Ekpaidevseos	Accelerated Vocational Training Center
KTEFA	Koinon Tameion Eispraxeon Fortigon Avtokiniton	Joint Freight Truck Collection Funds
KTEL	Koinon Tameion Eispraxeon Leoforeion	Joint Bus Receipts Fund
KTEO	Kendron Tekhnikon Elengkhon Okhimaton	Center for Technical Control of Vehicles

KTEYL	Koinon Tameion Eispraxeon Yperastikon Leoforeion	Joint Urban Bus Receipts Fund
KTGKD	Kendrikon Tameion Georgias, Ktinotrofias kai Dason	Central Fund for Agriculture, Animal Raising, and Forests
KThVE	Kratiko Theatro Voreiou Ellados	Northern Greece State Theater
KTIL	Koinon Tameion Idiotikon Leoforeion	Joint Fund for Privately Owned Buses
KTKOV	Kommatikon Tmima Kommatikis Organosis Vaseos	Base Party Organization Section
ktl	kai ta loipa	[Literally: and the rest] and so forth; etc.
KTME	Kendron Touristikon Meleton kai Ekdoseon	Tourist Studies and Publications Center
KY	Kendra Ygeias	Health Centers
	Kratiki Ypiresia	Government (vehicle); For Government (official) use; official (vehicle)
KYDEP	Kendriki Ypiresia Diakhoriseos Enkhorion Proiondon	Central Service for the Division of Domestic Products
KYEP	Kendriki Ypiresia Erevnis Paraponon	Central Service for the Investigation of Complaints [in the Office of the Minister to the Prime Minister]
	Koinoniki Ypiresia Ektakton Peristaseon	Social Service for Special Cases
KYET	Kendron Ypodokhis Ekpaidevseos Tekhniton	Technicians Training Reception Center

KYME	Kypriaki Mathimatiki Etaireia	Cypriot Mathematical Association [C]
KYP	Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion	Central Intelligence Service
	Kypriaki Ypiresia Pliroforion	Cyprus Information Service [C]
KYPA	Kendriki Ypiresia Politikis Aeroporias	State Civil Aviation Administration
KYPE	Kendriki Ypiresia Paralavis Ekpombon	Central Radio Monitoring Service
	Kendriki Ypiresia Pliroforion kai Erevnon	Central Information and Investigation Service
KYS	Koinotikos Ygeionomikos Stathmos	Community Medical Station
KYSDE	Kendriko Ypiresiako Symvoulio Dimotikis Ekpaidevsis	Central Service Council for Elementary Education
KYSEA	Kyvernitikon Symvoulion Ethnikis Amynis	Government Council for National Defense
	Kyvernitikon Symvoulion Exoterikon kai Amynis	Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defense
KYSME	Kendrikon Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Central Service Council for Secondary Education
KYSOP	Kyvernitiko Symvoulio Oikonomikis Politikis	Government Council for Economic Policy
KYSSE	Kendrikon Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Stoikheiodous Ekpaidevseos	Central Service Council for Elementary Education
KYT	Kendriki Ypiresia Takhydromeion	Central Postal Service
	Kendron Ypodokhis Tekhniton	Technicians Reception Center

L

L'; l' (lamda)	triakostos, -i, -on; trianda	30th; thirtieth; XXX; thirty
LAE	Laiki Agonistiki Enotita	Popular Fighting Unity
LAOS	Laikai Antistasiakai Omades Sambotaz	Popular Resistance Sabotage Groups
LD	Laiki Dimokratia, Laokratiki Dimokratia	People's Republic
LDE	Laiki Dimokratiki Enotita (enotis)	Popular Democratic Unity
LDG	Laiki Dimokratia Germanias	German Democratic Republic Use: GDR
LE	Laiki Exousia	Popular Power [communist organization]
LEA	Laiki Epanastatiki Andistasi	Popular Revolutionary Resistance
LEAS	Laikos Ethnikos Apelevtherotikos Syndiasmos	Popular National Liberation League [C]
LEK	Laikon Enotikon Komma	Popular Unionist Party [C]
LEM	Laiki Etaireia Metaforon	Popular Transport Company [C]
LES	Laikus Espanastatikos Statos	People's Revolutionary Army
LIPTOL	Lignitorykheia Ptolemaidos	Ptolemais Lignite Mines
LK	Laikon Komma	Popular Party
l.kh	logou kharin	for example

LNA	Laikon Nosokomeion Athinon	Athens Public Hospital
LOEL	Laiki Oinoviomikhaniki Etaireia Lemesou, Ltd.	Popular Distillers Company of Limassol [C] Use: LOEL, Ltd.
LOK	Lokhos Oreinon Katadromon	Mountain Raider Company
LP	Laiki Paideia	Popular Education [Group]
LPK	Laikon Proodevtikon Kinima	People's Progressive Movement
LPS	Limenikos Pyrosvestikos Stathmos	Port Fire Station
LS	Laikos Synagermos	People's Rally
	Limenikon Soma	Port Corps
l/smos	logariasmos	Acct.; account
LY	Lokhos Ygeionomikou	Medical Company
LYS	lian ypsili sykhnotis	very high frequency

M

M'; m' (mi)	tessarakonda; saranda	forty; fortieth; 40th; XL
MA	Makhitiki Aristera	Militant Left
	Metavatiko Apospasma	Transient Detachment
	Monimos Andiprosopeia	Permanent Delegation
MAD	Mikta Apospasmata Dioxeos	Joint Pursuit Detachments
MAEDY	Monas Aeroporikis Exypiretiseos Dimosion Ypiresion	Public Services Air Service Unit
MAKI	Mathitiki Anexartiti Kinisi	Student Independent Movement
MAP	Mikhanokinitos Astynomia Poleon	Motorized Cities Police
MAT	Monades Andimetopiseos Tarakhon	Riot Control Units
	Monades Apokatastasis tis Taxis	Units for the Restoration of Order
MAVAS	Monimos Andiprosopeia Voreio-Atlandikou Symfonou	Permanent Delegation to NATO
MAVI	Metopo Apelevtheroseos Voreiou Ipeirou	Northern Ipeiros Liberation Front
MAY	Monades Asfaleias Ypaithrou	Rural Security Units
ME	Mikton Epiteleion	Joint Staff
MEA	Metopon Ethnikis Anasyngrotiseos	National Reconstruction Front
	Monades Ethnikis Amynis	National Defense Units

MEAP	Mikroviologikon Ergastirion Afthodous Pyretou (Dimosion)	Foot-and-Mouth Disease Microbiological Laboratory (Public)
MEDY	Monas Exypiretiseos Dimosion Ypiresion	Public Services Support Unit
MEE	Mikti Ergatiki Epitropi	Joint Labor Committee [C]
MEENEN	Monimos Ektimitiki Epitropi Navtikon Epitaxeon kai Navloseon	Permanent Committee for Assessing Naval Requisitions and [Ship] Charters
MEK	Mathitiko Ethnikistiko Kinima	Student Nationalist Movement
	mikhani esoterikis kavseos	internal combustion engine
MELT	Mouseion Ellinikis Laikis Tekhnis	Museum of Greek Folk Art
MEMAR	Makedoniki Etairia Marmaron	Macedonian Marble Company
MEO	Mikti Ekpaidevtiki Omas	Joint Training Unit [military]
	Mikti Epiteliki Omas	Joint Staff Group
MEOP	Mathitiki Epitropi Organotikis Protovoulias	Student Committee for Organizational Initiative
MEOSA	Mikti Epiteliki Omas Somaton Asfaleias	Security Corps Joint Staff Unit
MEP	Mikti Epitropi Prosopikou	Joint Personnel Committee [C]
	Monas Episkevis kai Perisoseos	Repair and Salvage Unit
MEPA	Mikti Epitropi Prosopikou Astynomias	Police Personnel Joint Committee

MEPEY	Mikti Epitropi Prosopikou Ekpaidevtikis Ypiresias	Joint Committee of Educational Services Personnel [C]
MES	Mitropolitika Ekklisiastika Symvoulia	Metropolitan Ecclesiastical Councils
MESE	Morfotikos Ekpolitistikos Syllogos Elevsinos	Elevsis Educational and Cultural Association
METVA	Metallourgiki Viomikhania Aigaiou	Aegean Metallurgical Industry
MEVEA	Mesogeiakai Epikheiriseis Viomikhanias-Emboriou-Andiprosopeion	Mediterranean Industrial, Commercial, and Distribution Enterprises
MEY	Metallion Evdokimou Ypiresias	Medal of Honorable Service
MFI	Benakeion Fytopathologikon Institouton	Benakeion Plant Pathology Institute [Note: initial letters of Benakeion are "mp" in Greek]
MI K YO	Mikhanografiko Kendron Ypourgeiou Oikonomikon	Ministry of Finance Computer Center
mk	megakykloi	megacycles (mc)
MKh	Meta Khristou	A.D. (Anno Domini)
MKK	Monimo Kefalaio Kiniseos	Permanent Working Capital
MLKE	Marxistiki Leninistiki Kinisi Ellados	Marxist-Leninist Movement of Greece
mm	meta mesimvrian	PM (Post Meridian)
MMAD	Mikhanokinitos Monas Amesou Draseos	Instant Action Motorized Unit

MME	Mikromesaies Epikheiriseis	Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
MOA	Mikti Orkhistra Athinon	Athens Mixed Orchestra
MODNE	Mathitiki Organosi Dimokratikis Neolaias Ellados	Student Organization of Democratic Youth of Greece
MOEAK	Mystiki Organosis Ethnikis Apelevtheroseos Kyprou	Secret Organization for the National Liberation of Cyprus [C]
MOKA	Mystiki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston	Underground Organization of Cypriot Fighters [C]
MOMA	Miktai Omadai Mikhanimaton Anasyngrotiseos	Joint Reconstruction Equipment Units [See SYKEA]
MON	Makhitikai Omadai Neolaias	Fighting Youth Groups
MOOM	Monades Organoseos kai Methodon	Organization and Methods Units
MOSVIPE	Mikti Omas Stratiotikis Voitheias Inomenon Politeion en Elladi	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Unit in Greece Use: JUSMAG
MOVE	Motosyklistikos Omilos Voreiou Ellados	Motorcyclists Club of Northern Greece
MP	mesi piesis	IP; intermediate pressure, mean pressure
MPAA	Marasleios Paidagogiki Akadimia Athinon	Marasleios Pedagogical Academy of Athens
MPO	Makedoniki Politiki Organosis	Macedonian Political Organization [Bulgarian anti-Greek organization]
MS	mesi sykhnotis	MF; medium frequency

MSAN	Morfotikoi Syllogoi Agrotikis Neolaias	Agricultural Youth Educational Associations
MSF	Monimoi Synodikai Epitropai	Permanent Synodical Committees
mtf.	metaforikos	fig.; figuratively
MTN	Metokhikon Tameion Navtikou	Naval Pension Fund
MTPY	Metokhikon Tameion Politikon Ypallilon	Civil Servants Pension Fund
MTS	Metokhikon Tameion Stratou	Army Pension Fund
MTVA	Metokhikon Tameion Vasilikis Aeroporias	Royal Air Force Pension Fund
MTVN	Metokhikon Tameion Vasilikou Navtikou	Royal Navy Pension Fund
MV	Megali Vretannia	GB; Great Britain Use: UK

N

N'; n' (ni)	pendikostos, -i, -on; pendikonda; peninda	fifty; fiftieth; 50th; L
N	Nea, Neon	Nea, Neon [as in N. Smyrni, Nea Smyrni]
	Notos	S; south
NA	Notioanatolikos	SE; southeast
NAAFI		Naval, Army, and Air Force Institutes [British Armed Forces canteens] [C]
NAK	Nea Agrotiki Kinisis	New Agrarian Movement
	Neolaiistiko Andidiktatoriko Kinima	Neo-Popular Antidictatorial Movement
	Neos Astikos Kodix	New Code of Civil Procedure
NAP	Nosokomeion Anapiron Polemou	Nursing Home for War Handicapped
NAPK	Nea Anexartitos Politiki Kinisis	New Independent Political Movement
NAS	Navtikos Athlitikos Syndesmos	Naval Athletic League
NAT	Navtikon Apomakhikon Tameion	Seamen's Retirement Fund
ND	Nea Dimokratia	New Democracy
	Nomothetikon Diatagma	Legislative Decree
	Notiodytikos (anemos)	Southwesterly (wind)
NDA	Navtiki Dioikisis Aigaiou	Aegean Naval Command

NDFK	Neon Dimokratikon Foititikon Kinima	New Democratic Student Movement
NDNA	Navtiki Dioikisis Notiou Aigaiou	Southern Aegean Naval Command
NE	Nomarkhiaki Epitropi	Nome Committee
	Nomismatiki Epitropi	Currency Committee
NEA	Nea Elliniki Aristera	New Greek Left
	Neolaia Epanastaseos 21^{is} Apriliou	Youth of 21 April Revolution
NeaGSEE	Nea Geniki Synomospondia Ergatoypallilon Ellados	[See NGSEE]
NED	Neolaia Ethnikis Draseos	Youth for National Action
NEDA	Neolaia Eniaias Dimokratikis Aristeras	Youth of the United Democratic Left
NEDE	Nomos peri Eispraxeos Dimosion Esodon	Law on Collection of Public Revenues
NE DI K	Neolaia Dimokratikou Kommatos	Democratic Party Youth
NEDIPA	Nea Dimokratiki Parataxi	New Democratic Party
	Neolaia Dimokratikis Parataxis	Democratic Party Youth
NEDISY	Neolaia tou Dimokratikou Synargermou	Democratic Rally Youth [C]
NEDKE	Neon Ethnikon Dimokratikon Komma Ellinon	New National Democratic Party of Greeks
NEE	Navtikon Epimelitirion Ellados	Merchant Marine Chamber of Greece

NEK	Neo Elliniko Komma	New Greek Party
NEKA	Nea Ergatiki Kinisis Athinon	New Labor Movement of Athens
	Nomarkhiaki Epitropi Katapolemiseos Analfavitismou	Nome Anti-Illiteracy Committee
Neolaia AETOU	Neolaia Andistasiakis Ethnikis Vasilikis Organoseos Ellinon	Youth of the Greek National Resistance Royalist Organization
Neolaia PEV	Neolaia Panelliniou Enoseos Vasilikon	Youth of the Panhellenic Union of Royalists
Neolaia VEO	Neolaia Vasilikis Ethnikis Organoseos	Youth of the Royalist National Organization
Neolaia VEP	Neolaia Vasilikis Ethnikis Parataxeos	Youth of the National Faction of Royalists
NEP	Nea Ergatoypalliliki Parataxis [Also: Nea Ergatiki Parataxis]	New Labor Faction
	Nomarkhiaki Epitropi Pistoseon	Nome Credit Committee
NGP	Nomiko Grafeio Prothypourgou	Prime Minister's Legal Office
NGSEE	Nea Geniki Synomospondia Ergatoypallilon Ellados	New Greek General Confederation of Labor [Also: NeaGSEE]
NIEE	Nosilevtikon Idryma Ekklisias Ellados	Nursing Foundation of the Church of Greece
NIEN	Nosilevtikon Idryma Emborikou Navtikou	Maritime Workers Nursing Home
NIETh	Nosilevtikon Idryma Ergaton Thalassis	Maritime Workers Nursing Home

NIKE	Nosilevtikon Idryma Klirikon Ellados	Nursing Home for Greek Clergy
NIMTS	Nosilevtikon Idryma Metokhikou Tameiou Stratou	Army Pension Fund Nursing Home
NKDA	Nea Kinisi Dikigoron Athinon	New Movement of Athens Attorneys
NKEA	Nea Kinisi Emboron Athinon	New Movement of Athens Merchants
NMA	Neon Maknitikon Aeroskafos	New Fighter Aircraft
NME	Navtiko Mouseio tis Ellados	Naval Museum of Greece
NNA	Navtikon Nosokomeion Athinon	Athens Naval Hospital
	notio-notio-anatolikos	SSE; south-southeast
NNP	Navtikon Nosokomeion Peiraios	Piraeus Naval Hospital
NO	Navtikos Omilos	Yacht Club
NOE	Navtikos Omilos Ellados	Yacht Club of Greece
	(Skholi) Nomikon kai Oikonomikon Epistimon	(School of) Law and Economic Sciences [See SNOE]
NOR	Navtikos Omilos Rodou	Rhodes Yacht Club
NOTh	Navtikos Omilos Thessalonikis	Salonica Yacht Club
N. PASOK	Neolaia PASOK	PASOK Youth
NPDD	Nomikon Prosopon Dimosiou Dikaiou	Legal Entity of Public Law [Referring to semi-government corporations]

NPE	Nomarkhiaki Peitharkhiki Epitropi	Nome Disciplinary Committee
NPID	Nomikon Prosopon Idiotikou Dikaiou	Legal Entity of Private Law
NPK	Nea Politiki Kinisis	New Political Movement
NS	Neoi Sosialistai	New Socialists
NSESA	Nomarkhiakon Symvoulion Exoskholikis Somatikis Agogis	Nomarchy Council of Extracurricular Physical Education
NSG	Navtikon Stratologikon Grafeion	Navy Recruiting Office
NSGP	Navtikon Stratologikon Grafeion Peiraios	Piraeus Naval Recruiting Office
NSK	Nomikon Symvoulion tou Kratous	State Legal Council
NSKE	Neolaia Sosialistikou Kommatos Ellados	Youth of the Socialist Party of Greece
NSVN	Nosokomeion Stelekhon Vasilikou Navtikou	Royal Navy Cadre Hospital
NSYA	Nomarkhiakon Symvoulion Ygeias kai Asfaliseos	Nomarchy Health and Insurance Council
NT	Nea Taxis	New Order
	Nomarkhiakon Tameion	Nomarchy Fund
NTA	Nomarkhiako Tameio Arkadias	Nome Fund of Arkadia
NYE	Nomiki Ypiresia tis Ekklisias	Church Legal Service

O

O'; o' (omikron)	evdomikonda, evdomikostos, -i, -on; evdominda	seventy; seventieth; 70th; LXX
	(omega) oktakosia; oktakosiostos, -i, -on	eight hundred; eight hundredth; 800th; DCCC
O	oxygonon	oxygen
OA	Olymbiaki Aeroporia	Olympic Airlines
OAA	Omilos Andisfairiseos Athinon	Athens Lawn Tennis Club
OAAA	Organismos Apaskholiseos kai Asfaliseos Anergias [also rendered as Organismos Apaskholiseos kai Asfaliseos kata tis Anergias]	Organization for Unemployment Insurance and Employment
OAAEE	Organosis Aoraton Agoniston Ellinikou Ethnous	Organization of Invisible Fighters of the Greek Nation
OADMA	Organismos Anegerseos Dikastikou Megarou Athinon	Organization for Constructing the Athens Court House
OAE	Omospondia Andistasiakon Ellados	Greek Federation of Resisters
	Organismos gia tin Anasyngrotisi Epikheiriseon	Organization for the Rehabilitation of Enterprises
	Organismos tis Afrikanikis Enotitos	Organization of African Unity Use: OAU
OAED	Organismos Apaskholiseos Ergatikou Dynamikou	Labor Force Employment Organization
OAG	Organismos Anaptyxeos Gis	Land Development Organization [C]
OAK	Organismos Amerikanikon Kraton	Organization of American States Use: OAS

OAN	Organismos Anelkyseos Navagion	Ship Salvage Organization
OAP	Organismos Apokhetevseos Protevousis	Capital Area Drainage Organization
OAS	Omades Asfaleias Stratevmatos	Army Security Units
	Organismos Astikon Syngoinonion	Urban Communications Organization
OASP	Organismos Andiseismikon Skhediasmon kai Prostasias	Organization for Anti-Earthquake Planning and Protection
OASTh	Organismos Astikon Syngoinonion Thessalonikis	Organization of Salonica City Communications
OAT	Omades Andimetopiseos Tarakhon	Riot Control Groups
OATh	Organismos Apokhetevseos Thessalonikis	Salonica Drainage Organization
ODA	Omada Diethnistikis Allilengyis	Group for Internationalist Solidarity
ODDEP	Organismos Dioikiseos kai Diakheiriseos Ekklisiastikis Periousias	Organization for the Administration and Management of Church Property
ODDY	Organismos Diakheirisis Dimosion Ylikon	Organization for the Handling of Public Materiel
ODEP	Organismos Dioikiseos Ekklisiastikis Periousias	Organization for the Administration of Church Property
ODEPDY	Omospondia Dioikitikou Epistimonikou Prosopikou Dimosion Ypiresion	Federation of Public Service Administrative and Professional Personnel
ODEPES	Organismos Diakheiriseos Eidikon Poron Ergasiakon Somateion	Organization for the Management of Labor Union Special Funds

ODG	Organosis Dimokratikon Gynaikon	Organization of Democratic Women [C]
ODISY	Organismos Diakheiriseos (pleonazondos) Symmakhikou Ylikou	Allied (Surplus) Materiel Management Organization
ODKD	Organismos Dimosion Ktimaton Dodekanisou	Organization of Public Properties of the Dodekanisos
ODMP	Organismos Diakheiriseos Monastiriakis Periousias	Organization for Administration of Monastery Property
ODS	Omada Drasis Staton	Army Action Group
ODYE	Omospondia Dikastikon Ypallilon Ellados	Federation of Judiciary Employees of Greece
	Omospondia Dimotikon Ypallilon Ellados	Federation of Civil Servants of Greece
OE	Oikonomiki Epitropi	Finance Committee
	Omada "Epanastasi"	"Revolution" Group
oe	omorrythmos etaireia	unlimited general partnership
OEA	Organismos Epikourikis Asfaliseos	Auxiliary Insurance Organization
OEAS	Organismos Elengkhou ton di Aftokiniton Syngoinonion	Organization for the Control of Automotive Communications
oed	oper edei deixei	Q.E.D. (Quod Erat Demonstrandum), which was to be demonstrated
OEDE	Omospondia Ergaton Dermatos Ellados	Federation of Greek Leather Workers

OEDV	Organismos Ekdoseos Didaktikon Vivlion	Organization for the Publication of Text Books
OEE	Omospondia Efimeridopolon Ellados	Federation of Greek Newspaper Vendors
OEEE	Oikonomikon Epistimonikon Epimelitirion Ellados	Economic-Scientific Chamber of Greece
OEESIO	Omospondia Elevtheron Ergatikon Somateion Imikratikon Organismon	Federation of Free Labor Unions of Semi-Governmental Organizations
OEEYDKE	Omospondia Ergatotekhniton kai Ektakton Ypallilon Dimon kai Koinotiton Ellados	Federation of Workers, Technicians, and Temporary Employees of the Municipalities and Communes of Greece
OEFEK	Omospondia Ethnikon Foititikon Enoseon Kyprou	Federation of National Student Unions of Cyprus [C]
OEFK	Oikonomiki Eforia Forologias Klironomion	Directorate of Inheritance Taxation
OEFSI	Omospondia Ellinikon Foititikon Syllogon Italias	Federation of Greek Student Associations of Italy
OEIFAE	Omospondia Epangelmation Idioktiton Fortigon Avtokiniton Ellados	Federation of Professional Truck Owners of Greece
OEK	Omospondia Ellinikon Koinotiton	Federation of Greek Communities
	Omospondia Ergodoton Kyprou	Federation of Cypriot Employers [C]
	Organismos Ellinikis Katoikias	Greek Housing Organization
	Organismos Ergatikis Katoikias	Workers Housing Organization
OEKAE	Omospondia Ergaton, Keramopoion, kai Angeioplaston Ellados	Federation of Tile, Brick, and Ceramic Workers of Greece

OEKhVE	Omospondia Ergatoypallilon Khimikis Viomikhanias Ellados	Federation of Chemical Industry Workers of Greece
OEKVE	Omospondia Ergatoypallilon Kapnoviomikhanias Ellados	Federation of Greek Tobacco Industry Workers and Employees
OELMEK	Omospondia Ellinon Leitourgon Mesis Ekpaidevseos Kyprou	Federation of Greek Secondary School Teachers of Cyprus [C]
OELTEK	Omospondia Ellinon Leitourgon Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos Kyprou	Federation of Greek Technical School Teachers of Cyprus [C]
OEM	Omospondia Ergaton Metallou	Metal Workers Federation
OEME	Organotiki Epitropi Mathitikon Ekdiloseon	Organizational Committee for Student Demonstrations [C]
OEMEE	Omospondia Ergatotekhniton Metallevtikon Epikheiriseon Ellados	Federation of Workers and Technicians of Mining Enterprises of Greece
OEMG	Omospondia Ergaton Metaforon kai Georgias	Federation of Transport and Farm Workers [C] [a SEK-affiliated union]
OEML	Organosi Ellinon Marxiston-Leniniston	Organization of Greek Marxist-Leninists
OEN	Organosis Ethnikis Neolaias	Organization of Nationalist Youth [C]
OENO	Omospondia Ellinikon Navtergatikon Organoseon	Federation of Greek Maritime Worker Organizations
OEOS	Organismos Evropaikis Oikonomikis Synergasias	Organization of European Economic Cooperation Use: OEEC

OEP	Omospondia Epangelmation Peiraios	Piraeus Tradesmen's Federation
	Organosi "Ergatiki Pali"	"Worker Struggle" Organization
OEPD	Organismos Ellinikou Papoutsiou kai Dermatos	Greek Shoe and Leather Organization
OEPTA	Omospondia Epistimonikou Prosopikou Topikis Avtodioikisis	Federation of Professional Personnel of Local Self-Administration
OES	Omada Epikheirisiakis Stratigikis	Operational Strategy Unit
	Organotiki Epitropi Syndiaskepsis	Conference Organization Committee
OESE	Omospondia Ekdromikon Somateion Ellados	Federation of Hiking Clubs of Greece
OESEKA	Omospondia Ekpaidevtikon Syllogon Ellinon Kyprion Anglias	Federation of Educational Associations of Greek Cypriots in England [C]
OESV	Organismos Ekdoseos Skholikon Vivlion	Organization for the Publication of School Books
OESVE	Omospondia Ergoliptikon Syndesmon Voreiou Ellados	Federation of Contractors Associations of Northern Greece
OETE	Omospondia Ergaton Typou Ellados	Federation of Greek Press Workers
OETY	Omospondiaki Epitropi Trapezikon Ypallilon	Federative Committee of Bank Employees
OEV	Omospondia Ergodoton kai Viomikhanon	Federation of Employers and Industrialists [C]

OEVA	Omospondia Epangelmation kai Viotekhnon Athinon	Federation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen of Athens [the last initial varies according to location]
OEY	Omospondia Eforiakon Ypallilon	Federation of Tax Assessors
	Omospondia Emborikon Ypallilon	Federation of Commercial Employees [C] [a SEK-affiliated union]
	Organismos Esoterikis Ypiresias	Internal Service Organization
OEYSK	Omospondia Ergatotekhniton kai Ypallilon Stratiotikon Katastimaton	Federation of Military Establishment Personnel [C]
OEYTE	Omospondia Ergatotekhniton-Ypallilon Tsimenton Ellados	Federation of Greek Cement Industry Workers and Employees
OF	Omada Fandaron	Soldier's Group
OFAA	Omilos Filon Astynomikon Athinon	Association of Friends of Athens Police Officers
OFE	Omospondia Fortoekfortoton Ellados	Federation of Greek Longshoremen
OFKO	Omospondia Filathlon Kynigetikou Oplou	Hunting Weapon Sportsmen's Federation
OG	Organotikos Grammatevs	Organizational Secretary
OGA	Organosis Georgikon Asfaliseon	Farm Insurance Organization
OGE	Omospondia Gynaikon Ellados	Federation of Greek Women
OGP	Oikonomiko Grafeio Prothypourgou	Prime Minister's Economic Office

OGS	Omospondia Georgikon Synetairismon	Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives
OGSE	Omospondia Georgikon Synetairismon Ellados	Federation of Greek Agricultural Cooperatives
OIE	Omospondia Ilektrotekhniton Ellados	Federation of Greek Electricians
	Organosis Inomenon Ethnon	United Nations Organization Use: UN
OIEE	Omospondia Idiotikon Ekpaidevtikon Ellados	Federation of Private Teachers of Greece
OIEKO	Omospondia Ilektrismou kai Epikheiriseon Koinis Ofeleias	Electric Power and Public Utilities Federation
OIELE	Omospondia Idiotikon Ekpaidevtikon Leitourgon Ellados	Federation of Greek Private School Teachers
OIEN	Organosis Ithikou Exoplismou Neotitos	Youth Moral Rearmament Organization
OILP	Odigoi Idiotikon Leoforeion Peiraios	Drivers of Piraeus Privately Owned Buses
OIO	Omospondia Imikratikon Organoseon	Federation of Semi-Governmental Organizations [C] [See also OEESIO]
OIYE	Omospondia Idiotikon Ypallilon Ellados	Greek Federation of Private Employees
ok.	oka; okades	[unit of weight equal to 2.8 lb]
OKA	Organismoi Koinonikis Asfaliseos	Social Insurance Organizations

OKDE	Organosi Kommouniston Diethniston Elladas	Organization of Communist Internationalists of Greece
OKE	Oikonomiki kai Koinoniki Epitropi	Economic and Social Committee
	Omades Koinovoulevtikou Ergou	Parliamentary Task Groups
	Omospondia Kafepolon Ellados	Greek Coffee Merchants Federation
	Omospondia Klostoyfandourgon Ellados	Federation of Greek Textile Workers
OKGV	Organismos Kypriakis Galaktoviomikhanias	Cypriot Dairy Industry Organization [C]
OKhEN	Orthodoxos Khristianiki Enosis Neon	Union of Orthodox Christian Youth [C]
OKhOA	Organismos Khrimatodotiseos Oikonomikis Anaptyxeos	Economic Development Funding Organization
OKhVY	Omospondia (ergaton, tekhniton kai ypallilon) Khimikis Viomikhanias kai Ygieinis	Federation (of workers, technicians, and employees) of the Chemical Industry and Sanitation
OKLA	Organismos Kendrikis Lakhanagoras Athinon	Athens Central Vegetable-Market Organization
OKLE	"Organosi Kommouniston Laiki Excusia"	"Popular Power Organization of Communists"
OKMLE	Organosi Kommouniston Marxiston-Leniniston Ellada	Greek Marxist- Leninist Communist Organization
OKNE	Omospondia Kommounistikis Neolaias Ellados	Federation of Greek Communist Youth
OKP	Organismoi Koinonikis Politikis	Social Policy Organizations

OKPYP	oloklliromena kyklomata poly ypsilon takhytiton	very high speed integrated circuits
OKS	Omospondia Katanalotikon Synetairismon	Federation of Consumer Cooperatives
	Organismos tou Kendrikou Symfonou	Central Treaty Organization Use: CENTO
OKSE	Omospondia Kyvernitikon kai Stratiotikon Ergaton	Federation of Government and Military Workers [C] [a SEK-affiliated union]
OKThE	Organismos Kratikon Theatron Ellados	Greek State Theater Organization
OLA	Omada Larkis Andistasia	Group for Popular Resistance
	Organosis Laikis Amynis	People's Defense Organization
OLE	Organosi Laikis Exousias	Organization of Popular Sovereignty
OLIE	Omospondia Leitourgon Idiotikis Ekpaidevseos	Federation of Private School Teachers
OLK	Organismos Limenon Kyprou	Cyprus Port Authority [C]
OLKA	Oikonomiko-Logistiko Kendro Aeroporias	Air Force Financial-Accounting Center
OLME	Omospondia Leitourgon Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Federation of Secondary School Teachers
OLNE	Organosis Leninistikis Neolaias Ellados	Organization of Leninist Youth of Greece
OLP	Organismos Limenos Peiraios	Piraeus Port Authority

OLTEE	Omospondia Leitourgon Tekhnikis kai Epangelmatikis Ekpaidevseos	Federation of Technical and Business Training Teachers
OLTEK	Organosis Leitourgon Tekhnikis Ekpaidevsis Kyprou	Organization of Technical Education Teachers of Cyprus [C]
OLTh	Organismos Limenos Thessalonikis	Salonica Port Authority
OM	Omospondia Metallorykhon	Federation of Miners [C] [a SEK-affiliated union]
	"Organosi Bolsevikon"	"Organization of Bolsheviks"
	Organosi "Makhitis"	"Fighter" Organization
OME	Omospondia Metallevton Ellados	Federation of Greek Miners
OME-DEI	Omospondia Ergazomenon - Dimosia Epikheirisis Ilektrismou	Workers Federation - Public Power Corporation
OMLE	Organosis Marxiston-Leniniston Elladas	Organization of Marxist-Leninists of Greece
OM-L/LE	Organosi Marxiston - Leniniston/ Laiki Exouisia	Marxist - Leninist Organization/ Popular Power
OMP	Olokliromena Mesogeiaka Programmata	Integrated Mediterranean Programs
OMPKA	Organismos Mathitikis Pronoias kai Andillipseos	Students Training and Welfare Organization
OMS	Organosi Mathitikou Syndikalismou	Organization of Student Trade Unionism
OMTVGE	Omospondia Mikhanikon kai Thermaston Viomikhanias kai Georgias Ellados	Federation of Greek Industrial and Agricultural Mechanics and Stokers

OMIVK	Omospondia Misthoton Typou kai Viomikhanias Khartou	Federation of Salaried Press and Paper Industry Employees
ONED	Organismos Neolaias Enoseos Kendrou	Center Union [Party] Youth Organization
ONK	Oristikos Navtikos Katalogos	Definitive Naval List
ONNED	Organosis Neon tis Neas Dimokratias	Youth Organization of the New Democracy [Party]
ONPDD	Omospondia Nomikon Prospopon Dimosiou Dikaiou	Federation of Legal Entities of Public Law
OO	Omospondia Oikodomon	Builders Federation
OOE	Odiki Omospondia Ellados	Greek Roads Federation
OOGE	Omospondia Oikodomon kai Genikon Ergaton	Federation of Construction and General Workers [C] [a SEK-affiliated union]
OOSA	Organismos Oikonomikis Synergasias kai Anaptyxeos	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Use: OECD
OP	Omospondia Pratirioukhon	Federation of Gas Station Owners [See SP]
OPA	Omada gia mia Proletariaki Aristera	Group for a Proletarian Left
	Organismos Prolipseos Atykhimaton	Accident Prevention Organization
OPAIE	Organismos Perithalpseos kai Apokatastaseos Israiliton Ellados	Organization for Aid and Resettlement of Jews of Greece

OPAP	Organismos Prognostikon Agonon Podosfairou	Organization of Soccer Game Forecasters
OPDIO	Omada Programmatismou Diafotistikon Omilion	Group for the Planning of Enlightenment Speeches
OPE	Organismos Prolipseos tou Englimatos	Crime Prevention Organization
	Organismos Proothiseos Exagogon	Organization for Exports Promotion
	Organosis Pankypriakis Enotitas	Organization for Pan-Cyprian Unity [C]
	Oulamos Prolipseos Englimatos	Crime Prevention Squad [C]
OPEK	Organosis Prostasias Ellinon Kyprion	Organization for the Protection of Greek Cypriots [C]
OPEKh		Use: OPEC
OPEOE	Omospondia Pandopolon, Edodimopolon, kai Oinopandopolon Ellados	Federation of Grocers, Food Dealers, and Wine Merchants of Greece
OPEP	Omospondia Prosopikou Etaireion Petrelaioeidon	Federation of Personnel of Petroleum Products Companies
	Organismos Protypon kai Elenkhou Poiotitos	Standards and Quality Control Organization
OPKhV	Omospondia Prosopikou Khimikis Viomikhanias	Federation of Chemical Industry Personnel
OPLA	Omades Prostasias Laikou Agonos	Units for the Protection of the People's Struggle
OPODD	Omospondia Prosopikou Organismon Dimosiou Dikaiou	Federation of Personnel of Public Law Organizations

OPOEKh	Organosis Politikis kai Oikonomikis Epistratevseos tis Khoras	Organization for the Political and Economic Mobilization of the Nation
OPOY	Omospondia Perifereiakon Oikonomikon Ypallilon	Federation of Regional Finance Employees
OPP	Omades Politikis Protovoulias	Political Initiative Groups
	Organoseis Prostasias Perivallondos	Environmental Protection Organizations
OPPE	Omospondia Palaion Polemiston Ellados	Federation of Greek Veterans
	Organismos Palaion Polemiston Ellados	Organization of Greek Veterans
OPSE	Omospondia Prosfygikon Somateion Ellados	Federation of Refugee Associations of Greece
OPXAE	Omospondia Prosopikou Xenon Aeroporikon Etaireion	Federation of Foreign Airline Company Personnel
OPYK	Omospondia Politon Ygron Kavsimon	Federation of Liquid Fuel Dealers
ORYSPPA	Organismos Rythmistikou Skhediou kai Perivallondikis Prostasias Athinon	Organization for Regulatory Planning and Environmental Protection of Athens
OS	Omada "Gia ton Sosialismo"	Group "For Socialism"
OSE	Omospondia Syndaxioukhon Ellados	Federation of Greek Pensioners
	Organismos Sidirodromon Ellados	Railways Organization of Greece [successor to SEK]
	Organosi Sosialistikis Epanastaseos	Socialist Revolutionary Organization

OSELMA	Organismos Synetairistikis Ekmetallevseos Limnothalassis Mesolongiou kai Aitolikou	Organization for the Cooperative Exploitation of the Mesolongion and Aitolikon Marshlands
OSK	Omospondia Syndaxioukhon Kapnergaton	Federation of Pensioned Tobacco Workers
	Organismos Skholikon Ktirion	School Buildings Organization
OSNIE	Omospondia Syllogon Nosilevtikon Idrymaton Ellados	Federation of Greek Nursing Home Societies
OSPA	Omospondia Somateion Politikis Aeroporias	Federation of Civil Aviation Associations
OSV	Organismos tou Symfonou tis Varsovias	Use: Warsaw Pact
OSVA	Organismos tis Synthikis tou Voreiou Atlandikou	Use: NATO
OSYGO	Omospondia Synetairistikon Ypallilon Georgikon Organoseon	Federation of Employees of Agricultural Cooperative Organizations
OTA	Organismoi Topikis Avtodioikiseos	Organizations of Local Self-Government
OTE	Omospondia Thiroron Ellados	Federation of Concierges of Greece
	Organismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados	Greek Telecommunications Organization
OTG	Organismos Trofimon kai Georgias	Food and Agricultural Organization Use: FAO
OThAK	Organismos Theatrikis Anaptyxeos Kyprou	Organization for the Theatrical Development of Cyprus [C]

OTOE	Omospondia Trapezo-ypallilikon Organoseon Ellados	Federation of Greek Bank Employee Organizations
OTP	Organismos Touristikis Pisteos	Tourist Credit Organization
OTSSE	Omospondia Topikon Spoudastikon Syllogon Ellados	Federation of Local Student Clubs of Greece
OTY	Omospondia Takhydromikon Ypallilon	Federation of Post Office Employees
OTYE	Omospondia Trapezikon Ypallilon Ellados	Federation of Bank Employees of Greece
Ounesko		Use: UNESCO
OUNFIKYP		UN Force in Cyprus Use: UNFICYP
OUNFISYP		Use: UNFICYP
OV	Organosis Vaseos	Base (Grass Roots) Organization [See KOV]
OVA	Organismos Viomikhanikis Anaptyxeos	Organization for Industrial Development
OVES	Omospondia Viomikhanikon Ergatoypallilikon Somateion	Federation of Industrial Worker and Employee Unions
OVGE	Omospondia Viomikhanikon kai Genikon Ergaton	Federation of Industrial and General Workers [C] [a SEK-affiliated union]
OVSA	Omospondia Viotekhnikon Somateion Athinon	Federation of Athens Handicrafts Associations

OVSTh	Omospondia Viotekhnikon Somateion Thessalias	Federation of Handicrafts Associations of Thessalia
OXNE	Organosis Xenonon Neotitos Ellados	Youth Hostel Organization of Greece
OYEKO	Omospondia Ypallilon Epikheiriseon Koinis Ofeleias	Federation of Public Utility Employees
OYI	Organismos Ydrevseos kai Ilektrofotismou	Water Supply and Electric Lighting Organization [followed by initial letter of location]
OYK	Omas Ypovrikhion Katastrofon	Underwater Demolition Squad
OYLE	Omospondia Ypallilon Limenon Ellados	Greek Ports Employees Federation
OYPAE	Omospondia Ypallilikou Prosopikou Avtokiniton Ellados	Federation of Transport Personnel of Greece
OYTh	Organismos Ydrevseos Thessalonikis	Salonica Water Supply Organization

P

P'; p' (pi)	
ogdoikostos, -i, -on; ogdonda; ogdoikonda	eighty; eightieth; 80th; LXXX
PA	
Proletariaki Aristera	[See OPA]
Proletariakos Agonas	Proletarian Struggle
PA.A.SOK	
Pankyprion Agrotikon Koinoniko-Dimokratikon Komma	Pan-Cyprian Agrarian Social-Democratic Party [C]
PADIK	
Paneforiaki Dimokratiki Kinisi	All-Tax Collection Democratic Movement
Pankyprion Dimokratikon Kinima	Pan-Cyprian Democratic Movement [C]
PAE	
Panellinios Aktoploiki Enosis	Panhellenic Coastal Shipping Union
Parataxis Agroton kai Ergazomenon	Agrarian and Labor Faction
PAEEK	
Podosfairiki Athlitiki Enosi Eparkhias Kyrineias	Kyrenia District Athletic Soccer Union [C]
PAEGAE	
Pronomioukhos Anonymos Etaireia Genikon Apothikon Ellados	Chartered General Warehouses Joint Stock Company of Greece
PAET	
Programma Anaptyxis Erevnas kai Tekhnologias	Research and Technology Development Program
PAK	
Paidagogiki Akadimia Kyprou	Pedagogic Academy of Cyprus [C]
Panellinion Apelevtherotikon Kinima	Panhellenic Liberation Movement
Pankyprio Andistasiako Kinima	Pan-Cyprian Resistance Movement [C]
PAKDE	
Patriotiki Koinoniki Dimokratiki Enosis	Patriotic Social Democratic Union
PAKIDI	
Panellinio Kinima Dikaiosynis	Panhellenic Movement for Justice

PAKOE	Panellinion Kendron Oikologikon Erevnon	Panhellenic Center for Ecological Research
PALMO	Panellinios Organosis Laikis Symbarastaseos	Panhellenic Organization of Popular Support
PAM	Patriotikon Antidiktatorikon Metopon	Patriotic Antidictatorial Front
	Patriotikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon	Patriotic Liberation Front
PAME	Pankyprion Ananeotikon Metopon	Pan-Cyprian Renewal Front [C]
PAMK	Panellinia Agonistiki Mathitiki Kinisi	Panhellenic Militant Student Movement
PAO	Panathinaikos Athlitikos Omilos	Pan-Athenian Athletic Club
	Panellinios Apelevtherotiki Organosis	Panhellenic Liberation Organization
	Panellinios Athlitiki Organosis	Panhellenic Athletic Organization
PAODYE	Pankyprios Anexartitos Omospondia Dimotikon Ypallilon kai Ergaton	Pan-Cyprian Independent Federation of Civil Service Employees and Workers [C]
PAOK	Panthessalonikeios Athlitikos Omilos Konstandinoupoleos	Pan-Salonica Athletic Club of Istanbul
PAP	Politiki Anexartiti Parataxis	Political Independent Faction
	Prokekhorimeni Apothiki Pyromakhikon	Advanced Ordnance Depot
para.; par.	paragrafos	paragraph
PARKE	Parataxis Kendrou	Party of the Center

PAS	Panellinios Andialkooliki Stavroforia	Panhellenic Anti-Alcohol Crusade
PASEGES	Panellinios Anotati Synomospondia Enoseon Georgikon Synetairismon	Panhellenic Supreme Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives
PASEN	Panellinia Syndonistiki Epitropi kata Narkotikon	Panhellenic Anti-Narcotics Coordinating Committee
PASEV	Panellinios Syndesmos Ekdoton Vivliou	Panhellenic Association of Book Publishers
PASKE	Panellinia Agonistiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi Ergazomenon	Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement
PASOK	Panellinion Sosialistikon Kinima	Panhellenic Socialist Movement [See also PSK]
PASP	Panellinia Agonistiki Spoudastiki Parataxi	Panhellenic Militant Student Faction
PASPE	Pandeios Anotati Skholi Politikon Epistimon	Pandeios Advanced School of Political Sciences
	Ptykhioukhoi tis Anotatis Skholis Politikon Epistimon	Graduates of the Advanced School of Political Sciences
PASYDY	Pankyprios Syndekhnia Dimosion Ypallilon	Pan-Cyprian Union of Civil Servants [C]
PASYPEE	Pankyprios Syndesomis Pligendon kai Ektopisthendon Epikheirimation	Pan-Cyprian Association of Distressed and Displaced Businessmen [C]
PATES	Paidagogiki Tekhniki Skholi	Pedagogic Technical School

PAYDS		
	Panellinios Agon Yperaspiseos tis Dimokratias kai tou Syndagmatos	Panhellenic Struggle for the Defense of Democracy and the Constitution
PAYP		
	Prokekhorimeni Apothiki Ylikou Polemou	Advanced Ordnance Depot
PD		
	Palaia Diathiki	Old Testament
	Perifereia Dimou	Municipal District
	Proedrikon Diatagma	Presidential Decree
	Prothypourgiko Diatagma	Prime Ministerial Decree
PDA		
	Perifereia Dimou Athinon	Athens Municipal Area
PDDD		
	Protovathmion Dioikitikon kai Diaititikon Dikastirion	First Instance Administrative and Arbitration Court
PDDDA		
	Protovathmio Dioikitiko Diaititiko Dikastirio Athinon	First Instance Administrative and Arbitration Court of Athens
PDE		
	Programma Dimosion Ependyseon	Public Investments Program [C]
	Proypologismos Dimosion Ependyseon	Public Investments Budget
PDEG		
	Panelliniki Dimokratiki Enosis Gynaikon	Panhellenic Women's Democratic Union
PDGA		
	Perifereiaki Dievthynsis Georgikis Anaptyxeos	Regional Directorate for Agricultural Development
PDO		
	Pankyprios Didaskaliki Organosis	Pan-Cyprian Teachers Organization [C]
	Perifereiaka Dioikitika Organa	Regional Administrative Organs
PDOG		
	Pankypriaki Dimokratiki Organosis Gynaikon	Pan-Cyprian Democratic Women's Organization [C]

PDSN		
	Pnevmatikos Desmos Spoudaston tis Neolaias	Cultural Bond of Student Youth
pe		
	parelthondos etous	of the past year; last year's
PE		
	Perifereiaki Epitropi	Regional Committee
PEA		
	Pankypria Enosi Agoniston	Pan-Cyprian Union of Fighters [C]
	Pankypriaki Enosis Apomakhon	Pan-Cyprian Veterans Union [C]
	Programma Evropaikis Anorthoseos	European Recovery Program Use: ERP
	Proodevtiki Enosis Agoniston	Progressive Fighters Union [C]
PEAEA		
	Panellinios Enosis Agoniston Ethnikis Andistaseos	Panhellenic Union of National Resistance Fighters
PEAK		
	Panavstraliaki Epitropi Avtodiatheseos Kyprou	Pan-Australian Committee for the Self-Determination of Cyprus [C]
	Panellinios Epitropi Avtodiatheseos Kyprou	Panhellenic Committee for the Self-Determination of Cyprus [C]
PEAKEL		
	Panellinia Enosis Allilengyis ston Kypriako Lao	Panhellenic Union of Solidarity With the Cypriot People
PEAKVA		
	Panellinia Epitropi Agona gia tin Katargisi ton Xenon Stratiotikon Vaseon	Panhellenic Struggle Committee for the Abolishment of Foreign Military Bases
PEAM		
	Pankypriako Ethniko Apelevtherotiko Metopo	Pan-Cyprian National Liberation Front [C]
PEAN		
	Panellinios Enosis Agonizomenon Neon	Panhellenic Union of Fighting Youth
	Patriotiki Enosis Agonizomenis Neolaias	Patriotic Union of Fighting Youth

PEAP	Panellinios Enosis Apomakhon Polemou	Panhellenic Union of War Veterans
	Pankyprios Enosis Anakoufiseos Pathondon [Also: Pankyprios Epitropi Apokatastaseos Pathondon]	Pan-Cyprian Union for Relief of the Distressed [C]
PEAT	Protypa Ergastiria Andikeimenon Tekhnis	Model Art Craft Workshops
PEATEA	Panellinios Enosis Anapiron kai Travmation Ethnikis Andistaseos Periodou 1941-44	Panhellenic Union of Wounded and Disabled of the National Resistance Period 1941-1944
PEAThP	Panellinios Enosis Anapiron kai Thymaton Polemou	Panhellenic Union of Disabled and Victims of War
PEAYEA	Panellinios Enosis Axiomatikon-Ypaxiomatikon Ethnikis Andistaseos	Panhellenic Union of Officers and Noncommissioned Officers of the National Resistance
PEDMEDE	Panellinios Enosis Diplomatoukhon Mikhanikon Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon	Panhellenic Union of Licensed Engineer Public Works Contractors
PEDMIEDE	Panellinios Enosis Diplomatoukhon Mikhanikon kai Ilektrologon Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon	Panhellenic Union of Licensed Mechanical and Electrical Engineer Public Works Contractors
PEDPA	Perifereiaki Dievthynsis Politikis Amynis	Regional Civil Defense Directorate [C]
PEE	Panellinia Enosis Ethnikofronon	Panhellenic Union of Nationalists
	Pankypriaki Epitropi Eirinis	Pan-Cyprian Peace Committe [C]
	Pankypriaki Epitropi Englovismenon	Pan-Cyprian Committee of Enclaved Persons [C]

PEEA	Panellinios Enosis Efedron Axiomatikon	Panhellenic Union of Reserve Officers
	Pankyprios Enosis Epangelmation Avtokinitiston	Pan-Cyprian Union of Professional Drivers [C]
	Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apelevtheroseos	Political Committee for National Liberation
PEEEPP	Panellinia Enosis Epanapatristhendon Ellinon Politikon Prosfygon	Panhellenic Union of Repatriated Greek Political Refugees
PEEG	Panellinios Enosis Ergazomenon Gynaikon	Panhellenic Union of Working Women
PEEK	Panellinios Epitropi Enoseos Kyprou	Panhellenic Committee for the Union with Cyprus
PEEL	Panellinios Enosis Epangelmation Logiston	Panhellenic Union of Professional Accountants
PEETh	Panellinios Enosis Elevtherou Theatrou	Panhellenic Union of the Free Theater
PEEY	Panellinia Enosi Eforiakon Ypallilon	Panhellenic Union of Tax Collection Employees
PEEYOV	Panellinia Enosi Ergatotekhniton kai Ypallilon tou Organismou Vamvakos	Panhellenic Union of the Cotton Organization Technical Workers and Employees
PEFIP	Panellinia Enosi Filon tou Polytekhneiou	Panhellenic Union of Friends of the Polytechnic Institute
PEFND	Panellinios Enosis Filon Neas Dimokratias	Panhellenic Union of Friends of New Democracy
PEFP	Panellinios Enosis Filon ton Polyteknon	Panhellenic Union of Friends of Parents of Large Families

PEG	Panelladiki Enosis Gynaikon	Panhellenic Women's Union
PEGA	Proodevtiki Enosis Gynaikon Ammokhostou	Progressive Union of Famagusta Women [C]
PEGDY	Panellinia Enosi Geoponon Dimosion Ypallilon	Panhellenic Union of Civil Servant Agriculturists
	Panellinios Enosi Gynaikon Dimosion Ypallilon	Panhellenic Union of Women Civil Servants
PEGO	Pankypriaki Ethniki Gynaikeia Organosis	Pan-Cyprian National Women's Organization [C]
PEGSAAA	Pankypria Epitropi Goneon kai Syngenon Adiloton Aikhmaloton kai Agnooumenon	Pan-Cyprian Committee of Parents and Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons [C]
PEGSAAAKT	Panellinios Epitropi Goneon kai Syngenon Adiloton Aikhmaloton kai Agnooumenon tis Kypriakis Tragodias	Panhellenic Committee of Parents and Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Mission Persons of the Cyprus Tragedy [C]
PEIAIKh	Panellinios Enosis Idioktiton Avtokiniton Idiotikis Khriseos	Panhellenic Union of Owners of Private Use Vehicles
PEIK	Panellinios Enosi Idiotikon Klinikon	Panhellenic Union of Private Clinics
PEK	Panagrotiki Enosis Kyprou	Pan-Agrarian Union of Cyprus [C]
	Panellinios Enosis Kinimatografiston	Panhellenic Cinematographers Union
	Perifereiakai Epitropai Katanomon	Regional Apportionment Committee
	Proodevtiki Enotiki Kinisi	Progressive Union Movement
PEKA	Pankyprios Enosis Kyprion Agoniston	Pan-Cyprian Union of Cypriot Fighters [C]

	Panspoudastiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos	All-Students Committee of the Cyprus Struggle [C]
	Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos	Political Committee of the Cyprus Struggle [C]
PEKDY	Panellinia Enosi Ktiniatron Dimosion Ypallilon	Panhellenic Union of Veterinary Civil Servants
PEKh	Pankyprios Enosis Khimikon	Pan-Cyprian Chemists Union [C]
PEM	Pankypriaki Enosis Mikrokatastimatarkhon	Pan-Cyprian Union of Small Shopkeepers [C]
	Pankypriakon Enotikon Metopon	Pan-Cyprian Unifying Front [C]
	Pankyprion Ergatoagrotikon Metopon	Pan-Cyprian Labor Agrarian Front [C]
PEMA	Pankyprion Eniaion Metopon Agoniston	Pan-Cyprian United Fighters' Front [C]
PEME	Proodevtiki Enosi Miteron Ellados	Progressive Union of Greek Mothers
PEMEK	Panellinios Enosis Mikhanikon Esoterikis Kavseos	Panhellenic Union of Internal Combustion Engineers
PEMEN	Panellinios Enosis Mikhanikon Emborikou Navtikou	Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Engineers
PEMOEA	Panellinios Enosis Makhiton Omadon Ethnikis Andistaseos	Panhellenic Union of Fighter Groups of the National Resistance
PEMOP	Panepistimiaki Etaireia Meletis ton Oikonomikon Provlimaton	University Association for the Study of Economic Problems
PEN	Panellinios Enosis Navton	Panhellenic Seamen's Union
	Pankypriaki Ethniki Neolaia	Pan-Cyprian Nationalist Youth [C]
	Pnevmatiki Estia Nikaias	Nikaia Cultural Home

PENE	Panellinios Ethniki Navtergatiki Enosis	Panhellenic National Maritime Workers Union
PENEN	Panellinios Enosis Navtomageiron Emborikis Navtilias "O Agios Spyridon"	Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Cooks "Agios Spyridon"
	Panellinios Enosis Navton Emborikis Navtilias	Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Seamen
PEO	Pankyprios Ergatiki Omospondia [sometimes given as Pankypriaki Ergatiki Omospondia]	Pan-Cyprian Labor Federation [C]
PEOIATA	Panellinios Ethniki Omospondia Idioktiton Avtokiniton Taxi kai Agoraion	Panhellenic National Federation of Owners of Taxis and Vehicles for Hire
PEOM	Pankypria Ethniki Organosis Mathiton	Pan-Cyprian National Students Organization [C]
PEON	Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neolaias [Also: Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis Neon]	Pan-Cyprian National Youth Organization [C]
PEOPEF	Panellinios Enosis Oikogeneion Politikon Exoriston kai Fylakismenon	Panhellenic Union of Families of Political Exiles and Prisoners
PEP	Pankyprios Epitropi Prosfygon	Pan-Cyprian Refugee Committee [C]
PEPASY-OTE	Panellinios Enosi Ptykhioukhon Anotaton Skholon Ypallilon OTE	Panhellenic Union of OTE (Greek Telecommunications Organization) Employees Graduates of Advanced Schools
PEPEN	Panellinios Enosis Ploiarkhon Emborikis Navtilias	Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Masters

PEPG	Pankyprios Enosis Proodevtikon Gynaikon	Pan-Cyprian Union of Progressive Women [C]
PEPPVE	Perifereiaki Epitropi Prostasias Perivalondos Voreiou Ellados	Regional Committee for the Environmental Protection of Northern Greece
PEPT	Panellinia Ekthesis Poton kai Trofimon	Panhellenic Exposition of Beverages and Food
PERP	Programma Elenkhou Rypanseos Perivallondos	Pollution and Environment Control Program
PESAEN	Panellinios Enosis Syzygon Axiomatikon Emborikou Navtikou	Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Officers' Wives
PESEA	Panellinios Enosis Syndesmon Ethnikis Andistaseos	Panhellenic Union of National Resistance Associations
PESEDE	Panellinios Enosis Syndesmon Ergolipton Dimosion Ergon	Panhellenic Union of Public Works Contractors Associations
PESEN	Panellinios Enosis Syndaxioukhon Emborikou Navtikou	Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine Pensioners
PESESY	Syndekhnia Ypallilon Symvoulion Ydatopromitheias	Union of Water Supply Boards Employees [C]
PESI	Panellinia Enosi Sofronistikon Idrymaton	Panhellenic Union of Correctional Institutions
PESIE	Panellinia Enosi Synetairismon Ilektrologon-Engatastaton	Panhellenic Union of Electrician and Installer Cooperatives
PESK	Panellinios Epitropi Symbarastaseos Kyprou	Panhellenic Committee for Aid to Cyprus
PESN	Panellinios Ergazomeni kai Spoudazousa Neolaia	Panhellenic Working and Studying Youth

PESP	Pankypriaki Elliniki Sosialistiki Profylaki	Pan-Cyprian Greek Socialist Vanguard [C]
	Proodevtiki Ergatiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi	Workers Progressive Trade Union Faction
PESPEF	Panellinios Enosis Syngenon Politikon Exoriston kai Fylakismenon	Panhellenic Union of Relatives of Political Exiles and Prisoners
PETh	Panellinios Enosis Thalamipolon	Panhellenic Union of Stewards
	Pronoia Ergaton Thalassis	Maritime Workers Welfare
PEThGK	Panellinios Enosis Thimaton Germanikis Katokhis "O Foinix"	"Phoenix" Panhellenic Union of Victims of the German Occupation
PEThTh	Panellinios Enosis Thermaston Thalassis	Panhellenic Union of Sea Stokers
PEV	Panellinios Enosis Vasilofronon	Panhellenic Union of Royalists
PEVD	Panellinion Kinima Vasilevomenis Dimokratias	Panhellenic Movement for a Royalist Republic
PEVEV	Panellinios Ethniki Vasiliki Enosi Voreioelladiton	Panhellenic National Royalist Union of Northern Greeks
PEVK	Panellinia Enosis Viomikhanon Klostoyfandourgias	Panhellenic Union of Spinning Mill Manufacturers
PEYDD	Panellinia Enosi Ypallilon Dioikitikon Dikastirion	Panhellenic Union of Administrative Courts Employees
PEYKE	Panellinios Enosis Ypallilon Kinimatografikon Epikheiriseon	Panhellenic Union of Employees of Motion Picture Enterprises
Pez.	Pezikon	Infantry

PFD	Protovathmion Forologikon Dikastirion	First Instance Tax Court
PFK	Pan-Foititikon Kinima	All-Student Movement
PFS	Panellinios Farmakevtikos Syllogos	Panhellenic Pharmaceutical Society
	Pankyprios Farmakevtikos Syndesmos	Pan-Cyprian Pharmaceutical Society [C]
PG	Politikon Grafeion	Politburo
PGAP	Poleodomikon Grafeion Athinon kai Perikhoron	City Planning Office of Athens and Suburbs
PGK	Proodevtiki Gynaikeia Kinisi	Progressive Women's Movement [C]
PGL	Proodevtikai Gynaikai Larnakos	Progressive Women of Larnaca [C]
PGO	Panelladiki Omospondia Gynaikon	Panhelladic Federation of Women
PGS	Panellinios Gymnastikos Syllogos	Panhellenic Gymnastic Club
	Panionios Gymnastikos Syllogos	Pan-Ionian Gymnastic Club
p.i.	palaion imerologion	old calendar
PIKPA	Patriotikon Idryma Koinonikis Prononias kai Andilipseos	Patriotic Institute of Social Aid and Welfare
PIS	Panellinios Iatrikos Syllogos	Panhellenic Medical Association
	Pankyprios Iatrikos Syllogos	Pan-Cyprian Medical Association [C]
PK	Patriotiko Kinima	Patriotic Movement
	Poinikos Kodix	Penal Code

	Proedros Kyverniseos	President [automobile license plate designation]
	Proodevtikon Komma	Progressive Party
	Prothypourgos Kyverniseos	Prime Minister [automobile license plate designation]
PKAE	Politikon Komma Agroton Ellados	Farmers' Political Party of Greece
PKD	Panellinia Kinisi Dasologon	Panhellenic Foresters Movement
PKE	Programma Kyvernitikou Ergou	Government Task Program
PKED	Panellinia Kinisi Epangelmatikon Dikigoron	Panhellenic Movement of Professional Attorneys
PKEN	Pnevmatiki Kinisis Ellinikis Neolaias	Intellectual Union of Young Greek Professionals
PKENNE	Pnevmatiki Kinisis Ellinikis Neolaias Neon Epistimonon	Intellectual Movement of Greek Youth and Young Professionals
p. kh.	paradeigmatos kharin	for example (e.g.)
PKh	Pro Khristou	B.C. (Before Christ)
PKhA	pithanos khronos afixeos	estimated time of arrival
PKhAn	pithanos khronos anakhoriseos	estimated time of departure
PKhDE	Pangosmia Khristianiki Dimokratiki Enosis	World Christian Democratic Union
PKO	Panellinios Kapnergatiki Omospondia [also appears as Pandelladiki Kapnergatiki Omospondia]	Panhellenic Tobacco Workers Federation

PKOE		[See PAKOE]
PKVD	Panellinios Kinisis Vasilevomenis Dimokratias	Panhellenic Movement for a Crowned Republic
pl/khos	ploiarkhos	captain (Navy); master (Merchant Marine)
PM	Patriotikon Metopon	Patriotic Front
PME	Pteryx Miktis Ekpaidevseos	Joint Training Wing [Air Force]
PMO	Pangosmios Meteorologikos Organismos	World Meteorological Organization Use: WMO
PMSP	Proodevtiki Mathitiki Spoudastiki Parataxi	Progressive Student Faction
	Proodevtiki Mathitiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi	Progressive Student Trade Union Faction
PN	Polemikon Navtikon	Navy
PNE	PASOK Nomarkhiaki Epitropi	PASOK Nome Committee
	Programma Nomothetikou Ergou	Legislative Task Program
PNO	Panellinios Navtiki Omospondia	Panhellenic Seamen's Federation
PNPDD	Praxeis Nomikon Prosopon Dimosiou Dikaiou	Acts of Legal Entities of Public Law
POA	Panellinios Omospondia Aliergaton	Panhellenic Federation of Fishing Industry Workers
	Panellinios Omospondia Artergaton	Panhellenic Federation of Bakery Workers

	Pankyprios Organosis Anapiron	Pan-Cyprian Organization of the Disabled [C]
	Pezoporikos Omilos Athinon	Athens Walking Club
POAA	Pankyprios Organosis Apokatastaseos Anapiron	Pan-Cyprian Rehabilitation Organization for the Handicapped [C]
POAAP	Panellinios Omospondia Astegon Aston Prosfygon	Panhellenic Federation of Homeless Urban Refugees
POAEA	Panellinios Organosis Agoniston Ethnikis Andistaseos	Panhellenic Organization of National Resistance Fighters
POAP	Pangosmios Omospondia Adelfopoiimenon Poleon	World Federation of Sister Cities
POAS	Pankyprios Omospondia Anexartiton Syndekhnion	Pan-Cyprian Federation of Independent Trade Unions [C]
POAYA	Panellinios Omospondia Artergaton kai Ypallilon Artou	Panhellenic Federation of Bakery Workers
POAYL	Panellinios Omospondia Avtokinitiston Yperastikon Leoforeion	Panhellenic Federation of Interurban Bus Drivers
POAYS	Panellinios Omospondia Avtokinitiston Yperastikon Syngoinonion	Panhellenic Federation of Drivers in Interurban Transportation
PODDY	Panellinia Omospondia Dasofylakon Dimosion Ypallilon	Panhellenic Federation of Civil Servant Forest Rangers
PODG	Pangosmios Organismos Dimokratikon Gynaikon	World Federation of Democratic Women Use: WFDW

PODN	Pangosmios Organosis Dimokratikis Neolaias	World Federation of Democratic Youth Use: WFDY
PODY	Pankyprios Organosis Dimokratikon Gynaikon	Pan-Cyprian Organization of Democratic Women [C]
POE	Patriarkhiki Oikonomiki Epitropi	Patriarchal Finance Committee
POEA	Pankypria Omospondia Efedron Axiomatikon	Pan-Cyprian Federation of Reserve Officers [C]
POED	Pankyprios Organosis Ellinon Didaskalon	Pan-Cyprian Greek Teachers Organization [C]
POEEYTE	Panellinios Omospondia Ergaton Episitismou kai Ypallilon Touristikon Epangelmaton	Panhellenic Federation of Food Supply and Tourist Trades Workers
POEI	Panellinios Omospondia Ergatoypallilon Imatismou	Panhellenic Federation of Garment Workers and Employees
POEK	Panellinios Omospondia Ergatoypallilon Kreatos	Panhellenic Federation of Meat Industry Workers and Employees
POEKO	Panellinia Omospondia Emborikon Kladikon Organoseon	Panhellenic Federation of Commercial Branch Organizations
POELIME	Pankyprios Organosis Ellinon Leitourgon Idiotikis Mesis Ekpaidevseos	Pan-Cyprian Organization of Greek Private Secondary School Teachers [C]
POEM	Panellinios Omospondia Ergaton Metallou	Panhellenic Federation of Metal Workers
POEO	Panellinios Omospondia Ergatotekhniton Oikodomon	Panhellenic Federation of Building Trades Workers

POEOX	Panellinios Omospondia Ergatoypallilon Oikodomon kai Xylou	Panhellenic Federation of Construction and Lumber Workers
POES	Pangosmios Omospondia ton Ergatikon Syndikaton	World Federation of Trade Unions Use: WFTU
POEV	Panellinia Omospondia Ekdoton-Vivliopolon	Panhellenic Federation of Publishers and Book Sellers
POEYGTP	Panellinios Omospondia Ergatotekhniton-Ypallilon Galaktos, Trofimon, kai Poton	Panhellenic Federation of Milk, Food, and Beverage Personnel
POEYPEPG	Panellinios Omospondia Ergatotekhniton kai Ypallilon Paragogis, Epexergasias kai Poliseos Galaktos	Panhellenic Federation of Milk Production, Processing, and Sales Personnel
POFE	Panellinios Organosis Filelevtheron Ellinidon	Panhellenic Organization of Liberal Women
POFI	Panellinios Omospondia Fotos kai Ikhou	Panhellenic Federation of Light and Sound
POFNE	Pankypria Omospondia Foititon kai Neon Epistimonon	Pan-Cyprian Federation of Students and Young Professionals [C]
POGO	Pankyprios Omospondia Gynaikeion Organoseon	Pan-Cyprian Federation of Women's Organizations [C]
POIAL	Panellinios Omospondia Idioktiton Astikon Leoforeion	Panhellenic Federation of Urban Bus Owners
POIEKO	Panellinios Omospondia Ilektrismou kai Epikheiriseon Koinis Ofeleias	Panhellenic Federation of Electric Power and Public Utility Enterprises
POK	Panellinion Oikologikon Kinima	Panhellenic Ecological Movement

POKAEI	Panellinia Omospondia Kathigiton Anotaton Ekpaidevtikon Idrymaton	Panhellenic Federation of Professors of Advanced Educational Institutes
	Panellinia Omospondia Kathigiton Anotaton Ekpaidevtikon Idrymaton	Panhellenic Federation of Teachers of Advanced Educational Establishments
POKE	Panellinios Organosis Kinimatografikon Epikheiriseon	Panhellenic Organization of Motion Picture Enterprises
POKY	Panellinios Omospondia Koinotikon Ypallilon	Panhellenic Federation of Communal Employees
POL	Panellinios Omospondia Logiston	Panhellenic Accountants Federation
POLAG	Panellinios Omospondia Leoforeioukhon Agonon Grammon	Panhellenic Federation of Unprofitable Bus Line Operators
POLYAG	Panellinios Omospondia Leoforeioukhon Yperastikon Agonon Grammon	Panhellenic Federation of Unprofitable Interurban Bus Line Operators
POME	Panellinios Omospondia Mousikon Ellados	Panhellenic Federation of Greek Musicians
POMM	Panellinios Omospondia Milergato-ypallilon kai Makaronotekhniton	Panhellenic Federation of Mill and Macaroni Workers and Employees
PON	Panellinios Omospondia Navtikon	Panhellenic Seamen's Federation
	Panellinios Organosis Neolaias	Panhellenic Youth Organization
POPD	Panellinia Omospondia Prosopikou Diylistirion	Panhellenic Federation of Refinery Employees
POP-DEI	Panellinios Omospondia Prosopikou DEI	Panhellenic Federation of Public Power Corporation Personnel

POPEO	Panellinios Omospondia Paragogis kai Emborias Oporokipevtikon	Panhellenic Federation of Fruit and Vegetable Producers and Marketers
POPODD	Panellinios Omospondia Prosopikou Organismon Dimosiou Dikaiou	Panhellenic Federation of Personnel of Public Law Organizations
POPP	Pangosmios Omospondia Palaion Polemiston	World Veterans Federation Use: WVF
POPS	Panellinios Omospondia Politikon Syndaxioukhon	Panhellenic Federation of Civil Pensioners
POPsY	Pangosmios Organismos Psykhikis Ygeias	World Federation for Mental Health Use: WFMH
POS	Panellinios Odondiatrikos Syllogos	Panhellenic Dental Society
	Panellinios Omospondia Sidirodromikon	Panhellenic Railwaymen's Federation
POSD	Panellinios Omospondia Syndesmon Dasoponon	Panhellenic Federation of Forestry Workers' Associations
POSG	Panellinios Omospondia Syndesmon Geoponon	Panhellenic Federation of Agriculturists' Associations
POSK	Panellinios Omospondia Syndaxioukhon Kapnergaton	Panhellenic Federation of Pensioned Tobacco Workers
POSS	Panellinios Omospondia Syndaxioukhon Sidirodromikon	Panhellenic Federation of Railroad Pensioners
POTA	Prosopikon Organismon Topikis Avtodioikiseos	Personnel of Local Self-Government Organizations
POTDY	Panellinia Omospondia Tekhnikon Dimosion Ypallilon	Panhellenic Federation of Technical Civil Servants

POTY	Panellinia Omospondia Tamiakon Ypallilon	Panhellenic Federation of Treasury Employees
POVA	Promithevtikos Organismos Vasilikis Aeroporias	Royal Air Force Procurement Organization
POVEK	Pankyprios Organosis Viotekhnon, Epangelmation kai Katastimatarkhon	Pan-Cyprian Organization of Artisans, Tradesmen, and Shopkeepers [C]
	Pankyprios Syndesmos Dianomeon Ygraeriou	Pan-Cyprian Association of Liquid Gas Distributors [C]
POVM	Panellinia Omospondia Viotekhnon Metallou	Panhellenic Federation of Metalworking Handicraftsmen
POX	Panellinia Omospondia Xenodokhon	Panhellenic Federation of Hotel Owners
POY	Pangosmios Organosis Ygeias	World Health Organization Use: WHO
POYA	Panellinia Omospondia Ypallilon Agrofylakis	Panhellenic Federation of Agrarian Police Employees
	Panellinios Omospondia Yperastikon Avtokinitiston	Panhellenic Federation of Interurban Drivers
POYPA	Panellinios Omospondia Ypallilikou Prosopikou Avtokiniton	Panhellenic Federation of Automotive Personnel
POYYPEN	Panellinia Omospondia Ypallilon Ypourgeiou Emborikis Navtilias	Panhellenic Federation of Ministry of Merchant Marine Employees
POYYPK	Panellinia Omospondia Ypallilon Ypourgeiou Proedrias Kyverniseos	Panhellenic Federation of Ministry of the Prime Minister Employees
PP	Proodevtiki Parataxis	Progressive Faction [C]

PPK	Panellinia Politistiki Kinisi	Panhellenic Cultural Movement
PPKEN	Poinikos kai Peitharkhikos Kodix Emborikou Navtikou	Merchant Marine Penal and Disciplinary Code
PPP	Proodevtiki Panspoudastiki Parataxi	Progressive Pan-Student Faction
PPSP	Proodevtiki Panspoudastiki Syndikalistiki Parataxi	Progressive Pan-Student Trade Union Faction
pr.	praktoreion	agency; agent's office
PRO-PO	Prognostika Podosfairou	Soccer Forecasts
pr/smos	proypologismos	budget
PS	Pandeios Skholi	[See PASPE]
	Perifereiakon Symvoulion	Regional Council
	Pyrosvestikon Soma	Fire Corps
PSA	Pangosmion Synedrion Apodimon	World Congress of Repatriates
	Pankyprios Syndesmos Agoniston	Pan-Cyprian League of Fighters [C]
	Pyrosvestikoi Stathmoi Athinon	Athens Firefighting Stations
PSAA	Panellinios Synomospondia Agoniston Andistaseos	Panhellenic Confederation of Resistance Fighters
PSAAThAX	Panellinios Syndesmos Axiomatikon Asyrmatou Thalassis, Aeros kai Xiras	Panhellenic Association of Marine, Air, and Land Radio Officers
PSAEEA	Panelladikos Syndesomos Agoniston Eamikis Ethnikis Andistasis	Panhellenic Association of EAM [National Liberation Front] National Resistance Fighters

PSAPY		
	Panellinios Syndesmos Atmoploikon kai Pratoreiakon Ypallilon	Panhellenic Association of Shipping and Travel Agency Employees
PSAThP		
	Panellinios Syndesmos Anapiron kai Thymaton Polemou 1912-1941	Panhellenic Association of Disabled and Victims of Wars 1912 and 1941
PSDMI		
	Panellinios Syllogos Diplomatoukhon Mikhanologon-Ilektrologon	Panhellenic Association of Licensed Mechanics and Electricians
PSE		
	Panellinios Syndesmos Exagogeon	Panhellenic Exporters Association
	Pangosmion Symvoulion Ekklision	World Council of Churches Use: WCC
	Pangosmios Synomospondia Ergaton	World Confederation of Labor Use: WCL
	Pankyprion Symvoulion Eirinis	Pan-Cyprian Peace Council [C]
	Pankyprion Symvoulion Evimerias	Pan-Cyprian Welfare Council [C]
PSEA		
	Panellinios Synomospondia Efedron Axiomatikon	Panhellenic Confederation of Reserve Officers
	Politiki Skhediaseos Ektaktou Anangis	Emergency Planning Policy
PSEDIK		
	Pankypria Syntekhnia Ergatoypallilon Dimon kai Koinotiton	Pan-Cyprian Union of Workers and Employees of Municipalities and Communities [C]
PSEDN		
	Pankyprion Soma Ethelondikis Douleias Neolaias	Pan-Cyprian Youth Corps for Volunteer Work [C]
PSEEPP		
	Pankyprios Syndesmos Ellinon Ethelondon Palaion Polemiston	Pan-Cyprian League of Greek Volunteer Veterans [C]
PSEGS		
	Panellinios Synomospondia Enoseon Georgikon Synetairismon	Panhellenic Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives

PSEGSE	Panellinios Synomospondia Enoseon Georgikon Synetairismon Ellados	Panhellenic Confederation of Agricultural Cooperative Unions of Greece
PSEODM	Panellinios Syndesmos Epikheiriseon Odikon Diethnon Metaforon	Panhellenic Association of International Road Transport Enterprises
PSEPE	Proodevtiki Syndikalistiki Ergatoypalliliki Parataxis Ellados	Progressive Labor Employee Faction of Greece
PSEPP	Proodevtiki Syndikalistiki Ergatoypalliliki Parataxis Peiraios	Progressive Labor Employee Faction of Piraeus
PSIOE	Pankyprios Syndesmos Idioktiton Okhimaton Enoikiaseos	Pan-Cyprian Association of Car Rental Owners [C]
PSIYM	Panellinios Syllogos Idiotikon Ypallilon Mikhanografiseos	Panhellenic Association of Private Machine Accounting Employees
PSK	Panellinion Sosialistikon Kinima	Panhellenic Socialist Movement [also appears as PA.SO.K--use PASOK]
	Panspoudastiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi	Pan-Student Trade Union Movement
	Proodevtiko Syndikalistiko Kinima	Progressive Trade Union Movement
PSKhM	Panellinios Syllogos Khimikon Mikhanikon	Panhellenic Association of Chemical Engineers
PSL	Panellinios Synomospondia Logiston	Panhellenic Confederation of Accountants
PSM	Panellinios Syllogos Mikhanologon	Panhellenic Association of Mechanical Engineers

PSO	Pangosmios Syndikalistiki Omospondia	World Federation of Trade Unions Use: WFTU
	Pankyprios Synergatiki Omospondia	Pan-Cyprian Cooperative Federation [C]
PSOKhS	Panellinios Synomospondia Orthodoxon Khristianikon Syndikaton	Panhellenic Confederation of Orthodox Christian Trade Unions
PSP	Ploigikos Stathmos Peiraios	Piraeus Shipping Pilots Station
	Proodevtiki Syndikalistiki Parataxis	Progressive Labor Faction
	Pyrosvestikoi Stathmoi Peiraios	Piraeus Firefighting Stations
PSPS	Panellinios Syndesmos Politikon Syndaxioukhon	Panhellenic League of Civil Pensioners
	Pyrosvestiki Skholi Pyrosvestikou Somatos	Firefighting Corps School
PST	Pankyprios Syndesmos Tourkoplikton	Pan-Cyprian Association of Victims of Turks [C]
PTA	Perifereiakon Tameion Agrofylakis	Rural Police Regional Fund
PTDP	Perifereia Teos Dioikiseos Protevousis	Former Athens Administrative Area
PTE	Pangosmios Takhydromiki Enosis	Universal Postal Union Use: UPU
PTV	Programma Tekhnikis Voitheias	Technical Assistance Program
PV	Proedros Voulis	President of Chamber of Deputies [automobile license plate designation]

P/V	Pyrovolikon	Artillery
PVE	Pteryga Vasikis Ekpaidevseos	Basic Training Wing
PVEE	Pronoia Voreion Eparkhion Ellados	Greek Northern Provinces Welfare
PVK	Pedion Volis Kritis	Crete Firing Range
py	prosopikos ypologistis	personal computer
PYE	Protovathmios Ygeionomiki Epitropi	First Degree Medical Board
PYP-	Pyrosvestiki Ypiresia Poleos -	Fire Department of the City of [plus initial of respective city]
PYRKAL	Pyromakhika kai Kalykes	Munitions and Cartridge Company
PYS	Praxis Ypourgikou Symvouliou	Act of the Ministerial Council
	Protovathmion Ypiresiakon Symvoulion	First Degree Service Council
PYSDE	Perifereiakon Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Dimotikis Ekpaidevseos	Regional Service Council for Elementary Education
PYSME	Perifereiakon Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Mesis Ekpaidevseos	District Service Council for Secondary Education
PYSSE	Perifereiakon Ypiresiakon Symvoulion Stoikheiodous Ekpaidevseos	District Service Council for Elementary Education

R

R'; r' (ro)	ekatostos, -i, -on; ekaton, ekato	one hundred; one hundredth; 100th; C
RGLYS	radiogoniometron lian ypsilis sykhnotitos	very high frequency direction finder
RIK	Radiofonikon Idryma Kyprou	Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation [See also CBC]
RSA	Rythmistikon Skhedion tis Athinas	Athens City Plan

S

S'; s' (sigma)	diakosia; diakosiostos, -i, -on	two hundred; two-hundredth; 200th; CC
S		[In lower case preceding personal name: Comrade]
SA	Skholi Alexiptotiston	Parachutists School
SAA	Skholi Astyfylakon Athinon	Athens Policemen's School
	Syndesmos Apostraton Axiomatikon	Alliance of Retired Officers [followed by initial letter of service branch]
SAAK	Synetairismoi Apokatastaseos Aktimonon Kalliergiton	Cooperatives for the Rehabilitation of Landless Farm Workers
SAAN	Skholi Axiomatikon Adelfon Nosokomon	Nurse Officers School
SADAS	Syllogos Arkhitektonon Diplomatoukhon Anotaton Skholon	Association of Advanced School Graduate Architects
SADEO	Synergazomenoi Agonistikoi Dimokratikoi Organismoi Ergazomenon	Cooperating Democratic Militant Workers and Employee Organizations
SAEE	Syndesmos Anaptyxeos Ellinikon Exoplismon	Association for the Development of Greek Armaments
SAEM	Synergazomenon Andidiktatorikon Ergatiko Kinima	Cooperating Antidictatorial Labor Movement [See AEM]
SAGA	Syllogos Anaisthisiologon Giatron Attikis	Association of Anesthesiologists of Attiki
SAGE	Symvoulion Arkhigon Genikon Epiteleion	General Staff Officers Council

SAK	Spoudastiki Andi-imperialistiki Kinisi	Student Anti-Imperialist Movement
SAKA	Syllogos Apofoiton Kollegiou Athinon	Athens College Graduates Association
SAKE	Synepis Aristeri Kinisi Elladas	Consistent Leftist Movement of Greece
SAKEK	Syndikalistiki Anexartiti Kinisi Elevtheron Dikigoron	Independent Trade Union Movement of Free Attorneys
SAL	strofes ana lepton	revolutions per minute
SALE	Syndesmos Anaptyxeos Larnakos kai Eparkhias	Larnaca City and District Development Association [C]
SAM	Slavomakedonikon Apelevtherotikon Metopon	Slav-Macedonian People's Liberation Front
SAN	Syndesmos Neon Axiomatikon	League of Young Officers
SAOV	Symvoulion Amoivaias Oikonomikis Voitheias	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Use: COMECON
SAP	Sidirodromoi Athinon-Piraios	Athens-Piraeus Railways
	Skholi Astynomias Poleon	Cities Police School
	Soma Amesou Paramvaseos	Instant Intervention Corps
	Soma Astynomias Poleon	Cities Police Corps
	Symvoulion Ambelourgikon Proiondon	Vine Products Council [C]
	Syndesmos Anapiron Polemou	League of War Disabled

SAPEA	Syndesmos Agoniston Poleos kai Eparkhias Ammokhostou	Famagusta Town and District Fighters League [C]
SAPEL	Syndesmos Agoniston Poleos kai Eparkhias Lemesou	Limassol Town and District Fighters League [C]
SAPP	Skholi Anapiron Paidon "Parnassou"	Parnassos Crippled Children's School
SARK	Syndesmos Avtoergadotoumenon Radiotekhniton Kyprou	Association of Self-Employed Radio Technicians of Cyprus [C]
SAS	Skholi Aeroporias Stratou	Army Air Force School
SASNA	Syllogikon Amyndikon Symfonon Notioanatolikis Asias	South-East Asia Treaty Organization Use: SEATO
SASPY	Syndesmos Allilovoitheias Syndaxioukhon Politikon Ypallilon	Mutual Aid Society for Pensioned Civil Employees
SAT	Sminos Apodoseos Timon	Honor Guard Squadron
SATA	Syndikaton Avtokinitiston Taxi Attikis	Attiki Taxi Drivers Trade Union
SATE	Skholes Anotatis Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos	Schools of Advanced Technical Training
	Syndesmos Anonymon Tekhnikon Etaireion	Association of Incorporated Technical Companies
SA'V	Stathmos Proton Voitheion	First Aid Station
SD	Stathmos Dioikiseos	Command Post
SDA	Stratiotiki Dievthynsis Athinon	Athens Military Directorate

SDAM	Stratiotiki Dioikisis Anatolikis Mesogeiou	Military Directorate for the Eastern Mediterranean
SDAN	Skholi Diakonisson Adelfon kai Nosokomon	School for Deaconesses and Nurses
SDE	Sosialistiki Dimokratiki Enosis	Socialist Democratic Union
	Symvoulion Dimosion Ergon	Public Works Council
SDEK	Stratiotikon Deltion Epilogis kai Katastaseos	Military Selection and Status Bulletin
SDEP	Systimata Dioikiseos, Elengkhon kai Pliroforion	Command, Control, and Information Systems
SDG	Syllogos Dimokratikon Gynaikon	Association of Democratic Women
SDI	Sivitanideion Dimosion Idryma	Sivitanideios Public Foundation
SDIEGEE	Somateion Daktylografon Idiotikon Epikheiriseon-Grafeion kai Elevtheron Epangelmaton	Union of Typists of Private Enterprises, Offices, and Liberal Professions
SDM	Synetairismoi Dytikis Makedonias	Cooperatives of Western Macedonia
SDOE	Syndesmos Diplomatoukhon Oikonomikon kai Emborikon Epistimon	Association of Economic and Commercial Sciences Graduates
SDOEE	Syndesmos Dimiourgias Oikonomikou Epimelitiriou Ellados	Association for the Creation of an Economic Chamber of Greece
SDS	Stratiotiki Dioikisis Sidirodromon	Military Administration of Railroads

SE	Skholi Evelpidon	Army Cadets Academy
	Soma Edonopoulon	EDON Corps [C]
	Symvoulevtiki Epitropi	Consultative Committee
	Symvoulion Epikrateias	Council of State
	Syndikalistiki Enotita	Syndicalist Unity
SEA	Skholai Efedron Axiomatikon	Reserve Officers Schools
	Skholi Ethnikis Amynis	National Defense School
	Soma Ellinon Alkimon	Corps of Valiant Greeks
	Syllogos Ellinon Arkhaiologon	Association of Greek Archeologists
	Syllogos Emboroypallilon Athinon	Association of Athens Commercial Employees
	Syndesmos Efedron Axiomatikon	Reserve Officers Association
	Syndesmos Ellinikis Anexartisias	Greek Independence League
SEAAKh	Skholi Epimorfoseos Anoteron Axiomatikon Khorofylakis	Gendarmery Senior Officer Training School
SEAAPP	Syndesmos Eispraktoron Avtokiniton Athinon-Peiraios-Perikhoron	Union of Bus Collectors for Athens, Piraeus, and Suburbs
SEAAS	Syllogos Ellinon Apofoiton Anotaton Skholon	Society of Greek Graduates of Advanced Schools [C]
SEAK	Spoudastiki Enotiki Andi-imperialistiki Kinisi	Student Unifying Anti-Imperialist Movement
	Syndesmos Emborikon Andiprosopon Kyprou	Association of Cypriot Sales Representatives [C]
	Syndonistiki Epitropi Agoniston Kyprou	Coordinating Committee of Cypriot Fighters [C]
	Synomospondia Epangelmation Avtokiniston Kyprou	Confederation of Professional Drivers of Cyprus [C]

SEAKEE	Syndonistiki Epitropi Andidiktatorikis Kinisis Ekpatrismenon Ellinidon	Coordinating Committee for the Antidictatorial Movement of Expatriated Greek Women
SEAN	Skholi Episkeptrion Adelfon Nosokomon	Visiting Nurses School
	Syndesmoi Efedron Axiomatikon Nomon	Nome Reserve Officers Association
SEAP	Syndikalistiki Ergatiki Agonistiki Parataxi	Labor Union Struggle Faction
SEAPK	Syllogos Exoriston kai Apofylakisthendon Politikon Kratoumenon	Association of Exiled and Released Political Prisoners
SEASOE	Syndonistiki Epitropi Andidiktatorikon Organoseon Ellados	Coordinating Committee of Antidictatorial Organizations of Greece
SEAT	Syndekhnia Ergatoypallilon tis Arkhis Tilepikoinonion	Union of Telecommunications Authority Employees [C]
SED	Stathmoi Elengkhou Diavatirion	Passport Control Stations
	Syllogos Ellinidon Dikigoron	Association of Greek Women Lawyers
	Syndesmos Ellinon Diaititon	League of Greek Arbitrators
	Syndikalistiki Ergatiki Dimokratia	Labor Union Democracy
SEDES	Synomospondia Elevtheron Dimokratikon Ergatikon Syndikaton	Confederation of Free Democratic Labor Unions
SEDIEK	Syndekhnia Ergatoypallilon Dimon kai Imidimosion Epikheiriseon Kyprou	Union of Employees of Municipal and Semi-Public Enterprises of Cyprus [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]

SEDIGEP	Synergatiki Enosis Diatheseos Georgikon Proiondon	Agricultural Products Cooperative Marketing Union [C]
SEDIK	Syndesmos Epangelmation Dimosion Skheseon Kyprou	Association of Public Relations Professional Personnel of Cyprus [C]
SEDMEK	Syndesmos Ellinon Dievthyndon Mesis Ekpaidevseos Kyprou	League of Greek Secondary School Principals of Cyprus [C]
SEDN	Syndesmos Ellinon Dimokratikon Nomikon	League of Greek Democratic Lawyers
SEDO	Syndonistiki Epitropi Dimosioypallilikon Organoseon	Coordinating Committee of Public Employee Organizations
SEDYK	Syndekhnia Epistimonon Ypallilon Kyprou	Union of Professional Civil Servants of Cyprus [C]
SEE	Sosialistiki Epanastatiki Enosi	Socialist Revolutionary Union
	Symvoulion Evropaikis Enoseos	European Union Council
	Symvoulion Exoterikou Emboriou	Foreign Trade Council
	Syndesmos Ellinidon Epistimonon	League of Greek Professional Women
	Syndesmos Erioviomikhanon Ellados	Association of Wool Manufacturers of Greece
SEED	Syndonistiki Epitropi Emmisthon Dikigoron	Salaried Attorneys Coordinating Committee
SEEFA	Syndonistiki Epitropi Ellinon Foititon Anglias	Coordinating Committee of Greek Students in England
SEEG	Syndonistiki Epitropi Ergazomenon Gynaikon	Coordinating Committee of Working Women
SEEGE	Syndonistiki Epitropi Ergazomenon Gynaikon Ellados	Coordinating Committee of Working Women of Greece

SEEKA	Syndesmos Ellinon Eisagogeon Koinis Agoras	Association of Greek Importers from the Common Market
SEENE	Syndonistiki Epitropi Ergazomenon Neon Ellados	Coordinating Committee of Working Youth of Greece
SEENGP	Syndesmos Ellinon Exagogeon Nopon Georgikon Proiondon	League of Greek Exporters of Fresh Agricultural Products
SEES	Synomospondia Elevtheron Ergatikon Syndikaton	Confederation of Free Labor Unions [C]
SEEY	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Ergaton Ependysis kai Ypodisis	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Garment and Shoe Workers [C] [a PEO-affiliated union]
SEF	Syndesmos Ellinoaigyptiakis Filias	Greek-Egyptian Friendship Association
SEFA	Syllogos Ergaton Fotaeriou Athinon	Athens Gas Workers Union
SEFG	Syllogos Ellinon Foititon Gallias	Greek Students in France Association
SEFS	Syllogos Ergazomenon Foititon Spoudaston	Association of Working Students [a fifth letter added for name of of city in which located]
SEG	Syllogos Ellinon Geologon	Association of Greek Geologists
	Syndesmos Ellinon Germanias	Association of Greeks in Germany
SEGAS	Syndesmos Ellinikon Gymnastikon kai Athlitikon Somateion	Association of Greek Gymnastic and Athletic Clubs
SEGD	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Ergaton Georgias kai Dason	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Farm and Forest Workers [C] [a PEO-affiliated union]

SEGM	Syndesmos Ellinikon Grafeion Meleton	Association of Greek Projects Research Offices
SEI	Somateion Ellinon Ithopoion	Greek Actors Association
SEK	Sidirodromoi Ellinikou Kratous	Greek State Railways [See OSE]
	Symvoulion Ethnikon Klirodotimaton	National Bequests Council
	Syndesmos Ergodoton Kyprou	Cyprus Employers Association [C]
	Synomospondia Ergaton Kyprou	Confederation of Cypriot Workers [C]
SEKA	Syndonistiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agonos	Coordinating Committee of the Cyprus Struggle [C]
SEKAM	Syndonistiki Epitropi Kanonismou Anatheseos Meleton	Coordinating Committee for Regulation of Research Assignments
SEKAP	Synetairistiki Kapnoviomikhania Ellados	Cooperative Tobacco Industry of Greece
SEKE	Sosialistikon Ergatikon Komma tis Elladas	Socialist Labor Party of Greece [forerunner of KKE]
	Synetairistiki Enosis Kapnoparagogon Ellados	Cooperative Union of Greek Tobacco Growers
SEKEP	Symvoulio Emborias Kypriakon Elaiokomikon Proiondon	Cypriot Olive Products Marketing Council [C]
SEKF	Syndonistiki Epitropi Kyprion Foititon	Cypriot Students Coordinating Committee [C]
SEKI	Somateion Ellinon Kyprion Ithopion	Greek-Cypriot Actors Association [C]

SEKNA	Syndonistiki Epitropi Kykloforias Nomou Attikis	Coordinating Committee for Attiki Nome Traffic
SEKO	Syndonistiki Epitropi Kommaton kai Organoseon	Coordinating Committee of Parties and Organizations [C]
SEKOVE	Synetairistika Ergostasia Konservopoiias Voreiou Ellados	Northern Greece Cooperative Canning Factories
SEKP	Symvoulion Emborias Kypriakon Pataton	Cyprus Potato Marketing Council [C]
SEKV	Syllogos Ekdoton Vivliou	Association of Book Publishers
SEKXA	Syndikaton Ergatotekhniton Katergasias Xylou Athinon	Athens Union of Technicians and Workers in Wood Processing
sel.	selis (selides)	p. (pp); page(s)
SEL	Syndesmos Efedron Lemesou	League of Limassol Reserves [C]
	Syndesmos Ellinon Logotekhnon	League of Greek Writers
SELE	Syllogos Enkekrimenon Logiston Ellados	Association of Greek Certified Accountants
SELETE	Skholi Ekpaidevtikon Leitourgon Epangelmatikis kai Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos	School for Teachers in Trades and Technical Education
SELPE	Syndesmos Epikheiriseon Lianikis Poliseos Ellados	Association of Retail Enterprises of Greece
SEM	Soma Efodiasmou kai Metaforon	Supply and Transportation Corps [Army]
SEMEYK	Syndekhnia Epistimonon Mikhanikon Ekpaidevtikis Ypiresias Kyprou	Union of Professional Engineers of the Cyprus Educational Service [C]

SEMME	Syllogos Ergazomenon Mathiton Mesis Ekpaidevseos Athinon	Association of Working Students in Secondary Education
SEMMIK	Syndekhnia Ergatoypallilon Metallou, Mikhanotekhniton kai Ilektrotekhniton Kyprou	Union of Metal Workers, Mechanics, and Electricians of Cyprus [C]
SEMO	Syndonistiki Epitropi ton Metallourgikon Organoseon	Coordinating Committee of Metallurgical Organizations
SEMT	Skholi Ekpaidevseos Mikhanikon Tilepikoinonias	Training School for Telecommunications Engineers
SEN	Skholi Emborikou Navtikou	Merchant Marine Academy
	Soma Ellinon Navtoproskopon	Greek Sea Scouts
	Soma Elpidoforon Neon	Corps of Hopeful Youth [C]
	Somateion Ellinidon Nomikon	Association of Greek Women Attorneys
	Symvoulion Emborikou Navtikou	Merchant Marine Council
SENA	Symvoulion Elengkhou Navtikon Atykhimaton	Council for the Control of Marine Accidents
SENAA	Syndonistiki Epitropi Neolaion Andimonarkhikou Agona	Coordinating Committee of Youth of the Antimonarchical Struggle
SENE	Syndonistiki Epitropi Neon Ergazomenon	Coordinating Committee of Working Youth
SENO	Syndonistiki Epitropi Neon Oikodomon	Coordinating Committee of Young Construction Workers
SEO	Soma Ellinidon Odigon	Greek Women Drivers Corps
	Symvoulion Epilogis Opliton	Soldier Selection Council
	Syndesmos Ellinon Oreivaton	Greek Mountain Climbers League

SEOED	Skholi Eidikon Oplon Enoplon Dynameon	Armed Forces Special Weapons School
SEOIL	Syndesmos Ergazomenon kai Odigon Idioktiton Leoforeion	Association of Employees and Drivers of Privately Owned Buses
SEOPP	Syndonistiki Epitropi Organoseon Prostasias tou Perivalondos	Coordinating Committee of Organizations for the Protection of the Environment
SEP	Skholi Epangelmatikou Prosanatolismou	Trade Orientation School
	Soma Ellinon Proskopon	Greek Boy Scouts
	Sosialistiki Epanastatiki Pali	Socialist Revolutionary Struggle
	Symfonia Emboriou kai Pliromon	Trade and Payments Agreement
	Symvoulion Elaiokomikon Proiondon	Olive Oil Products Council
	Symvoulion Emborias Pataton	Potato Marketing Council [C]
	Symvoulion Exagogikis Politikis	Export Policy Council or Board
	Systima Enorganis Prosgeioseos	Instrument Landing System
SEPA	Syngrotima Exypiretiseos Prosopikou Aeroporias	Unit for Assistance to Air Force Personnel
SEPDTh	Syndikalistiki Epitropi dia tin Prostasian ton Dimokratikon Thesmon	Trade Union Committee for the Defense of Democratic Institutions
SEPEO	Syndonistiki Epitropi Provolis Ellinikis Oikonomias	Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of the Greek Economy
SEPs	Syllogos Ellinon Psykhologon	Association of Greek Psychologists
SEPT	Syndesmos Etairion Paidikon Trofon	Union of Baby Food Companies

SEPTE	Syllogos Epistimonikou Prosopikou Trapezis tis Ellados	Association of Professional Personnel of the Bank of Greece
SEPVPS	Somateion Ergatikou Prosopikou Viomikhanion Plastikon Ylon kai Synafon Athinon-Peiraios-Perikhoron	Union of Working Personnel of the Plastics and Related Industries of Athens, Piraeus, and Suburbs
SES	Syndesmos Ethnikofronon Somateion [Also: Synomospondia Ethnikon Somaton--League of Nationalist Groups]	League of Nationalist Associations [C]
	Synomospondia Evropaikon Syndikaton	Confederation of European Trade Unions
SESME	Syndesmos Epikheiriseon Soupermarkets Ellados	Union of Super Market Firms of Greece
SET	Skholai Ekpaidevseos Tekhniton	Technicians Training Schools
	Symvoulio Erevnis Timon	Price Research Council
SETEM	Syndesmos Ergolipton Tekhnikon Ergon Makedonias	Association of Macedonia Technical Projects Contractors
SETETh	Syndesmos Ergolipton Tekhnikon Ergon Thessalonikis	Association of Salonica Technical Projects Contractors
SETT	Skholi Ekpaidevseos Tekhnikon Tilepikoinonias	School for the Training of Telecommunications Technicians
SETTIL	Skholi Ekpaidevseos Tekhniton Tilepikoinonias	School for the Training of Telecommunications Technicians
SEV	Syndesmos Ellinon Viomikhanon	Association of Greek Industrialists
SEVAP	Syndesmos Ergaton Vyrsodepson Athinon-Peiraios	Union of Athens-Piraeus Tannery Workers

SEVATh	Synetairistiki Etairia Viomikhanikis Anaptixeos Thrakis	Cooperative Association for the Industrial Development of Thraki
SEVE	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Emborikon kai Viomikhanikon Ergatoypallilon	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers [C] [a PEO-affiliated union]
	Syndesmos Ergatotekhniton Viomikhanias Elastikou	Union of Rubber Industry Workers and Technicians
SEVEGEP	Synergatiki Etaireia Viomikhanikis Epexergasias Agrotikis Paragogis	Cooperative Company for Industrial Processing of Agricultural Produce [C]
SEVOP	Syndesmos Ellinon Viomikhanon Oinon kai Poton	Association of Greek Industrialists of Wines and Beverages
SEVT	Syndesmos Ellinikon Viomikhanion Trofimon	Association of Greek Food Products Industries
SEYET	Syndikalistiki Enotita Ypallilon Ethnikis Trapezis	Syndicalist Unity of National Bank Employees
SEYPIKA	Syllogos Epistimonikou Ygeionomikou Prosopikou IKA	Association of Professional Health Personnel of the Social Insurance Foundation
SF	Soma Frondiston	Quartermaster Corps
SF/DE/SKKE	Sosialismos Filelevtheron/ Dimokratiki Enosis/Sosialistiko Komma Kinima Ellados	Liberals' Socialism/Democratic Union/Socialist Party Movement of Greece
SFEE	Syndesmos Farmakevtikon Epikheiriseon Ellados	Union of Pharmaceutical Enterprises of Greece
SFEVA	Syndonistiki Foititiki Enosi Voreioipeirotikou Agonos	Coordinating Student Union for the Northern Epirus Struggle

SFOA	Spoudazousa Foititiki Organosis Athinon	Athens Organization of Enrolled Students
SFP	Syllogos Foititon Peiraios	Piraeus Students Club
SGEFE	Syndonistikon Grafeion Ellinon Foititon Exoterikou	Coordinating Bureau of Greek Students Abroad
SGEFI	Syndonistikon Grafeion Ellinon Foititon Italias	Coordinating Office for Greek Students in Italy
SGEK	Stathmoi Georgikis Erevnis kai Ktinotrofias	Agricultural Research and Animal Breeding Stations
SI	Skholi Ippikou	Cavalry School
SIA	Skholi Iptamenon Aeroporon	Air Force Flying School
SIEFA	Syndesmos Idioktiton Elafron Fortigon Aftokiniton	League of Light Weight Truck Owners
SIEL	Syllogos Idiotikon Ekpaidevtikon Leitourgon	Association of Private School Teachers
SIFA	Syndesmos Idioktiton Fortigon Avtokiniton	League of Truck Owners
SIFMAP	Somateion Idioktiton Fortigon kai Motosykletton Athinon-Peiraios	Association of Athens-Piraeus Truck and Motorcycle Owners
SIILMT	Syndesmos Idioktiton Leoforeion Meizonos Typou	League of Owners of Large Buses
SIMO	Somateion Ithopion Melodramatos kai Operas	Association of Musical Stage and Opera Performers
sim/ros	simaioforos	Ens.; ensign [navy rank]

SIS	Stratiotiki Iatriki Skholi	Army Medical School
	Symvoulion Iatrikon Syllogon	Medical Associations Council
SIT	Soma Ippikou kai Tethorakismenon	Cavalry and Armored Corps
SITAP	Syndesmos Idioktiton Taxi Athinon kai Proasteion	Athens and Suburbs Taxi Owners Association
SK	Stratiotikos Kanonismos	Military Regulations
SKA	Somateion Ktiston Athinon	Union of Athens Builders
	Symvoulion Koininikis Asfaliseos	Social Insurance Council
	Syndesmos Koniaston Athinon	Union of Athens Plasterers
	Syndonistikon Klimakion Arogis	Detachment for Coordination of Assistance
SKAF	Syndikalistiki Kinisis Aristeron Filelevtheron	Labor Movement of Leftist Liberals
SKE	Sosialistikon Komma Ellados	Socialist Party of Greece
	Syllogos Kyprion Epistimonon	Association of Cypriot Scientists [C]
SK-ELD	Sosialistikon Komma-Enosis Laikis Dimokratias	Socialist Party-Union of Popular Democracy
SKEPA	Syndonistiki Kinisis tou Ethnikou Pandimokratikou	Coordinating Movement for the National Democratic Struggle
SKF	Sosialistiko Kinima Foititon	Student Socialist Movement
SKh	Stathmos Khorofylakis	Gendarmery Station
SKhA	Syndagma Khorofylakis Athinon	Athens Gendarmery Regiment

SKhEM	Syndikaton Khersaion Emborevmatikon Metaforon	Land Commercial Transports Trade Union
SKhM	Syllogos Khimikon Mikhanikon	Association of Chemical Engineers
SKI	Soma Ktiniatrikou kai Ipponeion	Veterinary and Remount Corps
	Syndikalistiki Kinisi Iatrikis	Medical Trade Union Movement
SKIKha	Syllogos Katokhon Idiotikis Khriseos Avtokiniton	Society of Private Automobile Owners
SKKF	Syndesmos Kypro-Koreatikis Filias	League of Cypriot-Korean Friendship [C]
SKN	Symvoulion Kriseos Nomarkhon	Council for Judging Nomarchs
	Syndekhnia Kyvernitikon Nosokomon	Union of Government Nurses [C]
SkOE	Skopevtiki Omospondia Ellados	Marksmen's Federation of Greece
SKOM	Stratiotiki Kommounistiki Organosis Makronisou	Makronisos Communist Army Organization
SKOP	Symvoulion Koinonikis kai Oikonomikis Politikis	Social and Economic Policy Council
SKP	Soma Kyprion Proskopon	Boy Scouts of Cyprus [C]
SKS	Sovieto-Kypriakos Syndesmos	Soviet-Cypriot Association [C]
SKSE	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Kyvernitikon kai Stratiotikon Ergaton	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Government and Military Workers [C] [a PEO-affiliated union]
SKT	Synergatiki Kendriki Trapeza	Cooperative Central Bank [C]

SKVVI	Stathmos Koinonikon Voitheion Vasilikou Idrymatos	Social Assistance Station of the Royal Foundation
SKYP	Skholi Klostikis Yfandikis kai Plektikis	Spinning, Weaving, and Knitting School
SLAEAA	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Limenergaton, Akhthoforon, kai Ergaton Apothikon kai Alieias	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Port Workers, Porters, and Warehouse and Fishing Workers [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]
SLD	Skholi Limenikon Dokimon	Port Cadets School
SLE	Symvoulia Laikis Epimorfosis	Councils for Training People
SM	Skholi Mathiteias	Apprenticeship School
	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Metallorykhon	(Pan-Cyprian) Miners Union [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]
SMA	Skholi Mikhanikon Aeroporias	Air Force Engineer School
SME	Skholi Metekpaidevseos Enilikon	Advanced Training School for Adults
	Syndesmos Metallevtikon Epikheiriseon	Union of Mining Companies
SMEA	Stratiotikai Monades Ethnofylakis Amynis	National Guard Military Defense Units
SMF	Syllogos Megareon Foititon	Association of Megara Students
SMGE	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Metaforon kai Genikon Ergaton	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Transport and General Workers [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]
SMI	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Mikhanotekhniton kai Ilektro-tekhniton	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Machinists and Electricians [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]

SMIVE	Syllogos Mikhanologon-Ilektrologon Voreiou Ellados	Association of Engineers-Electricians of Northern Greece
SMP	Sosialistiki Mathitiki Parataxi	Socialist Student Faction
SMY	Skholi Monimon Ypaxiomatikon	Regular Noncommissioned Officers School
SN	Stratiotikos Nomos	Military Law
SND	Skholi Navtikon Dokimon	Naval Academy
SNOE	Skholi Nomikon kai Politikon Epistimon	School of Law and Political Sciences [See NOE]
SNPAE	Syndesmos Neon dia ton Pyrinikon Afoplismon kai tin Eirinin "Bertrand Russell"	Youth League for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace [frequently referred to as the "Bertrand Russell League"]
SNPK	Syndesmos Navtikon Praktoron Kyprou	Association of Cypriot Shipping Agents [C]
SNPKI	Syllogos Nosilevtikou Prosopikou Kratikon Idrymaton	Association of State Institutions Nursing Personnel
SOAM	Stratiotikos Oikos tis Avtou Megaleiotitos	His Majesty's Military Aides
SOD	Skholi Opliton Diavivaseon	Enlisted Men's Signal Corps School
SODAP	Synergatikos Organismos Diatheseos Ambelourgikon Proiondon	Vine Products Cooperative Marketing Organization [C]
SODE(A)	Synergatikos Organismos Diatheseos Esperidoeidon (Ammokhostos)	Citrus Fruit Cooperative Marketing Organization (Famagusta) [C]

SODE(M)	Synergatikos Organismos Diatheseos Esperidoeidon (Morfou)	Citrus Fruit Cooperative Marketing Organization (Morfou) [C]
SODF	Synergatikos Organismos Diatheseos Ftharton	Cooperative Organization for the Marketing of Perishables [C]
SODY	Stegastikos Organismos Dimosion Ypallilon	Civil Servants' Housing Organization
SOE	Skholi Oikonomikon Epistimon	School of Economic Sciences
	Soma Orkoton Ektimiton	Certified Appraisers Body
	Symvoulevtiki Oikonomiki Epitropi	Advisory Economic Committee
SOESSEI	Syndonistikon Organo Synergazomenon Somateion Erevnitikon Idrymaton	Coordinating Body of Cooperating Research Institutes
SOGEK	Synergatikos Organismos Genikou Emboriou Kyprou	General Trade Cooperative Organization of Cyprus [C]
SOK	Synergatikos Organismos Kapnoparagogon	Tobacco Growers Cooperative [C]
SOL	Soma Orkoton Logiston	Certified Accountants Corps
SOO	Synetairistikos Oinopoiitikos Organismos	Cooperative Wine-Making Organization
SOPAZ	Synergatikos Organismos Paragogis Zootrofon	Animal Feeds Production Cooperative [C]
SOPE	Etaireia Prostasias Syngrafikon Dikaiomaton	Society for the Protection of Authors' Rights [C]

SOREL	Synergatikos Organismos Elaioparagogon	Olive Producers' Cooperative Organization [C]
SOVE	Symfoniki Orkhistra Voreiou Ellados	Northern Greece Symphony Orchestra
SOXGE	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Oikodomon, Xylourgon, kai Genikon Ergaton	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Construction Workers, Carpenters, and General Workers [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]
SOY	Soma Oikonomikon Ypiresion	Finance Corps [Army]
SP	Sosialistiki Poreia	Socialist Path
	Syllogos (Synomospondia) Pratirioukhon	Association of (Confederation of) Gas Station Owners [See OP]
	Syndaktiki Praxis	Constituent Act
	Syndonismeno Plegma	tuned grid
SPA	Symvoulion Pliroforion kai Asfaleias	Intelligence and Security Council
SPAK	Synepis Politikon Aristeron Kinima	Consistent Political Movement of the Left
SPAP	Sidirodromoi Peiraios-Athinon-Peloponnisou	Piraeus-Athens-Peloponnisos Railways
SPE	Sosialistiki Panspoudastiki Enosi	Socialist All-Student Union
	Symvoulion Proothiseos Exagogon	Exports Promotion Council
SPEA	Synergatiki Promithevtiki Enosis Ammokhostou-Larnakos	Famagusta-Larnaca Cooperative Supply Union [C]
SPEDA	Syndikalistiki Pandimokratiki Enosis Dikigoron Athinas	Pandemocratic Trade Unionists Union of Lawyers of Athens

SPEKA	Synetairistiki Promithevtiki kai Emboriki Enosi	Cooperative Supply and Commercial Union
SPEL	Synergatiki Promithevtiki Enosis, Ltd., Lefkosias	Nicosia Cooperative Supply Union, Ltd. [C]
SPEP	Syndesmos Proothisis Ellinikon Proiondon	Association for the Promotion of Greek Products
SPIM	Syndikalistiki Parataxi Ilektrologon-Mikhanologon	Trade Union Faction of Electricians and Mechanics
SPK	Stratiotikos Poinikos Kodix	Military Penal Code
SPKT	Symvoulion Paragogikon kai Koinonikon Taxeon	Council of Social and Productive Classes
SPMA	Syllogos Politikon Mikhanikon Athinon	Athens Civil Engineers Association
	Syndesmos Politikon Mikhanikon kai Arkhitektonon	League of Civil Engineers and Architects [C]
SPME	Syllogos Politikon Mikhanikon Ellados	Association of Civil Engineers of Greece
SPOA	Syndesmos Palaion Odigon Avtokinitiston	Association of Veteran Drivers
SPOLP	Synergatiki Promithevtiki Organosis Lemesou-Pafou	Limassol-Paphos Cooperative Supply Organization [C]
SPP	Somateion Paraiatrikou Prosopikou	Para-Medical Personnel Association
	Syndikalistiki Proodevtiki Parataxis	Progressive Labor Faction

SPPFKAS	Syndikalistiki Parataxis Proodevtikon Filelevtheron kai Anexartiton Syndikaliston	Labor Faction of Progressive Liberals and Independent Syndicalists
SR	synekhes revma	DC; direct current
SS	Sidirodromikos Stathmos	Railroad Station
	Simeiosis Syndaxeos	Editorial note; Editor's note; Ed. note
	stigma synandiseos	geographical position of interception
SSAS	Stratiotiki Skholi Axiomatikon Somaton	Corps Officers Military School
SSD	Soma Stratiotikis Dikaiosynis	[Army] Legal Corps
SSDE	Syndonistikon Symvoulion Dimosion Ependyseon	Public Investments Coordinating Council
SSE	Stratiotiki Skholi Evelpidon	Military Cadet Academy
	Syllogiki Symvasis Ergasias	Collective Labor Agreement
	Synelevsis Symvouliou Evropis	Meeting of the Council of Europe
SSEMP	Syndesmos Spoudaston Ellinikou Metsoviou Polytekhneiou	Students Association of the Greek Metsovion Polytechnic School
SSES	Syndonistikon Symvoulion ton Emborikon Syllagon	Coordinating Council of Trade Boards
SSK	Sosialistiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi	Socialist Trade Union Movement
SSKE	Sosialistiki Syndikalistiki Kinisi Ergazomenon	Socialist Trade-Unionist Workers-Employees Movement

SSP	Sosialistiki Spoudastiki Pali	Socialist Student Struggle
	Synomospondia dia tin Sotirian tou Paidiou	Save the Children Federation Use: SCF
SSSA	Stratiotiki Skholi Somatikis Agogis	Military School for Physical Training
SSXG	Stratiotiki Skholi Xenon Glosson	Military School for Foreign Languages
ST'; st'	Ekt-os, -i, -on; (exi)	6th; sixth; six; VI
STA	Skholi Tekhnikon Aeroporias	Air Force Technical School
	Somateion Typografon Athinon	Union of Athens Printers
STE	Skholi Touristikon Epangelmaton	Tourist Trades School
	Systima Taktikis Enopoiiseos	Tactical Fusion System
StE	Symvoulion tou Ethnous	Council of State
STEAM	Skholi Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos Axiomatikon Mikhanikou	Technical Training School for Engineer Corps Officers
STEAT	Skholi Tekhnikis Ekpaidevseos Axiomatikon Tekhnikon	Engineer Officers Technical Training School
STEV	Syllogos Tekhikon-Epistimonon Viomikhanias	Association of Industry Technicians-Scientists
STIAD	Skholi Tilepikoinonion-Ilektronikon Axiomatikon Diavivaseos	Telecommunications and Electronics School for Communications Officers
STY	Soma Tekhnikon Ypiresion	[Army] Technical Services Corps

SVAP	Syndesmos Viomikhanon Attikis-Piraios	Industrialists Union of Attiki-Piraeus
SVDE	Sidirodromoi Voreiodytikis Ellados	Railways for Northwestern Greece
SVE	Syndesmos Viomikhanon Endyseos	Clothing Industries Association [C]
SVIE	Skholi Voithon Iatrikon Epangelmaton	Medical Assistants School
SVP	Syndagmatiki Vasiliki Parataxis	Constitutional Royalist Faction
	Syndesmos Viomikhanon Plastikon	Association of Plastics Manufacturers
SVVE	Syndesmos Viomikhanon Voreiou Ellados	Federation of Industrialists of Northern Greece
SXEKA	(Pankypria) Syndekhnia Ergaton Xenodokheion, Estiatorion kai Kendron Anapsykhis	(Pan-Cyprian) Union of Hotel, Restaurant, and Recreation Center Workers [a PEO-affiliated union] [C]
SYA	Somateion Ypodimatergaton Athinon	Union of Athens Shoeworkers
SyD	Synodiki Dioikisis	Synodical Administration
SYDNE	Syndesmos Dimokratikon Neon Ellados	League of Greek Democratic Youth
SYET	Syllogos Ypallilon Emborikis Trapezis	Association of Employees of the Commercial Bank
SYETE	Syllogos ton Ypallilon tis Ethnikis Trapezis tis Ellados	Association of the National Bank of Greece Employees

SYETh	Somateion Ypovoleon Ellinikou Theatrou	Greek Theater Prompters Union
SYKA	Syndekhnia Kypriakon Aerogrammon	Cyprus Airways Trade Union [C]
SYKEA	Stratiotiki Ypiresia Kataskevis Ergon Anasyngrotiseos	Military Service for the Construction of Reconstruction Projects [See MOMA]
SYKFA	Syllogos Kyprion Foititon Anglias	League of Cypriot Students in England [C]
syn.	syndrofos	comrade
SYNERGAZ	Synergatikos Organismos Emfyaloseos Ygraeriou	Gas Bottling Cooperative Organization [C]
SYP	Soma Ylikou Polemou	[Army] Ordnance Corps
SYPAEK	Syndesmos Ypoaposkholoumenon kai Anergon Epistimonon Kyprou	Association of Underemployed and Unemployed Professionals of Cyprus [C]
SYPE	Symvoulion Prostasias Perivallondos	Environment Protection Council
SYTA		Use: CYTA [q.v.]
SYTANE	Synergatikon Tamievtirion Spoudazousis Neolaias	Cooperative Savings Bank for Students [C]
SYTYRIK	Syndekhnia Tekhnikon Ypallilon RIK	Union of CBC Technical Personnel [C]
SYVEPA	Syndesmos Viomikhanon Exagogon Proiondon Ambelou	Association of Vineyard Products Exporters

T

T'; t' (tav)	triakosia; triakosiostos, -i, -on	three hundred; three hundredth; 300th; CCC
t	teos	former
T	Tomos	Volume
TA	Tameion Arogis	Assistance Fund
	Tameion Asfaliseos	Insurance fund
	Tetarti Avgoustou (4^i Avgoustou)	4th of August
	Trapeza Anaptyxeos	Development Bank [C]
TAA	Tameion Agrotikon Asfaliseon	Agricultural Insurance Fund
TAAKh	Tameion Apallotrioseos Arkhaiologikon Khoron	Fund for Expropriation of Archeological Areas
	Tameion Arogis Axiomatikon Khorofylakis	Gendarmery Officers Relief Fund
TAAMM	Tameion Asfaliseos Artergaton, Mylergaton kai Makaronopoion	Bakery and Mill Workers and Macaroni Makers Insurance Fund
TAAS	Tameion Allilovoitheias Axiomatikon (kai Anthypaspiston) Stratou	Mutual Aid Fund for Army Officers (and Warrant Officers)
TAAThP	Tameion Arogis Anapiron kai Thymaton Polemou	War Victims and Disabled Assistance Fund
TAD	Taktiki Aeroporiki Dynamis	Tactical Air Force [C]
TADKY	Tameion Asfaliseos Dimotikon kai Koinonikon Ypallilon	Municipal and Communal Employees Insurance Fund

TAE	Tameion Asfaliseos Emboron	Merchants Insurance Fund
	Tmima Anikhnevseos Englimaton	Criminal Investigation Department [C]
TAETA	Tameion Asfaliseos Ergaton Typou Athinon	Athens Press Workers Insurance Fund
TAISYT	Tameio Asfaliseos Idioktikon kai Ypallilon Typou	Insurance Fund for Press Owners and Employees
	Tameion Asfaliseos Idioktiton Syndakton kai Ypallilon Typou	Insurance Fund of Press Owners, Editors, and Employees
TAK	Tameion Asfaliseos Kapnergaton	Tobacco Workers Insurance Fund
TAKE	Tameion Asfaliseos (Orthodoxou Efimeriakou) Klirou Ellados	Greek (Orthodox Parish) Clergy Insurance Fund
TAKhDIK	Tameion Khrimatodotiseos Dikastikon Ktirion	Court Building Construction Financing Fund
TAKhMAYKhA	Tameion Asfaliseos Khrimatiston, Mesiton, Antikryston kai Ypallilon Khrimatistiriou Athinon	Insurance Fund of Brokers, Account Executives, Specialists, and Employees of the Athens Stock Exchange
TANPY	Tameion Asfaliseos Navtikon Praktoron kai Ypallilon	Shipping Agents' and Employees' Insurance Fund
	Tameion Navtikon Praktoron kai Ypallilon	Shipping Agents and Employees Fund
TAOA	Tameion Arogis Organon Agrofylakis	Rural Police Assistance Fund
TAOKh	Tameion Asfaliseos Opliton Khorofylakis	Gendarmery Officer Insurance Fund
TAPAP	Tameion Andallaximou Periousias kai Apokatastaseos Prosfygon	Exchangeable Property and Refugee Resettlement Fund

TAPET	Tameion Asfaliseos Prosopikou Ethnikou Typografeiou	National Printing Office Personnel Insurance Fund
TAPOTE	Tameion Asfaliseos Prosopikou tou Organismou Tilepikoinonion Ellados	Greek Telecommunications Organization Personnel Insurance Fund
TAPT	Tameion Asfaliseos Prosopikou Trapezon	Bank Personnel Insurance Fund
TAS	Tameion Asfaliseos Symvolaiografon	Notaries Insurance Fund
TASE	Tameion Anasyngrotiseos para to Symvoulion Evropis	Council of Europe Reconstruction Fund
TATMGT	Tameion Asfaliseos Typografon kai Misthoton Grafikon Tekhnon	Insurance Fund of Typographers and Graphic Arts Employees
TAV	Tameion Asfaliseos Voulevton	Deputies Insurance Fund
TAVN	Tameion Allilovoitheias Vasilikou Navtikou	Royal Navy Mutual Aid Fund
TAXY	Tameion Asfaliseos Xenodokhoypallilon	Hotel Employees Insurance Fund
TAYAP	Tameion Arogis Ypallilon Astynomias Poleon	Cities Police Employees Assistance Fund
TAYAYS	Tameion Arogis Ypallilon Armodiotitos Ypourgeiou Syngoinonion	Communications Ministry Employees Assistance Fund
TD	Tekhnitos Doryforos	Artificial Satellite
TDVK	Tourkiki Dimokratia tis Voreias Kyprou	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [C]

TE	Trapeza tis Ellados	Bank of Greece
TEA	Tagmata Ethnikis Asfaleias	National Defense Battalions
	Tekhniki Epopteia Alieias	Fishing Control Service
	Topikai Epitropai Ardevseos	Local Irrigation Committees
	Typografiki Enosis Athinon	Athens Printers' Union
TEAEDX	Tameion Epikourikis Asfaliseos Ergatotekhnikon Domikon kai Xylourgikon Ergasion	Auxiliary Insurance Fund for Construction and Carpentry Workers and Technicians
TEAM	Tameio Epikourikis Asfalisis Misthoton	Auxiliary Insurance Fund for Salary and Wage Earners
TEAMK	Tameion Epikourikis Asfaliseos Misthoton Klosto-yfandourgias	Auxiliary Insurance Fund for Salaried Textile Workers
TEAPET	Tameion Epikourikis Asfaliseos Prosopikou Etaireion Tsimendon	Auxiliary Insurance Fund for Cement Company Employees
TEAPOKA	Tameio Epikourikis Asfaliseos Prosopikou Organismon Koinonikis Asfaliseos	Auxiliary Insurance Fund for Social Insurance Organizations Personnel
	Tameion Epikourikis Asfaliseos Prosopikou Organismon Koinonikis Asfaliseos	Auxiliary Insurance Fund for Social Insurance Organization Personnel
TEAYEK	Tameion Epikourikis Asfaliseos Ypallilon Emborikon Katastimaton	Auxiliary Insurance Fund of Commercial Establishment Employees
TEAYEOK	Tameion Epikourikis Asfaliseos Ypallilon Ethnikou Organismou Kapnou	Auxiliary Insurance Fund of National Tobacco Organization Employees
TEDK	Tekhnikos Exoplismos Dimon kai Koinotiton	Technical Equipment of Municipalities and Communities

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West Europe Report

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SECRECY SURROUNDS DEATH OF ANGOLAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 4 Oct 86 pp 1, 24

[Text] The judicial police are investigating the circumstances surrounding the death last August of a security employee at the Embassy of the People's Republic of Angola in Lisbon, Venancio Luis (Gordurosa), as EXPRESSO learned from an official source.

The Angolan ambassador to Lisbon assured EXPRESSO that Venancio Luis had died in a Lisbon hospital, a cancer victim, showing us various documents (medical reports and a death certificate) attesting to his claim; but, nevertheless, strong rumors have been circulating about the possibility of the employee's having been a murder victim.

Information procured from several police sources and others associated with the Angolan community in Lisbon indicate that Gordurosa appeared to have died from strangulation at the bottom of the Tagus River, under the Almeirim bridge. Yesterday, the judicial police informed us officially that an "investigation" is under way in that police agency of the death of the Angolan citizen, Venancio Luis, which took place "at a Lisbon hospital," while the results of the required autopsy are being awaited.

The fact that this investigation process exists and an autopsy has been requested of the corpse has raised suspicions about the case, and lent some credibility to the rumors of the criminal origin of the death.

Venancio Luis was a long-standing cadre of Holden Roberto's FNLA, who was later "recovered" for the MPLA. He was also security chief for the RPA's former ambassador in Lisbon, Adriano Sebastiao; but he returned to Angola because of differences with the latter regarding the methods used in his defense. Later, he reportedly returned to Portugal at the order of the current diplomatic representative, Mawete Batista.

Meanwhile, the magazine AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL, published in Lisbon, reported Venancio Luis' death in its latest issue, in a section on "espionage in Angola" (see page 10), in which reference was made to various dismissals or transfers of personnel connected with the Angolan Embassy in Lisbon, linking them with "activities in the area of espionage."

In this connection, the ambassador claimed that the aforementioned changes had been due to "corruption problems," attributing to the magazine, with circulation limited to subscribers, the intention of damaging the good relations between Portugal and Angola with this report.

Mawete Batista said that, "AFRICA CONFIDENCIAL is banned from entering Angola, at a recent decision by the MPLA's 'politburo,'" because it is a publication "subsidized by Americans and South Africans to protect their interests."

The magazine's editor, Xavier de Figueiredo, who worked in Angola, told EXPRESSO that "it repudiates this claim, which is completely groundless and inappropriate." And he gave assurance that the bulletin that he edits "does not publish even 50 percent of what it knows about the activities of the Angolan Embassy in Portugal."

2909
CSO: 3442/22

POLITICAL PORTUGAL

PROSPECTS OF SOARES-CAVACO SILVA RECONCILIATION DISCUSSED

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 16 Sep 86 pp 10-11

[Article by Agapito Pinto]

[Text] At least until there is proof to the contrary, it seems that the so-called "flag war" arising out of the autonomous status of the Azores has ended. In assessing the prestige of the various sovereign organs, the Assembly of the Republic seems to have suffered the greatest losses, having provided a magnificent example of legislative incompetence, while the president of the republic made the greatest gains, having for his part won out over almost all sectors of public opinion. The government managed to emerge from this crisis unscathed despite the fact that it became obvious that the opposition parties were trying to blame it for the "concealment of information" which, they claimed, underlay the vote in the Assembly of the Republic. The situation of the cabinet was rather difficult as well, because it happened that the party represented there is the same as that which controls the regional government of the Azores. Mota Amaral came to the national PSD to ask for solidarity, and this could have created tension between the cabinet and the president of the republic. But the strategy of playing down the drama pursued by Cavaco Silva produced results, and at the National Council meeting last weekend, the PSD succeeded very skillfully in obtaining a consensus which reconciled solidarity with Mota Amaral and respect for, if not agreement with, the presidential veto.

Soares' Peacemaking Role

It was in fact the president of the republic who gained from this crisis. All of the parties, from the PC to the CDS, recognized the propriety of his action, and Mario Soares must have particularly savored the fact that his decision was applauded by the right-wing sectors of Portuguese society, which have never forgiven him his involvement in the decolonization process. In a single stroke, taking advantage of this magnificent opportunity, Mario Soares succeeded in winning the armed forces over to his side. This is important if we recall that they had evidenced some signs of trauma because of the statements about the "demilitarization of Portuguese society" which began to circulate more frequently in connection with and following the first election of a civilian president within the current Portuguese constitutional system. This was a unique occasion, and Mario Soares profited from it. It should be said, moreover, that this did not even seem very difficult, because the great mobilizing force which all of the affective elements related to the national community have is well known. Once again, Soares demonstrated that he is inclined to give priority to all aspects of consensus, all of those elements which strengthen the sense of national identity. And it is this, moreover, which a president of the republic should do, and it is in this light that some symbolic evidences of this action by Soares, ranging from the trip to Sagres to the "fairs" in Guimaraes, should be viewed.

Some observers and certain sectors within the PSD tend to view the president's action within the context of a competitive situation between the prime minister and the cabinet. An effort is made to determine who gained most from a given action, whose prestige rose and whose declined. Now if indeed this competition concept may make some sense, and it may be legitimate to measure the prestige of the various sovereign bodies in the polls published, the truth is that it is not always true that triumph for some necessarily means defeat for others. In other words, while it is true that the cabinet and the Assembly of the Republic are in direct competition one with the other and that the image of the government (given its minority nature) often improves in direct proportion to the decline in the image of the Assembly, the same is not true of the relations between the cabinet and the president. In fact, the "peacemaking" role oriented toward national consensus which Mario Soares has been playing provides one of the best kinds of aid the government could wish.

In fact, a minority government (which because of this very fact must necessarily find itself in situations of conflict with the Assembly of the Republic) could hardly survive a combat front with another sovereign body, in this case the Presidency of the Republic. But the situation has other aspects. With the strengthening of all factors in consensus and the encouragement of all signs of optimism, Soares is providing precious and basic aid to the government. And it is no accident that signs of courtesy and even some sympathy are to be seen on all sides.

This conduct on the part of Soares, apart from the fact that it may be the result of his understanding of what the actions of a president of the republic should be, is dictated by his goal of reelection. Soares certainly wants to be reelected, and he would like this to come about thanks to the "moderate" sectors in Portuguese society. Just recently, in a curious interview granted to L'EXPRESS, Soares once again proclaimed himself the European champion of anticommunism. And if the socialist vote is already a sure thing, it is not from the communists that he will seek support, but obviously, from a broad Social Democratic electorate, to which Soares will seek to avoid giving reasons for mistrust about his conduct as president. Thus, although he is seeking to avoid offending a sector of Portuguese society, Mario Soares was obviously concerned about eliminating the mistrust existing between himself and the voters who supported Freitas do Amaral, those in the PSD sector in particular.

The government understood this, and instead of entering into competition for first place in terms of prestige in the eyes of the public, it chose instead to take advantage of all the favorable elements resulting from the peacemaking approach to the presidential role. And it is no accident that a number of cabinet members will be with Soares during his visit to Guimaraes.

This indirect support of the cabinet by Soares, which is to a much greater extent the result of the way he is performing his presidential duties than any explicit evidence of agreement, does however have some conditions and some limits. Soares is prepared to support Cavaco Silva because he knows that without an absolute majority, he will continue to need his support. The limit is to be found here precisely. If Cavaco Silva wanted to risk a bet on an absolute majority, the most probable thing is that Soares would cease to support him. We have then a situation in which Soares and Cavaco need each other, with the former seeking to create the conditions for his reelection, and the latter trying to establish the best conditions for his government function. This relative dependence tends to guarantee good relations. And the country, exhausted with such lengthy political crises and institutional conflicts, would like to see evidence of this understanding.

5157
CSO:3542/4

POLITICAL POPULARITY POLL SHOWS WINNERS, LOSERS

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 13 Sep 86 p 3

[Text] Four Points Between the PS and PSD

The PSD would again win if legislative elections were held, but it would also fail again to obtain an absolute majority by what would now seem to be a greater margin. The PS would confirm its place as an alternative party, clearly scoring above 30 percent, and only 4 points away from the Social Democrats.

Thus the September EXPRESSO-Euroexpansao panel survey confirmed the tendencies evident in the preceding months, above all the trend toward bipolarization.

With regard to the other parties, relative stability was seen in the number intending to vote for the APU, which has always come to between 8 and 10 percent, and the relative lack of definition on the part of the PRD and CDS voters was also confirmed. Those supporting these parties seem always to hesitate between maintaining their preference in October or voting for the PS and the PSD, respectively. In this month's poll, there was almost triple the number of statements of intention to vote for the CDS, while the PRD lost half of the votes indicated in August. The closer relation between the results for the PS and the PSD is due precisely to the deterioration seen for the PRD and the improvement for the CDS.

September 1986 Voting Intentions



The poor score achieved by the renewal faction is likely to be related to the decline in the popularity of Ramalho Eanes. The "strategy of silence" this party seems to be pursuing will not, then, achieve great practical results.

Constancio and Eanes Lose Points

The political holidays in August were not at all favorable to the various opposition leaders, whose popularity declined across the board. Those who suffered most were Ramalho Eanes and Victor Constancio.

The former president of the republic, after having made a substantial advance last month, has now lost 7 points in the positive assessment of the panel, putting him in the worst situation ever.

The new secretary general of the socialists, after a boisterous beginning in which he came close to Cavaco Silva and scored better than Mario Soares, seems to be in a free fall. Last month he lost 5 points and this month 7 more. Although he continues to appear to be the best placed opposition leader, Victor Constancio will have to pay for what many regard as his first political error--having departed on holiday almost immediately following the congressional adjournment, leaving the public image of his party in the hands of secondary figures. However, the PS leader still has his leading trump--a very high standing among the voters for the PRD and the APU.

The assessment of the renewal faction voters is even more positive than that of the socialist voters.

In any case, the decline for Ramalho Eanes, along with that for Alvaro Cunhal and Adriano Moreira, confirms the bipolarizing trend among the voters which the slight recovery of the future leader of the PRD last month seemed to belie.

Alvaro Cunhal still has a very negative image, continuing to be the only political leader whose actions are criticized by more voters than approve of them. More than half of the members of the panel even termed them "bad" or "very bad."



The development of the prestige of Adriano Moreira continues to be a cause of concern for those who would like to see him confirmed as an alternative to the right of the PSD. After having lost 4 points in August, Adriano lost another 5 in September. In only 2 months, this centrist leader was abandoned by a third of those who regarded his actions as "good" or "very good."

Cavaco Capitalizes on a Hot August

August was not by any means a politically peaceful month, being characterized by labor conflicts in the mass transport sector, by the polemic between the doctors and the minister of health, by the Pontal speech by the leader of the PSD and prime minister and, in its final days, the "flag war" about the content of the statutes of the Autonomous Azores Region.

The prime minister must have been the greatest beneficiary of all these political events. The positive evaluations of his actions went up 3 points, giving him even more outstanding leadership on the charts (he is now 9 points ahead of Mario Soares), while the negative evaluations dropped from 15 to 11. The positive balance overall went up from 36 to 43 points.

The Assembly of the Republic is at the opposite extreme, which is curious, because it was in recess. Nonetheless, its prestige has fallen again, 3 points in this case, with the positive assessment index remaining the same. Was this the effect of the criticisms made at Pontal? Or is it instead a reflection of how the different parliamentary groups have come to claim unanimous approval of a document--the Azores Statutes, which in the final analysis they do not agree on?

The activity of Mario Soares in August was divided between vacationing in the Algarve or on board the Sagres and action on the issue of the Azores symbols. The point at which the panel was consulted (between 1 and 4 September) makes it difficult to assess the effect of the veto which was announced on the night of the third (although it had been expected earlier). The evaluation of the president of the republic thus improved slightly, but less than that of Cavaco Silva, and the index of negative answers remained very low. There is one notable feature, however, when we analyze how the voters for the various parties assessed the activities of the president. In fact, while it is natural that the most positive assessment would come from the socialist voters, followed by the PRD electorate, the truth is that the Social Democrats and the centrists came next, and only then the communists. In other words, despite the fact that the votes of the latter were decisive for his election, it is they who are least satisfied with the political conduct of the president.

The deterioration of the image of the cabinet continued in August, and it again lost out in the positive evaluations of the voters, although it has now lost only 1 point. On the other hand, it saw the index of negative assessment reduced.

As was the case for the prime minister, the CDS voters were the most enthusiastic about the actions of the executive branch, with the communists being the only ones, at the other extreme, to make a negative assessment of its actions.

If the current trends continue, it will be no surprise if the index of positive assessment of the prime minister's action is soon the double of that pertaining to the cabinet, a clear indication of how the images of the two are out of phase. It is commonly said that the present cabinet comes down to the prime minister personally. However, the voters clearly distinguish between the two realities, and they seem to regard the leading cabinet official as blameless for the errors and exempt from the criticisms made of the executive branch as a whole--a whole which, in the view of the public, is deliberately "effacing" itself. In fact, in what other period have we ever seen such an intensive upsurge of strikes as last August without any subsequent statements being made publicly by the ministers, including on television?


President of the Republic


Prime Minister


Cabinet


Assembly of the Republic

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IMPORT OF CUNHAL SPEECH ANALYZED

Strikes Possible

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 13 Sep 86 p 6

[Article by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa]

[Excerpts] September Events

Dr Alvaro Cunhal has been strangely silent. It was even feared that he had lapsed hopelessly into the Portuguese politicians' habit of regarding August as a holiday month unsuited to any serious statement, believable promise or trustworthy guarantee.

No such thing. Dr Alvaro Cunhal was awaiting the Avante Festival, which, all things considered, is perfectly understandable.

In the past, the Avante Festival was characterized by novelty, the freshness of the idea, the delight of coming to Lisbon, the festive atmosphere itself (and no one knows how to appreciate and cultivate these things better than the Portuguese).

Later, innovation turned into repetition, fewer foreign celebrities came, and the experience of Lisbon in 1980, 1981 or 1982 began to be monotonous as the festival became a tradition and a habit.

In Portugal, habit is disdained, not valued. Our fickle nation will overlook anything, excuse anything, except the mortal sin of developing and perpetuating habit. Above all in the Kafkaesque world of our politics and our politicians.

This is why the Avante Festival began as the political fad of September, only to end as a boring thing, something routine, a waste of effort.

The only surprise at the celebration, which by becoming compulsory had ceased to be festive, was the Messianic address by Dr Alvaro Cunhal. For on this matter, the people of Portuguese never tire--they always want more and better Messiahs. Both the left wing and the right.

Every year, Dr Cunhal comes down to the people, the embodiment of a died-in-the-wool proletarian, draws a veil of militant belief across his converts, and reads the stars.

Cunhal's Warning

For years on end it has been very stimulating intellectually to listen to Dr Cunhal and to "read" in his words the premonitory indications of much of what was about to happen.

The basic difference between today's "reading" and that of Dr Cunhal's speeches in the past is, however, worthy of some attention.

In the past, Dr Cunhal said exactly the opposite of what would probably happen (and we emphasized this a number of times between 1974 and 1980).

Now Dr Cunhal is more direct--he states specifically what he intends to do.

For the average militant, this is clearer. For the mass media, it is less ambiguous. And for the national political stratum, it is easier.

On this occasion, Dr Cunhal voiced a very serious warning to the government.

He emerged from the brief calm of a hot August, now past, to announce a new PCP campaign against Dr Cavaco Silva and his government. He even made it clear that this would be an immediate, clear and frontal effort with some likelihood of success.

Thus we see that, with a courteous month's notice, Dr Alvaro Cunhal has warned the executive branch that complex days lie ahead, in terms of political challenge.

The Labor Campaign

Having completed this first "reading," we must move on to a second, which also seems to us relatively easy.

What the PCP can do politically at the present time is not very much.

It does not have impressive parliamentary weight. It does not have the influence to sway other opposition parties which would enable it to emerge as the leader of any concerted party campaign.

It is losing ground in some traditionally strong areas, as the very controversial regular reports of the civil governors to the cabinet demonstrate.

Its only remaining resource, as a tool in this instance, is the trade unions.

What Dr Cunhal was seeking to announce for October was a real labor challenge, including, as an outstanding factor, recourse to the last resort--a strike.

The order has been given. It is thus a question, for the communist militants, led by the CGTP-IN trade unionists, of resuming the struggle launched toward the middle of August, rekindling the sacred flame and challenging the economic and social policy of the government.

Summer Intermission

We have already seen various strike methods, from the most imaginative to the simplest.

Something new was introduced this year, with a strike being suspended for the summer holidays. After claims of various sorts had been put forth, the strike lasted until the very eve of the summer holidays, which was also the moment when the self-financing capacity of the trade unions was on the brink of a breakdown.

When that moment came, everything stopped, yielding to a temporary truce.

This does not yet mean final victory, but it is a certain and wise step. Moreover, if the managers, frightened by the halt to their profits and rather insensitive to the logic of the labor campaign, made substantial concessions right at the outset, so much the better.

Then came the period of the summer vacation.

After a month and a half, it all began again--the demands, revised and improved, renegotiation of the temporary agreement, and resumption of the interrupted strike activities.

As an innovation, this was among the more clever maneuvers. We have both the stubborn persistence of the unions and the foresight and good sense of some worthy public administrators to thank.

Can It Last Four Months?

The PCP has already succeeded in this tour de force, unique since 1976, with the extension of the strike movement to August, with the PS and some UGT elements following up some initiatives.

In years of calm, everything has dragged until March and April. In turbulent years, the strikes have lasted until May or June. But never in memory until August. This took great discipline and much creativity, involving remote reasons and imminent pretexts, along with some aid from certain business managers.

What is being asked now is whether Dr Cunhal and the PCP are strong enough to continue the labor campaign for a whole quarter of a year.

This would involve strikes launched in October and still on the agenda when the parliamentary debates on the 1987 budget end--the same strikes or others.

For beginning in December and January, it is the season of the chronic mass transportation disputes.

Linking the October strikes to those early in 1987 would represent a great political dream, one which would match the threat in Dr Alvaro Cunhal's speech.

Let us see if the objective and subjective requirements for the realization of this dream exist.

Solidarity with the Government

Having carefully "read" the prophetic message of the charismatic leader of the PCP on the occasion of the launching of the political year, it is important to make it clear how important it is to crush this opposition strategy.

It is necessary to guarantee that the innovation of suspending strikes for a summer intermission does not become a lasting fashion.

It is necessary to ensure that the autumn escalation, far from being successful, proves a resounding communist failure.

It is necessary to close ranks with the government of Dr Cavaco Silva against a campaign which does not work to the benefit of Portuguese democracy, does not stabilize our community life, nor does it promise a happy future for anyone.

It is necessary to avoid any confusion between the legitimate demands of labor and the political maneuvers which are remote-controlled by the PCP and announced at the Avante Festival.

If there is anyone who refuses to endorse this immaculate and unblemished vision of salvation put forth by Dr Cavaco Silva, it is we.

If there is anyone who has insistently questioned this government about how so many can live off the political capital of a single man, it is we.

If there is anyone who prefers the solitude of critical freedom to easy unanimity with a leader regarded as unchallengable, it is we.

And so we will continue, whatever it may cost certain courtiers of the regime. Governments come and go at a rate much faster than that of the birth, life and death of those who must assess them calmly and dispassionately. But for this very reason, we find ourselves compelled to say that if there ever was a time when it was important to assure the government of clear, evident and conscious support, it is now. Because of Dr Cunhal's solemn warning.

For every conceivable reason--because it comes from Dr Cunhal; because it is the strategic order of the day for the PCP; because the labor struggle must not be manipulated by the communists; and because the PCP must never lead the opposition to the government.

And because healthy alternation in power requires that the PCP experience a decline, and in no case an increase , in the future.

And because the government and this prime minister are for the present and the near future, in relative terms, the best solution for Portugal.

And because Dr Cavaco Silva deserves to be given much more time and experience in order to govern Portugal.

For all of these reasons, and for yet another. It is because the communist strategy is designed to push the government to the wall socially, while at the same time, politically, drawing Dr Cavaco Silva into the arms of General Eanes, in order to limit his independence and deprive him of his freedom of action.

But this is another story, the analysis of which can well wait a week.

Festival Analyzed

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 13 Sep 86 p 10

[Editorial by Paulo Portas]

[Excerpts] Every year in September, the Communist Party calls for a general mobilization. Not a single cell is left without an assignment. And all of this, obviously, adds up to the Avante Festival.

Rarely has the question as to why the Communist Party pursues this undertaking been asked. With its impressive liturgy for the masses and the spectacular performance put on by the apparatus, the Avante Festival is a political fact of the first water in the hierarchy of communist productions. The communist comrades are not much given to sentiment, nor do they often let themselves be used. Unfortunately, the Communist Party does not produce useless things--what it does it does for its own reasons. And thus the motives for Avante Festival must be something else. And they make sense from the communists' point of view.

The Avante Festival is a production designed to sustain several fictions. Internally it serves to provide the comrades with an imitation of an open society. And it also plays an external role by erasing from the public mind the very accurate concept of the Communist Party as a closed society. But the Avante Festival does even more. Organized as a cultural phenomenon, it enables the communists, on an annual basis, to claim ownership of and imply a monopoly on intellectual creativity and diversions of the mind. This is indeed an achievement, because no one doubts that if it could, the party would limit freedom, internalize disputes and control the thinking of others. On the other hand, viewed as a mass event, it provides the communists with a mass turnout which appears to be an evidence of strength. This is another achievement, since the party espouses an extremely decadent ideology. And there is still more to be said. The Avante Festival is conceived as a demonstration of a style of life in which there is boundless joy. This achievement touches on the perverse, because the real party is the most tedious in the world, and its methods are those of the Berlin Wall. Finally, and this is the supreme irony, the Avante Festival is designed to seduce the young. And this is an achievement, because there is no contemporary evil as archaeological as communism. Reduced to a single concept, the Avante Festival gives the Communist Party the advantage of appearing to be the exact opposite of what it is. This kind of achievement is commonly called a lie of genius. The only thing the Avante Festival lacks is that most problematical element of character called truth.

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POLITICAL PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

ROSA COUTINHO PROSECUTES MERCENARIES--On Tuesday in a Lisbon court, there will come to trial a suit brought by Coteco (the Sosa Coutinho company) against two Portuguese pilots recruited by it who refused to carry out their mission in Lobito, instead of Luanda. The two pilots, both former members of the military, were recruited by Coteco as airplane and helicopter instructors. According to a report in AFRICA-CONFIDENCIAL, of the 32 Portuguese military men recruited by Coteco who were in Angola (with an average monthly salary of $2,400), over 20 came into conflict with the Rosa Coutinho company under various circumstances, ranging from material damage to attempted operational involvement. At present, there are only 12 members of the Portuguese military hired by Coteco remaining in Angola. It is noteworthy that the admiral failed to be received in Luanda with the former courtesies, namely, his lodging in an official residence. [Text] [Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Oct 86 p 64] 2909

CSO: 3442/22

MELILLAN LEADER REPORTEDLY MEETS MOROCCAN MINISTER

Barcelona LA VANGUARDIA in Spanish 10 Oct 86 p 14

[Article by Miguel Gonzalez]

[Text] Duddu is prepared to leave his post as adviser to the Interior Ministry if his freedom of movement and action is restricted as the leader of Melilla Muslims. He returned early yesterday morning to Melilla from Rabat, where he met with the Moroccan interior minister unbeknownst to Spanish authorities.

Melilla--In statements to this paper, Duddu declined to confirm "or deny" the meeting that, as LA VANGUARDIA has confirmed from reliable sources, he held with the Moroccan interior minister, Dris Basri, in Rabat. He did acknowledge, however, that he has had "informal" contacts with "high-level officials" in the Moroccan Government.

Duddu traveled last week to Melilla, where he crossed the Moroccan border in the company of the highest religious authority of Melilla Muslims, Sidi Driss. During the week that he spent in the kingdom, he visited the cities of Casablanca, Fez and Rabat.

Duddu stressed the "private" nature of the visit, which he made as leader of Melilla Muslims, not as an adviser to the Spanish Interior Ministry. His main purpose was to explain "directly" to Moroccan authorities that his group "is struggling for our social, cultural and religious rights, independent of the conflict between Spain and Morocco."

He was thus trying to counter the views expressed in some Moroccan media that have accused the Melilla Muslims of being "traitors" for claiming Spanish citizenship. According to him, the meetings were "very positive," and his hosts were receptive to his arguments and at no point asked him how he felt about the sovereignty of the Spanish enclaves in northern Africa.

The Melilla leader declined to say clearly whether he had informed the Interior Ministry about his contacts with Moroccan authorities. The Spanish Government was not aware, at least, of his meeting with Hassan's minister, which was arranged after Duddu had started his trip and at his request. Duddu did not contact any accredited Spanish diplomat in Morocco.

Ministry Remains Silent

For its part, the Interior Ministry remained completely silent on the issue yesterday. Its spokesmen merely indicated that Duddu had requested permission to travel to Morocco for family reasons and that the date of his return was not known.

When asked about the understandable displeasure that his contacts with Moroccan authorities have caused, Duddu told LA VANGUARDIA that when he accepted the government post, he did so on the condition that he would continue to discharge his functions as leader of Melilla's Muslims and that as such "I can meet with anyone I deem appropriate."

Duddu asserted that he is prepared to leave his post in the Interior Ministry as an adviser on the Muslim minority if an attempt is made to restrict his freedom of action. The Muslim leader is supposed to be back at his Madrid office next week.

Separately, the Popular Alliance Group has asked Duddu to come before Congress to explain his area of responsibility in the Interior Ministry and how the funds that his post has been allocated are being spent, EUROPE PRESS has reported. Duddu has been asked to appear along with many other high-level officials whom the parliamentary blocs are calling in as they debate next year's national budgets.

8743
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POWER STRUGGLE IN AP WIDENS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 5 Oct 86 p 6

[Article by Jorge Fernandez and Rafael Quintero]

[Text] The battle to end Manuel Fraga's leadership, which has so far cost Verstrynge and Ruiz Soto their jobs and entailed a lawsuit for Olarra, has spread the crisis in Popular Alliance (AP) to the provinces, according to the dissident [critico] faction. Congresses have been or will be held in 10 of them before January to elect new presidents. Meanwhile, they are being run by caretaker committees. The assistant secretary general, Jose Maria Aznar, who was in charge of policy for the autonomous communities, has submitted his resignation to Fraga, taking it for granted that the party will suffer a disaster at the polls.

Madrid--The ideological confrontation between the so-called critical faction and the official machine, along with the personal battle for control of the local apparatus, has spread the crisis besetting AP into the provinces.

In 10 of these provinces regular and special congresses have been or will be held to assess the situation and elect new provincial presidents. Until now these provinces have been operating under provisional committees.

Congresses were held last week in Cuenca and Cadiz and are scheduled from now until the end of the year in Cantabria (1 December), Cordoba (19 October), Malaga (29 November), Orense (19 October), Santa Cruz de Tenerife (12 December), Valencia (13 December) and Zaragoza (29 November). Mario Amilibia has been named president in Leon under powers provided for in the bylaws, and the congress in Alicante has not yet been scheduled.

Calero's Version

The outcome of these congresses could change the balance of power between the two factions vying for control: the machine and the dissident faction. Nevertheless, Verstrynge's withdrawal from the party sometime in the coming weeks could prompt his followers to leave AP as well.

Sources in the dissident faction have told this paper that they have a strong presence in the provinces of Burgos, Albacete, Pontevedra, Cuenca, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Valladolid, Alicante, Valencia, Malaga and Cantabria. The last four are about to hold their congresses. In the opinion of the party's assistant secretary general and head of organization, Juan Ramon Calero, "the main reason for the tensions in certain provinces is the slates at the last general election."

"Because of the pacts with our coalition parties, we had to keep key party men in the provinces out of the top spots. This gave rise to resignations and conflicts, which we will soon resolve at the congresses scheduled from now until the end of the year."

What happened in provinces such as Alicante, Valencia, Zaragoza and Cuenca confirms Calero's assertions. In Cuenca, Javier Rupurez from the PDP [People's Democratic Party] headed up the slate, and when the Popular Coalition won only one seat, AP was left without a representative from this province in Congress. Pedro Saugar, the Cuenca president, resigned immediately.

The same thing happened in Alicante with the PDP's Juan Rovira Tarazona. The provincial president of AP, Jose Cremades, was excluded from the congressional slate, ran for the Senate, did not win a seat and stepped down.

In Valencia, Cantabria and Zaragoza it was the party men sent from Madrid (Angel Sanchis, Alfonso Osorio and Jose Ramon Lasuen, respectively) who prompted the resignation of the provincial presidents.

This explanation of AP's provincial crisis is not shared by the dissident faction, which says that the roots of the confrontation go back several years. "This is at least what has happened in Zaragoza, Valencia, Cuenca, Alicante and Santa Cruz de Tenerife."

"The main cause," they told DIARIO 16, "is the excessive intervention of the central machine in everything that goes on in the provinces. Fraga is the one who makes the decision in all cases, even the minor ones."

The dissidents also justify their split with the party machine "because of the rightward drift of its main leaders." As far as this faction is concerned, the clearest example is the appointment of Alberto Ruiz Gallardon as AP secretary general.

Aznar Steps Down

The worsening situation in the provinces after the 22 June elections led the party's territorial policy chief and assistant secretary general, Jose Maria Aznar, to submit his resignation in a personal letter that he sent to Manuel Fraga on 8 July.

Aznar, who headed up the Avila slate, received only 29.48 percent of the vote, while Rodriguez Sahagun from the CDS [Democratic and Social Center] garnered 41.38 percent.

Popular Alliance was down 5,000 votes and 4 percent from the 1982 elections, whereas the CDS did 20,000 votes better.

In his poignant letter to the AP leader, which DIARIO 16 has seen, Aznar wrote 2 weeks after the elections that "after devoting many years to the party's local and autonomous community policy, I have come to the conclusion that my efforts in this field are exhausted and that it would be a good idea for other people with new ideas to devote themselves to this matter."

"I lost the election in Avila and have pursued the wrong policy, and there is just one person responsible for those failures, and I am that person. I earnestly request of you that I be relieved as assistant secretary general, regional president of Castile-Leon and chief of autonomous community and municipal policy."

8743
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NEW IMMIGRATION MINISTER ANDERSSON PLANS OPEN REFUGEE POLICY

Newspaper Interview

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Oct 86 p 8

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "A Loyal Working Ant"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] "In a job such as that, one naturally always needs a conscience. I am strongly aware of that, and I considered that carefully before I accepted Ingvar Carlsson's offer of the post of Minister of Immigration."

This was said by Georg Andersson, Social Democrat member of the Riksdag and newly elected chairman of the Christian Brotherhood Movement, in a conversation with DAGENS NYHETER before he was promoted as the new minister of immigration on Tuesday.

As one of his first tasks the new immigration minister expects to contact the head of the National Immigration and Naturalization Board, Thor Palmlund, because of his statement to DAGENS NYHETER that Sweden cannot receive more refugees.

"I will speak with him myself about what he said. What he probably meant was that more municipalities in the country should open themselves to receive refugees," said Andersson, who admits that he is surprised at Palmlund's statement.

Major Commitment

Georg Andersson from Lycksele said in his calm Norrland accent, as he sat in the Riksdag hall and waited for his promotion, that he had not worked much with immigration questions.

"But I have always had a strong personal commitment on refugee and immigration questions. In the Brotherhood Movement we have also always discussed these questions."

He said that he is glad that his home municipality decided some years ago to receive refugees. Personally the Andersson family has worked as a so-called contact family for two refugees at that place.

As a member of the Riksdag Georg Andersson has been mostly occupied with culture and education matters, and he was also a strong candidate for the post of minister of education. He was on a study trip with the Education Committee in Shanghai last week when he received the prime minister's offer.

"I surely wondered about it a great deal, since it meant an adjustment for the entire family. It is undeniably a tough job," said Georg Andersson.

Working Ant

Georg Andersson became 50 years old in March, and is educated as an elementary school teacher. He was chairman of the county council at home in Lycksele, and at the same time held the job as member of the Riksdag, to which he was elected in 1971.

He is one of the working ants of the Riksdag, and is known for his great party loyalty.

Andersson Addresses Youth Conference

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 18 Oct 86 p 12

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "Debut for Minister of Immigration; 'Hatred of Foreigners Grows Out of Fear'"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Strangnas. Much of the animosity toward foreigners which we know exists in Swedish society is more related to fear and anxiety than with any deep-seated repudiation of all those who are not Swedish-born.

This was said by Minister of Immigration Georg Andersson at a conference in Strangnas on Friday. It was the first real meeting of the new immigration minister with organized "immigrant Sweden."

A certain watchful tension also preceded the natty cultural politician's first appearance in a somewhat tentative speech of welcome which was clearly marked by Andersson's Christian commitment to the roots of the Social Democratic Christian Brotherhood Movement. Last summer Georg Andersson became chairman of the brotherhood which diligently used to criticize the government's immigration policies.

During the past year the government has had several meetings to discuss growing animosity toward foreigners. But at Friday's meeting in a conference center in Strangnes there were primarily youth organizations of different kinds invited.

Among the more than 60 participants from all the political youth organizations except the Conservative Youth Organization and immigrant organizations there were groups less accustomed to conferences such as BSB (Keep Sweden Mixed). BSB was represented by two punk girls, 18-year-old Lina Bergquist and 19-year-old Gorel Sonderland from Sollentuna. Two years ago they began fighting the racist graffiti in the subways, and surprisingly they suddenly found themselves leaders of a group with over 400 members.

"We now believe that we have put a stop to the graffiti in Stockholm, so we must continue to help with the work against hatred of immigrants," said Lina Bergqvist.

The happy young women with spiked punk hair told DAGENS NYHETER that they were going to paint out graffiti in Strangnas after the conference, since that beautiful Lake Malaren town is the center for the National Nazi Party NRP.

BSB has grown surprisingly fast, and finds itself now in a state of unstructured chaos administered from Gorel Sonderland's girls' room.

Crude Joke

The conference quickly settled into group work after Georg Andersson's short speech. But before that Jonas Widgren, Undersecretary for Immigration Questions since the minister post was filled ten days ago, warned the youthful conference participants against change in former taboos, which happens slowly.

"In West Germany they tell the same raw jokes today about the Turks that they used in the Nazi days against the Jews. It is dangerous when a taboo is used in that way," said Widgren, although he did not want to give an example of a racist joke used in Sweden.

Instead the conference participants heard and evaluated them performed by the Fenix Theatre Group of Orebro. There they saw participants led by immigration "bureaucrats" in shirt-sleeves happily leaping around and acting in various everyday situations in a way which would give good cause for conflict between Swedes and immigrants.

Many Fronts

Georg Andersson, who later in the evening dined with the conference participants, said, as did his predecessor Anita Gradin who was popular among immigrant organizations, that the fight against animosity to foreigners must be fought on many fronts, with political work, but primarily by the people themselves. It cannot be eliminated by government or legislative action.

9287
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POLITICAL SWEDEN

EDITORIAL EVALUATES CARLSSON'S NEW RIKSDAG APPOINTMENTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Oct 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Carlsson Rearranges the Furniture"]

[Text] The shifting of seats by cabinet ministers is really the only news in Ingvar Carlsson's second government proclamation. Svante Lundkvist is being pensioned after 15 years in the government, and thereby is leaving space for the formation of a Ministry of Environment and Energy under the leadership of Birgitta Dahl. Mats Hellstrom will have responsibility for a reduced Ministry of Agriculture, and Ulf Lonnqvist will be the Minister of Sport and Tourism; he will also take care of youth questions in the Ministry of Education. Anita Gradin is taking Hellstrom's place as Minister of Foreign Trade, and immigration questions will be taken over by the current chairman of the Education Committee, Georg Andersson.

The reorganization of the government can be seen as a confirmation of Birgitta Dahl's growing importance. She will now have her tasks assembled in her own ministry, and she is thereby given a stronger position toward her government colleagues as well as outside pressures. Dahl is definitely one of the government's assets, and the organization of the cabinet has now been adapted to her area of responsibility. The combination of environment and energy in the same ministry creates both hopes and fears; in the best case it can bring about increased integrity toward power companies and other producer interests. But as the Minister of Environment with dominant responsibility, Birgitta Dahl must also be able to intervene in matters which are dealt with within the Housing and Justice Ministries, among others.

It would be a mistake to interpret the moving of Mats Hellstrom as a demotion. He is now the head of a department, and responsible for matters of great economic and environmental importance, such as surplus production in agriculture and the level of cutting in the forests. As Minister of Foreign Trade, Hellstrom functioned as a devoted travelling salesman which, at least in the case of the export of weapons to Indonesia, fits poorly with his leading role in the Peace Forum of the Labor Movement. That he is moving to more earthly chores can prove to be his salvation as a Social Democrat politician. The naming of a special minister for sport and tourism within the Ministry of Agriculture on the other hand appears uncalled-for, except that Ulf Lonnqvist has waited a long time for his turn.

The choice of Anita Gradin as Hellstrom's successor is more surprising. It has been well known that Grandin desired to leave the pressing surroundings which resulted from the post of immigration minister, partly because she did not have sufficient support in the administration to carry out an open refugee policy. Ingvar Carlsson instigated the nomination through Anita Grandin's documented interest in international questions, which, however, did not include trade. Except possibly for the matter of export of weapons, she will not have the freedom to exercise her social and human rights beliefs as foreign trade minister, but instead she appears to be filling a vacancy in Carlsson's reorganization.

In Georg Andersson the Christian Social Democratic Brotherhood Movement is getting back a representative in the government; previously the only one was Bertil Zachrisson. It is conceivable that Andersson has the ideal attitude which makes him appropriate for the post of Minister of Immigration--his other attributes for the post are not known. He is a rector by profession, and has been politically active in the culture and education sector. The risk is obvious that the unprepared George Andersson will have an even more difficult time than Grandin in defending refugee policies against demands for further restrictions. However he can concentrate on this task, as questions of equality will go over to Anna-Greta Leijon.

As we have seen, bold strokes are absent in the reorganization of the government. There is hardly any political renewal in the personnel changes, nor can Birgitta Dahl's new department achieve such possibilities. For its part, the government declaration brings no news except for carefully precise mention of the quality of life. That can, however, be seen as Ingvar Carlsson's personal contribution, which in the best case means that the government is going to place heavy emphasis on environmental questions.

It is positive that the government now definitely appears to have rejected the concept of a strong defense "according to our circumstances"; Now the defense ("the total defense") will be "strong and comprehensive." It is not difficult to see a connection with the government's striving for political unity before next year's defense decision.

Otherwise there is mischief in the outstretched hands of this fall's government declaration. The one-time tax will come first among the measures which according to the government are required for more just distribution. Both the government and the opposition are headed for conflict on questions about which the blocs differ. The pattern of politics appears to be returning to the old and habitual ways.

9287
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POLITICAL TURKEY

COLUMNIST VIEWS USSR IMPERIALISM

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 23 Sep 86 p 5

["Corner" column by Ergun Goze: "Baltic Republics, Turkish Republics"]

[Text] At a recent conference on Soviet-American relations, a dispute arose between the Russian and the U.S. delegates. The dispute was over the Baltic republics. The Baltic republics are: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

U.S. Position on Baltic Republics

According to the Americans, these republics are under the occupation of the Russians. John Mallock, the U.S. delegate at the said conference, said in a speech before an audience of 2,000 that the United States does not recognize this occupation diplomatically and that it has not acquiesced to this fait accompli. Several other speakers also used this occasion to condemn Soviet imperialism.

Soviet Position on the Issue

The Soviet delegates at the conference refuted these charges and described them as "sheer provocation." Vitali Zurkin, the deputy head of the Soviet Academy of U.S. and Canadian Studies and one of the Soviet delegates, said that Soviet regimes were set up in these republics in 1917, that they were later seized by bourgeois governments and that the peoples of these republics opted for socialism and elected socialist leaders in 1940.

What Is the Truth?

In Estonia, whose past is representative of the history these three republics, the events took place as follows: On 12 April 1917 Estonia won its independence. However, in December of the same year it was invaded by the Bolsheviks. Lenin expelled the barons of Estonia. At the invitation of the barons, the Germans occupied Estonia. In March 1918, Lenin conceded Estonia to the Germans. But the allied powers did not permit that and attacked the Germans, and the Russians rushed to reoccupy Estonia. The Paets government was successful, and the great powers recognized Estonia in 1921. While the country had a parliamentary regime at the beginning, a dictatorship was set up as a result of continuous provocations by the Bolsheviks. Democracy was restored in 1937. To defend itself against Soviet imperialism, Estonia signed treaties with its neighbors and Finland, reached a nonaggression pact with the Russians and entered the League of Nations. However, this nonaggression pact notwithstanding, the Soviets demanded the surrender of the naval bases of Dago, Osel and Paldiski from Estonia. The Red Army entered Estonia to take over the bases but occupied the entire country. About that time, the Soviets had signed an agreement with the Germans and had occupied half of Poland. The communist party, until then unknown in Estonia, won the elections held under the supervision of the Red Army. But when the Germans declared war against the Soviet Union, they occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The Soviets reoccupied these countries after the Germans were defeated; they exiled the local population to Siberia on grounds that they had collaborated with the Germans and annexed the three countries to the Soviet empire. Since then these three countries are Soviet Socialist republics.

Sincerity of the Sides

The Soviet contention that the "Baltic republics opted for socialism and elected socialist leaders" is a disgrace. But the Soviets repeated this disgrace in Afghanistan 40 years later and earlier in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and they will certainly repeat it in the future whenever the opportunity presents itself.

But are these recent protestations by the Americans sincere? They are not. Because if they were, they would not abandon these three republics to the Russians at the end of World War II. Because at that time the Russians did not have an atomic bomb. Then why is the United States rekindling this issue today? Firstly, to appease voters of Baltic-origin who have settled in the United States. Secondly, the Soviet Union is trying to expand its red empire into Central America where it has satellites like Cuba. So the United States is "riposting" the Soviets by resurrecting their old sins. Moreover, the United States wants to squeeze the Soviets into a corner in the current clamor over the summit and disarmament. In other words, the two superpowers are dancing over the corpses of oppressed nations, while the entire world remains unaware of this tragedy, this hypocrisy and this flagrant repression. Where is justice? Where is law? Where are human rights? Where is fairness? Where is help for the weak? Everyone is dyeing his own yarn.

What About Our People?

What is our Foreign Ministry doing? What are the other institutions of the government doing? Is anyone talking about these Baltic republics? Does anyone know about them? If this issue has not been as well publicized as Turkey's leftists have expounded about Cuba and Chile, then we are faced with a major threat. How are we going to explain Soviet imperialism and to whom?

Because in our country there are still people who say: "The Soviets are not occupying Afghanistan. At best, one may talk about the Afghan revolution."

Despite the destruction of hundreds of thousands of Turks by the Soviets and their cooppressors, the Bulgarians, we are still having sports events with them. It is as if we are saying: "Well done; do it again."

What about the Turkish republics the Soviets have swallowed--the republics which Lenin swallowed and Stalin digested? Is anyone thinking about them?

9588
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COMMENTARY ON GREECE'S EAST EUROPEAN POLICY

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 21 Sep 86 p 4

["Commentary" column by Professor Fahir Armaoglu: "Greece's Endeavors"]

[Text] Greek Prime Minister Papandreou's policy toward Turkey took an interesting form in 1986. Judging from the point this policy has reached today, the general pattern of Papandreou's Turkish policy of the last 5 years can be described as "from right to left."

Since the day Papandreou assumed office, Turkey has been the dominant factor in Greece's foreign policy. Greece's Turkish policy has in its turn been dominated by the portrayal of Turkey as an "enemy" and allegations that Turkey "is threatening" Greece and that the threat to Greece is from the "east." Papandreou used these recurrent themes in negotiations with the United States and NATO and tried to isolate Turkey in the West. At the beginning both the United States and NATO found these allegations "sincere" and tried to "pacify" him. But when Papandreou raised his voice even higher after he was emboldened with the success of his posture, the U.S. and NATO response turned into one of "weariness."

In response, Papandreou turned away from NATO and took his anti-Turkish endeavors to the Council of Europe [COE] and the EEC. Because the rebirth and the restoration of democracy in Turkey and the consequent gradual development of a favorable environment toward Turkey in the two European organizations drove Papandreou into panic, his attempts to block Turkey's return to the COE failed, and Turkey was fully admitted to these two European organizations. In other words, Papandreou has lost his battle in these two forums.

Papandreou is now concerned about Turkey's efforts to revitalize, to reinvigorate and to strengthen its relations with the EEC. Consequently, he has now directed his efforts to exclude Turkey from Europe to the EEC. The meeting of the Turkish-EEC Association Council meeting in Brussels on 16 September shows how determined Greece is in these efforts. However, Turkey has won the first round.

The positive settlement of Turkey's relations with these two major European organizations must have frustrated Papandreou's efforts in this direction, because now he has moved further to the left; by hugging and kissing with communist countries and by provoking communist countries against Turkey, he is seeking their support for his bankrupt policy. Papandreou signed a nonaggression pact with Bulgaria on 11 September. According to this pact, which is openly aimed against Turkey, in the event of a threat to any of the two signatories, their governments will begin immediate consultations to neutralize the threat. Then what? Is Bulgaria going to send troops to Greece? That is how absurd it is.

Now, East Germany has appeared on the scene. During Greek President Sartzetakis' visit to East Germany on 15 through 19 September, East German President Honecker--who displayed his ignorance by describing the Aegean as a Greek lake--guaranteed Greece's territorial integrity. Against whom? Against Turkey, of course.

Apparently the next step Papandreou will have to take to ensure the success of his anti-Turkish policy is to join the Warsaw Pact. Because that is where his course is leading.

9588
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NATION URGED TO PURSUE DRIVE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN EEC

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Sep 86 p 4

["This Is Earth" column by Zafer Atay: "Fairy Tales for Adults"]

[Text] Some notable narrators of fairy tales have cropped up in our country in recent years. These people tell "bogeyman" stories for adults. All of them are intellectuals. They write columns in newspapers and lecture in universities. Their mouths, though, are filled with clutter. Everything they talk about ends with warnings that the West will swallow Turkey. They also have magic formulas. Some insist that Turkey must withdraw first from NATO and then from the Council of Europe in order to be "fully independent and democratic." It must also forget about the EEC. According to these people, Turkey must establish closer ties with socialist (communist) countries.

There are others who say that we can turn to the Middle East--of course on condition that we break away from the Christian West, forget the EEC, withdraw from NATO and kick out the Council of Europe. According to our contemporary narrators of fairy tales, these formulas are our only courses of salvation.

The fairy tale narrators have recently begun talking about the EEC at a time when Turkey has begun normalizing its relations with the EEC for the first time in the last 6 years .

A "conditional green light" was given at the Turkey-EEC Association Council meeting in Brussels. In other words, Turkey was told the steps it must take before applying for "full membership."

The EEC is neither a monster nor a trap set by those who want to swallow Turkey as the "narrators of bogeyman stories" allege. The membership of the EEC has risen to 12. These 12 members are Europe's free and democratic countries. The community's economic power has reached a level where it can compete with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Turkey is allied with these countries in NATO. It also sits with them in the Council of Europe. Most of Turkey's technological trade is with the EEC. The Community also commands a major share of Turkey's exports and imports. Moreover, since the 1950's Turkey has been an "associate member" of the EEC.

During the 2000's Europe will be fully integrated. Borders will be removed, and a single currency will be used. Citizens of the member countries will carry a single passport. Everywhere around the world, differentiations will be made between those who are in "United Europe" and those who are not.

The EEC does not admit everyone who applies. In other words, these countries do not have motives such as "let us admit and swallow Turkey" on their minds. On the contrary, there are several parties who are working to block Turkey's membership. Greece, in particular, wants to keep Turkey weak economically and diplomatically by keeping it out of the EEC. There are other members of the Community who do not want to admit among themselves a Turkey with a population of 51 million--of which 60 percent are young--and endowed with fertile lands and untouched underground riches. It is obvious that a Turkey which remains outside United Europe will be exploited much more easily. There are of course "fanatical Christians" who say "what business does Muslim Turkey have among us."

In sum, Turkey will enter the EEC by forcing itself in. Of course this will not be easy. Everyone will be forced to straighten out his affairs. Those who manufacture low-quality products, those who evade taxes, those who make billions from customs fraud and those who make a living by imaginary trade will be rubbed out. Because in the EEC nobody will be allowed to play basketball in the football field. Naturally, the politicians will also have to watch themselves. They will have to avoid postures that may cause the degeneration of democracy. Because only free and democratic countries have a place in the EEC. We have before us a obstacle course which runs into the 2000's. We are obligated to open up that road while maintaining our dignity. Let us not pay attention to the narrators of fairy tales.

9588
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PROFILES OF WINNING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Sep 86 p 6

[Text] Husnu Dogan (Istanbul 6th District, Motherland Party [MP])

Dogan was born in Malatya in 1944. He is a graduate of the Malatya Lycee and the Civil Engineering Department of the Middle East Technical University [METU]. He worked in the State Planning Organization [SPO], the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry and the Soil Products Office. He also worked in the private sector as a consultant, director general, board member, coordinator and department head. After the 1983 elections, he was named Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Village Affairs in the Ozal government as an extraparliamentary cabinet member. Dogan, who speaks English, is married and has two children.

Vahit Halefoglu (Ankara, MP)

Born in Antakya in 1919, Halefoglu is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences. He is a retired ambassador. After the 1983 elections, he was named Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ozal government as an extraparliamentary cabinet member. Halefoglu speaks English, German and Arabic. He is married and has two children.

Erdal Inonu (Izmir, Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP])

Inonu was born in Ankara in 1926. After completing his elementary, middle and high school and college education in Ankara, he went to the United States. He earned a doctorate in physics from the California Institute of Technology. He returned to Turkey in 1952 and began to work as a graduate assistant at the School of Science of the Ankara University. He conducted research work in the United States from 1957 through 1960. Later he returned to Turkey and accepted an appointment as a professor of physics at METU. After leaving METU he worked as a physics professor at the Bosporus University between 1974 and 1983. In May 1983, he resigned from the Bosporus University to form a social democratic party. Soon afterwards, he formed the Social Democracy Party. The party was given corporate status on 6 June 1983. The National Security Council vetoed Erdal Inonu and 20 of his colleagues 17 days after they had formed their party. On 17 December 1983, he was reelected as leader of the Social Democracy Party following the resignation of Cezmi Kartay. Led by Inonu, the Social Democracy Party won 23.40 percent of the vote in local elections [in 1984] and became the second largest party in Turkey. The SDPP was formed through the merger of the Social Democracy Party and the Populist Party. Inonu became the second leader of the SDPP after Aydin Guven Gurkan. Inonu ran in the by-elections as a SDPP candidate from the 2d district of Izmir.

Akin Gonen (Nigde, MP)

Gonen was born in Bor in 1942. He completed his elementary and middle school education in Bor. After graduating from the Istanbul University's School of Law, he began working in the Ministry of the Interior. Gonen, who served as county administrator in various locations, resigned as the Governor of Cankiri, his last civil service position, and ran as a MP candidate in Nigde in the by-elections. Gonen, who speaks French, is married and has three children.

Hasan Celal Guzel (Gaziantep, MP)

Born in Gaziantep in 1945, Guzel is a graduate of the Economics and Finance Department of the School of Political Sciences. His first civil service job was in the SPO. Later, he served as conselor to the Prime Minister, consultant to the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, Deputy Director of the Turkish Agricultural Equipment Board, Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Secretary General and Deputy Undersecretary of the SPO and Deputy Undersecretary of the Office of the Prime Minister. He became the Undersecretary of the Office of the Prime Minister immediately after the Ozal government was formed. He served as a faculty member in the Army War College and various schools and academies as an instructor in economics, law and public administration. Guzel, who was elected the "Bureaucrat of the Year" in 1986, has published several textbooks, research papers and transactions on economic and social topics. Guzel resigned from his position as Undersecretary of the Office of the Prime Minister to run as an assembly deputy candidate from Gaziantep in the by-elections. Guzel, who speaks English, is married and has two children.

Sumer Oral (Manisa 1st District, Correct Way Party [CWP])

Born in Turgutlu in 1938, Oral is a graduate of the Ataturk Lycee in Izmir and the School of Economics of the Istanbul University. He worked as a Ministry of Finance auditor between 1962 and 1972. He served as the Deputy Director General of Budget and Finance Control at the Ministry of Finance between 1972 and 1975. Later he became the director general of the same unit. Oral, who was elected to the assembly as a Justice Party deputy from Manisa in the 1977 elections, became the Minister of Social Security in 1980. Oral, who speaks French, is married and has two children.

Sait Ekinci (Burdur, MP)

Ekinci was born in Buyukalan village of Golhisar in 1947. After completing his elementary education in the Buyukalan village and his middle school education in Tefenni, he graduated from the Gokceada Teachers' School. After working as a teacher for two years, Ekinci entered the School of Pharmacy by completing his lycee deficiency classes. He graduated from the School of Pharmacy in 1975. Ekinci is married and has one child.

Mahmut Sonmez (Bingol, MP)

Sonmez was born in the Melekhan village of Bingol in 1953. He completed his elementary and middle school and lycee education in Bingol in 1973. Sonmez has been working as a jeweler in Bingol since 1980. He is married and has two children.

Umit Canuyar (Manisa 2d District, CWP)

Born in Manisa in 1939, Canuyar went to elementary and middle school and the lycee in Manisa. He served as the provincial leader of the defunct Justice Party. In the local elections of 1984, he ran as a candidate for mayor of Manisa. He ran in the by-elections as the CWP's provincial leader in Manisa. Canuyar is married and has four children.

Husamettin Cindoruk (Samsun, CWP)

Born in Izmir in 1933, Cindoruk is a graduate of the Ataturk Lycee in Ankara and the School of Law of the Ankara University. Cindoruk, who entered politics in his early youth, served as the president of the Youth Branch of the Democratic Party. During the years he practiced law as a private citizen in Ankara and Istanbul, he did not completely withdraw from politics. He defended members of the Democratic Party at the Yassiada trials. Cindoruk, who was the Justice Party's Istanbul provincial leader before that party was shut down, was one of the founders of the Great Turkey Party. After that party was shut down, he entered the CWP and served on the party's central decision and administrative council. Currently, he is the leader of the CWP. Cindoruk, who speaks English, is married and has three children.

Koksal Toptan (Zonguldak, CWP)

Born in Rize in 1943, Toptan is a graduate of the Istanbul School of Law. He practiced law for some time. He was elected to the assembly as a Justice Party deputy from Zonguldak. He served as Minister of State in the Demirel government. Toptan, who ran as a CWP candidate in the by-elections, is married and has three children.

9588
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OZAL 'MISTAKES' REVIEWED BY COLUMNIST

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 30 Sep 86 p 3

["Store Window" column by Yavuz Donat: "The Price of Mistakes"]

[Text] Ozal was politicking when he said "11-0."

Up to 10 days ago his "true expectations" were that the Motherland Party [MP] would win nine of the contested seats in the by-elections.

Around the end of the election campaign he told his closest advisers: "It may turn out to be 8-2-1."

He thought the Correct Way Party [CWP] deserved 1 seat.

Two nights ago, Ozal did not sleep--like everyone else.

He asked frequently: "How is Mehmet doing?"

He was concerned about [Mehmet] Kececiler's performance.

When Manisa was lost by 2-0, Ozal could only say: "I had doubts about Pakdemirli, but Mehmet..."

The Prime Minister talked to his inner circle about the "other provinces":

"I thought Samsun would be a dead even race; it was not. There were problems in Zonguldak. We also had problems in Izmir."

At midnight, Ozal told his "inner circle" other things.

For example, he said:

"We must reexamine our organizations."

One of the listeners jumped in:

"Sir, we must also properly evaluate the electoral base we depend on."

However, Ozal might not have heard those remarks because of the "noise on the television."

These are the notes about "Ozal's house."

The MP was not ready for the by-elections. When his "close advisers" told him that, Ozal "disregarded them."

That was a mistake.

Ozal was never able to integrate the organization with the candidates and the candidates with the parliamentary deputies. He did not make any "special efforts" to do that.

That was a mistake.

Ozal appointed candidates like "appointing civil servants." He did not consult with the party organization, the region's assembly deputies or even the cabinet ministers.

That was a mistake.

Every time he rose to speak, he said "I":

"'I' formed this party."

"When 'I' was forming the party on my own, nobody helped me."

"When forming the party, some people undermined 'me'."

His insistence on saying "I, I, I" went on until the day of the election.

That was a mistake.

It would be a bit exaggerated to say that "he removed from his side" those "who stood by his side; those who raised them on their shoulders; Halil Sivgin, who despite his faults could be helpful for small appeasing gestures; Ercument Konukman who was liked by the group; Alaaddin Kisakureki; and Gurbuz Yilmaz"--in sum, his rainy day friends.

But he pushed them aside.

He forgot them.

That was a mistake.

He said: "We are nobody's continuation."

He attempted to "deny the past."

He did not talk about the "right or the left" until the election results were announced.

He did not pay attention to the question of "what electoral base voted for him" or "what electoral base he depended on."

That was a mistake.

He appointed as ministers people who were not supported by the party's rank and file, who were not accepted by the party's administration and who were not liked by the MP's assembly group.

He did not replace them despite the resentment.

That was a mistake.

Some ministers could never shed their "image of being the minister of a supraparty government," and they had confrontations with the assembly deputies.

Nevertheless, these ministers were supported.

That was a mistake.

Relations with the press were worse than "under any other government."

The entire organization of the party's central headquarters and the entire government could not replicate the good relations Istanbul Mayor Bedrettin Dalan and Izmir Mayor Suha Baykal had established with the press.

That was a mistake.

Politics does not tolerate too many mistakes.

In politics, mistakes carry a price.

The results of these by-elections constitute a heavy price for the MP.

Had this been a "general election," had it not been for the "special votes" for Hasan Celal Guzel and had the people of Nigde not made a "special effort" for Akin Gonen, the "price" might have been much heavier.

The MP needs a shakeup without delay. It needs to revise its economic and political plans.

Otherwise this "bad course" will persist.

This is a party where the individual whose office label says "Chief of Organization and Deputy Party Leader" lost the elections.

These are important events.

One may consider these important events "as unimportant" and "may disregard or dismiss" them.

But that would be a fresh mistake added to the "dozen previous mistakes."

The price would have to be paid sooner or later.

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PROMINENT LEFTIST EXAMINES ELECTION RESULTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 30 Sep 86 pp 1,12

["Observation" column by Ugur Mumcu: "Who Won?"]

[Text] When asked "Who won?" almost everyone gives the same answer:

"The grey horse and the rider of the grey horse won the elections."

Then who lost?

The losers are numerous. The bee of the Motherland Party [MP], the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] with its six arrows and olive branch and the irascible pigeon of the Democratic Left Party [DLP].

If you look at the election results from another perspective, you may conclude that the "12 September prohibitions lost these elections." Without drowning you in figures let me just say that the parties which oppose the prohibitions won more than 60 percent of the total votes cast.

Is that not enough?

In other words, the Correct Way Party [CWP], the SDPP, the Prosperity Party [PP] and the Nationalist Work Party [NWP] won more than 60 percent of the votes. In my opinion, this is the most significant result of the elections.

It would also be useful to evaluate the election results from a perspective of "combined vote for the right and the left." As a basis of comparison, let us take the general elections of 1983 and the latest by-elections, and let us compare the votes cast in the same regions in the two elections.

In the 1983 elections, votes for the right--made up of the MP and the Nationalist Democracy Party [NDP]--in Ankara totaled 75 percent. In the recent by-elections total votes cast for the MP, CWP, PP and other rightist parties was lower than the 1983 total by about 1 or 2 percentage points. Votes cast for the left rose by the same amount.

In Istanbul, the combined vote of 65.7 percent for the MP and the NDP in the 1983 elections was more or less preserved in Sunday's by-elections. The combined vote for the left, on the other hand, rose slightly from 33.2 percent in 1983 to 33.8 percent today.

In Izmir, the Populist Party alone had won 38 percent of the vote in 1983. In Sunday's by-elections the combined vote of the SDPP and the DLP rose to 44.5 percent. Meanwhile, the combined vote for the right declined from 61 percent in 1983 to 55 percent today.

Now let us look at Zonguldak, "the workers' city."

In Zonguldak, the combined vote for the right declined from 68.9 percent in 1983 to 67.3 percent today--totaling the votes cast for the MP, CWP, PP, the Free Democracy Party and other parties. The decline amounts to 1.6 percentage points.

In the same province, the left, which had won 31.1 percent of the vote with only the Populist Party in 1983, won 32.6 of the vote with the SDPP and the DLP in Sunday's by-elections. Similar changes are observed in other provinces.

If the votes for the left were not divided between the SDPP and the DLP which share the same roots, the SDPP would have become the "second party" at the minimum.

The results which show the CWP to have been successful are a reflection of the division of the votes for the left and the concentration of the votes for the right around the CWP. If the pattern of "erosion of rightist votes" in the MP persists, the CWP will become the largest party in the general elections of 1988.

Then what will happen?

"What do you think will happen?" Let no one doubt that the rider of the grey horse will compete for the "President's Cup" in the 1988 elections. If the current bans are lifted in the meantime, Demirel, who insists, "I am a coward if I want anything for myself," will run for president.

Then, the "3d National Front government" will be established through a partnership between the CWP and the MP. Until the 1988 elections the MP and the CWP will fight bitterly against each other, and then the two parties will form the "3d National Front government" in a ceremony marked with kisses and handshakes.

In Sunday's by-elections, Demirel and the Justice Party [JP] organization supported the CWP. Observers who followed the developments closely were not at all surprised with the success of the CWP which was supported by the JP, a party which had won 37 percent of the vote in the 1977 elections.

In contrast, the SDPP organization did not have the same opportunity. Former members of the Republican People's Party, most of whom had joined the SDPP, were forced to compete against their former leader Ecevit.

SDPP leader Inonu's election strategy was based on the premise that he could make his wife run as a parliamentary candidate in Izmir in order to lose the election there, thus dividing the votes on the left and raising new hopes from the turmoil that would result in the SDPP. But that tactic did not pay off.

Mr Ecevit, who led the left into failure twice as prime minister, helped the right with his latest election tactics.

The election results manifest failure for the SDPP. The leftist electorate and the SDPP must examine the causes of this failure; the SDPP must partly look to itself for the causes of such low electoral support at a time when the right is so divided.

It is natural that the CWP should win the votes of the former JP. Because the votes cast for the MP in the past were JP votes. The votes "lent" to the MP in 1983 are now being called in. The shift of votes from one rightist party to another which shares the belief in the same economic model should not be considered an "extraordinary success." What is important is that the social democrats prove that an "alternative" exists to this model.

Consequently, we must concentrate on the failure of the SDPP rather than the success of the CWP.

Do not ever ask, "Where is Turkey headed?" Where do you think it is headed? The course is set toward the "3d National Front."

The course is set toward a "3d National Front" encompassing Demirel and Ozal after the 1988 elections. Where are the "leftist parties" that will halt this march? Where are the effective leaders to do that? Where are the needed sacrifices, awareness and skills?

9588
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COLUMNIST ASSERTS NEED FOR NEW IDEOLOGY

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 29 Sep 86 p 10

[Article by Talat Halman: "The Ideology Vacuum"]

[Text] It is said that Napoleon blamed all the misfortunes of France on ideologies--or rather, on those who remained blindly loyal to ideologies. The well-known British cultural commentator, Professor Raymond Williams--who is a Marxist himself but who has not remained stuck to Marxist methods--says: "Among the people, ideology is still used in the sense Napoleon implied." He adds: "Sensible people rely on their experiences, or they have a philosophy; foolish people, on the other hand, emphasize ideology."

The views of Williams and Napoleon on ideology appear to be fully justified in the light of the bloody events that our country experienced in the 1970's. The clashes between the communists and the fascists, in particular, cost the lives of thousands of people in the name of doctrines, ideals and ideologies. Many of the victims were naive youths. Some of them were not even involved in politics and, in particular, had no ties to either the right or the left. Many of our compatriots became the victims of indiscriminate bombings, shootings and arson incidents by saboteurs who wanted to create an atmosphere of terror and anarchy.

During the same period, there was also a religious fundamentalist group which occasionally got mixed up in acts of terrorism. These naive people, pushed forward by fanatics, poisoned the country's environment.

It can easily be said that in the 1970's Turkey did not benefit from any of the well-known ideologies; it was only hurt by them. That, of course, was not the fault of the ideologies themselves. Ideologies which are not turned into assassination, murder and sabotage may offer major benefits to political life within a framework of thought and programs.

But I think it would not be wrong to say that during the period extending from 1974 to 1980--when various ideologies were most lively-- Marxism-Leninism, religious fundamentalism, fascism and similar other ideologies did nothing but harm to our nation.

Today, in the wake of the directives of the 12 September operation and as a consequence of the restrictions of the 1982 Constitution, there are no ideologies in our politics. Extremist views are outlawed. An intimidated Motherland Party [MP] can move toward neither religious fundamentalism nor nationalism. It gets by with the doctrine of free enterprise. The parties of the left do not even contemplate anything beyond the palest hues of socialism. None of the parties gives any thought to any form of communism. Religious fundamentalism is an ideal about which the MP does not even dare to open its mouth. Fascism and neo-Nazism wait in ambush. On one side we have the MP, the Correct Way Party and other capitalist parties, and on the other side we have etatist parties like the Social Democracy Populist Party and the Democratic Left Party. In fact, none of them have any genuine ideologies. The Turkey of the 1980's is still so weary of the 1970's that it does not want rigid doctrines.

No matter what the results of yesterday's by-elections are, one fact is clear: All of the winning and losing parties are in fact "liberal parties." It is ironic that a "liberal party" was never established in our country. But almost all the major parties of the last 40 years were infinitesimally close to being liberal parties. In yesterday's by-elections, too, each one of the winning and losing candidates were adherents of the liberal doctrine with very minor differences of degree.

Lenin has said: "The alternatives are the bourgeois ideology and the socialist ideology. There is no middle way, because humanity has not invented a third ideology."

Our political world has only the middle way. In general, the middle way has no direction. Our hope is that a third ideology--a Turkish ideology which responds to the realities and yearnings of our nation--is born. The liberal doctrine cannot go beyond being a compromise based on sensibility. Is a third ideology possible? Islamism? Islamic socialism? Ataturkism? Scandinavian socialism?

Today, our political life is deprived of ideologies. Perhaps that is not a loss, because in modern times some ideologies have died, and others are on their deathbeds. But the creation of a new ideology which fits our national, historical and cultural identity will be imperative for the development of our democracy. As we proceed toward the 1988 elections, I hope that some of our parties and politicians will renounce doctrines which have died in the West and will develop a genuine ideology that is desired by a dynamic Turkish nation.

9588
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FRG LAW ALLOWS TRANSFER OF TURKISH WORKERS' SAVINGS

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 11 Sep 86 p 2

[Report by Nurhan Yonezer]

[Text] Ankara--The work on drafting legislation to enable Turkish workers to use their funds deposited in German home savings institutions to buy property in Turkey has been completed. The FRG government is preparing pamphlets and forms which will acquaint Turkish workers with the legislation. After this work is completed, Turkish workers wishing to transfer their accounts in the said institutions to Turkey will be able to file applications.

According to information obtained from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, after the FRG government instituted the necessary legislative changes, an agreement was signed between the German home savings institutions and Turkey's Public Housing and Public Partnership Fund. This agreement enables Turkish workers to use the funds in their accounts--currently totaling DM4 billion--to buy or to repair homes and property in Turkey.

The officials stated that the FRG government is now preparing the relevant pamphlets and forms which will enable Turkish workers to submit applications on this issue.

Stating that the Turkish workers must be properly informed about how their accounts in the FRG can be used to buy homes in Turkey and what procedures they will need to follow, the officials said:

"Legislative changes have been made, and agreements have been signed between the two countries on this issue. Now the time has come to prepare the contracts."

The contracts which Turkish workers wishing to transfer their accounts to Turkey will have to sign are being prepared by the FRG government. The FRG government is also preparing informative pamphlets for the Turkish workers.

After these documents are prepared, they will be sent to Turkey for examination and if they are approved the system will become operational. The implementation of the system is expected to begin in the coming days because no lengthy procedures are required in Turkey.

Currently, there are 31 home savings associations in the FRG. Of these, 18 are privately-owned and the remaining 13 are government-owned. The waiting period to qualify for loans offered by these associations varies between 24 and 48 months. Interest rates on these 11-year loans vary between 4.5 and 6 percent. Nearly 130,000 Turkish workers currently have accounts totaling DM4 billion in these associations. The officials stated that once the system becomes operational, it will be possible to use these loans in the Turkish housing market and that, as a result, an annual foreign currency inflow of DM250 million to DM300 million is expected. The officials added that as a result of this inflow 10,000 additional new homes are expected to be built annually.

9588
CSO: 3554/30

FRG AID FOR RETURNING TURKISH WORKERS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Sep 86 p 6

[Report by Fahir Ersin]

[Text] Bonn--The state government of North Rhine-Westphalia, which has a large population of Turks, has decided to offer low-interest long-term loans to Turkish and German entrepeneurs wishing to invest in tourism in Turkey.

A 17-man delegation, headed by the state's minister of labor, Hermann Heinemann, and comprised of parliamentarians and senior officials, will visit Turkey on 14 through 22 September to hold contacts and to conduct inquiries on this issue.

The Westphalian minister of labor and members of his delegation, who will meet with Turkish Minister of Labor, Dr Mustafa Kalemli, in Ankara, will seek ways of solving the problems of repatriated Turkish workers. The German delegation, which will also visit Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] leader Sevket Yilmaz and main opposition leader Erdal Inonu, will hold talks with State Industrial and Investment Bank Director General Halit Kara and will tour installations operated by worker-owned firms in Kirsehir, Yozgat and Bursa.

The Westphalian government has decided to offer long-term, low-interest loans to returning Turkish workers and German entrepeneurs who wish to invest in touristic projects such as vacation villages in Turkey. During its visit to Turkey, the delegation will investigate and discuss the prospects of investing in regions permitted by existing legislation and incentive measures.

9588
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UGT REPORTEDLY LEADING CCOO IN UNION ELECTIONS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 27 Oct 86 p 21

[Text] The Socialist labor confederation UGT [Central Union of Workers] is holding a slight gain over CCOO [Workers Commissions] in the union elections 3 weeks before they begin. The results in business firms with over 200 workers ensure a future de facto dual trade unionism, because both CNT [National Confederation of Labor] and USO [Workers Trade Union] and the independents are losing the slight ground won in 1982.

UGT is clearly gaining over CCOO in the union elections held to date in firms with over 200 workers, while USO and CNT are virtually confined to testimonial labor confederations, ELA [Basque Traditional Catholic Labor Union]-STV [Solidarity of Basque Workers] has turned out to be a hegemonic trade union in the Basque Country, and INTG appears to be divided in Galicia.

According to the report from firms in which elections have been held, provided by UGT and CCOO, once they have been cross-checked and compared, one may claim that UGT has won 955 delegates; followed by CCOO with 837; the non-affiliated with 116; and other unions, 299. USO and CNT are among the latter.

These results pertain to 88 companies with over 200 workers, which employ more than 150,000 workers and have elected 2,265 delegates between 1 and 24 October.

Favorable Data

It must be pointed out that CCOO has provided a list of 58 firms, including 94,953 workers, who have elected 1,900 delegates. As is usual, these are companies in which the results have been more favorable to them, and hence they appear as winners, with 830 delegates; followed by UGT, with 690; while the other unions plus the non-affiliated total 360.

UGT has done the same thing, providing a list of 51 firms including over 100,000 workers, who have elected 1,630 delegates, 775 of whom belong to them; followed by CCOO, which received 501; and the other unions and non-affiliated ones, with 354.

Although this is still a small percentage, these results already seem like a first poll indicating the evolution and trend in the workers' vote. It should be noted that among the business firms counted are large companies such as Rio Tinto Explosives, Babcock, Wilcox, Bandas de Chevarri, ENDASA [National Aluminum Enterprise, Inc], Michelin, Astano, Tabacalera, Renault, Bimbo, Mercadona, Standard, Inespal, Imepiel, Snice, Cross, Santana Land Rover, Zuazo, Mini Watt, Macosa de Valencia, etc., all with over 1,000 workers.

One infers from the analyses of the data that CCOO is declining in the metal sector which, paradoxically, had been the "accursed sector" for UGT; because it was thought that this union would suffer severe attrition as a result of industrial reconversion. The elections held to date in the large companies subjected to reconversion plans, such as Astano, prove that this attrition has not occurred.

Another surprising fact is the slight difference in delegates between the Communist-influenced union and the Socialist one in Catalonia. The latter community had traditionally been a "fiefdom" of the Workers Commissions; however, the data provided by this union confederation indicate that there is only a difference of 13 delegates. According to other sources, UGT is even taking the lead. The same thing might be claimed to be happening in Madrid.

Nevertheless, Marcelino Camacho's union appears to have a certain amount of growth in the medium-sized business firms (with between 250 and 500 workers), and in the areas of Castilla and Levante, where it did not have any special entrenchment.

In the Basque Country, ELA-STV shows up with a great deal of strength, becoming consolidated as the second-ranking union force, with CCOO left virtually sliding downward.

UGT, on the other hand, has proven that it is very well maintained and has even improved slightly in firms with over 1,000 workers; whereas, in the medium-sized ones, there lies its "Achilles' heel." But there is every indication that it is in small business (with under 100 workers) that it is on a roll, thanks to an electoral strategy better established than that of its competitors, accomplished through the electoral agents who cover and organize the elections.

Participation

Another feature of the electoral process is the widespread participation that is occurring. This will cause UGT and CCOO (whoever the final winner is) to improve considerably the results accrued in 1982. At the present time, preliminary announcements have already been made for holding elections in more business firms than 4 years ago. It is thought that nearly 200,000 more workers will participate than did in the previous election.

The possibility that a third union force may show up in these elections is becoming dimmer every day. According to the results that are being accrued, ELA-STV will have more delegates in the Basque Country alone than USO will in the entire national territory.

It appears that the Workers Trade Union can hardly equal the percentage of delegates that it received 4 years ago, which were even then considered to be a very poor number. CNT is scarcely showing a presence in the results accrued to date.

2909
CSO: 3548/17

DEMOGRAPHERS REPORT LOWER BIRTH RATES, INCREASED MIGRATION

Madrid EL PAIS (FUTURO supplement) in Spanish 29 Oct 86 pp 2-3

[Text] The sharp decline in fertility, an increasingly reduced death rate, and a positive balance of migration abroad are the main demographic phenomena currently occurring in Spain. Some demographers are beginning to view with concern the fact that birth control campaigns are being conducted in Spain when the forecasts indicate that we shall enter the 21st century with a population in which there will be more aged people than ever, and fewer children than at any other time in our recent history.

The decline in fertility has been taking place in our country uninterruptedly since the turn of the century, extending to the mid-1950's. In 1922, Spanish women had an average of four children, and by 1956, the rate had dropped to 2.61. Then a slight rise was noted until 1964, with another moderate drop until 1977, and a sharp decline after that date. The latest estimate, in 1984, indicated that our country's women now have only 1.7 children on the average. To guarantee the generational replacement, at least 2.1 would be required.

This sharp decline in fertility had occurred in 1965, in the Central European countries, in 1973 in France, in 1974 in Italy, and in 1977 in Portugal. None of these countries has managed to change the direction of the trend; indicating that Spain could hardly do so over the short term. The Spanish phenomenon has surprised the demographers, who were not expecting it to occur in such a drastic manner.

A population projection made by seven experts from the Labor Ministry predicted that the crossing of the threshold to replace the generations (fertility rate of 2.1) would occur in 1986; and,it actually took place in 1981. The same projection, which noted that, in 1975, the life expectancy of Spaniards was 70.7 years for men and 76.5 for women, and that these rates were surpassed only by Sweden and Japan, foresaw a moderate growth in life expectancy of 0.22 years for men and 0.34 for women in the years 1975-1986. The real gain, from 1975 to 1981 alone, has been 1.8 years for men and 2.1 for women.

Men and Women

As a comparative item of information, it must be said that, in 1900, Spanish men had a life expectancy of 33.9 years, and women, of 35.7.

Insofar as migration abroad is concerned, in 1973 there was a break in the traditional emigration trend of the Spanish population. Since then, the return of emigrants and the settlement of foreigners in our country have exceeded the egress of Spaniards beyond our borders.

The latest official statistics, those from the census of 1 March 1981, indicate that our country has 37,682,355 inhabitants, of whom 18,491,187 are men, and 19,191,168 women. Only in eight of the State's 50 provinces (Alava, Avila, Burgos, Guadalajara, Huesca, Lerida, Las Palmas, and Teruel) is the number of women lower than that of men. Jose Vicente Garcia Sestafe, deputy general director of the Electoral Census Office of the National Statistics Institute (INE), claims: "Of every 100 births occurring in the world, 51 are male and 49 female. At ages 18 or 20, however, there are already more women."

According to 1982 data, the birth rate in Spain per 1,000 inhabitants stands at 13.44 points. When the data are broken down by provinces, one notes that most of the births occur in the southern provinces and the Canaries; while the least number occur in the interior provinces, which have undergone severe population losses from the emigration of the 1960's. The list is headed by Melilla (20.58 per 1,000), ending with Soria (10.35), Avila (10.31). Teruel (9.48), and Orense (8.52).

As for the death rate, the rate for the entire State is 7.44 per 1,000. This is widely surpassed by Lugo (12.07), Teruel (11.71), Cuenca (11.56), and Soria (10.46); while Alava (5.20), Madrid (5.41), and Guipuzcoa and Valladolid (5.83) are the ones with the lowest rates.

There are currently in Spain over 600,000 foreigners with legalized work cards. The internal migrations are more difficult to ascertain. They would have to be picked up from the changes in residence that must be reported to the town hall of where they leave and to the one where they arrive.

Registering

However, Spaniards are not in the habit of doing so until they have to register in order to procure some document or permit. According to Garcia Sestafe, the INE has observed a decline in the flow of population toward the cities, and even a return of many emigrants of the 1960's to the locations from which they departed.

For example, these migratory shifts are causing Extremadura to gain population, and the Basque Country to lose it; but there are no recent data on either trend.

Where are the major demographic phenomena cited previously leading? Last May, in Madrid, the International Symposium on Demographic Trends and Economic Planning took place. In one of the reports, "Demographic Evolution and Work Force Supply," the demographers Carmen de Miguel Castano and Isabel Aguero prepared three different population projections for Spain up until the year

2051, each of which was based on a different assumption of the fertility rate. The assumed average (1.8 children per woman) would cause our country to have 41.2 million inhabitants in 2001, 41.5 million in 2026, and 37.9 million in 2051. A fertility rate of 1.5 would cause us to have 39.9 million in 2001, 374. million in 2026, and 30.3 million in 2051. The hypothesis of the highest rate (2.1) would mean that, in 2001, we would number 42.6 million, in 2026 we would reach 46.2 million, and in 2051, it would be 47.2 million.

Any of the three hypotheses offers a population pyramid at least as broad in the upper sections (pertaining to retirement ages) as at the base (young population). The question is how much the few young people in the 21st century will have to work in order to enable the many old people at that time to collect their pensions. Garcia Sestafe claims: "We are below the fertility rate that would guarantee the generational replacement; and that means that, within a few years, we shall begin losing population. Then we shall have to foster emigration from outside into Spain."

2909
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MOTHERLAND PARTY BLAMED FOR BRINGING RELIGION INTO POLITICS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 25 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by Oktay Eksi: "Religion and Politics:]

[Text] As the campaign connected with the by-elections goes on, each party's variegated hues have began to appear.

Some already have nothing in their bag of tricks. Others have fished out long-hidden bad habits and are making a public show of them.

But Hon Bulent Ecevit, who supports the Democratic Left Party, has provided what is possibly the most striking spectacle.

Well, it now seems that the Honorable Mr Ecevit has never been against contesting matters relating to religion and religious sanctity in the wrestling ring of politics. It now seems that he does not believe that one of the fundamental principles of secularism is to leave such issues strictly to people's own consciences. He now says that what he said and wrote on the subject earlier merely shows what needed to be said at the time. Thus, for example, it seems that the following criticism he directed in 1968 at the Justice Party and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel--respectively, the party in power and the prime minister at the time-- in the course of a speech from the rostrum of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on behalf of the Republican People's Party [RPP] on the draft budget was not at all in earnest. Look at what the Honorable Mr Ecevit said at the time: "The Honorable Mr Demirel is making the most extreme concessions in all fields and in every sense, to counterrevolutionaries that he thinks, quite wrongly, that he can bring under control at any time. Among these counterrevolutionaries, among these zealots for reactionary uprising--who are sometimes incited and encouraged either by him or by his close colleagues and who, at other times, drag him along willy-nilly--there are some who are against Ataturk's revolutions, the secular state, the 27 May revolution, social justice, and the constitution."

The truth is that now it is the Honorable Mr Ecevit who is doing the same things.

Which Ecevit?

"Those who believed that secularism was merely an administrative formality, required merely for a certain degree of separation between religion and affairs of state and between religion and world affairs, and who thought this was all there was to it, have understood much better in recent years that the secularism that Ataturk brought to this country has a function that goes much futher than that. Secularism is a fundamental condition for national unity in Turkey. Secularism is one of the greatest guarantees for our nation and our state against those who want to divide this nation from within by transforming differences in religious denomination into friction in Turkey. Therefore, let no one have any doubts about it: secularism will grow stronger and survive. (Speech given on 4 May 1979 at the Ankara Provincial Congress of the RPP).

The truth is that, in years past, one of the most carefully preserved principles of Turkish political life was "to refrain from the exploitation of religion and all that is sacred for political advantage."

What the Democratic Party managed to do in this matter was, at the very worst, confined to annulment of "the decision that the call to prayers be in Turkish." And the concessions made by the Justice Party [JP] administration were limited to a nod of approval to some sect leaders and to Demirel's performance at electoral mass meetings to have a copy of the Koran presented to him, then kissing it and touching it to his head."

Now, however, religion has become an overt medium of politics.

It is true that it was the Motherland Party that started the ball rollings. In plainview of the Republican prosecutors--of the Republican chief prosecutor, no less--religion "publicly" climbed into the political ring. Thus began the placing of dynamite sticks at the foundations of the secular republic. Ecevit--unfortunately--also fell in with the fashion.

A pity, a great pity!

13184/13104
CSO: 3554/13

POLITICAL SCIENTIST ADVOCATES ISLAMIC ECONOMIC ORDER

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 25 Aug 86 p 4

[Text] Speaking at the Economic Consultative Council of the Economic and Social Research Centre [ESRC], Prof Dr Besir Hamitogullari has said: "Inflation is the bastard child of the capitalist form of production."

Speaking at a seminar organized by the ESRC on "The Distribution of Incomes in Turkey--Problems and Solutions," Besir Hamitorgullari, a member of the faculty of Political Sciences, said the following, according to the UBA agency:

--Inflation is the bastard child of the capitalist form of production, whereas Islamic economics is economics without inflation.

--In Turkey, a debate on economic alternatives at the scientific level is impossible because concepts are subject to prohibitions.

--Some diplomats, described as intellectuals in Turkey, are unable to break out of the bounds of ideologies injected in them by foreign centres.

--The Right in Turkey has been building itself up since 1983. A change in the system has begun on the Right.

--The 24 January [1980] decisions constitute the most radical move in the history of the Turkish Republic. The country's economy has never been dislocated to this extent before.

--Where the working population and the intellectuals have been silenced, there you have "savage capitalism." And what we have in Turkey is not liberalism, but savagery combined with arbitrariness.

--The Right takes sides with capital, the Left with labor. Islamic economics, not being on the side of capital, is not on the right.

--If an economic model has had 60 years to develop a country and failed, then it should be dumped on the garbage heap, and those responsible should repent rather than boast about their deeds.

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IMPORTANCE OF SECULARISM TO DEMOCRACY EXAMINED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 25 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by retired Maj Gen Muzaffer Erendil: "The Basic Principle of the Turkish Revolution: Secularism"]

[Text] "Secularism" has become one of the hottest issues of public debate in Turkey today.

Since Ataturk's time, secularism has enjoyed legal safeguards, and these have been carefully embedded in subsequent "constitutions" that form the foundation of the country's laws, attesting to the importance of the concept in a country like Turkey which must fall in step with the modern world. The extent to which secularism has been observed in practice, however, is more important than its legal status. As recent events show, the interest of the press and its sensitivity to the issue reflect the people's sentiments.

In the past, the word "secular" was used to denote "someone without the characteristics or powers of a clergyman," "someone outside religion and the priesthood," and "secularism" meant "the separation of the authorities for religious and worldly affairs within the state." And "laicism" (laicisme) is the school of thought that supports secularism in organizations and establishments.

Modern, advanced nations in the past waged great struggles against trusteeship and control of the state by the church and succeeded in separating the affairs of state and religion, achieving great feats in the process. Secular thinking in the West was born of the Renaissance and of "Humanism," which put the stress on the value of the human being. This struggle of the modern world goes back to the 13th century, and the superiority of the West lies in its settlement of the 700-year-old issue of secularism and in handling worldly affairs in a rational and scientific manner.

In contrast with the superiority gained by the West in this field, "the East became mired in the concept of a theocratic state and constantly retreated before the West; having failed to keep in step with the ways of the world, it has suffered the familiar consequences. The past enslavement and the present backwardness of the East, caused by its reliance on the concept of the theocratic state, are full of valuable lessons. The Turkish Republic, Ataturk's great achievement, is the first state in the Islamic world to have come to grips with this subject.

Whether a state is secular or not depends on what is understood by secularism.

Secularism is, first and foremost, "the freedom of thought and conscience." This means respect by the state for every kind of religious thinking and not taking sides on the subject of religion. Respect for the human being, one of the basic principles of democracy, depends on a secular attitude and behavior. Societies and nations comprised of members free of any kind of repression and interference in matters of thought and belief are strong because the freedom of thought and conscience is connected with a human being's rational inner world. A person whose thinking and belief is repressed is a person who has been reduced to a tool, and such a person is deprived of creative ability. Persons forced to adopt a certain religion are not only victims of the worst kind of blasphemy, but also of a practice that runs counter to the concept of modern democracy. In fact, the principle of respect for every kind of religious thinking is an integral component of modern democracies. Secularism is the separation of religion from state affairs. This means that religion should manage affairs in its own sphere and not be involved in the administration of the state, that is, in politics. States that abolish the trusteeship of religion and the religious establishment over the administration of the state find it easy to fall in step with modern civilizaton. Conversely, this ensures respect for religion and the religious establishment.

The establishment of secularism in the minds and behavior of people is also in keeping with the modern philosophy of life which regards a realistic and rational attitude useful for the success of scientific efforts in life, development, and progress. No method can be as successful in research, experimentation, and in finding the best as the rational approach. No behavior can take the place of rational behavior in solving problems.

Having defined secularism, let us ask whether the Ottoman state was secular or not. The Ottoman state may be described as a "national theocratic" state in its early years. As the state was extended by conquest, its national aspect dwindled to nothing and it acquired a thoroughly "theocratic" identity. The assumption of the office of the Caliph by the Ottoman monarchs added religious powers to their political ones; in other words, the state became theocratic. Furthermore, the creation of the office of the "minister of all religious affairs" [Turkish: "Seyhulislam"] by the Ottoman monarch and the requirement that all matters of state should be subject to its endorsement must be described as the interference of religion in the affairs of state. This method amounted to a subjugation of the affairs of the state to religion. The foundation of jurisprudence in the Ottoman state on Islamic Sharia law was further proof of the theocratic structure of the state.

In the light of the evidence, it would be naive to argue that the state behaved in a tolerant manner toward the various peoples and religions that comprised it and, on this basis, to claim that the state was not a theocratic one. The Ottoman state disappeared from the hisorical scene because it based all its views and actions on religious considerations and consequently failed to keep in step with the world's mode of progress.

It is necessary to point out that secularism does not mean irreligion. Secularism means respecting religion by respecting freedom of conscience. Ataturk, the founder of the Turkish revolution, established secularism as one of the basic principles of the revolution. This was essential for catching up with modern civilization and for taking gaint steps along this route. To attain its goals, his revolution depended on respect for human dignity and for human freedom of thought and conscience.

Having made an excellent diagnosis of the consequences of both the interference of religion in affairs of state and of basing the course of state affairs on religion, Ataturk made it a fundamental principle of the revolution to confine religion to managing its own affairs. Ataturk's concept of secularism is beyond arguement. He said: "Religion is a necessary institution. Nations without religion cannot survive. It is, however, a fact that religion is a matter between God and his creatures." (Footnote 1) (Kilic Ali: "Ataturk's Qualities," p 116)

Ataturk believed in the rational aspect of Islam, free from all casuistry. He said: "Our religion is a most reasonable and most natural religion. And it is only because of this that it has become the ultimate religion. To be natural, a religion must be compatible with reason, science, technology, and logic. Our religion is so entirely." (Footnote 2) ("Ataturk's Speeches and Statements," Vol 2, p 90)

The Turkish Republic, following a war of independence and in light of the lessons it drew from a series of disasters, initiated a series of reforms under the leadership of Ataturk. The goal of all these movements for renewal was and is the creation of a modern, civilized, advanced, and strong nation. This is a matter of life and death. The fundamental problem in modernization is to achieve a democratic regime based on national sovereignty, respect for human dignity and the freedom of thought and conscience. This is predominently stated in Article 9 of 1982 constitution: "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenents set forth in the Preamble."

In the modern concept of a state, secularism means "freedom of religion and conscience"; "the neutrality of the state in matters of religion"; "the separation of religion and politics, that is, from affairs of state"; and the adoption of "rational and scientific methods" in worldly matters, that is, in the affairs to be conducted for the benefit of the nation and the country. On the principle that secularism does not mean irreligion, everybody is free in his faith. In these respected, secularism as a component of Ataturkist philosophy is one of the foundation stones of the Turkish revolution. Ataturkism, (the Turkish revolution) is an indivisible whole.

Secularism is a philosophy of life for the Turkish nation which has to keep up with the modern world. Any movement aimed at causing the Turkish nation to falter in its great achievements on the Ataturkist course is to be characterized as an attempt to inflict the greatest evil to the nation. One may rightly say, in view of the fact that the Turkish revolution and Ataturkism constitute a whole, that secularism is one of the foundation stones of the revolution. To disturb this stone--let alone dislodge it--may bring down the edifice, the whole great monument. Let it be known that anybody who makes the attempt will be buried under the edifice.

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SECULARISM CONTRASTED WITH WESTERN CONCEPT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 23 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Nahid Dincer: "Their Ways and Ours"]

[Text] In 1978, the Turkish Teachers' Association [TTA] in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in the FRG wrote to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) complaining about Koranic courses in the state and demanding the closure of these courses.

After examining the complaints of the TTA, SPD parliamentarians Busow, Hein and Reymann submitted a list of questions to the State Assembly on 19 February 1979 and requested that the state government answer them. The motion submitted to the assembly was as follows:

"The TTA has complained about the Koranic schools (in Germany this term is erroneously used to mean Koranic courses) and the instructional methods used by teachers in those schools and has demanded the closure of these schools. They have made this demand on grounds that the Koranic schools violate current Turkish law.

"In addition, it has been contended that attending the Koranic schools constitutes a heavy burden for Turkish students, that the schools are having a negative effect on the students and that they are instigating indifference toward normal classes.

"It is also said that the Koranic schools have become propaganda vehicles for extreme rightist parties and that insults against other Turkish parties and German parties are often encountered in these schools.

"It is charged that the Koranic schools preach intolerance toward other ideas, a national-socialism which opposes the peaceful coexistence of nations and antagonism against German children and that, in sum, the students are encouraged and induced to take a wrong approach which isolates them from society.

"We ask the state government:

"1. What are the legal principles under which these schools, known as Koranic schools, operate in the federal republic and in North Rhine-Westphalia?

"2. What oversight measures provided by the federal and state constitutions have been used so far to control the operation of the Koranic schools?

"3. Has any data been gathered about the Koranic schools' curriculla, teaching methods, locations and public health status? How is this data evaluated and are they in compliance with German laws?

"4. Is it true that the Koranic schools are established and exploited by extreme rightist parties? Does the state government have any information on this matter? If so, what conclusions have been reached?

"5. Assuming that the criticism leveled by the TTA against the Koranic schools is justified on basic issues, does the state government share our views on the following points?

"The continued operation of the said schools and the attendance of children in these schools is in the interests of neither the students nor our state. What steps will the state government take to prevent violations of the federal and state constitutions?"

Answers

The state's ministers of labor, health and social affairs, culture and the interior jointly formulated answers to these questions. The answers were read on 26 March 1979 on behalf of the government:

"With regard to Question 1:

"These schools, known as Koranic schools, are not schools as defined by the state constitution and the relevant provisions of the law. These institutions employ quasi-instructional methods to teach verses from the Koran in Arabic, which is considered essential for the teaching of the Islamic religion. Currently, no special legal principles exist with regard to the teaching of the Koran, other than Article 4/2 of the Constitution which guarantees religious worship without state interference.

"With regard to Question 2:

"The general oversight of the Koranic courses is not possible without a legal basis. Intervention in isolated circumstances is authorized by the penal code only if a proven offense requiring punishment is committed.

"With regard to Question 3:

"The state government has received no information about proven violations of German laws to justify intervention.

"With regard to Question 4:

"The teaching of Islam is carried out by various institutions. Allegations that extremist political groups are exploiting the teaching of the Koran for their purposes have not been substantiated until now.

"With regard to Question 5:

"In sum, it can be stated that the guarantee for religious worship without state interference also applies to the adherents of Islam. Within the framework of its policy on aliens, the state government remains committed to the principle of allowing workers and their family members who are here legally to choose for themselves their time of stay, their degree of adaptation and their adherence to their national and religious identity."

The Stance of the Press

We see in the answers given by the state government to the SDP parliamentarians' questions the implementation of the concept of secularism and the principle of the supremacy of the law. I would like to draw the attention of people in Turkey who hide behind the mask of secularism to the Westphalian state government's response to the TTA's unfounded, unsubstantiated and exaggerated allegations and accusations designed to provoke the Germans, and I would like to comment on the stance of the German press.

The said petition by the TTA and the SPD deputies' questions to the government were reported by the German press neither in banner headlines nor in a way that could provoke the persecution of Muslims. Nor was the issue exploited by the press as commercial capital. The German press did not use this opportunity to threaten and to accuse the government and did not attempt to indoctrinate government forces against Muslims.

If a similar petition, filled with such allegations, were written by an association of teachers in Turkey and brought before the Turkish Grand National Assembly by a political party, the stories, articles and commentaries our press would churn out would be such that the earth would move. In Germany, on the other hand, the press did not twitch a hair with regard to this petition by the TTA.

Only recently, one segment of our press carried stories distorting the work of a sincere Muslim who has no motive to change the government system or to eliminate secularism and whose eagerness and dedication to serve his religion is reflected only in his personal behavior (not the social order). These reports were filled with accusations of extreme religionism and reactionarism, but nothing more than glib talk and the comments of the correspondents who wrote the stories. It is not very hard to see in these reports the inconsistencies, the erroneous interpretations and the opinionated stances stemming from ignorance. While large banner headlines extending over five columns carried hair-raising remarks, the stories following these headlines contained nothing more than allegations about praying and handing out religious pamphlets--which are not criminal offenses--and admissions that government authorities and security officials could not find any criminal evidence despite all their efforts. The discrepancy between these banner headlines, designed to cause panic in our society and among government officials, and the reports following them is a good indication of how these press organs judge and view their readers.

The Western Approach

In Germany, the survival chances of papers which attempt to provoke persecution against believers and which fabricate such frivolous reports are very slim because of the negative impression such acts may create about themselves. Moreover, the Church would stand up against papers fabricating such stories; that would end all chances of survival for those papers, and they would die.

But in Turkey, such papers can perpetuate their anti-religion stories--behind the facade of warning against reactionarism and defending secularism--without any fear or restraint because they believe that their sales will not decline.

Secularism is not a one-way street or a knife with one cutting edge. Secularism is a system which protects the believer's right to believe and which guarantees an environment where the individual can engage in behavior arising from his religious beliefs and can worship freely and without interference. Secularism does not mean to engage in anti-religionism by distorting the most innocent incidents. Those who interpret secularism in accordance with their own ideology and who wish to morally pressure government forces to take action against believers are obstructing the integration of the Turkish nation and the Turkish state, and that is the great peril.

This is the difference between the concept and practice of secularism in the West--which we have been trying to imitate--and the stance of our papers which think they have a monopoly on secularism and its practice.

9588
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FOREIGN MINISTER, INDUSTRY MINISTER DIFFER ON EXPORTS

Copenhagen BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN in Danish 17 Oct 86 pp 12-14

[Article by Stig Albinus: "Export War"; first paragraph is BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN introduction]

[Text] The disagreement between the industrial affairs minister and the foreign minister could threaten the continuity of the government's business policy. Reports from the meeting suggest that the dispute peaked at the government's meeting at Saunte House.

Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Industrial Affairs Minister Nils Wilhjelm have fallen out over the government's most important political issue this fall, a dynamic business policy.

The foreign minister's desire to launch the government's export strategy himself in a report on export policy has irritated Nils Wilhjelm and created conflict between Conservative and Liberal ministers. This has produced a bad atmosphere and threatens to destroy the continuity of the big plans.

The Conservative cabinet ministers have reacted sharply to what they regard as the Liberal Party chairman's attempt to take the credit for the business policy offensive that the new Conservative minister of industrial affairs, Nils Wilhjelm, was selected to present. Within the government Wilhjelm has called Ellemann-Jensen an "imperialist," while Ellemann-Jensen says that Wilhjelm and his ministry are the ones who have tried to "grab too much power for themselves" in the area of economic policy where the Foreign Ministry's trade section has made increasingly energetic efforts in recent years.

The controversy came to a head at the government's meeting on strategy at Saunte House in North Sjaelland on 28-29 August where a lengthy quarrel occurred. The Conservative ministers took turns trying to persuade the foreign minister to abandon his plan to present the government's overall export policy personally and to allow it to be incorporated in the prime minister's opening speech or Wilhjelm's industrial policy statement instead. But Ellemann-Jensen stood his ground. He will present a statement on export policy to Folketing in early November.

The conflict over the presentation of the export policy statement concerns much more than which minister will have the honor and prestige of launching the government's fall scoop, its dynamic business policy. It is a fight among government officials over which ministry will coordinate the government's export policy and the practical export-promoting activities in this country and abroad. Will it be the Industrial Affairs Minister and its industrial policy secretariat, which wants to become stronger, or will it be the Foreign Ministry's trade section with its experienced practicians? Nils Wilhjelm feels that the coordination naturally falls under his ministry, as the ministry for business policy, while the foreign minister feels it is quite obvious that the Foreign Ministry should coordinate export activity. "The Foreign Ministry people have the practical experience," says Ellemann-Jensen.

Finally it is a question of the attempt by the Liberals and Ellemann-Jensen to recapture the central position in planning the government's economic strategy which was partially lost when Conservative Palle Simonsen took over the leadership of the Finance Ministry as then Liberal chairman Henning Christophersen's successor.

Here Ellemann-Jensen has found a speedy short cut to exert influence via his own field of competence on the area that will be one of the main themes in economic policy in the years ahead, namely business policy.

When questioned directly, Nils Wilhjelm saw no problem in the division of work between the Foreign Ministry and the Industrial Affairs Ministry.

Clear Work Division

"There is a very clear division of work in the present areas of responsibility. This will not be changed. The Industrial Affairs Ministry and the other ministries are concerned with problems connected with the national scene while external affairs are dealt with by the Foreign Ministry."

Who should coordinate export policy?

"Coordination is dealt with by the government's business committee. This committee has discussed my report and my business policy program for urban businesses. And the business committee will also approve the export policy statement."

Who should coordinate practical export efforts, the Industrial Affairs Ministry or the Foreign Ministry?

"As in the past, coordination should occur in both places."

Why was so much time spent at the Saunte House meeting on discussing whether the foreign minister should deliver the export policy statement?

"That was not the case."

We pointed out that reports of the meeting clearly indicated this.

"I have no comment on that," said Nils Wilhjelm.

Conflict at Saunte House

High-level sources in the Foreign Ministry described the discussion of export policy at the government's strategy meeting at Saunte House as a "regular fight" in comments to BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN. And the otherwise carefully edited account of the meeting makes it quite clear that there was an internal debate.

Various Conservative minister in turn--the prime minister, the finance minister and the cultural affairs minister--made a vain effort to get the foreign minister to abandon his idea of personally delivering a statement on export policy.

According to the account of the meeting Nils Wilhjelm first presented the main lines of his industrial policy statement. Then it says:

"The foreign minister raised the question of an overall export policy. It was not a proposal for more money. General business policy is the cornerstone of export policy. But we might achieve a better utilization of various aspects of our dynamic policy if we try to combine and coordinate the energy a number of ministers expend on export promotion. This has never been tried. Perhaps the government could present an overall policy statement. The basic idea was that an attempt should be made to gather our forces.

"The industrial affairs minister agreed in principle. The thought was in line with his idea of reactivating the Export Promotion Council.

"The prime minister assumed that the idea was not to combine all export promotion activities under the direction of the Foreign Ministry but to better combine and coordinate presentation to the public of the policy the government wants to pursue.

"The cultural affairs minister was not sure that a statement would be appropriate. A section in the opening speech would be better.

"The foreign minister maintained his desire for an export policy statement, at which point the prime minister remarked that the statements should be coordinated.

"The finance minister said that references to the export promotion measures might be more appropriate in the statement from the ministry in charge of that area. It would also be possible to get something out of this sort of division of effort."

The matter was not concluded at the meeting but Ellemann-Jensen will present his export policy statement, thereby getting his own way.

No More Signals

The need to coordinate ministry efforts in the export area has become great as export policy activity became really prestigious. Almost all the ministries feel it is an honor to launch export initiatives themselves. But the problem is that so far this activity has not been coordinated.

It is apparent from one of the Industrial Affairs Ministry's preliminary memos on a "long-range dynamic business policy," dated 28 April 1986, that the government intends to do something about this problem:

"It should be strongly emphasized that planning a long-range dynamic business policy is an effort that goes across ministerial lines. It will not be possible to accomplish this task unless public authorities within a number of policy areas understand the need for--and are capable of--working in harmony. The only way this can be done is by making cooperation across ministerial lines an unconditional requirement."

The desire to improve coordination across ministerial lines is based on pointed criticism of the lack of a systematic approach in the past:

"It would also be a positive element if the 'small signals' of various ministries are reduced to a minimum. On the other hand it is important that we stress that a long-range strategy is being fashioned. Otherwise the unsystematic 'firing off of small signals' will continue and this will shake the business world's belief in the seriousness of our intentions."

Consequently the memo states that a coordinated effort calls for an "expansion of the industrial policy secretariat" in the Industrial Affairs Ministry.

Liberals Want Export Ministry

With its plans to strengthen the Industrial Affairs Ministry, "reactivate" the Export Promotion Council, strengthen the export promotion secretariat and cause it to function in a more purposeful way, the Industrial Affairs Ministry is on a collision course with the Foreign Ministry.

A more purposeful export promotion activity under the auspices of the Industrial Affairs Ministry will almost inevitably lead to a conflict with the efforts being made by the Foreign Ministry's trade section both in other countries and inside Denmark.

Business people already want better coordination and control of the export support and guidance available to Danish firms today. It is said that export promotion coordination is a "giant with feet of clay" and that it functions poorly in relation to small and medium-sized firms in particular.

At a meeting in Grindsted recently section chief Jens Peter Larsen of the Foreign Ministry told a group of Jutland business people that "too many small and medium-sized Danish firms are running their heads against a brick wall when they seek information about how they can sell their products in other countries. They run the gauntlet from one office to another and too often their efforts are wasted on that account."

The chairman of the Liberal Folketing group, Ivar Hansen, who attended the same meeting, stated in this context that "it may be necessary to gather the export problems under one hat in a single Export Ministry."

Actually Ivar Hansen's suggestion means that export promotion work would be moved from the Industrial Affairs Ministry to the Foreign Ministry. Ellemann-Jensen does not think it makes sense to separate the Foreign Ministry's work in the foreign economic and foreign policy areas.

The director of the Trades Council, Laue Traberg--another Liberal--also saw this perspective in strengthening the work of the export promotion secretariat:

"When the Export Promotion Council is changed in the way the government is proposing, with the work of the council becoming more authoritative, it would be a good idea to start discussing whether the Export Promotion Council should come under the direction of the Foreign Ministry. There is a trend in development toward the establishment of an Export Ministry under the Foriegn Ministry. In this way we could also avoid Norwegian and Swedish conditions with their bad experiences from going the other way and concentrating on export efforts in the ministries responsible for domestic business affairs."

This idea has the support of prominent business people who feel that by virtue of their practical experience in export work abroad, Foreign Ministry people are far better equipped to coorinate export activities than the deskbound theoreticians in the somewhat oldfashioned Industrial Affairs Ministry.

However Nils Wilhjelm categorically rejects the idea of moving the Export Promotion Council to the Foreign Ministry:

"It is totally unthinkable. If we do not link the sales side to the production and development side we will lose an important prerequisite for a harmonious business policy."

But regardless of how unthinkable it is for Nils Wilhjelm the fight for control of export policy does not end there. It has just begun.

6578
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ECONOMIC DENMARK

ECONOMIST SEES NEED FOR CURRENCY DEVALUATION

Copenhagen BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN in Danish 10 Oct 86 pp 18-19

[Unattributed article: "Krone Overvalued"; first paragraph is BORSENS NYHEDSMAGASIN introduction]

[Text] Any government in office a year from now will be forced to devalue the krone, according to economist Torben Nielsen.

In spite of their support in principle for the government's goal of maintaining a fixed krone exchange rate policy, several economists regard it as unlikely that the government will be able to maintain this policy after the contract settlements next spring, which are expected to cost Danish firms a lot of money.

Stockbroker Torben Nielsen is one of the supporters of the fixed rate policy because the fixed rate of the krone has been an important factor in the decline of interest rates. But he does not believe this policy can be maintained much longer:

"The fixed krone rate policy, as it is defined now, can be maintained with the wage development and the cost growth that seem likely in 1987. But regardless of what government is in office a year from now it will be forced to abandon the fixed krone rate policy as now defined, with the krone fixed in relation to the ECU. It will probably be necessary to fix the rate of the krone in relation to an average of all currencies, including the dollar," he said.

"The export trend at this time shows that the krone is probably too strong internationally in relation to our international competitiveness. I do not believe that competitiveness can be corrected in the short term through wage restraints. The krone is so overvalued that it will take a great many years with a very strict income policy to accomplish that," said Torben Nielsen.

He sees the choice this way: Do we want to maintain the krone rate policy or are we willing to accept a substantial increase in unemployment?

"That is the alternative. We can get by for a while with very poor competitiveness and high unemployment, for then the correction will occur on the wage side alone through a sharp rise in unemployment. Otherwise we must devalue the krone or at any rate adjust the krone in relation to our competitiveness," Torben Nielsen said.

Wage Restraint Decisive

Even economosts who reject any discussion of the possibility of a devaluation or adjustment of the krone emphasize that maintaining the fixed krone rate policy calls for a strict income policy and very low wage developments in the future.

Director John Rammer of the Danish Bank warned at a regional meeting in North Sjaelland in late September against the "instant solution" in the form of a devaluation which "is aired in the media at regular intervals." His argument was that devaluation would plunge the country into increased inflation and high interest rates. At the same time it is doubtful in the current economic situation whether Danish exporters can make use of a short-term improvement in competitiveness to increase their sales substantially, John Rammer said. But he added that "only through wage restraint can the fixed krone rate and the interest level--which is still relatively low, in spite of everything--be preserved."

The Industrial Council has also said that currency exchange rates are a problem for Danish competitiveness. In a comment on the trade deficit in August, chief economist Verner Puggard blamed the high exchange rate of the krone for the fact that the volume growth of industrial exports has not made an impact in the form of better trade figures.

Jorgen Hansen, deputy director of the Industrial Council, also made it clear to the daily publication BORSEN that the "currency exchange rate side" will probably not produce any improvement in competitiveness in the "near future."

"Therefore domestic wage cost developments will be of the utmost importance," he said, stating that there is no room for wage increases in the coming contract negotiations if competitiveness is to be improved in 1987.

If wage developments run wild in the contract decisions in the spring it could be difficult to maintain the fixed krone rate policy, in other words.

Leading Social Democrats have made the same assessment. The Social Democratic leadership has decided that party representatives will not participate at all in a public discussion of the exchange rate of the krone or the advantages and disadvantages of a possible devaluation.

But internally several Social Democrats have made no secret of the fact that they regard it as highly unlikely that the government will be able to maintain the fixed krone rate after the contract negotiations.

Political Suicide

In their opinion, maintaining the fixed krone rate would require a contract settlement with a wage development of minus 2-3 percent. Thus they expect the Danish krone to come under enromous pressure after the contract negotiations are concluded in the late spring of 1987.

Per Bendix, Handelsbanken's chief economist, said the talk of an overvalued krone represents "exaggerated nervousness."

"The government has made the fixed rate policy in relation to EMS currency the backbone of its economic policy. So the market must ask if we believe in it or not. I believe in it. And the consequences of devaluation would be fatal. It would be political suicide to abandon the fixed rate policy. That is how firmly the government has committed itself to the fixed rate policy. But it is obvious that unless the government comes up with a policy in which others, especially the international community, have confidence, the government will be in real trouble," said Per Bendix.

"The trick for Denmark is to create an export level that can support the standard of living we want to have. Unless the contract negotiations end with a wage development that is closely linked to an identifiable productivity development on the part of Danish firms, I regard it as inevitable that we will see a tightening of fiscal policy after the contracts are negotiated," Per Bendix said.

6578
CSO: 3613/18

ECONOMIC SPAIN

SECTORS, SCALE OF UNDERGROUND ECONOMY ANALYZED

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 20 Oct 86 pp 58-64

[Article by Gonzalo San Segundo: "Underground Economy: Lawless Spain"]

[Excerpts] They are defrauding the State of over 300 billion pesetas in taxes. They are competing unfairly on the market. But they are also creating jobs, and feeding families who do not collect any subsidy. Those are the two sides of a reality known as a hidden economy: 300,000 small clandestine businesses.

The government paid 80 million pesetas for the report on the Spanish underground economy. Five of the country's leading consulting firms (Alef, Dym, Eco, Emopublica, and Metra Seis) did the field work during November and December 1985, with the participation and direction of the Sociological Research Center (CIS). A total of 64,000 interviews were held.

Carlos Solchaga, minister of economy and finance, had kept the report under lock and key since last spring. But in August, in Mallorca, it was impossible to conceal, and the bomb exploded: "There are in Spain a million fewer unemployed than the official statistics indicate," it read.

The match of this assertion ignited quickly, and the criticism of the minister was vented upon him by the opposition parties, trade unions, and business owners' organizations. All of them, with more or less emphasis, accused Solchaga of using the hidden economy as a buffer for unemployment. The head of the government, Felipe Gonzalez, later confirmed his minister's comments.

The report, which has evoked an unusual interest among congressmen, indicates that there are in Spain nearly 3 million Spaniards working in the underground economy, the majority of whom are not listed as employed in the Active Population Survey (EPA). Of that number, 1 million are considered officially as unemployed. Hence, Solchaga was shown the 15 percent real unemployment, rather than the 21.5 percent indicated by the EPA.

Compared with the real economy, in the hidden economy the pay is worse, there is a larger number of young people, one can more easily change companies, work at home is more common, and there is a predominance of workers without family responsibilities. Half the underground workers are women.

Based on geographical areas, Murcia, Andalucia, and Castilla-La Mancha have an underground economy exceeding the national average, totaling 22 percent. Situated in the lowest category, in this order, are Madrid, Aragon, and Cantabria, which do not exceed 16 percent.

What would become of this country with 3 million unemployed, only one of every three of whom collects any type of subsidy, if there were no underground economy? This question is asked by the administration, the trade unions, and the business firms. The answer is unanimous: Certainly, a revolution would have erupted.

But quite the opposite has occurred. The government allows it; the trade unions excuse it; the employers are violently opposed to it; and the banks (even the government ones) grant it loans. Many legal companies foster it through subcontracting. The unemployed without unemployment insurance find a means of survival in it; and those who have a job seek multiple employment therein.

Why does the underground economy exist? Jose Antonio Segurado, leader of the Liberal Party, and on behalf of the Popular Coalition, claims: "The business firms are submerged by such a savage tax pressure that exists, and by the lack of a flexible market for labor relations."

According to Marcelino Camacho, head of the Workers Commissions, "The most direct paths toward black market employment lie in the flexibility regulations and seasonal contracts introduced by the Socialist government."

Among these positions, there are other causes, according to sources who were queried, such as the difficulty in finding employment legally, the loss of purchasing power, and the possibility of raising family income: the latter, on the part of the workers.

The reasons of the business firms are different. Apart from the tax pressure, there are the ability to survive and to increase benefits (based on not paying taxes), the increase in salary and financial costs, and the loss of competitiveness owing to the technological lag.

But, as a rule, the underground businessman shows little interest in technology. Santos Ruesga, a professor of economic structure at the Autonomous University of Madrid, remarks: "The business owner's surplus in the hidden economy, for the most part, does not go into technological reconversion, but rather into consumption."

Quite the opposite of what the Italians are doing. Italy, the OECD country with the highest rate of underground economy, is also the country exporting the most products originating in irregular or illegal activities. The Spanish underground economy, on the other hand, is more aimed at the domestic market.

Is the underground economy good or bad? Must it be accepted or, on the contrary, should it be persecuted? Here too, there are opinions for all tastes, depending on the interests being protected by each individual.

Rafael Termes, president of AEB, the bank management association, thinks that the hidden economy is contributing to maintaining the dynamism of the total economy, and hence it would be a great mistake to persecute it. He commented: "The underground economy is stopping the evils of an unemployment which,if it were real, would be explosive. The course of action does not lie in ending it, but rather in attempting to have it emerge."

Jose Borrel, secretary of state for finance, upholds quite a different position. He claims: "We must demand compliance with the law and, at the same time, change a group of regulations to gear them to reality." And, graphically, he adds: "To make a submarine emerge, it does not suffice to direct depth charges at it."

Juan Rovira Tarazona, economic official of PDP [Popular Democratic Party] and deputy representing Alicante, is also categorical: "It is bad, and we must try to make it non-existent." And he adds: "It is a cancer that will end up devouring the legal economy if a rapid remedy is not applied."

What remedies, what solutions should be adopted? In a recent report on hidden employment, OECD claims that the most effective strategy against the existence of the underground economy consists of promoting a regular work market that is more flourishing and flexible.

Santos Ruesga is more concrete: "We must make the price of the worker flexible; that is, broaden the wage scale upward and downward; one which is currently very much constricted by collective contracts and labor legislation."

The solutions proposed by Rovira Tarazona to make the hidden economy crop out are: to see to it that work is not so heavily penalized by taxes, to put more emphasis on the tax on business firms ("which is becoming devoid of essence"), to reduce the business firms' contribution to social security and, starting at that point, "impose stiff penalties on anyone who is underground." Expressing himself along this same line is Jose Antonio Segurado, who terms the unfair competition carried out by the underground businesses as "savage" and an "intolerable situation."

If the entire underground economy paid its taxes, the public deficit would be reduced in half. This is the concern of Rafael Termes: "The hidden economy must be made to crop out, through the distribution of the size of the public sector, cutting spending so that taxes can be cut without creating a deficit."

According to the experts, the underground economy produces over 3 billion pesetas; in other words, a quarter of the gross domestic product (GDP). Most of this money is generated by 300,000 small and medium-sized clandestine businesses which employ some 3 million Spaniards, including the unemployed, housewives, retirees, those under age 16, students, those with multiple jobs, and the disabled. One out of every three is officially considered to be unemployed.

For example, work at home occupies 650,000 persons (most of whom are housewives and retirees), half a million of whom have not been dropped from social security. And, in the ready-made clothing occupation, only half of its 200,000 employees are registered.

In Alicante, 40 percent of the production (especially that of shoes, textiles, and toys) is in the hidden economy. In Catalonia, the construction sector shows a similar percentage in the underground economy. And, specifically in Igualada, two out of every five pesetas produced (mainly in the knitting industry) is an irregular economy, according to the Workers Commissions.

According to NEWSWEEK magazine, in Andalucia half of the unemployed are underground, and over 40 percent of the businesses established in this region with under 100 workers have underground employment, according to Santos Ruesga.

From an economic-labor standpoint, it is the small clandestine production shops that have most bolstered the underground economy. Here, the typical features of the underground worker are that he is an officially unemployed person between 25 and 45 years of age, with a certain amount of occupational experience. Working in the trades and in traveling sales, such as that taking place on street stands, are unemployed youths, students, and people seeking their first job.

A prominent member of UGT [General Union of Workers] comments: "All this activity, however extremely illegal it may be considered, cannot be eliminated at one fell swoop." The former head of the government, Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, declared during the summer of 1981: "We are ready, as a government, to prevent part of the economy from being outside of the law." He could not, and had no time to prevent it.

The present government appears determined to intervene in the matter. The first step was the preparation of the report: quantifying the hidden economy, and learning where the pockets of fraud of the Finance Ministry, social security, and both autonomous and local entities, are occurring.

"What is up to us now, after a parliamentary debate on the subject, is to devise measures to force that irregular economy to crop out," asserts a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Economy. And he adds: "However, it will not be easy to establish a table of effective measures, because the hidden economy has, along with its bad side, a good side."

The bad part of the underground economy is marked by its nature as an illegal activity, opposed to the businesses and workers who are operating legally, and who pay their taxes and social security contributions religiously. In addition, it is an unfair competition with a hard labor system imposed on workers (low wages, long work days, meager health conditions, etc.).

The tax fraud committed by the underground businesses has been assessed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance at over 300 billion pesetas.

Its good side is the creation of jobs, the reduction of business costs by 40 percent, and production at competitive prices.

The underground economy is not limited solely to the job market. The black market money derived from tax fraud, drug trafficking and consumption, smuggling, illegal gambling, and prostitution, is also a hidden economy. Estimates by official agencies put drug consumption in Spain at the figure of 200 billion pesetas. According to the experts, the prostitution business represented over 100 billion pesetas in 1984, over half of which originated in the Chinese district of Barcelona.

According to Professor Edgar L. Feige, of the University of Wisconsin, in the United States, "The underground economy is gowing at a rate faster than that of the legal economy, the one that is accounted for." If the official statistics were to contain all the data on the hidden or parallel economy, the socioeconomic reality in Spain would be quite different.

For example, the economic growth would be greater, and the official unemployment rate (according to the experts consulted) would decline between 30 and 40 percent. For this reason, Professor Feige claims that, "To close one's eyes to this reality could cause the failure of the economic policies that are adopted to solve the crisis."

Returning to Spain again, during 1984, according to estimates by several experts, the "mole economy" carried out illegal transactions worth some 130 billion pesetas, generating an untaxed income exceeding 700 billion pesetas. To be added to these figures is another 80 billion from the unpaid taxes on business firms, derived basically from businesses which are established and operate clandestinely.

In all, this amounts to more than half of the public deficit. And these data relate only to the underground economy caused by tax pressure; in other words, the hidden economy of the productive market.

2909
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ECONOMIC SWEDEN

WAGE MINISTER UNDER ATTACK FROM TRADE UNION NEGOTIATORS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Oct 86 p 14

[Article by Ann-Marie Asheden: "Wage Minister in the Middle of the Storm"]

[Text] Accusations rain down and the speeches in defense are loud when Bengt K. A. Johansson takes the floor these days. He finds himself in the middle of the struggle between the government and the union negotiators.

"Can he handle it?" some of his tender-hearted friends wonder.

"Of course he can handle it. He is just telling the hard truth," one hears from inside his headquarters in the confident Finance Department.

Up until a year ago, Johansson lived a relatively protected life.

This life began in Sandared near Boras almost 50 years ago, in classical Social Democratic worker environment. The son of a carpenter, Bengt went on to high school and the university. With his ideals intact, he began during his university years in Goteborg to work politically in the Social Democratic Student Union.

Awakened Respect

He took a degree in political science, economics, and history, and he had thought of continuing his studies toward an academic career when he received an offer from the highest Social Democratic level, where they were looking for sons of the movement who had received an education. At the age of 26, he became a secretary in the prime minister's cabinet and one of Erlander's "boys."

After a few years of apprenticeship with the prime minister, the finance minister took him over. In Gunnar Strang's hard school he learned the art of saying no and of juggling the nation's budget and dealing with general economic problems.

After this he went as a policy official to the Labor Department. When the nonsocialists took over the government in 1976, he left, but he was offered the job of manager in the Riksdag's Finance Committee by the nonsocialist majority.

This was his first nonpolitical job, and he awakened the respect of everyone by playing the role of a pure civil servant very well.

"Stubborn"

When the Social Democrats came back to power in 1982, he again entered the political machinery as undersecretary under Kjell-Olof Feldt in the Finance Department with responsibility for, among other things, budgetary matters. He often used his ability to say no, and this earned him the solid reputation for stubbornness among those departments that became acquainted with his red pencil.

There are many stories about this stubbornness. Here is one:

"B.K.", as he is called in the Finance Department, walks into the lunch room where the state secretaries have their weekly meeting and says, "Hello!"

"Did you say "No"? a quick-witted colleague asks.

After the elections in 1985, he was promoted to wage minister, since the Department of Civil Service Affairs, which until then had handled wage matters, had given in and let the clever negotiators steal the government's shirt, as one negotiator expresses it today.

The world of negotiation welcomed his appointment with mixed emotions, but the positive ones dominated because they thought it was good not to have to detour over the Department of Civil Service Affairs when it was still the Finance Department that decided.

Total War

Today, a year later, there is total war between the professional negotiators and Johansson. He is accused of being clumsy and of lacking insight into the customs and rules of the world of negotiation.

In the Trade Union Confederation he has been compared to Curt Nicolin, the most stubborn man of the 1970s from the union's point of view.

"Johansson is clumsy," Curt Persson cried out at the government employment office last week.

"He treats us as if we were mentally handicapped and waves his pointer," an old union spokesman added.

"He should have lain low for at least a year to learn the game and to see that unions consist of people of flesh and blood," a professional negotiator said to DAGENS NYHETER.

"But instead he began to prattle like an idiot about there not being any room for wage increases in the public sector. He is hit by the syndrome of appearing in the mass media all the time just because there is a demand for him."

"Recently he acted as if he were the wage minister for the whole work force, when his mandate does not go any farther than the public sector."

"And then he has a state secretary who doesn't understand anything, either..."

"And then he made the mistake of getting into wage negotiations by appointing a mediation committee much too soon..."

The accusations rain down, and in the Finance Department in the operations room Johansson is sitting and waiting.

His fellow workers tell a completely different story from that of the professional negotiators.

"The negotiators are accustomed to good-natured employers. B.K. is the first person to say right out how things are. His role is to follow a different economic policy in the role of a hard taskmaster. So now they are attacking him personally because they do not want to debate him on the subject."

The truth in this uncertain area will perhaps appear some day. Today one can only ask questions: Does the wage minister not understand union and wage negotiations? Or is he a real tough guy who knows exactly what he wants -- and dares to go get it? Or is he possibly bringing forth the government's hard message all too rapidly?

Inflexible

Considering the information on the wage minister's life and the personality traits described by his colleagues, it is not impossible that the answer is yes to all three questions.

He has not had much union experience; it is limited to membership in the Civil Service Union during his time as a civil servant. On the other hand, he sweats together with union men at the People's Exercise Gymnasium at Folksamhuset every Monday morning at seven o'clock as he has done for years.

He is described as ambitious, efficient, and extremely accurate by those who know him. And also sharp, combative, and quite hard and tough. But this aggressiveness can at time turn into inflexibility; he can close himself off.

In a year's time he has also aggressively presented this message: "Now the time must end when wages and prices chase one another."

He lacks the charisma that makes great statesmen. His aura is more ascetic and excellent. And to cement the impression of excellence he continues to take part loyally in the lowest form of party work. Together with his wife Sonja he even goes around distributing party information in mailboxes in his home in Farsta.

There he lives in a townhouse that contains for the most part books and art.

"He is very well-read," his friends say, and a "fine fellow."

9124
CSO: 3650/18

BIGGEST TRADE DEFICITS WITH U.S., JAPAN

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Sep 86 p 9

[Text] Foreign trade figures for the first 6 months of 1986 have clearly exposed the falsity of views that the substantial decline in exports to Middle Eastern countries has been offset by increases in exports to West European countries, the United States and the Far East.

Although exports to Turkey's largest trade partners, the OECD countries--which include nations such as the United States and the FRG--rose by as much as 51.3 percent in the first half of this year, the trade deficit with this group of countries grew to twice the figure for the corresponding period of 1985. The trade deficit with the EEC countries, which are considered Turkey's traditional export markets, grew fivefold compared to the first 6 months of last year.

The rapid growth in imports from these countries minimized the positive effect on general trade expected from the shrinkage of the country's oil import bill.

According to trade figures for the first 6 months of this year, the country with which Turkey has the biggest trade deficit is the United States. The trade deficit of $405 million with the United States constitutes 21.4 percent of the country's total foreign trade deficit.

The trade deficit with the FRG, which imported 17.8 percent more from Turkey in the first half of 1986 than in the corresponding period of 1985, reached $211 million. The trade deficit with the FRG constitutes 11 percent of the total trade deficit.

The shift in trade with Japan to Turkey's disadvantage also contributed substantially to the growth of the trade deficit to a total of $1.885 billion. The trade deficit with Japan, which amounted to $269 million in the first half of 1986, constitutes 14.2 percent of the total trade deficit.

What is more interesting is that Turkey's trade deficit with these three countries alone constitutes one half of the country's total foreign trade deficit. Consequently, while exports to these countries--or the OECD which encompasses these countries--grew substantially, faster growth in imports from these countries made the export growth meaningless.

While trade with Middle Eastern countries in the January-June period of 1986 declined by 14.4 percent compared to the corresponding period of last year, imports from these countries shrank by 35.5 percent.

According to figures compiled by ANKA, the trade volume with Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia--which supply a major part of Turkey's oil--declined by 33.5 percent in the first half of 1986 compared to the corresponding period of last year, dropping from $2,790,800,000 in the first 6 months of 1985 to $1,856,000,000 in the corresponding period of 1986. However, the trade deficit with these countries dropped from $459,800,000 in the first half of 1985 to $140,200,000 this year.

Turkey bought $1,625,300,000 worth of products--almost entirely crude oil--from the said countries in the first 6 months of 1985. This figure dropped by 47.2 percent to $857,900,000 in the corresponding period of this year. Exports to these countries declined by 14.4 percent from $1,165,500,000 in the first half of 1985 to $998,100,000 in the corresponding period of this year.

Thus while exports to these four countries covered 71.7 percent of the mostly oil imports in the first half of last year, Turkish exports in the first 6 months of this year have exceeded imports from the said countries.

Trade deficit with major countries (January-June, million dollars)

Country	1986	1985
United States	-405	-308
Japan	-269	-177
FRG	-211	58
Italy	-180	-54
France	-174	-69
Libya	-99	-282
Britain	-74	11
Iraq	-59	-116
Switzerland	-58	13
Belgium/Luxembourg	-49	-10
Kuwait	-37	7
Holland	-17	3
OECD countries	-1,727	-819
EEC countries	-784	-165

9588
CSO: 3554/33

ECONOMIC TURKEY

WARTIME EXPORTS TO IRAN, IRAQ EXCEED $8 BILLION

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 30 Sep 86 p 3

[Text] Ankara--The Iran-Iraq war, which has become the longest war since World War II, has completed its 6th year. Despite declines this year, Turkey's total exports to the two warring sides in the last 6 years has surpassed the $8 billion mark. In contrast, there was no real increase in imports from these two countries during the same period. Turkey imports about $1 billion worth of crude oil from these two countries each year.

Turkey's exports to Iraq rose from $13,480,000 in 1980, the year the war began, to $961,400,000 in 1985. Meanwhile, exports to Iran rose from $84,800,000 in 1980 to $1,078,800,000 in 1985. Officials state that, beside the growth in the quantity of exports to these two countries, the diversification of export products must also be considered a significant development. On the other hand, nearly 95 percent of Turkey's imports from these countries consist of crude oil. Turkey's imports from Iraq dropped from $1,151,000,000 in 1980 to $1,136,700,000 in 1985 while imports from Iran rose from $770,600,000 in 1980 to $1,264,600,000 in 1985.

The war betwen Iran and Iraq boosted these countries' imports substantially, and Turkey had its share of this increase. However, last year's sharp decline in oil prices, coupled with the cost of the war, resulted in an economic crisis in both countries. Because of this crisis, Turkey's trade with these countries declined and that decline, in turn, had an adverse effect on Turkey's foreign trade. A comparison of figures for the first 6 months of 1985 and 1986 shows that Turkish exports to Iraq dropped from $472,600,000 last year to $363,000,000 this year, while exports to Iran declined from $482,300,000 last year to $402,400,000 this year. Paralleling the decline in exports, Turkey's imports from Iraq dropped from $592,200,000 in the first half of last year to $422,000,000 in the corresponding period of this year, while imports from Iran declined from $640,600,000 to $151,600,000 over the same period of comparison. While the substantial decline in imports from Iran are attributed to Turkey's decision to cut its oil imports from that country in view of the two countries' failure to sign a trade agreement, Iran is continuing its efforts to diversify its exports to Turkey.

9588
CSO: 3554/45

BULGARIAN MOTIVE FOR DIALOG PROPOSAL SAID TO BE ECONOMIC

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 23 Sep 86 p 7

[Text] Ankara--It has been determined that Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov's offer of a dialog with Turkey "is not sincere." It was determined that Bulgaria, which is one of the rare countries with which trade has turned in Turkey's favor, made this offer in view of its loss of Turkish markets.

A steady decline in Turkish imports from Bulgaria, Turkey's decision to "apply the brakes" on its trade relations with its neighbor since last year and the halting of electricity purchases from Bulgaria have had a negative effect on the Bulgarian economy.

According to the assessments of the Foreign Ministry, Bulgaria has a trade deficit with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It also has a trade deficit with European countries to which the highest quality Bulgarian agricultural products are sold. The only countries with which Bulgaria has a trade surplus--about $1 billion--are the Third World nations. Moreover, the Soviet Union has complained about the low quality of Bulgarian products.

Noting that Zhivkov was forced to propose a "dialog" with Turkey because of these reasons, Foreign Ministry officials said:

"Turkey and Bulgaria have no outstanding issues to discuss other than the repression of the 1 million Turkish residents of Bulgaria. If there will be talks between Sofia and Ankara then the only item on the agenda will be this issue which deeply interests the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.

"As long as this matter is not resolved, there can be no discussion about developing relations and expanding trade between the two countries. Even so, however, we are prepared to discuss any issue.

"Zhivkov must state openly and publicly that the question of the Turkish minority will be discussed. Otherwise, his statement remains far from being sincere."

9588
CSO: 3554/40

ECONOMIC TURKEY

MASTER PLAN FOR SEE PRIVATIZATION CRITICIZED

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 23 Sep 86 pp 1,9

[Article by Professor Mustafa A. Aysan: "The Master Plan for SEE Privatization Does not Offer Solutions"]

[Text] The "Master Plan for the Privatization of Turkish SEEs [State Economic Enterprises]," which we had been awaiting since January 1986, has been made public. The Master Plan enumerates our problems related to the SEEs, and instead of proposing solutions to these problems, it tells us:

"Find yourselves four good consultants; let them solve these problems."

This Master Plan, which was prepared by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Bank, one of the largest commercial banks in the world, has disappointed everyone connected to the matter. This article will attempt to examine the reasons for this disappointment.

The Master Plan gives the impression that privatization is a goal in itself. In fact, it is because of this erroneous approach that the report ends with some traditional proposals of little value. It is now understood that this erroneous approach stems from the letter circulated by the State Planning Organization requesting bids on the project. A good consultant should have stated in its report that the principal objective is not privatization. The report's failure to mention this point means that the Morgan Guaranty Trust experts see privatization as a goal in itself.

We believe that the principal objective of privatization is to increase the SEEs' efficiency and productivity in time and thus to minimize costs. Privatization is "good" or "bad" to the extent that it serves this principal objective. The Master Plan does not even address this issue. That being the case, it is not clear when the privatization of SEEs would serve this principal objective and when it would not.

It is known that there are very efficient and productive state-owned enterprises as well as very inefficient and unproductive but very profitable private enterprises around the world. In Turkey (in fact in all countries in the world) low efficiency and productivity in the SEEs is one of the main problems. This basic problem has various causes. Privatization may have very harmful results if these causes are not resolved and productivity is not improved. One of the most damaging of these harmful results is the reversion of the privatized corporation to the state with heavier burdens in the years following privatization. It is evident from previous cases that such a prospect may place heavy burdens on the government. The Eregli Iron and Steel Works and the Karadeniz Copper Corporation are representative examples of such a prospect which may straddle the government with heavy costs. These precedents must be studied, and measures must be taken to prevent small savers from returning their SEE stock to the government a short time after privatization.

How can SEE stock certificates be made more attractive to buyers? Should profit dividends be guaranteed at the time of initial offering? Which corporations, which buyers and what periods should dividends be guaranteed for? How can future governments be prevented from withdrawing these guarantees? How can the purchasing power of the small savers' capital be protected?

In order to privatize SEEs by the sale of stock certificates and to ensure the durability of privatization, many questions similar to the ones enumerated above must be answered.

The principal causes of the low efficiency of the SEEs include: the inclination of politicians and central government officials to interfere with the decisions of the SEE business managers (in fact, in many cases they make basic policy decisions rather than the managers); frequent reassignment of the managers to different positions; a flawed auditing system which does not work even as it causes weariness among the managers; and the lack of a "Shareholders' General Assembly." Even if the SEEs can be privatized by selling them whole or in parcels, such a privatization would not be durable without resolving these problems. The Master Plan drafted for the privatization of the SEEs should have suggested ways of solving these problems. The Morgan Guaranty's Master Plan proposes privatization after the solution of these problems rather than suggesting a basis for resolving the problems that afflict all the SEEs. This is because the authors of the Master Plan have chosen the wrong goals and the wrong priorities. This erroneous approach must be corrected and the SEEs must be privatized each on its own merit in accordance with the suggestions outlined below:

1. The purpose of privatization is to increase efficiency and productivity in the SEEs--not "to increase competition in the country" as the Morgan Guaranty Master Plan suggests. The SEEs are expected to become more efficient after privatization for the following reasons:

a) There will be fewer opportunities for politicians and politically-motivated bureaucrats to interfere in the work of SEE managers.

b) SEE managers will be able to make independent decisions on investments and finance.

c) SEE managers' expectations of receiving material aid from the government in times of hardship will decline over time.

d) SEE managers will learn in time that in order to win financial support in money and stock markets they will have to persuade investors in these markets that their work will be productive. They will have to persuade these investors that they will provide them the best return on their investment. In doing that they will do their best to increase efficiency in their operations; they will know that they will be replaced if they fail.

e) SEE managers will be forced to assure the consumers that they are offering the highest-quality products at the lowest price, and they will increase efficiency in trying to accomplish that.

2. To this end, each SEE (with limited responsibilities) must be privatized in accordance with the following procedures:

a) They should first be turned into joint stock corporations in accordance with the Turkish Trade Law; their capital should be divided into small portions and should be quoted in the Securities Market.

b) The joint stock corporations to be formed must publish balance sheets and profit-loss statements relevant to the assets mentioned in the balance sheets in simple and easily-understood pamphlets. The firms' most recent annual reports, if any, must be printed and distributed in large numbers.

c) Measures must be taken to maximize the number of stock buyers.

d) All the revenues earned from the sale of stock certificates must be recorded as income to the Treasury, thus benefiting all the taxpayers who provided the capital for the SEEs before privatization.

The failure of the Master Plan to suggest practical solutions on the issues outlined above is probably the primary cause of the aforementioned disappointment. The Master Plan assumes that most of these solutions will be proposed by new consultants who are recommended to be foreigners. The truth is that the issue of the privatization of the SEEs, whose social and political aspects are as important as its economic dimension, does not involve questions that can be addressed by foreign experts. The characteristics of the technical procedures thay may play a role in the sale of a corporation can be found in textbooks. It is obvious that the implementation will be carried out by SEE employees and the Turkish government.

What needs to be done now is that this Master Plan--as well as other SEE-related reports prepared by other foreign institutions--be debated in seminars to be attended by Turkish and foreign experts and that the best alternatives be sought for the Turkish economy during these debates.

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CIVIL SERVANTS TO RECEIVE PAY INCREASE

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 23 Sep 86 p 4

[Report by Yavuz Gokmen]

[Text] Ankara--The basis of the salary increases to be given to civil servants in 1987 was determined during the discussion of Turkey's 1987 fiscal year budget and government program. It is reported that in 1987 civil servants' salaries will be increased by around 25 to 30 percent, reflecting adjustments in the civil service pay scale coefficient, fuel allowance, supplementary payments and the cost-of-living index, and that this figure could reach as high as 30 to 35 percent for some categories of civil servants. It was also agreed that "housing assistance" not be included in the determination of the salary increase. It is reported that if the housing allowance were to be included in the salary increase, the net salary of the civil servants would decline by 8 to 10 percent. Speaking about the budget and program work of the government and senior economic officials, a government official told HURRIYET:

'Coefficient Lost Its Importance'

"In the determination of the salary increase to be given to civil servants in 1987, the civil service pay scale coefficient has lost its importance. The coefficient is a vehicle. In addition to the coefficient, fuel allowances, the supplementary pay coefficient and the cost-of-living index will be taken into consideration. In principle, at the beginning of 1987 a salary increase of about 15 to 17 percent will be given, reflecting adjustments in the pay scale coefficient, fuel allowance and supplementary pay, and in the second half of the year a cost-of-living index adjustment will be added to the coefficient, fuel allowance and supplementary pay coefficient adjustments, and the second part of the salary increase will be paid. What this means is that the civil service pay scale coefficient will not be kept as high as it was before. However, what is important is not the coefficient or other indexes, but the net amount of the increase.

"The inflation rate will be held at around 25 percent in 1986. This figure is expected to remain at 20 percent in 1987. The budget will be drafted on the basis of these figures. This means that the salary increase to be given is 5 to 10 percentage points above the inflation rate. In fact, with the cost-of-living index adjustment, some civil servants will receive a 'year to year' raise of over 30 percent in the second half of the year. As a result, in 1987 civil servants will not lag behind inflation."

Another official stated that "the issue of whether to include the housing assistance in the salary increase was discussed, but it was realized that the civil servants would suffer because the money they would not receive in cash would be considered a salary increase. Stating that "the work on the index is still incomplete and has not yet been submitted to the Prime Minister," this official said: "If the Prime Minister approves a higher civil service pay scale coefficient which will facilitate a larger increase, then the salary raises can be even higher. However, no one should expect any increase that is more than reasonable."

However, economic observers noted that these assessments are made on the assumption that the inflation rate will be lower than 20 percent and that the salary increases given to the civil servants would be meaningless if--like this year--the inflation rate is not cut next year.

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IMPACT OF CREDIT INTEREST HIKE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 22 Sep 86 pp 1,11

[Report by Emine Munyar]

[Text] The continuing shortage of Turkish currency and the sluggish growth in new bank deposits have forced the banks to raise interest rates on credit by 2 to 4 percentage points. Banks which have decided to raise their credit interest rates are pursuing two different tactics in this regard. While some banks have increased their nominal interest rates, other banks have raised effective interest rates on their loans by ending their "preferred contract interest rate" programs while keeping their nominal rates the same. Private banks such as the Construction Bank and the Import Export Bank have raised their nominal credit interest rates by 2 percentage points. Meanwhile, banks like Akbank, Yapi Kredi Bank, Pamukbank and Garanti Bank have not explicitly increased their nominal interest rates, but by minimizing their preferred interest rate programs they have effectively raised their interest rates by 2 to 4 percentage points.

Noting that the shortage of Turkish currency continues and that there has been no significant increase in bank deposits in the last 3 months, bankers insist that a hike in credit interest rates was inevitable in the face of this imbalance between supply and demand. Meanwhile, industrialists underscore the need to reduce credit interest rates and expressed resentment with regard to this latest move by the banks. The rising trend in credit interest rates, which began to spread in the last 2 to 3 weeks, has pushed up the interest rates by 2 to 4 percentage points. With the new increases in interest rates, the banks are charging interest rates of 60 to 65 percent on their loans, but the actual cost of credit has risen to the range of 75 to 100 percent.

Industrialists React

Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchanges [TUCE] President Ali Coskun and Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association [TIBA] Deputy President Omer Dinckok expressed resentment at the developments. TUCE President Coskun said that he cannot see the sense in this decision by the banks at a time when credit interest rates must be lowered. He continued:

"We do not approve and we oppose the banks' decision to raise credit interest rates. In today's circumstances, credit interest rates need to be lowered.

It appears that under present circumstances the inflation rate will remain under 30 percent. In fact, the inflationary trend is such that we may go into 1987 with an inflation rate of 25 percent. Unless unexpected fluctuations occur in world economic conditions, inflation appears to be under control. This being the case, keeping the interest rates at above 50 percent is contrary to the present economic approach. If it is true that the banks are raising credit interest rates at a time when they definitely need to be lowered, such a move would have an extremely negative effect on industrial growth and investment patterns. Moreover, such a move would upset the desired balances at a time when economic stability is needed more than ever and would create a bad impression both at home and abroad. It is hard to comrehend such a move by the banks. If the banks' pretext for raising interest rates is the shortage of Turkish currency and sluggish deposit growth, then they can use the foreign currency in their reserves to pay for imports and convert them into Turkish currency. That way, they can relieve some of the effects of the Turkish currency shortage."

Stating that credit interest rates in real terms are very high and that the rising pattern is continuing, TIBA Deputy President Omer Dinckok said: "Assuming that the inflation rate is around 30 percent, credit costs of 75 to 80 percent indicate a very large real difference. The government's reliance on the money market to finance its investments and its policy of forcing banks to buy government debentures is diminishing the credit resources available for the private sector. The increase of 2 to 5 points in credit interest rates in recent weeks is an indication of this situation." Dinckok added that industrial production is adversely affected by these developments.

Inflow of Deposits Shrinks

The shift of savings to domestic public borrowing instruments and other securities is seen as the leading factor preventing growth in bank deposits. Noting that as a result of the government's borrowing policies the difference between interest rates on bank deposits and yields on treasury bonds and government debentures has been growing, the bankers explained their grounds for raising credit interest rates by saying: "Because of this situation, the flow of deposits into the banks shrank. When a commodity is scarce its price goes up." In view of these developments, if an interest rate of 60 percent--described as the lower bound--is charged on a loan, the effective cost to the borrower will be around 75 to 77 percent. If the upper bound of 65 percent interest is charged on the loan, the actual cost of the loan may go as high as 100 percent.

If a bank charges 60 percent annual interest on a loan to its customer, the Resource Utilization Fund assessment of 10 percent of the interest (for loans secured by bonds), the 2-percent bank commission, the 3-percent banking and insurance processing tax on interest and commissions and the 7 to 8 percentage point additional cost incurred by quarterly capitalization (since the interest on the loan is collected every 3 months, the repetition of the process every 3 months incurs an additional cost, known as the capitalization cost, on the customer) raise the cost of the loan to 76 to 77 percent. If an annual interest rate of 65 percent--the current upper limit on credit interest rates--is charged on the loan, the 2-percent commission, the 10-percent

Resource Utilization Fund assessment, the 3-percent banking and insurance processing tax on interest and commissions and the quarterly capitalization cost increase the effective cost of the loan to 99.7 percent.

An administrator of a large private bank said: "The people's savings are flowing into other instruments because the competing instruments are very attractive. In an environment where bank deposits are declining, the banks resorted to raising interest rates." The same bank official added:

"Previously, the lowest limit on interest rates was 50 percent and the upper limit was 65 percent. Those who were charging between 50 and 60 percent interest raised their rates by 2 to 4 percentage points. I do not think that the 65-percent upper bound will be raised. That is because the customer who is lent money at 65 percent is a marginal and risky customer. Consequently, that figure will not be increased. The rise in credit interest rates in contrast to several reductions in deposit interest rates during the year is primarily the result of capital flight from the banks and the absence of new deposits. The total deposits of the 7 large private banks rose by only 83 billion Turkish lira in the 3-month period between 16 May and 15 August. In other words, during that period deposits rose by 2 percent from 3.949 trillion Turkish lira to 4.032 trillion Turkish lira. A rise of 2 percent is insignificant and, in fact, reflects a decline in real terms."

'When a Commodity is Scarce, Its Price Goes Up'

Stating that "when a commodity is scarce its price goes up," the director general of another bank noted that until recently there were banks which lowered credit interest rates to 50 percent and lower. He added: "Nowadays, all banks have raised their credit interest rates to over 60 percent." The same banker outlined the latest developments as follows:

"The banks' demand for Turkish currency has increased while there has been no significant increase in bank deposits. When a commodity is scarce its price naturally goes up. Given this situation, we see that credit interest rates have risen by 2 to 4 percentage points. Banks which were charging 60 percent interest on loans are now charging 62 to 63 percent. Our bank is charging 63 percent interest on 1-year loans. Of course, this is effectively costing the customer nearly 80 percent. Interest rates on foreign currency-denominated loans are still low--48 percent or even lower. In the coming days, particularly after the elections, the government is expected to implement a tighter monetary policy. Since this will result in the withdrawal of money from the market, credit interest rates may rise by another 1 to 2 percentage points."

'Contract Interest Rate' Practice Minimized

The director general of a large private bank whom we consulted on the issue said that his bank has not increased the nominal interest rates on its loans but has ended its "preferred contract interest rate" practice for its selected customers and added that some other banks have also opted for this tactic. This banker said that this action has raised the cost of credit to firms benefiting from preferred rates by 3 to 4 percentage points and that this action will affect 25 to 30 percent of the bank's loans. Stating that "the entire problem hinges upon the goverment's budget deficit," the banker said:

"Forced to cover its budget deficit, the government is continuing its policy of domestic borrowing through treasury bonds and government debentures. In other words, it is unable to lower the interest rate on these instruments. Since it cannot do that, it must seek less expensive means of borrowing. Trying to raise revenue by collecting taxes may be a more sound solution."

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OFFICIAL DISCUSSES LAND DISTRIBUTION PREPARATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 22 Sep 86 pp 3,7

[Report by Samil Tayyar]

[Text] Ankara--The Land and Agricultural Reform Director General Metin Kumal disclosed that lands whose distribution was halted in Urfa will be leased.

According to information given by Kumal to MILLIYET, while lands whose distribution was halted in the Harran region will be leased, peasants whose lands were nationalized in excess of the established norms will have the excess amount returned. Distribution of irrigated land in the Ceylanpinar region will begin in January. Persons who will be given land by this program are required to be literate, not handicapped in any way and less than 65 years old.

Stating that the distribution of previously nationalized dry lands will not resume before 1992, Director General Kumal said that in the meantime these lands will be irrigated by the government and leased to farmer families with little or no land.

Kumal said that after the land is irrigated it will be registered in the names of qualified applicants in accordance with the land distribution norms established. He said:

"The State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General has stated that the irrigation of the Harran region will begin in 1992. That is because the Urfa Tunnel will open for irrigation in 1992. In view of that situation, we will begin to distribute land in Harran after 1992. If the Urfa Tunnel is opened for irrigation before 1992, we can begin distributing land earlier. Until then we will lease the lands in Harran. We will not distribute land."

Kamul also disclosed that peasants whose lands nationalized in excess of the established norms will have the excess lands returned. Stating that work for land return procedures is under way, Kumal said that the land return process will be completed by the end of this year. Kumal said with regard to land returns:

"We are beginning to return land outside the area which cannot be irrigated before 1992--that is outside the Harran region. We will return land to those who were left with plots smaller than the established norms."

Land Disribution in January

Kumal said that preparations have begun for land distribution in the Circiplak area of Ceylanpinar and that actual land distribution will begin in January if the formalities are completed in normal time. Kumal stated that around the beginning of October, citizens will be handed out land request forms which they will have to fill and submit to the Land Reform Directorate General in at most 2 months. Kumal added that land distribution procedures will begin after the information on the forms is processed by computers.

Conditions

According to information given by Director General Kumal, to qualify for land grants by distribution program, applicants must be Turkish citizens, literate and heads of families. The successful applicants are also required not to have any "physical handicaps" which may impair their ability to engage in farming and to be less than 65 years old. Persons who were given land previously in other land distribution programs and lost it or whose land was repossessed for legal reasons will not be qualified to apply for land this time.

Kumal added that factors such as the applicant's education, agricultural knowhow, number of children, time of residence in the area and condition and ability to run a corporation will also play a role in "preferences."

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RAILROAD INDUSTRY SEEING TECHNOLOGY UPGRADE

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 30 Sep 86 p 3

[Report by Nurhan Yonezer]

[Text] Ankara--The continued use of outmoded technology in manufacturing in the railroad industry and the aging of the locomotives currently in use has created serious bottlenecks in the railroads' operational capacity. A technological upgrade is planned for the railroad industry to overcome this bottleneck and to improve railroad safety. The projects for this drive will first be implemented in the Adapazari Railcar Factory and the Eskisehir Locomotive and Engine Factory. Foreign investors will participate in the effort to help these factories use advanced technology in their manufacturing.

Following years of neglect for the modernization and rehabilitation of the railroads, the railroad industry is still using outmoded technologies in its manufacturing processes. Because 60 percent of the existing railroad tracks are more than 30 years old, trains have to travel at reduced speeds which results in higher costs.

In view of inadequate signaling systems in 60 percent of the railroads, the incidence of accidents on railways is high. Currently, 85 percent of all railroad transportation is done by diesel electric locomotives, 10 percent by steam-driven locomotives and the rest by electric locomotives--mainly on suburban commuter lines. The steam-driven locomotives, all of which are more than 35 years old, need to be put out of service immediately. It is also reported that 30 percent of all freight cars and 40 percent of passenger cars have lived out their economic usefulness.

Stating that Turkey will buy new technology, officials said that talks on this issue are under way with the most advanced countries and firms. Stating that U.S. and European firms are eager on the issue of partnership, the officials said: "There is intense interest on this issue. Work on this issue will begin as soon as we determine the countries and the firms whose partnership can be useful. Within this framework, the best system will be selected, and steps will be taken to enable the railroad industry to manufacture using advanced technology."

Railway Transportation to Be Encouraged

Meanwhile, the municipalities' practice of individually inviting bids for railway transportation equipment is seen objectionable on grounds that they may create bottlenecks in the long run. To resolve this problem, meetings will be held with municipality heads in the coming months to induce them to fill their railway transportation needs from the Adapazari Railcar Factory. During these meetings municipalities will be asked to end their practice of inviting bids individually. The officials stated that by persuading the municipalities on this issue, they will try to create demand for the railway transport vehicles manufactured by the Adapazari Railcar Factory.

Speaking to DUNYA in this issue, the officials pointed out that imported railway transport vehicles will be junked after a certain time because there are no repair and maintenance facilities for them in Turkey. They added that to prevent that situation, the factory in Adapazari will manufacture as well as repair and maintain its vehicles and supply their spare parts.

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MODERNIZATION INVESTMENTS IN STEEL INDUSTRY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 23 Sep 86 p 7

[Text] Izmir--The continuing crisis in the iron and steel industry is forcing the producing firms to seek various solutions. While trying to expand their export opportunities, the firms are also emphasizing renovation and modernization investments. In an effort to minimize the impact of the crisis, METAS [Izmir Metallurgy Factory Corporation], the first private steel manufacturer in Turkey, is continuing its investments to acquire the latest technological innovations in the sector.

METAS Executive Council President Haluk Ozsaruhan stated that the multifaceted crisis experienced in the steel industry will continue in the coming years and that the producing firms must move toward more efficient and economic production methods. Noting that this can only be accomplished by keeping up with technological developments, he said that his firm has always preferred this course. Stating that renovation and modernization investments for this purpose are continuing, Ozsaruhan said the following about these investments:

"The steel industry is experiencing a global crisis. Consequently, the producing firms are coming up with new innovations every day. On our part, we are keeping up with the latest technology as we have done for many years. To this end, we will use the previously installed Japanese-developed jet arc system to produce oxygen and argon. We used the same system to implement a smoke suction system, the first of its kind in Turkey. We are thus preventing environmental pollution."

'Annual Production Capacity to be Raised to 450,000 Metric Tons'

Stating that most recently his firm decided to realize a new joint investment with the German firm, Krupp, Ozsaruhan said that this investment will increase METAS' annual production capacity to 450,000 metric tons. Ozsaruhan said:

"This investment will help us to import a brand new technology to Turkey. This technology, which encompasses the preheating of scrap iron with flu gases before it enters the furnace, will facilitate savings in energy and increase production. Thus, our steel production capacity will rise to 450,000 metric tons from its current level of 400,000 metric tons. There are a number of other areas where we are planning or have decided to invest. One of these areas is the bottom casting system. Another area of planned investments is the system of reducing the steel after it is molten. We are planning to complete all these investments in the first months of 1987. In addition, we have bought a rolling mill with a capacity of 90,000 metric tons to increase our rolling capacity. We will begin production at the end of this month. Our investments will not end there. Our renovation and modernization investments will continue with the same pace after 1987."

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ECONOMIST DISPUTES STATISTICAL INSTITUTE GROWTH FIGURES

Instanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 20 Aug 86 p 9

[Article by guest writer Arslan Besir Kafaoglu: "Surprise GNP Calculations"]

[Text] When we learned the details of the national income and growth rate estimate (or, more correctly, manipulation) released by the State Statistical Institute [SSI], it became clear how far these calculations may be wrong. For one thing, a 7.8-percent increase in income is no run-of-the-mill increase. If a country achieves a 7.8-percent increase in income, such an increase is immediately reflected in the economic and social life of that country; even it the distribution of income is as bad as in South Korea, business proceeds smoothly, more use is made of productive investments, bond repayments are not dishonored, and stocks and shares are bought and sold like hot cakes.

What is hapenning in our country is exactly the opposite. There is decreased use of productive investments (fertilizers, for instance), more than twice as many bonds have not been honored on time as happened last year, truck and tractor sales are down, and dealings in stocks and shares are at a standstill on the Stock Exchange. To say "there is rapid economic development" when the masses have not idea of what is going on and when they have received no relief, amounts to consciously stepping beyond the limits of reality.

In agriculture, farming and stockbreeding incomes appear to have increased 7 percent. This, on the basis of the figures on hand, is an impossibility. All faith is pinned on the estimate that wheat production has risen from 17 million to 19 million tons. The truth is that nobody believes that wheat production was 17 million tons in 1985 or that it has reached 19 million tons this year. Even if we ignore last year's wheat imports, which exceeded exports, we have to accept that every individual in the country has consumed 340 Kilograms of wheat in a year. This average "individual" also includes children up to the age of 2, who constitute 7 percent of the population, and diabetics and old people under medical care. Even this figure is considered insufficient for this year, and the figure for the per capita consumption of wheat is raised to 360 Kilograms. Furthermore, we know for a fact that even SSI and State Planning Organization experts, in their more serious calculations, discount such statistical data by 10-15 percent (where agricultural produce is concerned). What is more, wheat is not the sole determining factor in Turkish agriculture. Even with its present exaggerated status, wheat accounts for 12-15 percent of agricultural output. The statement that farming and stockbreeding have achieved a 7-percent increase in income hangs in midair in view of the great losses in stockbreeding in the winter of 1985-86 and the sort of large-scale slaughter of poultry in the spring of 1986 that made news in the press. And this at a time when it is known that the situation is also bad for citrus fruit and olives as a result of frost.... Another point that drives us to regard the agricultural estimates as suspect arises from the fact that the SSI officials had the audacity after last year's drought to announce a 2.7-percent growth in agriculture --an important figure for agriculture. To go by these estimates of the SSI, one must believe in the hypothesis that agriculture can achieve a rate of development rarely seen anywhere in the world even if weather conditions are adverse and even if little fertilizer is used on the land.

It is impossible to comprehend the 10.7-percent increase in industry, because statistical experience shows that in countries with a rapidly growing population and a high rate of urbanization, the production of electricity, gas, and water leads industrial growth by a large margin. Yet, the calculations provided by the SSI show a 10.3-percent growth rate for manufacturing industry and a mere 12-percent for the electricity, gas, and water sector. If, in a country like ours, where the population is increasing and the cities account for a growing proportion of the population--that is to say, the direct consumption of gas, electricity, and water is growing rapidly--there has been an increase of a mere 12-percent in this subsector, then there cannot be a 10.3-percent increase in the manufacturing industry.(*)

Once manufacturing industry and agricultural incomes are booster in this disproportionate and inordinate manner, then construction, import duties, and state services have to pay the price. The provability? of data in these sectors is easier. Therefore, care has been taken to avoid artificially boosting these subsectors and sectors.

And so, look at what has happened:

--Despite all the boasting, the construction industrys's share of the national income--which was actually expected to rise-- has fallen from 5.5 percent to 5.3 percent (and this in spite of the explosion of housing construction about which Ozal boasts at such length).

--At a time when banking is booming, the share of banking services in GNP has fallen from 3 percent to 2.9 percent.

--It is striking that while imports have been increasing so much and the increase in terms of Turkish liras is up in the region of 35 percent, the share of the import duty has not increased at all (static at 2.3 percent).

--Despite the announcement of horrific increase in surcharges for various funds and taxes that meet the current expenditures of the state, the share of state services has fallen from 9.6 percent to 9.3 percent.

Could you imagine that statistician would believe--and try to make us believe, too--that the share of the construction industry and banking services in GNP has fallen, this year of all years, that state services have been reduced in an election, year, and above all that taxes on imports have remained the same at the same time as an explosion occurs in imports.

We cannot be so naive as to believe those who make these estimates. There is a further curiosity: a growth in manufacturing and mining of 14 percent and 10.3 percent, respectively, with trade income keeping out of step with them by stopping at 9.6 percent. The truth is that for each 1 percent of industrial development in a country like Turkey, the growth in trade income cannot be less than 1.2 percent.(**) As can be seen, the 1986 national income estimates hardly stand up to even a cursory glance. Who can believe, of all things, that the share of rents in the national income is going down at a time when rents are soaring out sight?

(*) In fact, in conformity with this compelling reason, last year the growth in the electricity, gas, and water subsector whas shown as 11.6 percent against an increase of 5.7 percent in the manufacturing industry. The new SSI establishment, however seems untouched by such niceties.

(**) This rule has been more or less observed in 1985. the growth in the manufaturing industry is 5.7 percent and in trade income 6.5 percent.

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OUTWARD-ORIENTED GROWTH MODEL DEVELOPMENT EXAMINED

Instanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 20 Aug 86 p 9

[Article by Necmi Celik: "An End of Outward-Oriented Growth?"]

[Text] For the first time since the 24 January decisions were taken in 1980, there will be a drop in the ratio of exports to the national product. A tendency for exports to stall in a year when the rate of growth of Gross National Product approaches the highest level in 10 years raises the question of whether "the Ozal economy"--which has taken exports as the engine of economic development --"has run its course."

According to figures released by the State Statistical Institute [SSI], Turkish exports, which had risen in value up to 15 percent of GNP in 1985, will go down to about 13 percent in 1986. The drop in exports in relation to GNP to below the level of even 1984, the first year of the Ozal administration, makes the change in the structure of the national product more significant.

The fact that the 1.7-percent increase in the agricultural sector has played an important role in the estimated 7.8-percent rate of growth in 1986 and that, conversely, the share of exports--the locomotive of the current economic policies --has dropped in the growth of the national product constitutes a development that is regarded as a powerful sign of a setback for the Ozal economy.

The share of exports in GNP followed a natural rising curve during the first 5 years after the 24 January decisions, which aimed at a policy of developing the national economy by integration with the international economy as a basic principle. The ratio of exports to GNP was 5.2 percent in 1980 and rose to 15 percent in 1985. In other words, the share of exports in GNP tripled during the period in question.

The effect of exports on the growth of the national product continued at an accelerated rate also in the first 2 years of the Ozal administration, which emerged as the "true practitioner" of the 24 January economic policies. In 1984, the first year of the Ozal administration the share of exports in GNP rose by 3 percent over the preceding year to 14.2 percent. In 1985, it reached a peak of 15 percent.

In 1986, however, when the balance of foreign trade began to present an increasingly unfavorable picture, exports--the basic engine of development--

began to show a tendency to fire on one cylinder and consequently to have a diminishing effect on the growth of the national product. The earnings from abroad included in GNP calculations, too, decreased to less than 541 billion lira in constant prices. In view of these developments, the increase in agricultural production and in industrial production--the latter largely due to the an invigorated domestic market--have become the most effective elements for the growth of GNP.

In consequence, a high rate of development driven by the increase in domestic demand has emerged.

In an environment where in the foreign markets were drying up one after another and, in sharp contrast, the domestic market was becoming attractive, the system created a balance of its own despite Ozal's strategy of outward-orientation. While turning away from demands for export credits, banks began showering industrialists with credits to finance the growing activity in the domestic market. The quadrupling of the volume of credit in the first 6 months of the year confirmed this tendency. With the transfer of bank resources to the industrial sector largely with the aim of turning the wheels of production, the moaning and groaning of the industrialists given to weeping during Ozal's initial years in power came to a halt.

In contrast, in 1986 the sound of wailing rising from the exporters, who have missed out on the benefits of the current increase in domestic demand, has replaced their happiness in preceding years when exports were rising.

The outward-oriented growth model has turned into an "inward--looking" model in the third year of the Ozal government. The fact that wholesale and retail trade is given as one of the fastest growing sectors, with a growth rate of 9.6 percent in the first growth estimates of the SSI, points to a move toward an "inward-looking" growth model.

The most influential element in the rise of the growth rate for the industrial sector,estimate at 10.1 percent, is once again the increase in the manufacturing industry. An Istanbul Chamber of Industry [ICI] survey of the growth of the manufacturing industry discloses that the highest increase in output has been in such branches as white goods, [aspublished] automobiles, and heavy construction materials where domestic demand has increased and which bolster the tendency toward consumption.

In the electrical goods industry, which leads with a growth of 38 percent, the lion's share goes to the group consisting entirely of such consumer goods as TV sets, video recorders, radios, and music center sets. On the other hand, the five-fold increase in production registered in the first quarter of 1986 compared with last year in such brances as refrigerators and washing machines, where domestic demand is at its most intense, also provides an idea as to what sustains the momentum of GNP.

The SSI and the ICI used the results of the same survey in determining the growth rate of the industrial sector. Therefore, the ICI indices of manufacturing industry growth in the first quarter are able to identify the basic sources that are sustaining the growth rates, estimated as 7.8 percent for GNP and 10.1 percent for the industrial sector. Thus, for instance, the automotive industry, which showed a negative growth rate of 6.5 percent in the first quarter of 1985, has reached a positive growth rate of 10.2 percent in the corresponding period this year.

The heavy construction materials industry, for which the house-building sector constitutes the main source of demand--a sector which has witnessed rapid price increases--provided a striking display of development by achieving a growth rate of 17.4 percent compared with a negative growth rate of 5.4 percent last year.

While the rapid increase in production in the industrial sector, mainly in response to revived consumer demand, is proving effective in the growth of GNP, it is also regarded as a development which intensifies inflationary pressures.

13184/12951
CSO: 3554/02

BRIEFS

JOINT MINERAL EXPLORATION WITH JAPAN--Joint Turkish-Japanese mineral exploration work is continuing in the Kocadal village of the Torul county in Gumushane. According to information obtained by the Anatolia Agency correspondent from officials, the exploration work is being carried out jointly by the MTA [Mining Research Institute] and the Japanese State Research Organization, JICA. The mineral exploration work which was begun last year with a $1.5-million grant from Japan will continue for 3 years. JICA is supplying the equipment and technology needed for the joint mineral exploration work. [Text] [Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 12 Sep 86 p 8] 9588

BUSINESS PROTOCOL WITH PAKISTAN--The Pakistani Federation of Commerce and Industry Chambers and the Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchanges [TUCE] have signed a protocol envisaging the establishment of a Turkish-Pakistani Business Council. TUCE President Ali Coskun said: "As the support of brotherly Islamic countries increases, Turkey will expand its strength among European countries and will become a bridge between Europe and Islamic countries." After completing its contacts in Izmir and Ankara, the Pakistani Federation of Commerce and Industry Chambers delegation came to Istanbul to hold talks with Turkish businessmen. Speaking at the signing ceremony for the protocol at the Sharaton Hotel yesterday, TUCE President Coskun said that the ties between Turkey and Pakistan go beyond friendship and that they must be strengthened even further. He added: "The trade volume between Turkey and Pakistan varied between $20 and $50 million in recent years. This figure will probably be around $30 million this year. However, difficulties encountered in shipping, banking and communications between the two countries must be overcome." The President of the Pakistani Federation of Commerce and Industry Chambers, Aziz Zulfikar, said that after his contacts in Izmir and Istanbul he came to the conclusion that they were too late to come to Turkey. He said that the products displayed at the Izmir Fair and OTIM have "a good chance of being marketed in Pakistan." It was also decided to hold the Turkish-Pakistani Business Council's meeting in Pakistan next year. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 22 Sep 86 p 11] 9588

CSO: 3554/39

PROSPECTS OF RENEGOTIATING LAJES BASE AGREEMENT DISCUSSED

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 13 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by MD]

[Text] Everyone in Portugal always wants to renegotiate everything. Therefore, no one makes too great a connection between the promises or proposals for the renegotiation of an international treaty with a political agreement or a collective bargaining arrangement.

And then, in the government, the PSD is the expert on renegotiations above all since, and quite rightly, moreover, it has a number of times demanded a revision of the pact which the Central Bloc sponsored.

Even so, the promise by Prime Minister Cavaco Silva that the Lajes agreement will be renegotiated on terms more favorable for Portugal than those obtained under the prevailing socialist administration, caused a sensation.

As is known, the agreement in effect is not fully satisfactory to Portugal, and specifically, to the Autonomous Azores Region.

On the other hand, whether in financial terms or in terms of military support, Cavaco Silva's government has precise ideas about what the U.S. is seeking to achieve.

Thus the idea of renegotiation comes at a good time and is praiseworthy, and may demonstrate the efficiency of the government and may go against the legitimate aspirations of the Azores. Would that its realization might confirm the expectations aroused. And furthermore, that it not take too long.

In politics there is a proper time for all measures, even those which depend on third parties. The present government, lacking political strength because it is a minority government, has nonetheless revealed a healthy desire to do its duty.

The prime minister has shown courage in facing up to the weaknesses inherent in the government formula adopted. He will proceed with the renegotiation of the Lajes agreement, certainly and successfully. We have no doubt of that.

5157
CSO:3542/2

REDUCTIONS ANNOUNCED IN MILITARY SERVICE TERMS

Madrid YA in Spanish 24 Oct 86 p 12

[Text] Madrid--A total increase in the contingent of 1,694 youths, a reduction of 8,269 in volunteers, and a rise in the quota of youths in compulsory service amounting to 9,963 are some of the comparative figures between 1986 and 1987 indicating the change in the number of youths joining military service. The information, stipulating that 238,940 youths will be drawn by lots on 16 November, was published yesterday in the Office State Bulletin.

To understand those cold figures, one must recall the existence of two Ministry of Defense plans that are currently bringing opposite effects: the reduction in youths performing military service, and the decline in age for joining the ranks. The former cannot be clearly observed until the youths have started taking their "mili" a year younger; which is now necessitating an increase in the numbers of the contingent and in the quota surpluses, but this will be reduced considerably within 2 years.

The surpluses (youths freed from performing service) will increase more than 10 percent over last year. The designation of the 80,000 fortunate ones will be made on 16 November, during the drawing of lots for the contingents.

Unlike last year, in 1987 all youths residing in the Canaries, the Balearics, Ceuta, and Melilla will take military service in their own region. Serra remarked on several occasions during the last legislature that there would be no privileges for any youth when it is time for asssignment. Now, other unexplained criteria have changed the view. Regionalization has moved from 42 percent in 1986 to 60 percent in 1987.

Concurrently with the announcement regarding the contingent, on 1 October the compulsory period began for all youths born between 1 September 1968 and 31 December 1969 to enlist for military service. The deadline falls on 31 December of this year. Only if this prior step of registering in the town hall of residence has been taken may there be any requests for deferments, allegations and being declared a surplus quota. According to Ministry of Defense sources, the reform being made of military service will make it far easier to procure deferments.

The big surprise for 1987 is the decision of the defense minister, Narcis Serra, to move ahead the reforms called for in the Military Service Law. For example, the period for remaining in the Navy has become 12 months, 6 months less than what it had been. At the time, there was strong opposition from the Navy commanders, who disclosed some information showing that the cut was costing them many millions, and also that they were losing operativeness. To appease them, Serra offered them a progressive implementation of the reduction, although, ultimately, this was reversed.

With the reduction in the Navy, there is a uniformity at 12 months for the duration of the period of "mili" for all members of the military, whatever the branch of service in which they are engaged may be.

Slots for the Special Volunteers

The creation of the special volunteers, one of the most important reforms for the Armed Forces, materialized for the first time yesterday, in an order from the Defense Ministry. The "Official State Bulletin" called for 1,436 slots to render military service in the Navy's special volunteers, the long duration of which (between 18 months and 3 years) appears to be the Defense Ministry's compensation to this branch of service, in exchange for the reduction made to 12 months for normal military service. The convocation stipulated the special areas, such as artillery, sonar, torpedoes, electricity, and maneuvers, and the number of slots for each of them.

For next year, there has been an increase in the number of youths allowed to declare that they are conscientious objectors or to request that they perform substitute social service. In the Defense Ministry, there is gratification at having succeeded, after several years, in making the objectors cease to be a problem for the Armed Forces.

Status	Type	Duration
Availability		From 1 January of the year in which they reach age 19
Service in the ranks	Compulsory service	12 months
	Normal volunteer service	16 months
	Special volunteer service	18 months, 2 or 3 years
	Complementary service and naval reserve	From 12 to 16 months
Reserves		Until 1 January of the year in which they reach age 34. Absolute leave.

2909
CSO: 3548/19

ARMY STRUGGLES TO MEET 1986-87 BUDGET REQUIREMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Oct 86 p 15

[Article: "The Army Lacks 500 Million"]

[Text] The army lacks a good 500 million to be able to fulfill its activities in 1986-87. A good 230 million kronor is a carryover from last year -- 100 million kronor more than calculated.

The head of the army, Lieutenant General Erik G. Bengtsson, has therefore initiated a temporary stop in certain activities.

This includes among other things a halt to spring refresher courses. The army staff does not know yet how many this will affect.

Also stopped are orders for new material, for example for the new acquisition and renting of civilian trucks and the new building that has been begun by the fortification section.

Maintenance and repair must be undertaken with great restraint.

"The measures are temporary. The stoppage will be lifted in the middle of November, when we will have worked out a proposal for compensations," Major Kim Akerman, the press spokesman for the army staff, said.

"We must have time to decide what the correct and important measures are to limit expenses."

More Conscripts

The reason for the large deficit is primarily a lack of price compensation -- this alone amounts to 300 million kronor.

Another cause is that there are 1,500 more conscripts this year than last.

The army is now demanding that the supreme commander provide the money for the fulfillment of activities and of regular duties.

The army is also asking that the 1987 defense budget include an additional 100-150 million kronor for training.

"A number of commanders have kept within the economic framework, but some, as for example, Svea Livgarde in Kungsangen, have exceeded it. We must help them to manage their economic calculations," Akerman said.

Lack of Officers

Certain material systems must be examined, among others, Telesystem 8,000 -- a large item of expenditure.

"But we have not yet decided which material system we will have," Akerman said.

As if the budget deficit were not enough, the army lacks 1,000 officers.

"The officers are streaming out of the defense forces to the private sector at a rate we cannot deal with," Akerman said. "We have made a series of proposals to the defense minister to speed up new recruiting. If the authorities do not fulfill their responsibility so that we can keep the personnel we have and recruit new personnel, the defense forces cannot develop at the rate prescribed in the defense budget. Even if we get money, we have no personnel," Akerman said.

The lack of officers is connected to the fact that the government in accordance with the defense agreement of 1982 ordered a limitation of personnel.

The army's deficit has not been discussed in the defense committee.

"I will take up the question at the committee's next meeting on Tuesday of next week," the chairman of the defense committee, Lennart Blom (Moderate) said. We had no meetings during the summer when we could take up the problem."

9124
CSO: 3650/18

FP RIKSDAG MEMBER CRITICIZES ARMY MANAGEMENT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Oct 86 p 5

[Article by Hans Lindblad, Liberal Party member of parliament and member of the defense committee: "Change the Army Leadership!"]

[Text] The fact that the army lacks a functioning leadership is an acute problem. For my part, I am greatly concerned about what was revealed when a working group of the defense committee recently made a check of supplies in an important mobilization area for one of the most sensitive points near Stockholm. Not one weapon was found available. A company commander -- who at first had difficulty finding his section in the warehouse -- thought that he had at least four grenade launchers. But they were only the containers.

The army cannot be all right if one lets numbers go before quality in every situation. One has kept the same twisted way of thinking that existed among the conservative general staff of the 1920s. One does not seem to understand technical developments. The military organization must be reduced if it is to be possible to correct the materiel and training gaps in the Swedish land forces.

Recently, the defense efficiency institute has shown how a system could be made to discover principles for the army's war organization, training, and peace organization. The army itself lacks proposals and has in this way put the supreme commander in an awkward position.

The supreme commander admits in his program plan that there are large gaps in defense training, primarily in the army. Here it is remarkable that all he proposes is a new training system (including longer basic training) for the coast artillery and the fleet! It is certainly good to train, for example, the coast artillery's regular forces longer, but it is reasonable to assume that the need for coordinated maneuvers in these units is less than among the brigades of the army. The tank units do not maneuver together even within the battalion.

In the defense line organization it is not expedient to say what has gone wrong. But some officers are now willing to tell the truth in a semi-official connection. In introductory speeches at the war academy last year three or four generals and colonels have described problems in more detail than we have been accustomed to. This is very good, for only when the problem is recognized can it be solved.

The problems have affected both military personnel and materiel. But Major General Jorn Beckmann, chief of staff at Milo Island, shows that the army staff is leading training activities badly with many inconsistencies and bad signals. According to Beckmann, even recent members of the army staff need the courage to speak out clearly. Such a man is honorable in an organization in which the rules otherwise are to repeat the commander's explanations.

Today the accounts show that the army has lost control of the budget. Now almost 600 million is lacking for this year's budget, and panic measures are being taken. What did one think a few weeks ago? Zero, one hundred, or five hundred million?

There are regiments that have overdrawn their budgets by 20 million. The impression is that on the lower level one more or less ignores budgets. Is this a long time economic demoralization, which means that one does not think it makes much difference whether one holds to a budget or not?

One of the reasons for the budget overrun is probably that in the army there is no budget dialogue between the defense branch staffs and the local units. This is done, however, in the navy and the air force, where one also very correctly has a better economic leadership of operations. Instead there is for the army an intermediate authority so that the middle staffs can use all the army's money for training and peace activities. The middle levels are well-suited to take away responsibility with the possibility of putting the blame for the misfortune both upward and downward.

For my part, I have long thought that the military commanders should be freed of the responsibility for the army's budget. A military commander must demand the military unit he will primarily use (which is something different from the units that in time of peace happen to be trained in the respective areas). He must check their readiness and give the alarm when something goes wrong. But it is wrong to have him as a bureaucratic intermediate authority for base administration, mess personnel, firing range, and everything else that lies within the unit's budget.

Sweden has six military commanders. Their mission must be to lead operations in war and to prepare defense and maintain readiness in time of peace. It is not reasonable to place responsibility on these same six people for the army's budget -- a mission that we have now seen they do not fulfill.

Earlier it was clear that military commanders and their staffs in many cases devoted themselves much too much to financial and peacetime problems. This has had destructive consequences, for example on military medicine, which has gone completely over to peacetime goals.

Submarine intrusions, confused threatening images in the air, and the increased emphasis of the politicians that defense had to receive larger capacity to meet surprise attacks has contributed to the fact that military commanders now concentrate more on operations. This is good, but at the same time it is quite clear that they function worse as intermediate authorities for the army's budget.

The army always says that it is impossible to lead without an administrative middle level. But reality shows clearly that the present organization does not work. In civilian life -- both in the private and the public sector -- there are many operations in which one manages to follow the budget in spite of the fact that one has more local activities than the army has. The most natural way to follow up the budgets of 50 army authorities would be to demand responsibility from the commanders.

This organizational question is in the meantime just one part of the problem that basically consists of producing a reliable development of the army in relation to the threat we can see in the future. Considerable rethinking is necessary. The attitudes that up to now have been closed on the size of the defense organization, on the system of compulsory military service, and on many other things must be reconsidered.

This should be able to lead to the creation of a new spirit and belief in the future that the present army leadership clearly cannot instill in the personnel. And with this it should also be easier to recruit and hold efficient officers.

Probably one will not obtain such a reconsideration simply by changing some high officers in the army's leadership. A large part of the inertia comes probably from the fact that the army's leadership system is organized in a way that seems to make planning and decision-making more difficult.

The army leadership has not been able to solve the problem. Therefore public investigatory agencies and the department and defense staffs take on the main responsibility for giving the army a new direction and a modern system of leadership and training.

9124
CSO: 3650/18

TRAINING AIRSPACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRG

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Sep 86 p 10

[Text] Ankara--The continuing talks between Turkish and West German military authorities on low-altitude--down to 75 to 100 meters above ground--training flights by warplanes of the FRG Air Force in Konya and its environs have developed "hitches" with regard to the extent of the airspace to be used. While the West German Defense Ministry insists on a broader airspace for the flights, the Turkish side wants to have a more restricted airspace.

The Bonn government, which at first reduced the number of flight hours to minimize the noise generated by the low-altitude training flights, now wants to move training flights outside of Germany. To this end, the FRG is conducting separate talks with Turkey and Canada.

After talks began on this issue between Turkish and West German military authorities last year, the FRG Defense Ministry sent a military delegation to Turkey last May to survey the Konya training center proposed by the Turkish government. In the report prepared after this survey, the West German delegation expressed approval for the selection of the Konya site for the training of West German pilots. The FRG Defense Ministry endorsed the report which has now been submitted to the FRG government.

The main stumbling block in the talks between the Turkish and West German military delegations is reportedly related to the scope of the air space to be used by the West German training flights. While the West German delegation has insisted on a broad air space extending from Central Anatolia to the southern region, the Turkish side wishes to have a more restricted area. Another stumbling block has emerged with regard to the air traffic procedures to be used in training flights. Air traffic procedures will need to be changed to accomodate the regular training missions to be flown by the German airplanes.

According to the information obtained, it is also unclear under what umbrella the project will be implemented. One option under consideration is to implement the project directly under NATO auspices. However, it is reported that Turkey and the FRG may move to a bilateral arrangement because of fears that getting the project approved by NATO may take time and may develop additional hurdles.

The FRG Defense Ministry is studying two options with regard to the scale of the project. One of these involves the permanent basing of 100 Tornado planes in the Konya training center and running regular training programs at this center. The other option involves maintaining a fleet of 50 Tornado planes in Konya and rotating them continuously.

If the project is implemented, the Konya training center will undergo a major modernization effort. For this purpose it will be necessary to build new hangars and lodging facilities for the pilots and to set up modern communications systems. The FRG Defense Ministry is estimating that the project will cost between DM1.5 billion and DM2 billion.

9588
CSO: 3554/33

F-16 NEWS BANNED--It is reported that the Office of the General Staff has banned the release of information to the press about the F-16 planes that are planned to be produced jointly in Turkey. General Dynamics officials in Turkey, whom the ANKA correspondent queried about the F-16 project and the allegations published in the U.S. press with regard to these planes, said: "We asked the Office of the General Staff to brief the press on this issue, but we could not get permission to do so. We cannot make any announcements without their permission." It was reported in the U.S. press that the U.S. Air Force has banned all F-16 flights until a mechanical malfunction occurring in some of the planes' General Electric-built engines is diagnosed. The plane that developed the malfunction was powered by an F-110 engine made by the General Electric Corporation. [Text] [Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 11 Sep 86 p 9] 9588

CSO: 3554/33

ENERGY TURKEY

BRIEFS

OIL DISCOVERY IN ISKENDERUN GULF CLAIMED--It was claimed that U.S. firms found oil in the Gulf of Iskenderun in the course of their exploration work but chose not to mine it because of pricing policies. Stating that the strongest evidence of the presence of oil in the Gulf of Iskenderun is the discovery of pressurized saline water and gas at a depth of 5,000 meters, Professor Sungu Gokcen, a geological engineer, said: "In oil-bearing regions, oil remains sandwiched between saline water at the bottom and gas at the top. Exploratory drills in the Gulf of Iskenderun revealed the presence of saline water and gas. But the well was plugged with cement later on. There were two reasons for that action. Firstly, although oil was found, at that time oil prices had declined precipitously. Secondly, reserves were found in the Gulf after drilling only a few test wells. The U.S. firm can mine oil from the Gulf of Iskenderun any time it wishes." [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 10 Sep 86 p 3] 9588

CSO: 3554/33

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